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This thesis aims to focus on the question of the Area and its
International Sea-Bed Authority at this present stage. The new
legal regime governing the Area has been formulated in Part XI of
the Convention by almost all countries of the world as the common
heritage of mankind. Nevertheless, a number of retrograde
developments have occurred. These developments include the
enactment of domestic laws for exploitation in the Area by some
dissenting industrialized countries at a time when consensus on the
internationally negotiated legal regime was almost at hand and the
fall in demand for the metals contained in manganese nodules for the
deep sea-bed. State practice in the form of actual recovery of
mineral resources has not yet taken place, and the law is worked out
in anticipation of such a practice.
In this study there are eight chapters. Chapter One is an
introductory treatment of the whole thesis. The purpose of the
study, and the development of the new legal regime in Part XI of the
1982 Convention, are included in this chapter. The second chapter
examines the question of the limits of national jurisdiction with
particular regard to the sea-bed. Chapter Three outlines the
arguments for and against the classic doctrines such as res communis
and res nullius, and rejects them as legally valid bases for claims
to the deep sea-bed. The concept of the common heritage of mankind
on which Part XI of the Convention is based, is dealt with in
Chapter Four. Chapter Five explains the Parallel System as it is
- vii -
laid down in the Convention. Chapter Six deals with the legal
aspects of the International Sea-Bed Authority and the organs which
directly or indirectly are related to it. Chapter Seven reviews
the developments in the Preparatory Commission for the International
Sea-Bed Authority since the beginning of its work in 1983. The
last chapter presents the general conclusions of the study.
The Authority with its present structure and functions is an
entity under the effective control of its members. Its strength
depends on the modifications which may be introduced by the




I would like to express my indebtedness to my supervisor,
Dr Kabir R. Khan, Head of the Department of International Law, for
his constant encouragement, patience and kindness. In the later
stages of my study, the supervision was undertaken by Dr W. Gilmore.
I thank him for reading and making valuable comments on certain
parts of this study.
My thanks also go to the authorities of the Law Library and
George Square Library of Edinburgh University for help and
facilities.
I express my deepest appreciation of the generosity of the
authorities of the University of Kuwait who have provided the entire
funds for this study. Without such a grant, this work could not
have been achieved.
Finally, I am indebted to ray family for their continuous
encouragement and support during our stay in the city of Edinburgh.
- ix -
Abbreviations
AJIL American Journal of International Law
Area Sea-Bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction
Authority International Sea-Bed Authority
BYIL British Year Book of International Law
Cand. YBIL Canadian Year Book of International Law
CLP Current Legal Problems
Col. JTL Columbia Journal of Transnational Law
Conference Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea 1973-1982
Convention 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea
EEC European Economic Community
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
Grot. Trans. Transactions of Grotius Society
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICLQ International and Comparative Law Quarterly
ICNT Informal Composite Negotiating Text (1977)
ICNT/Rev. 1 First Revision of the ICNT (Spring 1979)
ICNT/Rev. 2 Second Revision of the ICNT (Summer 1980)
IJIL Indian Journal of International Law
I.Law. International Lawyer
ILA International Law Association
ILC International Law Commission
ILM International Legal Materials
ILR International Law Reports
IYBIL Italian Year Book of International Law
Law. Am. Lawyer of Americas
- x -
Abbreviations (contd.)
LCP Law and Contemporary Problems
LOS Law of the Sea
ISNT Informal Single Negotiating Text (1975)
MRE Marine Resource Economics
NIEO New International Economic Order
NILR Netherlands International Law Review
NRL Natural Resources Lawyer
NYUJIL New York University Journal of International Law
and Politics
ODIL Ocean Development and International Law
Off. Rec. UNCLOS III Official Records
PCIJ Permanent Court of International Justice
PLR Pace Law Review
Proc. ASIL Proceedings of the American Society of
International Law
RDC Recueil des Cours
RSNT Revised Single Negotiating Text (1976)
SDLR San Diego Law Review
SNT Single Negotiating Text (1976)
Syr.JIL.Com. Syracuse Journal of International Law and
Commerce
UN United Nations
UNCLOS III Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea 1973-1982
UNCTAD United Nations Conference for Trade and
Development
UN Doc. United Nations Document
Abbreviations (contd.)
UNTS United Nations Treaty Series
Virg.JIL Virginia Journal of International Law
YB Year Book
YBILC Year Book of International Law Commission





SECTION I: GENERAL PRESENTATION OF THE THESIS
The Law of the Sea Convention [hereinafter cited as the
Convention] is one of the significant conventions recently adopted
by the United Nations.
This Convention, in Part XI, contains specific articles
relating to the new legal regime governing the International Sea-bed
Area and its resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction
and the establishment of an International Sea-Bed Authority to
implement the provisions of Part XI of the Convention.
The process of formulating the provisions of Part XI, in fact,
was started by the United Nations during the 1960s. The discovery
of polymetallic nodules such as nickel, copper, cobalt and manganese
on the deep ocean floor accelerated this study by the United Nations
and its affiliated agencies. Certain questions were put to the
representatives of governments; these included what legal principles
govern that area and its resources and who has the right to exploit
the mineral resources.
In 1967, Arvid Pardo, Malta's representative to the United
Nations, submitted an initiative to the General Assembly in which he
had referred to the sea-bed and subsoil and the resources thereof
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction as the common heritage of
mankind.^ This initiative was the driving force at the start of a
process which has lasted until now, and can rightly be described as
a successful attempt to harmonize the interests of the sovereign
states with the interests of mankind as a whole.
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The compromise of individual states' interests with world
interests is a new idea in international law. What Pardo's
initiative and the concept of the common heritage of mankind have
introduced is very interesting indeed. According to the common
heritage principle, the interests of individual states were to be
dominated by the interests of mankind. The introduction of this
concept was resisted, however, by some developed countries.
The process of many years of negotiations in the United Nations
for the creation of a new legal regime for the deep sea-bed and
its mineral resources is, in fact, a conflict between a few
industrialized countries which have tried to invoke and extend the
principle of the freedom of the high seas to all uses of the sea on
the one hand, and the great majority of states, which have had the
preservation of the interests of mankind as their primary objective,
on the other.
It was generally understood from the outset that the legal
regime which should emerge from the negotiations had to be agreed
upon by the international community as a whole, because the declared
claims for the deep sea-bed and its mineral resources, either by
mankind or individual states, were so specified that no legal
security could exist in that area without the consensus of all
states. The problem was thus how to balance the interests of
states with the interests of the world community so that a consensus
could be achieved.
For the purpose of illustration in our discussion of this
subject of study, states are classified into two major groups:
developing and industrialized countries. Under this general
classification, what is the meaning of 'developing countries' and
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'developed countries'? The developing countries include all Latin
American, all African states except for South Africa, and almost all
Asian countries. The industrialized countries were those states
which either had the required technology, or the investment
possibilities, and included the United States, United Kingdom,
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands
and Japan. In both these groups there could exist differing views
with respect to the legal regime of the deep sea-bed and its
machinery, but as regards the major issues such as the legal status
of the deep sea-bed exploitation system of the mineral resources and
the international organization for the administration of the
resources, each group had a uniform consolidated position which was
clearly distinguishable from that of the other.
The position of the socialist countries has fluctuated. Up to
the start of the Conference in 1974, they had adopted the same
position as the industrialized countries, but since then they have
shifted their position to that of the developing countries.
Developing and industrialized countries each had their own
objectives concerning the regime which was to be created for the
exploitation of the mineral resources of the sea-bed.
The introduction of the concept of the common heritage of
mankind agreed with the argument of the developing countries for the
establishment of a New International Economic Order. What the
developing countries (or as so called, the Group of 77) could see in
that concept was an egalitarian base which underlay all constituent
elements of a whole where balance was obtained through taking from
the rich and giving to the poor.2 Thus> for the developing
countries, the sea-bed and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of
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national jurisdiction and their mineral resources constituted a
common and indivisible property belonging to the whole of mankind.
As such, those resources should be used solely for the benefit of
all mankind and administered by an international organization with
exclusive jurisdiction in that respect. No national claims to any
part of those areas and their resources were therefore acceptable.
The first reaction of the industrialized countries to the
concept of the common heritage of mankind was to reject it as a
vague concept, more moral and political than legal. Although the
concept was latterly recognized as the principle governing the deep
sea-bed and its resources by the unanimous adoption of the General
O
Assembly Resolution 2749 (XXV) - the Declaration of Principles -
the industrialized countries continued to refuse that concept as the
legal principle applicable to that area. For these countries, the
principle of the freedom of the high seas extended to all the uses
of the sea including the exploration and exploitation of the mineral
resources of the deep sea-bed. The problem was how to reconcile
the freedom of the high seas with the exclusive right that was
required for activities on the deep sea-bed. Unlike fishing,
navigation and other uses of the sea, deep sea-bed mining activities
required exclusive rights to a large area of the deep sea-bed and
for a long period of time. The precedents in the case of sedentary
fisheries and the continental shelf could not allow support for any
claim of exclusive rights to the deep sea-bed. Therefore, the
solution was sought in the establishment of an international
organization for registering the claims, or at most issuing
licences. Thus, the industrialized countries did not think of a
common property, to be managed by an international organization as
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the sole agent of mankind, but rather as a res communis, open to use
by all nations, whether they could or could not avail themselves of
this opportunity. While for the developing countries, the common
heritage principle had a strong moral obligation, the industrialized
countries approached the question in a business-like fashion.
The conflict of these two opposing positions resulted in the
emergence of an arrangement which is generally known as the Parallel
System. According to this system, the International Sea-Bed
Authority, invested with operational powers on behalf of mankind on
the one side, and the states parties to the Conventions or their
entities on the other, may engage in activities on the deep sea-bed.
However, this arrangement, which was originally suggested and
worked out by the industrialized countries, had not become
acceptable to some of these countries by the time the Convention was
ready to be adopted, and subsequently the United States, the United
Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany refused to sign the
Convention on the ground of dissatisfaction with Part XI concerning
the legal regime of the deep sea-bed. The United States enacted
legislation for deep sea-bed mining, and this practice was followed
by two other non-signatories, i.e., the United Kingdom and the
Federal Republic of Germany, and four other states which had signed
the Convention, namely the Soviet Union, France, Japan and Italy.
These national laws, which have an interim character pending
the entry into force of the Convention for the enacting states,
generally permit the start of commercial exploitation of deep
sea mineral resources by the subjects of the related states from
1 January 1988. Developing countries have stood against these laws
as wholly illegal and in disagreement with the principle of the
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common heritage of mankind, and have also expressed the view that
such laws are in contradiction of the principle of good faith which
has been presumed during the years of negotiations,
(a) The Purpose of the Investigation
It is worthwhile to focus on the new international legal regime
relating to the deep sea-bed Area at its present stage. The
adoption of the Convention in 1982 and its Part XI and related
annexes which embody the new legal regime for the deep sea-bed on
the one hand, and the enactment of the national legislation for deep
sea-bed activities by some industrialized countries on the other,
gives rise to one main question. What is the existing
international law in respect of the sea-bed mining activities?
Since we believe that the regime incorporated in Part XI of the
Convention and its related annexes characterizes the present status
of law in this regard, the thesis is mainly aimed at elaborating the
process of law-making for the Sea-bed Area through the United
Nations, taking into consideration the views of both developing and
developed countries. In this connection, an attempt has been made
to answer some questions: has the legal regime embodied in the
Convention successfully filled in the gaps that existed before the
adoption of the Declaration of Principles in 1970 and the adoption
of the Convention in 1982? Is the Parallel System, which is the
outcome of many compromises between the developing and
industrialized countries, an effective legal arrangement? How much
does the Parallel System reflect the balance of interests between
- 6 -
states and the international community? Has the Authority
sufficient power and legal capacity as the agent of mankind? And
what role does the Authority have to play in the international area?
Is the condition of efficient enforcement of law through the
establishment of an effective system for disputes settlement
fulfilled? These and many other questions may be combined within
one single investigation: is the regime in question a viable legal
order for the exploration of the deep sea-bed and exploitation of
its mineral resources?
As regards national law, the main concern is to examine the
applicability of the principle of the freedom of the high seas to
deep sea-bed activities as the legal justification of these laws,
the alleged compatibility of the said laws with the purposes of the
Convention, and their impact as state practice on the formation of
new rules of customary international law.
Being the result of the first active participation of the
majority of the developing countries in the development of
international law, it is also relevant to ascertain the substance of
the outcome, and whether the legal regime embodied in the Convention
represents a universal law as distinct from other branches of
international law which are reflected by the influence of the
practice of a few developed states.
By adopting an analytical approach, the answers to these and
other questions are drawn principally from the documents of the
United Nations; through the scrutiny of the drafting history of the
Convention by the Conference and from the national laws themselves.
On the basis of this investigation, it is concluded: (1) there now
exists a firm legal principle governing the Area and its resources,
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i.e., the principle of the common heritage of mankind; (2) the many
compromises of the developing countries in order to reach agreement
by consensus on the system of exploitation have resulted in a clear
change of balance of interests in favour of the industrialized
countries; (3) the Authority, despite its responsibility, which is
the representation of mankind in the Sea-bed Area activities, has a
defined power far less than what was originally anticipated for it;
(4) the establishment of the compulsory dispute settlement
procedures may, in the long run, make the Parallel System workable;
(5) with respect to national laws, because of strong and consistent
protests by the majority of countries, and the apparent
incompatibility of these laws with the negotiated regime in the
Convention, the practice of states in this regard is unlikely to
create an alternative legal order stable enough for the fulfilment
of its purposes; (6) the contribution of the developing countries
to the establishment of the legal regime for the Sea-bed Area has
demonstrated that the answer to global problems can be sought only
in the cooperation of all the states. Customary international law
may no longer be interpreted as the practice of a few states
extended to the rest of the world.
We further intend to establish that the regime as now
integrated in the Convention may not prove to be viable. Neverthe¬
less, this should not be interpreted as undermining the outcomes
which have been achieved. The disadvantages of the said legal
regime can be compensated for either through the Review Conference,
which provides for the revision of the system of exploration and
exploitation fifteen years after the start of the earliest
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commercial production under the Convention, or through the
negotiations of the Preparatory Commission.^
(b) The Structure of the Investigation
The legal regime for the Sea-bed Area is a complex subject.
Any study on this subject may entail an effort to answer a number of
questions: Where is the deep sea-bed area? What is its legal
status? How and by whom should its resources be administered?
How should the disputes arising from the activities on the sea-bed
be settled? And how should the law be in future with regard to the
application of the present regime?
All these questions are inter-linked, but each deserves to be
treated separately. The questions have been divided into eight
chapters. Although each question is studied in its own context, an
inter-disciplinary approach has been applied to identify the
relationship of each element to the other components of the legal
regime of the deep sea-bed area.
Chapter One aims, firstly, to present the question, the purpose
of the investigation, and the conclusions that are to be examined
throughout the work. It also includes the structure of the
investigation. Secondly, this chapter gives an overview of the
1982 Convention. A succinct understanding of the developments,
mainly within the United Nations, which led to the establishment of
the new legal regime governing the international Sea-bed Area and
its mineral resources in Part XI of the Convention, is dealt with.
The chronology of developments in the United Nations in respect of
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the Sea-bed Area covers briefly the sea-bed mineral resources, the
work of the Committees and the Conference as well as as well as an
introduction to the general aspects of the 1982 Convention on the
Law of the Sea.
The second chapter deals with the question of the limits of
national jurisdiction with particular regard to the sea-bed. It
is shown in this chapter, firstly, that the limits of coastal
jurisdiction have extended so much that the extension was regarded
as unthinkable when the idea of declaring the deep sea-bed area and
its resources as the common heritage of mankind was born. This
considerable extension of coastal zones had an important feature.
It has decreased the areas which were originally meant to be the
common heritage of mankind. Secondly, an examination of Article 76
of the Convention containing the definition of the continental shelf
exposes that, despite all attempts to work out a precise outer limit
for the continental shelf, the outcome can only with difficulty be
called precise. Therefore, it is still legally unclear where the
exact limits of the sea-bed lie.
Chapters Three and Four intend to deal with the question of the
legal status of the deep sea-bed and its resources This is an
important question, the answer to which may determine the studies
with respect to other related questions. The positions of the
developing and industrialized countries in this regard were
different. The legal status of the deep sea-bed for the
industrialized countries was the same as that of the superjacent
waters, i.e. res communis and the principle of the freedom of the
high seas was likewise extendable to the sea-bed. Thus, every
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state could engage in activities on the deep sea-bed provided
reasonable regard was shown to the interests of other users.
For the developing countries, on the contrary, freedom of the
high seas, which did not entail equal opportunities for all users,
was inappropriate; it was an outmoded concept which could only
serve the purposes of big maritime powers. For them therefore, the
common heritage of mankind with its inherent element of distributive
justice - by all, for all - had come to govern as the prevailing
principle on the deep sea-bed and its resources.
Chapter Three outlines all the arguments for and against the
classic doctrines such as res communis and res nullius, and rejects
them as legally valid bases for claims to the deep sea-bed. The
concept of the common heritage of mankind is dealt with in Chapter
Four, where a rather comprehensive account of the developments which
led to the consolidation of that concept into a general principle of
international law is provided. The legal status of the deep
sea-bed as the common heritage of mankind requires that all
activities in the deep sea-bed derive their legality from the
arrangement envisaged in the Convention.
An additionally important question is how and by whom the
activities in the Sea-bed Area should be implemented. Chapters
Five and Six examine possible answers to this question. Chapter
Five deals with the Parallel System of exploitation as it is laid
down in the Convention. The balance of rights between mankind and
its trustee, the International Sea-Bed Authority, on the one side,
and states parties and their entities, on the other, is examined.
Chapter Six is devoted to an examination of the structure of
the International Sea-Bed Authority and the organs which directly or
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indirectly are related to it. In addition to the Assembly, the
Council, the Secretariat and the Enterprise, the machinery for
disputes settlement is also considered. It is our intention to
show that the Authority with its present structure is a vulnerable
entity under the effective control of its members. Its strength
depends, to a great extent, on the modifications which may be
introduced by the Preparatory Commission, especially with regard to
the decision-making mechanism.
Chapters Seven and Eight contain a prospective view on the
issue. In Chapter Seven, a review of the developments in the
Preparatory Commission for the International Sea-Bed Authority and
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea since the
beginning of its works in 1983 until the present period is given.
Finally, in the last chapter, the general conclusions of the study
are presented.
SECTION II: AN OVERVIEW OF THE DNITED NATIONS* PRACTICE
ON THE SEA-BED ISSDE
(a) Sea-Bed Mineral Resources
Before we discuss the United Nations' practice on the sea-bed
issue, a brief account of the mineral resources is given in order to
understand the legal regime of the sea-bed established by the
Convention. This account, in fact, answers two important
- 12 -
questions: what the mineral resources are and what economic
significance they have.
The chief important mineral resources of the sea-bed are the
polymetallic or manganese nodules. They are normally found in
areas at depths of 5,000 metres or more.-' Nodules are scattered on
wide areas of the floor of the Atlantic, the Indian and the Pacific
Oceans. Nodules contain manganese, nickel, copper and cobalt.
The estimates of the average percentage of these minerals contained
in nodules differ, but figures cited for economically exploitable
nodules are 1.3 per cent nickel, 1 per cent copper, 23 per cent
manganese and 0.22 per cent cobalt.^ The most attractive nodule
deposits appear in the south east and central north Pacific Ocean,
in an area known as Clarion Clipperton Zone.^ This zone, according
to some estimates, contains about 2.1 billion tons of recoverable
O
nodules. Out of the components of manganese nodules, nickel is
economically most important. It is primarily the price of nickel
which may determine the profitability of sea-bed mining activities,
but some other metals such as copper and cobalt can also play a role
in this respect.^
Canada has been traditionally the largest producer of nickel,
but also from a few other regions in New Caledonia, the Soviet Union
and Australia a considerable contribution has been made to the world
production of nickel.^ The Soviet Union and Cuba together have
20 per cent of total world nickel reserves.^ While the first
substantive session of the Conference in 1974 started its work
with optimism about the prospect for future growth in the nickel
market,12 the ^ow economic growth in the West in later years
resulted in a fall in demand. This has been the main reason why,
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since the start of the present decade, no considerable new
investment has been made in sea-bed mining, waiting for the recovery
of the market for nickel.
Second in importance of the manganese nodules is copper. This
metal has a diverse production pattern, and industrialized countries
are the largest producers and consumers. The United States is the
world's largest single producer of copper. It is generally expected
that production from the nodules would have a very minor impact on
1 3
the copper market. °
Cobalt is a relatively expensive mineral with a small market,
and its value in world commodity trade is rather small. Cobalt is
a by-product of nickel or copper. It is only in Morocco and Zaire
14
that it can be mined independently and not as a by-product.
Zaire alone is responsible for over 50 per cent of the world
production of cobalt.^ It is estimated that the first phase of
ocean mining would account for about the volume of world output, and
could cause a price decline of about 35 per cent of the 1978
1 f\
price.10
Of the four minerals in question, manganese is the cheapest.
That is because land mines are numerous. The main use of manganese
is in the steel industry, and it is of vital importance for the
developed countries.^ The Soviet Union possesses the largest
manganese reserves in the world. The two largest producers of this
metal, the Soviet Union and South Africa, account for about 60 per
1 Q
cent of world total output of manganese.10
The land producers of these four metals are both developing and
developed countries, but since the production and export of these
metals in developing countries usually constitutes the greatest
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share of their income, it is mainly these countries which will
suffer most from sea-bed mining.
Nickel, cobalt and copper are considered by some industrialized
countries as strategic metals.^ The United States imports all its
20
primary consumption of nickel, cobalt and manganese. Japan
depends on imports for 100 per cent of its nickel and cobalt, 97 per
21
cent of copper and about 95 per cent of manganese. The Western
European countries are also greatly dependent on the import of the
metals in question and in this respect particular mention should be
29
made of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom.
The Soviet Union is self-sufficient in respect of these metals. It
is even a major exporter of nickel and manganese.
(b) The United Nations' Practice on the Sea-Bed Issue
The involvement of the United Nations in the effort for the
21
progressive development of international law with respect to
the sea-bed and its resources started in the 1960s. Two
conferences on the law of the sea were convened in 1958 and 1960.
They focused mainly on the readily accessible areas and those of
immediate interest to the coastal states: the territorial sea from
the point of view of security of the coastal state; the continental
shelf for its resources; and the high seas for navigation and
fishing. The sea-bed beyond the continental shelf was remote
because the area was technologically inaccessible and there was
little knowledge of its potential wealth. In 1966 the problem of
the sea surfaced, in the context of the development programme, as a
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practical contribution to the second half of the UN Development
Decade. The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
(ECOSOC) in 1966 adopted an important resolution,^ which requested
the Secretary-General, inter alia, to make a survey of the present
state of knowledge of these resources of the sea (minerals and food,
excluding fish) beyond the continental shelf, and of the techniques
for exploiting these resources, to identify those resources now
considered to be capable of economic exploitation, especially for
the benefit of the developing countries, and to identify any gaps in
available knowledge, which merit early attention by virtue of their
importance to the development of ocean resources, and of the
practicality of their early exploitation.
The General Assembly adopted in the same year Resolution 2172
(XXI)^ which requested the UN, in cooperation with its agencies and
interested member states, to undertake a comprehensive survey of
activities in marine science and technology, including mineral
resources, and to formulate proposals with regard to the exploita¬
tion and development of marine resources. The above UN initiative
sprang from the UN Development Decade and the Expanded Program for
Ocean Exploration, and it focused on the scientific aspects of
oceanography rather than all aspects of the law of the sea. In
fact, this was when the real focus on all aspects of the law of the
sea, and especially the law governing the sea-bed, began.
9
The Secretary-General, , pursuant to the above-mentioned
resolutions, submitted two reports stressing the need to examine
"the advisability and feasibility of entrusting the deep-sea
resources to an international body".
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The new law of the sea-bed beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction was started on 17 August 1967 when Ambassador Arvid
Pardo, the permanent representative of Malta to the United Nations,
suggested the inclusion of the following item in the agenda of the
22nd session of the General Assembly:
Declaration and treaty concerning the reservation exclusively
for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and ocean floor, under¬
lying the seas beyond the limits of the present national
jurisdiction and the use of their resources in the interest of
mankind. 27
The General Assembly adopted a resolution for the establishment of
an Ad Hoc Committee to study the peaceful uses of the sea-bed and
the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction to become
a Standing Committee - The Sea-Bed Committee - which continued
its work until 1973 when the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) was convened. The work of the
conference was concluded by adopting the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea in 1982 (the Convention). The following is a
brief account of the work of the Committees and the Conference as
well as an introduction to the general aspects of the Convention.
(c) The Sea-Bed Committee
The first response of the United Nations to the question of
establishing an international regime for the management of the
Sea-bed Area and its resources was the adoption by the General
Assembly Resolution 2340 (XXII),on 18 December 1967, according to
which an Ad Hoc Committee would be established "to study the
peaceful uses of the sea-bed and the ocean floor Beyond the Limits
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of National Jurisdiction". The number of members on the Ad Hoc
Committee was limited to 35 nations.^9 The Committee elected
Hamilton Shirly Amerasinghe from Sri Lanka as the President, and
O Q
established two working groups :J the Economic and Technical
Working Group and the Legal Working Group.
On 21 December 1968 the General Assembly adopted Resolution
91
2467 (XXIII)JX which created a Standing Committee, the Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits
of National Jurisdiction (the Sea-Bed Committee). The number of
Q 9
members of the Sea-Bed Committee was increased to 42, and its
mandate also became much broader. The Sea-Bed Committee was
charged, inter alia:
a. To study the elaboration of the legal principles and norms
which would promote international co-operation in the exploration
and use of the sea-bed and ocean floor, and subsoil thereof, beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction and ensure the exploitation of
their resources for the benefit of mankind, and economic and other
requirements which such a regime should satisfy in order to meet the
interests of humanity as a whole.
b. To study the ways and means of promoting the exploitation and
use of the resources of this area, and of international co-operation
to that end, taking into account the foreseeable development of
technology and the economic implications of such exploitation and
bearing in mind the fact that such exploitation should benefit
mankind as a whole;
c. To review the studies carried out in the field of exploration
and research in this area and aimed at intensifying international
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co-operation and stimulating the exchange and the widest possible
dissemination of scientific knowledge on the subject;
d. To examine proposed measures of co-operation to be adopted by
the international community in order to prevent marine pollution
which may result from the exploration and exploitation of the
resources of this area.
One of the hard-core issues before the Committee was how to
establish the limits of coastal state jurisdiction, and thereby the
limits of the international Sea-bed Area. Due to differences in
opinion with regard to the lawfulness of rules for the establishment
of the outer limit of the Continental Shelf, Malta submitted a draft
resolution on 31 October 1969 to the General Assembly revising the
definition of the Continental Shelf, and adopting "a precise and
internationally acceptable definition of the deep ocean floor".^
The proposal was amended by other delegations which wanted the
future conference to discuss all questions of the Law of the Sea.^
The General Assembly adopted on 15 December 1969 Resolution 2574
(XXIV)"^ in which the Secretary-General was requested to "ascertain
the views of member states on the desirability of convening at an
early date a conference on the Law of the Sea to review the regimes
of the high seas . . .".
In addition to the previous Resolution, the General Assembly
adopted the related Resolution 2574 D.^ This Resolution declared
that:
pending the establishment of the international regime:
(a) States and persons, physical or juridical, are bound to
refrain from all activities of exploitation of the resources
of the area of the sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
(b) No claim to any part of that area or its resources shall
be recognized.
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07This Resolution took the name of Moratorium Resolution , and almost
all votes against it came from the industrialized countries.
The outcome of the work of the Sea-Bed Committee in 1970 was
the adoption by the General Assembly of Resolution 2749 (XXV)-^ -
OQ
The Declaration of the Principles ^ - which is considered to be a
cornerstone in the history of the developments of the law of the
deep sea-bed area. The Resolution, which was adopted on 17 December
1970, by 108 in favour and none against, with 14 abstentions,
covered most of what Mr Pardo had envisaged. This Declaration
consisted of a preamble and 15 main principles. The preamble
reaffirmed that there exists a sea-bed and ocean floor area outside
the limits of national jurisdiction; although precise limits for
this area were not defined. It was further acknowledged that the
existing system of international law did not have exact rules that
regulated exploration and exploitation of its resources. The third
paragraph of the preamble laid down the principle that this area
should be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes and that
exploration of its resources should be carried out for the benefit
of mankind as a whole.
Under the Declaration of Principles Resolution, the concept
of the common heritage of mankind was formally explained.^
In 1970, Resolution 2750 (XXV) was adopted. This Resolution
was composed of three parts. In Resolution 2750 A, the Secretary-
General was requested to:
Identify the problems arising from the production of certain
minerals from the area beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction and examine the impact they will have on the
economic well-being of the developing countries, in
particular on prices of mineral exports of the world market.
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Resolution 2750 B1^ requested the Secretary-General to study
the particular needs and problems of land-locked countries.^
Resolution 2750 C^ provided for the increase of the membership of
the Sea-Bed Committee to 86 nations.^ More significantly, it
enlarged the mandate of the Sea-Bed Committee by assigning it as the
preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea to be convened in 1973. The Committee was thus mandated
to deal not only with questions relating to the establishment of an
equitable international regime, including an international machinery
for the area and the resources of the deep sea-bed beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction, a precise definition of the area, but also
a broad range of related issues including those concerning the
regimes of the high seas, the continental shelf, the territorial sea
(including the question of its breadth and the question of
international straits used for international navigation) and
contiguous zone, fishing and conservation of the living resources
of the high seas (including the question of the preferential rights
of coastal states), the preservation of the marine environments
(including, inter alia, the prevention of pollution) and scientific
research.
In order to cope with its enlarged mandate, the Sea-Bed
Committee established, in 1971, three sub-committees of the whole.
The task of preparing draft treaty articles embodying the
international regime and machinery for the deep sea-bed and its
resources was entrusted to Sub-Committee 1.^
Sub-Committee II was given the duty of preparing a
comprehensive list of traditional subjects and issues of the law of
the sea. The preparation of the draft articles concerning the
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preservation of the marine environment and scientific research was
allocated to Sub-Committee III.^
In 1972, the membership of the Sea-Bed Committee was once
again enlarged, now to 91 nations. Sub-Committee I, under the
chairmanship of P.B. Engo from Cameroon, adopted a programme of work
in that year. Item 1 of this programme dealt with status, scope
and basic provisions of the regime based on the Declaration of
Principles. Item 2 was about the status, scope, functions and
powers of the international machinery.^
Following the proposal of the chairman of Sub-Committee I, a
working group on the international regime with 33 members was
established. The mandate of this working group was to draw up a
working paper showing the areas of agreement and disagreement on
48
various issues related to the sea-bed area and its resources.
The text reflected agreement that the area and its resources are the
common heritage of mankind.^ jn 1973, when the Sea-Bed Committee
had concluded its work, Sub-Committee I had succeeded in preparing
texts illustrating areas of agreement and disagreement on items 1
and 2 in its programme of work.^^ These illustrative texts
indicated that it was obvious that, as a guide for discussion at the
Conference, they were hardly on the same standing as text usually
prepared by a specialized expert body such as the International Law
Commission.The latter would appoint a special rapporteur for
the subject and, in due course, issue a set of draft treaty articles
which would be submitted to governments for comments and which would
undergo a series of revisions. When the ILC's draft was considered
to be ready, the General Assembly would normally decide on the
convening of an international conference for the adoption of a
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convention. This was the procedure that preceded the adoption of
conventions, such as the four 1958 Conventions on the Law of the
Sea, the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the 1963
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Sometimes, instead of convening
an international conference, the ILC's draft would be discussed
within the General Assembly Sixth (legal) committee and a convention
would be adopted by the General Assembly itself. In short, a
single basic text by the ILC served as the basis of negotiations.
In the case of the UNCLOS III, the preparatory work was not
assigned to the ILC. Instead, UN General Assembly Resolution 2750
(XXV) requested the Sea-Bed Committee to prepare draft articles on
the agenda items.
To explain why the ILC was excluded from the preparatory
process of the sea-bed issue one should look at the UN member's view
at that time. The debate in the First Committee, of the General
Assembly, on the law of the sea question does not show that any
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serious consideration was given to this question. The records
show that many delegations spoke generally about the need for
thorough preparatory work. China (Taiwan), for example, stated
that it had originally informed the UN Secretary-General that
preparation should be entrusted in the first place to the ILC.
But, at the General Assembly session, China (Taiwan) changed its
position and agreed with the view that preparations be entrusted to
a body other than the ILC.^^ When delegations did refer to the
ILC, it was usually to point out that the 1958 Conventions had been
preceded by arduous preparatory work by the ILC. Brazil, for
example, pointed out that normally conferences of this kind "in
- 23 -
which legal texts are to be approved, have been finally decided upon
by the General Assembly when the draft articles were already
available and considered by the Assembly to constitute an adequate
basis of work" New Zealand also pointed out that the present
situation differed from 1958. There were "original texts
formulated in detail and in effect pre-negotiated over a long
period, by the ILC"."^ In fact, the views of member states, also,
did not contain any articulated reasons for the General Assembly's
decision to entrust the preparatory work to the Sea-Bed Committee.
The possible explanations for the General Assembly's decision to
entrust the preparatory work to the Sea-Bed Committee and not to the
ILC can be assumed in the following ways. Firstly, delegations had
different kinds of reservations about the ILC. Some developing
countries felt that the developing states were not adequately
represented on the ILC. Others regarded the ILC as being too
conservative. Yet others thought that the ILC's experience was
mainly on the codification of international law and that it might
not be suitable for making new law. Secondly, and probably the
most important explanation, is that it was generally recognized that
the questions at the UNCLOS III would not be purely legal. The
issues involved political, economic, strategic, environmental and
other considerations.^ It was also realized that the work of
the Conference would focus more on the progressive development
rather than the codification of this branch of international law.
Also, vital national interests were at stake, not only details.
States were simply unwilling to leave the promotion of their vital
interests to the ILC because they reasoned that only governmental
representatives could effectively formulate solutions.
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(d) The Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
was, in the opinion of many, an unprecedented and unique law-making
Conference. In no other similar conference have some 160 countries
of the world participated. No other conference has had such a
comprehensive and broad agenda. In no other conference were so
many conflicting interests of different nations involved, and so
many sensitive issues discussed. It is obvious that a conference
of such importance, with such a wide scope of agenda and so complex
and delicate a task, could not rely on the traditional structure,
procedure and working methods of the international conference.
What was required was a new procedure. The success of the
conference in bringing about a broadly agreed upon convention
after nine years of deliberation is to a great extent due to the
presence of two qualities in its structure: procedure and working
methods.
Before these aspects of the work of the Conference are
briefly explained, it is appropriate to point out that, according to
Resolution 3067 (XXVIII)^® by the General Assembly on 16 November
1973, the Sea-Bed Committee was dissolved and the first session of
the Conference, which was an organizational session, was convened in
New York on December 1973. The second session, which was the first
substantive session, was held in Caracas during 1974. In 1975, the
third session was held in Geneva. The fourth and fifth sessions
were held in New York, both in 1976. The sixth session was held in
New York in 1977. In 1978, the seventh session and its
- 25 -
sub-sessions were convened in Geneva. The eighth session likewise
comprised two sessions, one held in Geneva and the second in New
York in 1979. The ninth sessions were held in New York and in
Geneva in 1980. The tenth sessions were held in New York and in
Geneva in 1981, while the eleventh and final session was held in New
York in 1982. The Conference thus held a total of 11 sessions from
1973 to 1982.
1. The structure of the Conference
The structure of the Conference had a novel approach:
alongside the official structure there existed an unofficial
structure comprising different special interests groups which
emerged in relation to the agenda of the Conference and informal
private negotiating groups established by the initiatives of some
delegates in their personal capacities. In the official structure,
in addition to the Plenary, General Committee, Drafting Committee,
Credentials Committee and three Main Committees with agenda
inherited from the Sub-Committees of the Sea-Bed Committee, many
informal working groups were established to facilitate negotiations
in a more relaxed atmosphere and without keeping records. As
regards the official structure, in addition to the plenary, which
was allocated two items - peaceful uses of ocean space and
enhancment of the universal participation of states in multilateral
Convention relating to the Law of the Sea^^ - the Conference
established three main committees. The agenda of the First
Committee consisted of: (1) an international regime for the sea-bed
and ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction, and (2) archaeological
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and historical treasures on the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction.^
H.S. Amerasinghe, who had served as the Chairman of the
Sea-Bed Committee, was elected as the President of the Conference.
He continued his function until his death in 1980, when he was
succeeded by T.B. Koh from Singapore. P.B. Engo, as the chairman
of the First Committee, continued to lead the negotiations on the
legal regime of the deep sea-bed all through the Conference. With
respect to the official structure of the Conference, special mention
should be made of the Drafting Committee. This Committee had a
very delicate and difficult task. Since the objective was to bring
about a universally acceptable convention, it was necessary to
produce equally authentic texts of it in all the languages of the
United Nations. The innovation in order to achieve this goal was
the creation of informal language groups which facilitated this
task.^
Consequent on the large number of participants as well as the
delicacy of the issues involved, the Conference showed a preference
for utilizing small informal working groups which would be more
f\ 9
efficient than plenary meetings of 160 delegations.
A major part of the working of the Main Committees was
carried out by these working groups which generally held informal
meetings without records. The informal forums which were
established to assist the First Committee included: a working group
of 50 states in 1974 under the chairmanship of C.W. Pinto (Sri
Lanka) ; a working group of the whole on the system of exploitation
under J. Evensen (Norway) in 1972; three negotiating groups
established by the Conference in 1978 as part of an effort to tackle
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the hard-core issues before the Conference, comprising: Negotiating
Group (NG) 1, chaired by F.X. Njenga (Kenya), dealing with the
system of exploration and exploitation; NG2, under T.B. Koh
(Singapore), dealing with financial arrangements relating to deep
sea mining; NG3, chaired by P.B. Engo, dealing with the organs of
the international Sea-Bed Authority; and finally, The Working Group
of 21, established in 1978 and consisting of ten developing
countries, seven Western industrialized countries, three members of
the Eastern European Group and China, to resolve all the outstanding
issues of the First Committee in a more limited forum.
The other informal forums which were established by the
Conference to assist the other Main Committees included: NG4,
chaired by S. Nandan (Fiji), dealing with the problem of access of
the land-locked and geographically disadvantaged countries to the
living resources of the EEZ; NG5, chaired by C. Stavropoulos
(Greece), dealing with the question of settlement of disputes in
EEZ; NG6, chaired by A. Aquilar (Venezuela), dealing with the
definition of the outer limit of the continental shelf; and NG7,
chaired by E. Manner (Finland), dealing with the definition of
maritime boundaries between adjacent or opposite coasts.
The results of the deliberations in the working groups were
reported to the chairmen of the respective Main Committees who, in
turn, included them in their own reports to the plenary. The
function of the unofficial structure of the Conference was as
significant as that of the official one. The unofficial structure
included two kinds of grouping: special interest groups and
informal private negotiating groups.
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The emergence of special interest groups was a response to
the demands which could not be fulfilled by the traditional
groupings inside the United Nations system such as the regional
groups; since most of the national interests involved cut across
geographical groups or ideological lines.^
Some of the special interest groups included the Coastal
States Group, the Land-locked and Geographically Disadvantaged
States Group, Archipelagic States Group, Equidistance Line Group
(for the delimitation of maritime zones), Equitable Principle Group
and Great Maritime Powers Group. The traditional interest groups
of the United Nations, such as the regional groups, the European
Economic Community (EEC), the Arab Group and the Group of 77
(G77),^ could not function effectively, because of the diversity of
interests of the members of these groups. For example, the G77,
which consisted of over 120 developing countries, had divergent
interests in matters related to the agenda of the Second and Third
Committees, i.e. traditional subjects of the law of the sea as well
as the preservation of the marine environment, and marine scientific
research. But the G77 in relation to the question of the of the
sea-bed area - the mandate of the First Committee - was united
and the group acted effectively. The reason was that the interests
of the industrialized countries with regard to technology for deep
sea-bed mining were distinguishable from the interests of the
developing countries which did not have such technology.
Looking back on the result of the work of the Conference, it
is self-evident that, without these structural innovations, the
task, if at all accomplishable, would have taken much more time to
complete.
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2. The methods of the Conference
A main concept attached to the work of the Conference was
that of the package deal. The idea, as regards the law of the sea,
was born in 1970, and was incorporated in the General Assembly
Resolution 2750 (XXV) of the same year by referring to the close
inter-relation of the problems of the ocean space. In fact, it
was a recognition of the dominant fact of the present time, namely,
that the problems affecting the uses of the sea and the sea-bed
fiR
could only be tackled jointly. What was implied by a package
deal was that all parts of the Convention should be considered as a
single whole, negotiated and accepted as such* reflecting a balance
of interests of all participating delegations and a result of many
trade-offs.^ This balance was to mean "the minimum interests of
the largest possible majority while accommodating the essential
interests of the major powers and the dominant interest groups".^
A logical outcome of such a package deal is that no part of it can
be selectively picked up while rejecting the other parts. It is
also understood that, because of the package deal character of the
Convention, it is not possible to claim rights under the Convention
without being willing to shoulder the corresponding obligations.^
Another implication of the package deal is that, since the
Convention is an integral whole consisting of a series of
compromises, no reservations or exceptions to it are allowed. A
7 2
provision to the same effect is incorporated in the Convention.
The real success of the Conference was in allocating different
subjects to many working groups without failing to sustain the
package deal approach of the results which were ultimately embodied
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in an integral whole. A package deal was a prerequisite
70
characteristic for the Convention to obtain universal recognition.
Another step taken by the Conference in order to achieve a
result acceptable to all participating delegations was to choose
consensus as the main decision-making procedure. The adoption of
this method in a treaty-making conference was unprecedented,^ but
the task and the objectives of the Conference were in many ways
unique. Although consensus procedure had been used even in the
Sea-Bed Committee,^ many developing countries were against it.
They argued that the use of consensus would lead to protracted
decision-making and would eventually disable the Conference. The
industrialized countries, on the other hand, feared that the use of
an automatic majority would allow the adoption of norms not
acceptable to the considerable minority.^ To reconcile these
differing positions, the General Assembly, on 16 November 1973,
approved a formula which is known as the Gentlemen's Agreement.^
The Agreement, which was later appended to the Rules of Procedure of
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the Conference, stated that the General Assembly:
Recognizing that the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea at its inaugural session will adopt its
procedure, including its rules regarding methods of voting,
and bearing in mind that the problems of ocean space are
closely inter-related and need to be considered as a whole
and the desirability of adopting a convention on the law of
the sea which will secure the widest possible acceptance, the
General Assembly express the view that the conference should
make every effort to reach agreement on substantive matters
by way of consensus, that there should be no voting on such
matters until all efforts on consensus has been exhausted. 79
The Conference subsequently decided that the determination as to
whether all efforts in reaching consensus had been exhausted should
be made by a two-thirds majority of the representatives present and
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voting, providing that such a majority included the majority of the
OQ
states participating in that session.
One of the important features of the Convention is that all
provisions contained in that instrument are adopted by consensus.
Consensus in the case of the decisions of the Conference is defined
as a general agreement without vote which does hot necessarily mean
O 1
unanimity. The concept of consensus in the Law of the Sea
Conference was described by the delegate of Cameroon when he said:
"Consensus did not mean dictation by a small minority. It meant
the addition of many small packages to form one large package of
ideas which every member could accept albeit with some
o o
discomfort". The general assumption of the term "consensus" in
the United Nations' practice has been that: a minority of
delegations that do not fully support a text are willing simply to
state their reservations for the record, rather than insisting on
voting against it. It does not necessarily mean a unanimity rule
demanding the affirmative support of all participants, which would
give a veto power to each one of them. It is, essentially, a way
QO
of proceeding without formal objection.OJ Nevertheless, it can be
said that the text of the Convention represents a broad agreement
among all participating delegates to the Conference. The procedural
innovations in the form of a package deal, consensus and Gentlemen's
Agreement were genuine measures which proved to yield most
successful results, and would certainly set a procedural precedence
for future global conferences.
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3. The progress of work on the Conference
One of the most difficult procedural problems that the
Conference faced was that, unlike the 1958 Conference on the Law of
the Sea, which had as a basis for discussion draft articles prepared
by the International Law Commission,®^ the UNCLOS III lacked any
basic text for negotiation. What it had inherited from the Sea-Bed
Committee was a vast mass of different proposals and a list of
topics to be considered, but there did not exist any agreed upon
O C
text. During the second session in 1974, when the greater part
of the work of the Conference was devoted to general debate, a
considerable number of proposals and draft articles were submitted
by delegations. It was obvious that no meaningful discussion could
be carried out without first producing a single preparatory text.
The problem was partly resolved in 1975, when the Conference
decided to confer upon the chairmen of the Three Committees the
task of each preparing an Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT).°°
These texts were to reflect the results of all informal and formal
discussions held by them without prejudice to the position of any
delegation. The texts so produced were revised by the same chairmen
Q "7
in 1976, and the president of the Conference also took the
O O
initiative of preparing a Single Negotiating Text00 on dispute
settlement which was outside the agenda of the Three Main
Committees. Because of the package deal considerations, real
negotiations based on give and take principles could not be carried
out without having a comprehensive integrated text comprising
articles on all subjects on the agenda of the Conference. The
Conference, therefore, recommended in 1976 that the President and
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the chairmen of the Three Main Committees together would prepare a
Q Q
Single Composite Text. 7 This text was prepared in 1977 on
the basis of all preliminary texts, the work of the three Main
Committees and the formal and informal negotiating groups. The
result, which was the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT), ®
was a decisive step towards the agreement on a comprehensive
convention on the law of the sea. The Revised Composite Negotiating
Text (RCNT)^ was issued in 1979, followed by a second revision in
92
the 9th session of the Conference in 1980. At the end of the
resumed 9th session in 1980, the Conference decided to raise the
QQ
status of the RCNT to that of an informal Draft Convention.
This document was still a negotiating text having an informal
QA
character. The official text of the Draft Convention was released
one year later in August 1981 with the many drafting changes and
provisions concerning the seats of The Authority and The Law of the
Sea Tribunal. Attributing the title "official text" to the Draft
Convention, however, was not going to prevent the delegations from
further negotiations on certain outstanding issues. The result of
such negotiations, if entailing modifications supported by the
majority in the Conference, could be incorporated in the Draft
Q c:
Convention.7
The final session of the Conference was devoted to
negotiations on a few remaining issues including the establishment
of the Preparatory Commission for the International Sea-Bed
Authority and The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea;
the treatment to be accorded to the preparatory investment in deep
sea mining activities made prior to the entry into force of the
Convention and the question of participation by entities other than
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states in the Convention. On the basis of the deliberations of the
Conference, a set of changes for incorporation in the draft
Convention was produced, and draft resolutions concerning the
Preparatory Commission, pioneer investment and participation of
entities other than states were prepared. After the acceptance of
the new proposals in the plenary and their integration in the Draft
Convention, the plenary decided that all efforts to adopt the Draft
96Convention by consensus had been exhausted, and at the request
97of the representative of the United States, a recorded vote was
QQ
taken on 30 April 1982, and the Convention together with four
resolutions, all forming an integral whole, was adopted by 130 votes
for, 4 against and 17 abstentions. The United States voted against
the Convention because of dissatisfaction with Part XI concerning
the regime of the deep sea-bed area. Israel, Turkey and Venezuela
also cast negative votes, albeit for other reasons.Abstentions
belonged mostly to the industrialized countries of the West with
particular interests in deep sea-bed mining in the area.
As we notice, the main problem of the lack of a basic text
for the negotiations was resolved by the Conference through
assigning certain officers to prepare such texts and revise them on
the basis of deliberations carried out in different fora, and having
the results checked and approved by the plenary. In retrospect,
this proved to be a wise decision, and bearing in mind the number of
participating delegations and the scope of the agenda, the result
can be considered to be very successful.
As regards the international regime for the deep sea¬
bed area, two periods in the work of the Conference can be
distinguished. The first period which lasted until 1976 was
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characterized by disagreement on the issue by the G77, which
supported a strong international organization with discretionary
power over the activities in the sea-bed area, and some of the
industrialized countries, which favoured the participation of the
states parties to the Convention and their entities in those
activities under a flexible international licensing system.
In 1976 the idea of the Parallel System was considered by the
Conference. The core of the idea was to establish a system in
which both the Authority, through its operating arm the Enterprise
and the states parties to the Convention and public or private
entities would engage in the activities of exploration for and
exploitation of the sea-bed resources. From 1977 until 1982, the
efforts of the G77 in supporting the Authority on the one side of
the Parallel System and the industrialized countries on the other
side were each focused on changing, as much as possible, the balance
of interests which was to prevail due to the Parallel System, in its
own favour.
The first negotiating text, the ISNT of 1975, provided for a
strong international organization to control the activities in the
area of the deep sea-bed. This pro-G77 position was somehow
reversed in the 1976 RSNT in favour of the industrialized countries.
The acceptance of the idea of the Parallel System, which was a
compromise on the part of the G77, necessitated a modification in
the negotiating text to strengthen the position of the Authority
against other actors in the deep sea-bed area. The ICNT of 1977
was, therefore, more in favour of the G77. As from 1978, all
negotiating texts that were produced more or less favoured the
position of the industrialized countries. The adoption of
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Resolution II by the Conference in 1982, which provides for the
protection of pioneer investment and confers upon the pioneer
investers exclusive right to some areas of the deep sea-bed, was
another compromise by the G77 in favour of the industrialized
countries. The result is that, in structuring the Parallel
System-^® as the backbone of the regime of the sea-bed area in the
Convention, the industrialized countries have succeeded in turning
the balance in their own favour.
SECTION III: THE 1982 CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982,
with respect to the scope of subjects it covers, is one of the most
comprehensive international legal instruments ever worked out. Its
importance exists not only in the breadth of its subject matter, but
also in the fact that, unlike many other conventions, the provisions
contained in it are directly negotiated, drafted and accepted by the
official delegations of almost all sovereign states of the world.
The remarkable work comprises 17 parts consisting of 320
articles and 9 annexes with in total 103 articles. The Convention
under some 25 titles covers almost all issues relating to human
activities in the ocean space. The Convention is designed
primarily to regulate the use of the oceans in time of peace and not
in time of war or other armed hostilities. The first half of the
Convention, containing the first ten parts, is generally devoted to
the maritime zones under national jurisdiction, namely, the
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territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone,
and the continental shelf. The rules relating to the rights and
duties of states in the high seas are also included in this part.
The second part of the Convention, from Part XI to Part XVII, deals
with more recent issues such as the regime of the Sea-bed Area,
protection and preservation of the marine environment, marine
scientific research and compulsory dispute settlement system. Part
XI on the Sea-bed Area is by far the largest part of the Convention.
It contains 59 articles, from Article 133 to Article 191, and lays
down general principles relating to the Area beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction (Articles 136-149), development of the
resources of the area (Articles 150-155), the International Sea-Bed
Authority (Articles 156-183) and settlement of disputes (Articles
186-191).
Out of nine annexes to the Convention, two are directly
related to the question of the Sea-bed Area. Annex III, with 22
articles, sets forth the basic conditions for prospecting,
exploration and exploitation; Annex IV contains the Statute of the
Enterprise, the operating arm of the Authority. Moreover, the
whole of Section 4 of Annex VI is devoted to the Sea-Bed Dispute
Chamber which is a chamber of The International Tribunal for The Law
of the Sea, and has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising
from activities in the Sea-bed Area beyond national jurisdiction.
In addition to the nine annexes^! of the Convention, there
are six more annexes which are appended to the Final Act. The
first of these annexes contains four resolutions which were adopted
at the final session of the Conference. Resolution I concerns the
establishment of the Preparatory Commission for the Authority and
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the Law of the Sea Tribunal. Resolution II provides for the
protection of the preparatory investments, in pioneer activities
relating to polymetallic nodules.
Part XI, Annexes III and IV, and Resolutions I and II
together constitute the Law of the Sea-bed Area as negotiated and
agreed upon by the overwhelming majority of the nations of the
world.
The Convention, which has not yet entered into force, was
opened for signature on the last day of the final meeting of the
Conference, 10 December 1982, in Montego Bay, Jamaica. On the same
109
day, 119 delegations signed the instrument. The Convention
10 O
remained open for signature until 9 December 1984. By March
1989, a total of 159 signatures as well as 37 ratifications were
appended to the Convention.*^
All industrialized countries of the West with special
interests in the Sea-bed Area except the United States, the United
Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany have signed the
Convention. Sixty ratifications are required for the entry into
force of the Convention.*^ -p^g f0n0Wing chapter is concerned
with the question of the limits of the Sea-bed Area before the
United Nations fora.
- 39 -
Footnotes - Chapter One
1. For the details on Malta's proposal see Section II, note 17,
infra, and the accompanying text of Chapter One as well as
Section III (a) of Chapter Four.
2. For specific treatment, see Chapter Four on the concept of
the common heritage of mankind.
3. For a detailed account on the Declaration of Principles, see
Chapter Four, Section IV.
4. One of the main functions of the Preparatory Commission is
drafting detailed rules, regulations and procedures relating
to various organs of the Authority. The outcome of the
efforts in preparing these rules, regulations and procedures
will give the final shape to the limits of their powers and
extent of their discretion.
5. A.L. Clark and J. Cook Clark, "Marine Metallic Mineral
Resources of the Pacific Basin", 3 MRE, No. 1 (1986), pp.
45-62, at p.50.
6. See generally J.Z. Frazer, "Resources in Seafloor Manganese
Nodules", in Kildow (ed.), Deep Sea Mining, pp.41-83.
Cambridge: Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1980.
7. See Clark, op., cit. and R.C. Ogley, Internationalizing the
Sea-bed, p.8. Gower: Aldershot, 1984.
8. Clark, ££. cit. Frazer, with respect to the insufficient
information about manganese nodules and their location in the
Clarion-Clipperton Zone, estimates the quantity of the
nodules in the area to be something between 4 to 15 billion
tons. Frazer, op. cit., p.58.
9. A. Post, Deep Sea Mining and the Law of the Sea, p.14. The
Hague: Nijhoff, 1983.
10. L. Antrim, "The Role of Deep Sea-bed Mining in the Future
Supply of Metals", in Kildow, oj>. cit. , pp. 84-104, at
pp.87-88.
11. Antrim, ibid., p.89.
12. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/25, p.8.
13. M. Shafer, "Mineral Myths", 47 Foreign Policy (summer 1982),
pp.154-81.
14. Post, op. cit., p.46.
15. Ibid., p.23.
- 40 -
16. B.J. Reddy and J.P. Clark, "Effects of Deep Sea Mining on
International Markets for Copper, Nickel, Cobalt, and
Manganese", in Kildow, op. cit., pp.107-123, at p.110.
17. Shafer, op. cit., p.157.
18. Reddy (ed.), op. cit., p.110.
19. See Clark, op. cit., p.66.
20. J.C. Burrows, "The Net Value of Manganese Nodules to U.S.
Interests, with special reference to Market Effects and
National Security", in Kildow, op. cit. pp.124-39, at p.124.
21. Manganese Nodules Mining Systems, p.2, The Technology
Research Association of Manganese Nodules Mining System of
Japan, Tokyo, March 1985.
22. J.T. Kildow and V.K. Dar, "Introduction to an Unusual
Resource Management Problem", in Kildow, op. cit., pp.33-37,
at p.21.
23. Progressive development is defined as "the preparation of
draft Conventions on subjects which have not yet been
regulated by international law or in regard to which the law
has not yet been sufficiently developed in the practice of
states". See Statute of the International Law Commission,
Article XV.
24. UN Doc. E/Res./1112 (XXI) 7 March 1966. Barry Buzan
indicates that this "resolution was the first example of less
developing countries as an organized group using the U.N. as
a source of information which they could not obtain for
themselves". See B. Buzan, Sea-bed Politics, p.66. New
York: Praeger, 19 .
25. For Resolution 2172 (XXI) of December 1966 - Resources of
the Sea - see UN Doc. A/Res./2172 (XXI), 1966.
26. See Resources of the Sea, UN Doc. E/4449, and Add. 1, 2,
February 1968 and Marine Science and Technology: Survey and
Proposals, UN Doc. E/4487, 24 April 1968. The aim of the
EC0S0C is to serve as an organ promoting international
economic and social cooperation. This organ was created as
one of the six principal organs of the U.N. It consists of
54 members, all of whom are elected by the General Assembly
for three year terms, with one-third of the terms expiring
each year. The five permanent members of the Security
Council have been regularly re-elected, and the developing
countries are in the majority in the EC0S0C and can pass
resolutions favourable to their own interests, since all
measures are adopted by simple majority vote. In broad
terms, the mission of the EC0S0C is to promote the welfare of
all peoples everywhere. It meets twice annually. The
- 41 -
functions of the ECOSOC may be divided into three categories:
(1) deliberation and recommendations in matters related to
human rights, economy, education . . . etc.; (2) research
and reports related to subjects within the scope of ECOSOC
competence. These subjects constitute a primary source of
data for governments and private research. (3) coordination
through setting up priorities, eliminating duplication of
effort and conflict of interest among agencies. These brief
features of the ECOSOC are described in order to realize the
significance of this organ within the United Nation system.
For more information, see G. Schwarzenberger and E.D. Brown,
A Manual of International Law, pp.242-248. Oxon:
Professional Books Limited, 6th ed., 1976.
27. See United Nations General Assembly Document A/6695.
28. Resolution 2340 (XXII) is reproduced in M.H. Nordquist (ed.),
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, A
Commentary, Vol. I, p.161. Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1985.
29. These nations represented different regional groups such as
seven from Africa, five from Asia, six from Latin America and
eleven from Western Europe and others.
30. See UN Doc. A/7230, pp.1-2.
31. See Nordquist, op. cit., Vol. I, p.163.
32. See the names of these nations in ibid., p.169.
33. See UN Doc. A/C.1/L.473.
34. See, e.g., amendments submitted by Jamaica and Trinidad and
Tobago, UN Doc. A/C.1/L.475.
35. Nordquist, op. cit., Vol. I, p.169.
36. Ibid., p.172, and see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1969,
p.70; also see GAOR: 22nd session, First Committee, 1673rd-
1678th Meeting, November 1, 1969.
37. For additional information on the Moratorium Resolution 1969,
see Section I of Chapter Four.
38. Ibid.
39. This resolution is discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.
40. See B. Zuleta, Introduction to the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea. United Nations Publications, Sale No.
E.83, V.5, p.XX, 1983.




44. For the names of these nations, see ibid., p.181.
45. UN Doc. A/8421, pp.4-5.
46. Ibid., pp.30, 38.
47. UN Doc. A/8721, p.17.
48. Ibid., p.22.
49. T.G. Kronmiller, The Lawfulness of Deep Sea-bed Mining, Vol.
I, p.51. New York: Oceana, 1980.
50. This paper was presented as a Report of Sub-Committee I in
Appendix III of UN Doc. A/9021, Vol. II, pp.39-165.
51. C.A. Stavr opoulos, "Procedural Problems of the Third
Conference on the Law of the Sea" in Nordquist (ed.), op.
cit., pp.lvii-lxv, at p.lxi. According to Article 13 of the
United Nations Charter, the General Assembly in 1947
established the International Commission. It consists of 25
persons of eminent legal standing, nominated and elected by
states, but serving in their personal capacity. On the
basis of the work of the Commission, the United Nations
adopted a number of conventions relating to the Law of the
Sea and other subjects of international law. It has,
however, devoted most of its efforts to codifying and
developing the traditional subjects of international law,
rather than areas where state practice is slight such as
those where technology is making a major impact, or where the
new and developing states have been demanding major changes
such as in relation to economic development and power
sharing. See A.E. Gotlieb, Impact of Technology on
Contemporary International Law, 170 RDC (1981-1). The Hague:
Nijhoff, pp.119-329, at pp.131 and 132.
52. 25 GAOR, First Committee (177th meeting, et seq.).
53. UN Doc. A/7925.
54. 25 GAOR, First Committee (1785th meeting, para. 51).
55. Ibid., 177th meeting, para. 117.
56. Ibid., 1786th meeting, para. 23.
57. See GA Resolution 2750C (XXV) in Nordquist, o_g.. cit.,
pp.178-81, at 178 and 179. Preambular para. 5 of this
resolution states that "political and economic realities,
scientific development and rapid technological advances of
the last decade have accentuated the need for early and
progressive development of the law of the sea, in a framework
- 43 -
of close international co-operation".
58. See Nordquist, op. cit., Vol. I, pp.188-190.
59. See UN Doc. A/CONF.62/28.
60. Ibid. Under item 1, i.e. international regime, six sub¬
titles are specified. They are: 1- Nature and
characteristic; 2- International machinery, structure,
functions and powers; 3- Economic implications; 4-
Equitable sharing of benefits bearing in mind the special
interests and needs of the developing countries whether
coastal or land-locked; 5- Definition and limits of the Area
and 6- Use exclusively for peaceful purposes.
61. See Zuleta, op. cit., p.xxiii. The novelty of the working
procedures of the Drafting Committee was in its three-level
operations. On the first, there were the informal language
groups. The results of their deliberations were discussed
in a meeting of the co-ordinators of the groups and the
chairman of the Drafting Committee (second level), and
finally on the third level the Drafting Committee itself met.
See I.D.M. Nelson, "The Work of the Drafting Committee", in
Nordquist, op. cit., pp.135-152, at p.137.
62. Zuleta, op. cit., p.xxi.
63. See Tommy T.B. Koh and S. Jayakumar, "The Negotiating Process
of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea", in Nordquist, op. cit., pp.29-134, at pp.92-93.
64. Ibid., p.68.
65. Ibid. , pp.70-81. See also A. Hollick, U.S. Foreign Policy
and the Law of the Sea, p.403. New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1981.
66. The group of developing countries has been referred to as
"Third World countries", "less developed countries", or
"under developed countries", but the title most often
attributed to them in the course of negotiations on the Law
of the Sea from 1967 to 1982 was "the Group of 77". The
origin of this title is in the First United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, whose
main commitment was to lay the foundation of a better world
economic order. The basic problems of development which the
developing and mostly newly independent states faced in the
1950s and the beginning of the 1960s drove them together to
unify as a political force in order to preserve a common
interest, i.e. a new policy for international trade and
development. The original group at the 1964 UNCTAD comprised
77 developing countries, but the number has long passed over
100. The establishment of UNCTAD and the formation of the
G77 and persistent demand for a New International Economic
Order were against the will of developed countries. The G77
- 44 -
gradually expanded its scope of interest beyond UNCTAD to all
other international organiza- tions, and to every issue of
international concern, With this background, it is clear why
the expression "G77" was so frequently used in the
negotiations on the Law of the Sea. It should be emphasized,
however, that the G77 which met at the UNCLOS III was
distinct from the G77 in the General Assembly and other
United Nations organs, because it had its own officials and
working methods. See T.T.B. Koh, ojj. cit., pp.29-134, at
p.81. For a more detailed account of the formation of the
G77, see, e.g., M. Zammit Cutajar (ed.), UNCTAD and the
South-North Dialogue, The First Twenty Years, pp.30-35.
Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1985. See also Karl P. Sauvant, The
Group of 77: Evolution, Structure, Organization. New York:
Ocean Publication, 1981.
67. Preambular paragraph 4 of Resolution 2750 C (XXV) states that
the General Assembly is conscious that the problems of ocean
space are closely inter-related and need to be considered as
a whole. See Nordquist, ££. cit., pp.178-182. The same
formulation is now in the third preambular paragraph of the
Convention.
68. Statement of the Secretary-General at the 1974 Caracas
Session. Off. Rec, Vol. I, p.38, para. 37.
69. J. Evensen, "Key Address", in The 1982 Convention on the Law
of the Sea, Proceedings, Law of the Sea Institute Seventeenth
Annual Conference, pp.xxvi-xxvii, at xxvii, Law of the Sea
Institute: University of Hawaii, 1984.
70. Koh and Jayakumar, op. cit., p.40.
71. T.T.B. Koh, A Constitution for the Oceans, United Nations
Publication, Sales No. E.83.V.5, pp.xxxiii-xxxvii, at
p.xxxiv, 1983.
72. Article 309 of the Convention states: "No reservation or
exception may be made to this Convention unless expressly
permitted by other articles of this Convention."
73. For more details of the package deal, see Chapter Five,
Section VI.
74. According to Stavropoulos, before UNCLOS III, the consensus
procedure was "used mainly in regard to declarations, and
only in highly special circumstances such as those pertaining
to outer space questions, in regards to the formulation of
treaty texts"; see Stavropoulos, op. cit., p.lxiv.
75. In fact, from the very beginning of the work of the Ad Hoc
Committee, it had been decided that on any question agreement
would be reached without the need for voting; see UN Doc.
A/AC.135/SR.1-9, p.8.
- 45 -
76. See Evensen, op. cit., p.xxvii.
77. The Gentlemen's Agreement was included in The Report of the
First Committee to The General Assembly (A/9278, para. 16),
and was adopted by the General Assembly on 16 November 1973
(A/PV.2169, para. 15).
78. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/30/Rev.3.
79. UN Doc. A/9278, para. 26.
80. Rules 37(1) and 39(1) of The Rules of Procedure, UN Doc.
A/CONF.62/30/Rev.3.
81. According to Evensen, the definition of consensus in the Law
of the Sea Conference was the "adoption of articles - and the
text of the Convention as a whole - by general agreement (or
understanding) without resorting to a vote and, in effect,
without requiring a unanimous decision"; see Evensen, op.
cit., p.xxvi.
82. Off. Rec.. Vol. XIV, p.12.
83. See Stavropoulos, op. cit., p.lxiv.
84. See supra, note 51.
85. Stavropoulos, op. cit., p.lx.
86. Off. Rec., Vol. IV, p.26, paras. 92-95. The Informal Single
Negotiating Text (ISNT) was issued as UN Doc.A/CONF.62/WP.8.
This document had three parts corresponding to the subjects
of the Three Main Committees. See Off. Rec., Vol. IV,
pp.137-181.
87. UN. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev.1.
88. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.9.
89. Off. Rec., Vol. VI, p.24, para. 33(ix).
90. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10.
91. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.1.
92. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.2.
93. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.3/Add.l.
94. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/L.78.
95. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/114, reproduced in Off. Rec. Vol. XV,
p.100; UN Doc. A/CONF.62/62, para. 10.
96. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.174, p.13.
- 46 -
97. Off. Rec., Vol. XVI, p.154, para. 26.
98. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122, later published as United Nations
Publication, Sale No. E.83.V.5; also reprinted in ILM,
Vol. 21, p.1261, 1982.
99. Israel, Turkey, the United States and Venezuela: Israel
objected to observer status for the PLO. Turkey and
Venezuela apparently preferred to resolve offshore boundary
disputes with their neighbours before accepting the
Convention. The United States objected to provisions
regarding deep sea-bed mining.
100. See Chapter Five for more details.
101. Pursuant to Article 318, the annexes to the Convention form
an integral part of the latter.
102. The signatories were the following: African Group 37 states,
Asian Group 32 states, Eastern European Group 10 states,
Latin American Group 22 states, Western European and Others
Group 16 states and Namibia, represented by the United
Nations Council for Namibia and the Cook Islands as a
self-governing associated state with full competence to enter
into treaties in respect of matters governed by the
Convention also signed.
103. This date was established by Article 305(2) of the
Convention.
104. The ratified states include the following: 1982- Fiji;
1983- Zambia, Mexico, Jamaica, UN Council for Namibia, Ghana,
Bahamas, Belize, Egypt; 1984- Ivory Coast, Philippines,
Gambia, Cuba, Senegal; 1985- Sudan, Saint Lucia, Togo,
Tunisia, Bahrain, Iceland, Mali, Iraq, Guinea, Tanzania,
Cameroon; 1986- Indonesia, Trinidad and Tobago, Kuwait,
Yugoslavia, Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau Paraguay; 1987-
Democratic Yemen, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe; 1988-
Cyprus, Brazil.
105. Article 308(1) of the Convention states: "This Convention
shall enter into force 12 months after the date of the




THE LIMITS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SEA-BED AREA
SECTION Is THE ISSDE BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS
The question as to where to draw a line between national
jurisdiction and the international zone beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction is a hard-core issue for many states which
participated in the Conference. According to Article 1 of the
Convention the Area is defined as "the sea-bed and ocean floor and
subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction".^
The interrelation between the outer limit of the area under
coastal state jurisdiction and the boundaries of the deep sea-bed
area became a focal point when the General Assembly established the
Ad Hoc Committee in 1967, and entrusted it with the task of studying
the peaceful uses of the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction. The general understanding was
that landward of the area beyond the zone of national jurisdiction
coincided with the seaward limit of the area of coastal
jurisdiction. Since the new area was usually defined by reference
to area of national jurisdiction, it was logical to establish the
limits of coastal state jurisdiction.
When the Ad Hoc Committee started its work in 1968 many
delegations put emphasis on the need to establish the limits between
national jurisdiction and the international area. They demanded
"an internationally acceptable definition of the precise limits of
the area" beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, in order to be
able to discuss any legal regime for that area. An important
reason of concern for the establishment of the precise limits of
coastal jurisdiction was "the practice of an increasing number of
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states in extending their jurisdiction in the form of licensing of
exploration activities at great and increasing distance from their
o
coast". However, the view that the establishment of the limits of
the area beyond coastal state jurisdiction is a necessary condition
for negotiating a legal regime for that area was not shared by all
participating delegations at the Ad Hoc Committee or Sea-Bed
Committee. Some Latin American countries with claims of extended
maritime zone generally opposed any consideration of the limits of
national jurisdiction, and maintained that it was feasible to study
the regime of management of the Area without previous determination
of its boundaries.^ Although the establishment of the limits of
the Area was felt by a considerable number of delegations to be a
prerequisite for an effective and useful negotiation on the legal
regime, the direct relation of such limit with the outer limit of
the area under coastal states jurisdiction had turned into a
hard-core issue. The main problem was the coastal, and
particularly the large maritime nations, could not agree on any
limit for the coastal jurisdiction, before the nature and structure
of the international regime and machinery for the sea-bed area were
determined. For these states, therefore, the question of limits of
coastal jurisdiction were to be treated after other related issues
had been settled.^ The issue, however, remained at the top of the
list of topics before the Sea-Bed Committee, and in 1973 was
transferred as an unsolved problem to the UNCLOS III.
Although attention was never taken off from the question of the
limits of national jurisdiction, the greater part of the efforts in
the Conference was devoted to the establishment of the legal regime
for the Sea-bed Area.
- 49 -
In 1977, for example, the President of the Conference said:
It should be borne in mind that the Conference had two main
purposes. The first was to devise a regime for the exploration
and exploitation of the sea-bed. . . . The second . . . was to
review the existing body of international law of the sea, with
a view to reaching general agreement on the limits and the
nature of national jurisdiction. 6
Although the introduction of the concept of a 200-mile
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)'' gave a new dimension to the question
of the limits of coastal jurisdiction, its relation with the limits
Q
of the Area was only so far as the continental shelf did not extend
Q
200 nautical miles from the baselines of the territorial sea. In
this case the concept of EEZ had extended the jurisdiction of the
coastal states in respect of management of resources both in the sea
and on the sea-bed up to 200 miles from the coast. The real issue
in the case of the international sea-bed area was to determine the
outer limits of its connected sea-bed area, i.e. the continental
shelf independent of the EEZ and in areas where the shelf exceeded
the 200-mile distance from the coast. The criteria provided in the
1958 Continental Shelf Convention for the establishment of the outer
edge of the shelf had proved to be ambiguous and uncertain.^ The
formula incorporated in Article 76 of the 1982 Convention for the
determination of the outer limit of the continental shelf is the
result of the effort to substantiate a difficult compromise among
all diverging interests and is, by far, more complicated than its
precedent in the 1958 Convention.
In the following pages, after a background of the interests of
coastal states to the sea-bed and its resources and the interest of
the United Nations with respect to the Sea-bed Area, the development
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of the definition of the continental shelf and the content of
Article 76 of the Convention will be dealt with.
SECTION lis THE ERA OF COASTAL STATES INTERESTS
IN THE SEA-BED
(a) Background to the Interests Before 1945
Some basic facts should be first mentioned about the bed of the
sea. The latter can be divided into broad areas: the continental
margin and deep sea-bed."^ The continental margins of the earth
1 O
which are 175,000 kilometres long usually consist of continental
shelves, continental slopes and continental rises. The continental
shelf begins at a low water mark from the shore line, and gently
extends seaward to a point where an abrupt descent towards the ocean
floor occurs. That is where the continental slope starts, and goes
down towards the abyssal plains. The continental rise forms the
base of the continental slope. Abyssal plains are the generally
flat areas of the deep ocean floor which occupy nearly 40% of the
submarine basins. They usually start at 3,000 to 5,000 metre
depth. The deep sea-bed contains mountain ranges, ridges and deep
trenches.
The technological revolutions and discoveries of oil and gas
under the sea-bed urged the coastal states to rapidly extend their
claims over areas of the sea-bed beyond the territorial sea. For
this reason the doctrine of the Continental Shelf was born in 1945.
"Continental Shelf" as a geological term refers to the submarine
continuation of land mass, from the shore to the first substantial
fall-off on the seaward side. The fall-off usually occurs in
depths between 130 to 200 metres. In some areas, the substantial
fall-off never happens, and the geological continental shelf does
not exist. Some examples are the North Sea between Great Britain
and Denmark, the English Channel between Great Britain and France
and the Arabian Gulf between the Arabian Gulf Co-operation Council
States'"^ and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The first reference to the continental shelf in the present
century seems to be in a memorandum of the Russian Government in
1916 concerning certain Arctic lands which were situated on the
Asian coast of Russia, and formed a prolongation of the continental
platform of Siberia.^ The same claim was reaffirmed in 1924 by
the Soviet Government in a memorandum to the United States. But as
it became known later, the expression "continental platform" in
those two memoranda was not used to signify the submarine platform,
but rather was an application of the doctrine of appurtenance and
contiguity,"''^ or at least a variant of that "to support a claim to
all the islands lying to the north of Russia".^
Another reference to the continental shelf was made in 1916 by
a Spanish oceanographer, Oden de Buen, who believed that the rights
of the coastal states in the territorial sea should be extended to
the continental shelf in order to protect effectively the
conservation of the fisheries.^ Even here, continental shelf was
not used in connection with the mineral resources of the sea-bed,
but rather the fisheries in the sea.
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The first instance where consideration of the mineral resources
of the sea-bed beyond the territorial sea was expressly manifested
was the agreement of 26 February 1942 between the United Kingdom, on
behalf of Trinidad, which was then a British colony, and Venezuela
18
in order to divide the submarine area of the Gulf of Paria. This
was the first under sea boundary agreement, and the first
development of international prescription about the continental
shelf. However, the decisive event in state practice was the
introduction of the doctrine of continental shelf by the United
States in 1945.
(b) Truman Proclamations of 1945
On 28 September 1945, President Truman of the United States
20
issued two proclamations, one relating to fisheries in the high
seas contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States and the
second relating to the natural resources of the subsoil and sea-bed
of the continental shelf of the United States. According to the
first proclamation:
. . . the Government of the United States regards the natural
resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf
beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the
United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to
its jurisdiction and control.
In the preamble to the proclamation, it was held that:
. . .the Government of the United States, aware of the long
range world-wide need for new sources of petroleum and other
minerals, holds the view that efforts to discover and make
available new supplies of these resources should be encouraged
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The proclamation was carefully written to avoid any conflict
with the principle of the freedom of the high seas. Therefore, the
character as high seas of the water above the continental shelf and
the right of their free and unimpeded navigation are in no way thus
affected. Although control and jurisdiction were claimed over the
natural resources of the subsoil and not the sea-bed and subsoil
itself, it was hard to imagine any control over the resources
21without control over the sea-bed and subsoil. By stressing the
jurisdiction over natural resources, the proclamation meant to prove
that the United States did not plan to enclose the sea-bed of the
continental shelf. On the other hand, the main legal basis of the
claim was the argument that the continental shelf may be regarded as
an extension of the land mass of the coastal state and thus
naturally appurtenant to it. By this argument, the proclamation
rejected the legal status of the continental shelf either as res
22
communis or res nullius. This also shows that, although the main
interest was the mineral resources, they could not be brought under
control unless the sea-bed was considered as the natural
prolongation of the land mass, and because of this, under the
coastal state's jurisdiction. Hence, the Truman Proclamation,
while keeping the status of the superjacent waters as high seas,
took a significant step toward giving a large area of the sea-bed to
the coastal states.
In the cautious words of the proclamation "jurisdiction" and
"control" were preferred to "sovereignty" in order to affirm that
the United States had not extended its sovereignty beyond the
territorial sea, and the new claim related only to some limited
OQ
rights. Some writers, however, have argued that there is actually
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no distinction between "jurisdiction" and "exclusive control" and
"sovereignty". Lauterpacht, for example, is of the opinion that:
an area which is under the state's exclusive control and
jurisdiction, not delegated by or accountable to a foreign
government or authority, is under the sovereignty of that
state. An area declared henceforth within the exclusive
jurisdiction and control of a state becomes part of its
territory. 24
The Truman Proclamation did not establish any width for the
continental shelf but a United State government, in a press release
accompanying the proclamation, stated, inter alia, that "the U.S.
generally viewed the submerged lands contiguous to the continent and
covered by no more than 100 fathoms (600 feet) of waters as the
9 S
continental shelf". The choice of this depth seems to have been
an effort to adapt the legal definition of the continental shelf on
the geological definition of the term. Although some countries had
a negative attitude towards the United States' unilateral extension
of sea-bed resource distribution, there was no official objection to
the Truman Proclamation. On the contrary, some countries resorted
to unilateral proclamations for the purpose of extending their
maritime jurisdiction. From 1945 until 1958, the declarations of
coastal claims over the adjacent submarine areas, according to the
9fS
Truman Proclamation, increased to a large number, but there was no
uniformity in either the type of authority the claiming states
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sought to exercise or the extent of the area claimed. While the
Truman Proclamation spoke of control and jurisdiction over the
resources of the sea-bed, some of the following declarations claimed
sovereignty or sovereign rights, and, in some cases, not only over
the submarine area, but also over the superjacent water. The Truman
Proclamation and declarations of the Arabian Gulf states were
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concerned with oil and other mineral resources of the shelf,but
all Latin American declarations were primarily based on the
interests of those states and on the preservation of the living
resources of their adjacent seas.
Almost half of these declarations contained a certain depth
(usually 200 metres) as the outer limit of their claimed areas,
while the rest, like those of the Arabian Gulf states which have
shallow shelves or no shelf at all, or some states on the Western
coast of Latin America with steep shelves, did not define the outer
29
limits of their shelves.
Many of the claims were not limited to the sea-bed and its
resources, but extended to the living resources of the superjacent
on
waters. Although these claims were not accepted by other states,
Q I
and in some cases were even officially protested against, x some of
the claiming states enforced their jurisdiction at least in respect
on
of fisheries, and this generated many international contentions. ^
A few years after the Truman Proclamation, the doctrine of the
continental shelf had received such widespread support in the
practice of states that some authors considered it already a part of
customary international law. However, there were other writers who
could not share this view. Lauterpacht, for example, wrote:
the various proclamations . . . relating to the continental
shelf constitute, in the language of Article 38 of the Statute
of the ICJ, international custom as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law. 33
Others such as the arbitrator of the Abu Dhabi case (Lord Asquith of
Bishopstone) had another view. He, in 1951, acted as an umpire in
the case of the Sheikdom of Abu Dhabi and the Tricial Coast Company
in Par is. In this case, the arbitrator decided that the
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continental shelf doctrine has not yet assumed the hard lineaments
or the definitive status of an established rule of international
law.35
Until 1950, when the ILC started its work on the codification
of the law of the sea, there were few comments from Western European
States or the Soviet Union on the development of the doctrine of
continental shelf. One of the first writings about the subject
in the Soviet Union was an article in 1950 written by V.M. Koretskii
in which postwar claims to the continental shelf were surveyed.
The writer in this article, "A new development in the division of
the High Sea", was very critical and complained: "Sea spaces are
usurped and are transformed into 'national interests"' or "America
declares, satellites follow, science recognizes and a norm is
born".3^ Generally speaking, the Soviet Union had a vague policy
about the sea-bed, and this policy continued for rather a long time.
(c) The Work of the International Law Commission
With regard to the evident necessity to define the contents and
limits of the claims of states to the continental shelf, the ILC, in
its first session in 1949, decided to give priority to the
codification of the regime of the high seas. J.P.A. Francois, as
the Special Rapporteur, was charged with the task of preparing a
report on the subject. Discussion on the basis of this report
started in 1950. The main objective of the ILC was to work out a
definition with due regard to the geological fact that depth
criterion alone could be prejudicial to the case of many states, and
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stressing the existence of the geological continental shelf as the
OO
basis of rights might deprive some other states from those rights. °
As a result of deliberations in 1950, the ILC came to the
conclusion that:
... a littoral State could exercise control and jurisdiction
over the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas situated
outside its territorial waters with a view to exploring and
exploiting the natural resources there. The area over which
such a right of control and jurisdiction might be exercised
should be limited; but, where the depth of the waters
permitted the exploitation, it should not necessarily depend on
the existence of the continental shelf. The Commission
considered that it would be unjust to countries having no
continental shelf if the granting of the right in question were
made dependent on the existence of such a shelf. 39
The discussion in the 1951 session resulted in the adoption of
almost the same formulation as the year before in the form of a
draft on the definition of the continental shelf. It was thus
defined as:
The seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas contiguous to the
coast, but outside the area of territorial waters, where the
depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of
the national resources of the seabed and subsoil. 40
This definition and its exploitability clause was criticized by many
countries and a fixed limit of 200-metre isobath was generally
supported.^ In response to the criticism, the ILC adopted in 1953
the 200-metre depth limit instead of the exploitability criterion,
and explained this change of view by arguing that exploitability,
being an uncertain and imprecise concept, would give rise to
disputes.^ In the 1953 session of the ILC, a rather long
discussion was held on the nature of the coastal state's rights on
the continental shelf, and those members who supported "sovereignty"
or "sovereign rights" succeeded in excluding "jurisdiction and
control" from the text before the Commission.^
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The question of continental shelf was not raised in the ILC
until the eighth session in 1956. In the same year, the Inter-
American Specialized Conference on Conservation of Natural
Resources: the Continental Shelf and Oceanic Waters, organized by
the Organization of American States, was held in Ciudad Trujillo in
the Dominican Republic. This conference adopted a resolution on
the rights of the coastal states to exploit the resources of the
sea-bed and subsoil. It said:
The seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf, continental
and insular terrace, or other submarine areas, adjacent to the
coastal state, outside the area of the territorial sea, and to
a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth
of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the
natural resources of the seabed and subsoil, appertain
exclusively to that state and are subject to its jurisdiction
and control. 44
Garcia Amador, Chairman of the ILC in 1956, who had participated in
the Dominican Conference as the Cuban delegate, brought this new
definition to the ILC, and suggested modifications in the 1953
definition of the continental shelf be accepted to reformulate the
definition as follows:
For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental shelf"
is used as referring to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the
territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres (approximately 100
fathoms) or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural
resources of the said area. 45
The reintroduction of the exploitability criterion gave rise to long
discussions, but it was finally adopted by the Commission. It
should be pointed out that the term "adjacent" was added to the ILC
definition of the continental shelf to confirm that the application
of the exploitability test was qualified by the condition of
"adjacency", and the criterion should be used together with the
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"adjacency" condition. In other words, "the extent of the coastal
states rights was limited by a notion of adjacency in the sense of
'nearness', 'proximity'".46
In 1956, the ILC retained Article 2 of the 1953 Draft Articles
on the Continental Shelf, which recognized the sovereign rights of
the coastal state strictly for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting the natural resources of the seabed of the continental
shelf, and thereby refused any claims of sovereign rights over the
sea-bed of that area. The question of the continental shelf was
not solved in the ILC. Thus, the final report of the ILC in 1956
on the regime of the high seas, including the continental shelf, was
submitted to the General Assembly, and subsequently became the basis
of the negotiations at the First UNCLOS in 1958.
(d) The 1958 Continental Shelf Convention on the
Law of the Sea
The General Assembly, in its eleventh session, by Resolution
1105 (XI) of 21 February 1957, approved the convening of the United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, in order to study the 1956
ILC report on the law of the sea as the basis for consideration of
the problems involved in the development and codification of the law
of the sea.^ The Conference was held from 24 February to 27 April
1958, with a total of 86 participating states. Committee IV of the
Conference, charged with the task of studying the rights of coastal
states on the continental shelf, during 30 meetings reviewed
Articles 67 to 73 of the Draft Articles on the law of the sea
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prepared by the ILC. The Convention on the Continental Shelf,
which was adopted at the end of these discussions, is in both
substance and form very much like the Draft Articles prepared by the
ILC. Article 1 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf
states:
For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental shelf"
is used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the
submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of
the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that
limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of
the exploitation of the natural resources of the said area;
(b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas
adjacent to the coasts of islands. 48
While the 200-metre depth criterion was generally accepted at the
Conference, the exploitability test was challenged. Some
delegations maintained that this criterion was both vague and
subjective, for it was not clear if the technical capability of one
state or of all states was to be considered in order to judge what
was technically possible.^ Some writers later claimed that the
exploitability clause in Article 1 of the Continental Shelf
Convention should be interpreted objectively, i.e., the
interpretation should be based on the capabilities of the most
technologically advanced country which "expands the outer limit of
the continental shelf for all states as it develops its own shelf at
ever-greater depth".Some other scholars, criticizing the
exploitability criterion, argued that, by applying the rules of
Article 1, the whole sea-bed of the world will be divided between a
few coastal states. They believed the exploitability test did not
recognize any limits, and even if it were interpreted objectively,
the technological progress of a state would extend its national area
in the seas to the middle of oceans where the area might be
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separated by a median line from the national area of another coastal
state on the other side of the ocean.^
Those who were in favour of the exploitability test put much
weight on the term "adjacent". This term, in their view, was
inserted in Article 1 to make a distinction between the submarine
areas, which constituted the natural prolongation of the land mass
with almost the same geological features, and the deep ocean
floor.-*2 The term "adjacent", however, was vague and had a rather
relative content subject to a flexible interpretation and, as such,
lacked the precision which was required for the determination of the
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outer limit of the continental shelf.
Article 2 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf
enumerated the rights of the coastal states over the natural
resources of the continental shelf. According to that article:
"The coastal state exercises over the continental shelf sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural
resources". Like in the ILC, in the 1958 Conference, too, many
discussions were held as to the applicability of "sovereignty",
"jurisdiction" or simply "rights" instead of "sovereign rights".^
Some Latin American states, basing their argument on the Truman
Proclamation, invoked the natural prolongation argument, and claimed
the same rights for the coastal state in the continental shelf as it
enjoyed in the mainland, i.e. sovereignty.-^ Those who strongly
opposed the term "sovereignty", feared that this term, redolent of
territorial sovereignty and three-dimensional control, would
prejudice the status, as high seas of the waters over the shelf.
"Sovereign rights", however, was adopted as a compromise. The 1958
Convention on the Continental Shelf was an effort to codify the
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principles already laid down in the Truman Proclamation. These
principles were incorporated in the first three articles of this
Convention, which contained the definition of the continental shelf,
the nature of rights of the coastal states in that area and the
subjects of these rights. It is said that the 1958 Conventions"^
reflect "synthesized views of the developed, maritime Western
World".This statement might seem more acceptable with regard to
the "moderate and modestly conservative attitude" of the Soviet
c;q
Union both at the ILC and the 1958 Conference, and the under-
representation of the developing countries in that Conference
In fact, the doctrine of continental shelf was to bring the
submarine oil and gas reserves under the control of the coastal
state. The definition of the continental shelf in Article 1 of the
1958 Convention would serve this purpose perfectly. Indeed, some
writers believe that the imprecision of the definition by the
inclusion of the exploitability clause was intentional.^ Towards
the middle of the 1960s, the information gathered about the
existence of other mineral resources, namely, polymetallic nodules,
on the bed of the oceans gave a new dimension to the sea-bed
question. An increasing number of newly independent states in Asia
and Africa, which were generally poor and had no influence on the
work of the first two conferences on the law of the sea, expressed
their dissatisfaction with the existing law of the sea and
emphasized the need for the revision of that law. The definition
of the continental shelf, which had only one aspect in connection
with the right of coastal states, acquired a new dimension, and that
was in connection with the rights of the international community
over the sea-bed beyond the continental shelf. This new aspect
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inevitably necessitated the working out of a precise and clear
definition of the outer edge of the continental shelf.
Before the developments with respect to the world community
interest and their impact on the definition of the continental
shelf, and the establishment of its outer limit, are followed, we
should deal with an important case which had a strong effect on the
later developments of the concept of the continental shelf: the
f\ 9
North Sea Continental Shelf cases.
(e) The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
These cases were concerned with two continental shelf boundary
disputes between the Federal Republic of Germany on the one side and
Denmark and the Netherlands on the other. The three countries
started their negotiations for the delimitation of their respective
continental shelves in 1962. The result of more than two years of
negotiations was the determination of two partial boundaries in the
immediate nearness of their coasts. The continuation of the
negotiations, however, could not solve the problem of the rest of
the boundaries. On 16 February 1967, the three states submitted
their disputes to the ICJ and asked the Court to decide:
What principles and rules of international law are applicable
to the delimitation as between the parties of the areas of the
continental shelf in the North Sea which appertain to each of
them beyond the partial boundary [already] determined ... 63
The Federal Republic of Germany, which had signed but not
ratified the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, contended
that the correct rule to be applied was to give the states concerned
a just and equitable share of the continental shelfDenmark and
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the Netherlands, on the other hand, contended that the delimitation
should be made with respect to Article 6 of the 1958 Convention,^
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which in their opinion, contained a mandatory rule of law. The
Court noted that as the Federal Republic of Germany was not a
party to the 1958 Convention, Germany had no obligation to apply
Article 6. So it was for the Court to decide which rules of
international law could be applied for the delimitation in question.
The Court refused to accept the German claim, and stated that:
. . . the doctrine of the just and equitable share appears to
be wholly at variance with what the Court entertains no doubt
is the most fundamental of all the rules of law relating to
the continental shelf, enshrined in Article 2 of the 1958
Geneva Convention, though quite independent of it - namely
that the rights of the coastal state in respect of the area of
the continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation
of its land territory into and under the sea exist ipso facto
and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and
as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for
the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural
resources. In short, there is an inherent right. In order to
exercise it, no special legal process has to be gone through,
nor have any special legal acts to be performed. 67
The Court in many parts of its judgement, as in the preceding
passage, emphasized the notion of natural prolongation as the main
factor in conferring title on the coastal state. In the language
of the Court:
The doctrine of continental shelf is a recent instance of
encroachment on maritime expanses which, during the greater
part of the history, appertained to no-one. The contiguous
zone and the continental shelf are in this respect concepts of
the same kind. In both instances the principle is applied
that the land dominates the sea. 68
Both Denmark and the Netherlands claimed that the test of
appurtenance had to be "proximity" or "closer proximity" in the
sense that all those parts of the shelf which were closer to a
particular coastal state than any other point on the coast of
another state, were appurtenenant to the former and only an
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equidistant line would leave to each one of the states concerned
those areas that were nearest to its own coast.^ The Court, in
opposing this claim, maintained that "vague . . . terminology . . .
such as . . . 'near', 'adjacent to' . . . all of them are terms of a
somewhat imprecise character . . It continued:
. . . by no stretch of imagination can a point on the
continental shelf situated say a hundred miles, or even much
less, from a given coast, be regarded as "adjacent" to it,
or any coast at all, in the normal sense of adjacency, even
if the point concerned is nearer to one coast than to any
other. 70
The Court observed that adjacency is not always identical with
proximity. As a conclusion to this argument, the Court pointed
out:
More fundamental than the notion of proximity appears to be
the principle ... of the natural prolongation or the
continuation of land territory and domain, or land sovereignty
of the coastal state, into and under the high seas, via the
bed of its territorial sea, which is under the full
sovereignty of that State. There are various ways of
formulating this principle but the underlying idea, namely of
an extension of something already possessed, is the same, and
it is this idea of extension which is in the Court's opinion
determinant. 71
Although these cases were concerned with the determination of
continental shelf between three adjacent states, the conclusions
reached by the Court were immediately extended to the cases of
determination of the outer limit of the continental shelf when the
coastal state fronted on the open ocean. The concept of natural
prolongation as sanctioned by the court influenced the negotiation
at the Sea-Bed Committee and the UNCLOS III and was finally
70
integrated in the new definition of the continental shelf.
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SECTION III: THE ERA OF THE UNITED NATIONS INTERESTS
IN THE SEA-BED AREA
The proposal of Malta to the 22nd session of the General
Assembly in 1967 is a turning point in the history of claims to the
sea-bed and its resources, and a document that may be as significant
as the Truman Proclamation. By that proposal, the sea-bed and
subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, together
with their resources, were claimed to be the common heritage of
70
mankind. J The claim and the introduction of mankind as holder of
rights in the area of the deep sea-bed allowed the determination of
the precise outer limit of the continental shelf to be treated as
urgent.
(a) The Sea-Bed Committee
When the Ad Hoc Committee convened in 1968, the view of the
majority of the delegations was that Article 1 of the 1958
Convention on the Continental Shelf embodied the existing customary
law on the subject, but those who opposed the exploitability clause
suggested the revision of that article.^ Still others objected to
any discussion on the subject either, like Latin American countries
fearing to lose the rights they had presumably gained by the 1958
Convention^ or claiming that the question of the outer limit of the
continental shelf was not within the mandate of the Ad Hoc
Committee.^ When the question of the limits of national
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jurisdiction was raised in 1969, some delegations argued that this
question could be sufficiently determined in the case of the
continental shelf by using the combined elements of "adjacency" and
"exploitability" contained in Article 1 of the 1958 Convention on
the Continental Shelf which embodied a principle of customary law.^
Other delegations were of the opinion that the question of the
nature of the regime to be established for the exploitation of the
sea-bed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction was related to
the question of the limits of the area where it was to be applied
and, therefore, progress could only be achieved if both the
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questions were dealt with immediately. In 1970, Malta submitted
a draft resolution to the General Assembly stating that, in order to
preserve the deep sea-bed from violation which could be caused as a
result of the uncertainty of the definition of the continental
shelf, a conference should be held, meeting at an early date to
arrive at "a clear, precise and internationally acceptable
definition of that area of the deep ocean floor".^
According to this and other proposals, the General Assembly on
15 December 1969 adopted Resolution 2574 (XXIV) which stated, inter
alia, that since:
the definition of the continental shelf contained in the
Convention on the Continental Shelf of 29 April 1958 does not
define with sufficient precision the limits of the area over
which a coastal state exercises sovereign rights . . . [the
General Assembly requests] the Secretary-General to ascertain
the views of member states on the desirability of convening at
an early date a conference on the law of the sea to review the
regime of the continental shelf. 80
Moreover, the UNCLOS III initially was called to draw a line between
a national continental shelf and the international zone beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction. In fact, this issue has not been
easy for the Conference to solve. Outside the United Nations
- 68 -

suggestions, two main alternatives were mentioned for the determina¬
tion of the outer limit of the continental shelf. They were the
outer edge of the continental margin and the Soviet proposal of a
500 metre isobath or 100 nautical miles from the coast.
Before we embark upon the study of the definition of the outer
limit of the continental shelf in Article 76 of the Convention, it
is appropriate to mention, in brief, the introduction of the concept
of the Exclusive Economic Zone which resulted in a considerable
reduction of the size of the sea-bed area beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.
(b) The Exclusive Economic Zone Concept
Although some Latin American countries already had claims of
200-mile territorial sea, and some other countries were addressing
in the Sea-Bed Committee the question of preferential fishing rights
Q C
of the coastal states, J the new and a sui generis concept of the
EEZ as a compromise between the extreme claim of 200-mile
territorial sea and the modest claim of preferential fishing rights
was first introduced, in a formal document, by the Kenyan delegation
to the Sea-Bed Committee in 1972.®^ In its "Draft articles on
exclusive economic zone concept" Kenya had proposed that all states
should exercise sovereign rights over the natural resources of the
EEZ, living and non-living, either within the water column or on the
sea-bed and subsoil thereof. The limit of the EEZ was suggested
not to exceed 200 nautical miles. It was also envisaged that
neighbouring developing land-locked or geographically disadvantaged
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countries should be permitted, according to regional arrangements,
07
to exploit the living resources of the coastal state's EEZ.
Except for some maritime powers with far distance fishing
industries, such as the Soviet Union and Japan, the concept of EEZ
gained general support in the Sea-Bed Committee, though many
developed countries could not approve the legal content of the
concept as formulated by Kenya, The statements of different
delegations at the first substantive session of the UNCLOS III in
1974 was evidence of the fact that a consensus in favour of the
creation of the EEZ was within reach.
Negotiations in the UNCLOS III, which led to some modifica¬
tions concerning the rights of other states in the EEZ, paved the
way for the integration of this concept in different versions of the
UNCLOS III negotiating text and finally in the Convention itself.
Moreover, the practice of the majority of states in the form of
issuing declarations or enacting legislation for the establishment
of the EEZ transformed this concept, quite separate from the
OO
Convention, into a part of customary international law.
The outcome of the adoption of the EEZ as part of the new law
of the sea was that both the area beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction and its resources, which were the common heritage of
mankind, were reduced considerably from what they were at the time
of the adoption of the Declaration of Principles.^
Another factor which contributed to the reduction of the
initial size of the sea-bed area beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction was the definition of the outer limit of the
continental shelf in Article 76 of the Convention. This
development of Article 76 is the subject of the following pages.
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In the early discussion on the conference, many developing countries
were in favour of keeping the distance criterion of 200 miles for
the determination of the outer limit of the area of national
jurisdiction of the sea-bed and opposed any recourse to the
geomorphological definition of the continental shelf.^ There
were, however, many other countries, both developing and developed,
which supported further extension even up to the edge of the
Q1
continental margin.
In 1975, when the Chairmen of the Three Main Committees of the
Conference were assigned to each prepare a single negotiating text,
the text of the Second Committee defined the continental shelf of
the coastal states as:
. . . the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that
extends beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural
prolongation of land territory to the outer edge of the
continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles
from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin
does not extend up to that distance. 92
There was no agreement on the continental shelf jurisdiction beyond
200 miles, but Article 69 of the ISNT provided that the coastal
state should make payments or contributions in kind in respect of
the exploitation of the non-living resources of the continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. Many delegations believed that
the outer limit of the continental margin, when beyond 200 miles,
should be precisely defined. In that case, and provided it was
coupled with revenue sharing, a general agreement about the outer
QO
limit of the continental shelf should be worked out. In the RSNT
of 1976 there was no change in the definition of the continental
margin and the method of revenue sharing for that part of the margin
which lay beyond the 200-mile distance was retained.
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In the fourth session of the Conference in 1976, Ireland, in
an informal meeting of the Second Committee, submitted an informal
text containing a formula, known as the Irish Formula, having regard
to the relation between the oil reserves and the thickness of the
sedimentary rocks on the ocean floor,^ and had therefore related a
one per cent of the thickness of those rocks with their distance
from the base of the continental slope.^ Because of its
complexity, the formula could not be included in the RSNT, and the
Chairman of the Second Committee considered it necessary to
establish a group of experts to study it further.^ In the fifth
session of the Conference in 1976, the Irish proposal was discussed
for the first time. The question of sharing the revenues derived
from the exploitation of the resources of the continental shelf
beyond 200 miles was given more consideration in this session, but
no concrete result was achieved. Support for the Irish Formula
increased in the sixth session in 1977, but the Chairman of the
Second Committee refused to include it in the ICNT, because he
considered it unjustifiable at that stage.^ When in 1978 the
Conference decided to establish seven negotiating groups to discuss
the hard-core issues, Negotiating Group 6 was charged with the task
of finding solutions to the question of the definition of the outer
limit of the continental shelf and revenue sharing. In this
session, the Soviet Union proposed that the outer limit of the
continental shelf be set at a maximum 300 miles from the baseline,
QO
i.e., 100 miles beyond the limit of the EEZ. ° The proposal was
extensively discussed in Negotiating Group 6. There was strong
opposition to the Soviet proposal by the developing countries, which
supported the maximum distance of 200 miles from the baseline.
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By then, three principal ideas in regard to the determination
of the outer limit of the continental shelf had emerged: 1- the
majority of states which favoured a 200-mile limit for the EEZ and
the continental shelf; 2- an active minority of states with broad
margins which supported the extension of the limit to the outer edge
of the continental margin; and 3- the Soviet Union, which suggested
a combined criterion of depth and distance.^ In 1979, several new
informal proposals concerning the determination of the outer limit
of the continental shelf were submitted to Negotiating Group 6.^®
The problem at this stage was that the 300-mile limit alone could
not cover all submarine areas of coastal interest to broad margin
states.The Soviet Union came up with a solution by amending
its original proposal, this time suggesting the maximum limit at a
distance of 60 nautical miles beyond a 2500-metre depth. A
compromise formula emerged within Negotiating Group 6 by employing
that alternative criterion of 350 nautical miles from the baseline
or 100 miles from the 2500 metres, which ever was further
109seaward.In the second part of the eighth session of the
Conference in 1979, in addition to the questions of definition of
the continental shelf and revenue sharing, some other issues such as
the question of submarine oceanic ridges and the problemo of Sri
Lanka were touched upon. As regards the submarine ridges, it was
the opinion of some delegates that these ridges could be used for
the extension of the continental shelf. Although some proposals
about the determination of the outer limit of the continental shelf
in areas with submarine ridges were submitted to the NG6, further
consideration of the question was deferred to the next session. In
the first part of the tenth session in 1980, the United States, the
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Soviet Union and some broad margin states had several informal
meetings about the problem of submarine ridges. Their negotiations
were finally completed successfully, and a compromise formula was
produced. According to this formula, firstly, the continental
margin does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic
ridges, and secondly, when there are oceanic ridges, only the
criterion of distance, i.e., 350 miles from the baselines, should be
applied, "even though the Irish formula might otherwise place the
limit of the continental margin further seaward". These two
provisions were included in paras. 3 and 6 of Article 76 of the
second revised text of the ICNT which was issued at the end of the
first of these sessions. The broad margin states, however,
insisted that there should be a distinction between oceanic ridges
and submarine elevations which were natural components of the
continental margin, such as rises, caps, banks and spurs. They
argued that in the case of these elevations both the distance (350
miles) and depth (2500-metre depth plus 100 miles) should be
applied.
These modifications brought about a definition of the
continental shelf which was more or less considered adequate for the
determination of the outer edge of the continental shelf.
Nevertheless, it was difficult to say that the definition was an
expression of opinio -juris of the participating states at the
1 Ac
Conference. In the light of this development, the developing
states which insisted on a 200-mile limit, eventually showed
willingness to accept the agreed formula. The definition of the
continental shelf as agreed in the tenth session, and included in
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the second revision of the ICNT, was finally integrated in Article
76 of the Convention.
The question of revenue sharing was settled by a compromise
which is enumerated in Article 82 of the Convention. Under the
provision, the sovereignty of a coastal state is restricted to its
continental shelf. The coastal state has an obligation to make
payments or contributions in kind in respect of the exploitation of
the non-living resources of the continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles. The payments are to be made to the Authority,
which shall distribute them to states parties on the basis of the
equitable sharing criteria, taking into account the needs and
interests of the developing countries. The payments may amount to
up to 7 per cent of the value or volume of the production. If the
coastal state is a developing state and net importer of one of the
minerals produced from the area in question, that country is exempt
from any payments in respect of that mineral. In fact, the
international community has made the outer limit of the continental
shelf itself into a partially shared area, where the coastal state
acts as an agent of the international communityAs regards the
problem of Sri Lanka, the Conference decided to provide the solution
in the form of a Statement of Understanding contained in an annex to
the Final Act. This Statement of Understanding exempted Sri Lanka,
without directly naming that country, from the application of
Article 76 for the determination of the outer limit of the
Continental Shelf on account that such application results in
inequity. The Statement recognizes instead another method which is
worked out with due regard to the special characteristics of the
continental shelf of Sri Lanka.
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(c) The Continental Shelf under Article 76
Article 76 contains a number of paragraphs. Paragraph 1
reads as follows:
The continental shelf of a coastal state comprises the sea-bed
and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its
territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its
land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or
to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the
outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to
that distance.
The "natural prolongation" argument is assumed as the
cornerstone of the definition of the continental shelf, though this
time its application may be considered either superfluous or, at
most, relevant only to the case of a few coastal states with broad
margins. The two limits are established in this article with
different natures^ While the 200-mile distance is a
geographical limit and does not necessarily have to correspond to
that part of the sea-bed which is a geological natural prolongation
1 08of the land mass, the outer edge of the continental margin
denotes a geomorphological feature determinable in terms of geology
and susceptible to the natural prolongation test. Both these
limits, their apparent detailed specification notwithstanding, pose
some problems however. As regards the determination of a 200-mile
limit, the main problem is the method of drawing the baselines from
which this distance is measured. The Convention adopts, in
Articles 5 and 7, principally the same methods as were recognized in
1958 on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, i.e., straight
baselines for deeply indented coasts or where a fringe of islands
exists in the vicinity of the coast and normal baselines for other
cases. The methods, although not precise and satisfactory,
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constituted a precedent and were not, therefore, a hard-core problem
before the UNCLOS III. The result of the imprecision of the
methods, which is somehow an inherent feature of them, is that
coastal states, in many cases, can more or less arbitrarily
determine the baselines. The application of the method of straight
baselines, if it requires the utilization of straight lines of 200
miles or more, may result in a considerable change of location of
the limits of national jurisdiction.The problem with the
second limit, i.e., the outer edge of the continental margin, is
twofold. Firstly, it is prima facie the intention of the
draftsmen to base this limit on both the geomorphological and
geological characteristics of the sea-bed. This is clear from the
definition given for the continental margin in paragraph 3 which
reads:
The continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation of
the land mass of the coastal state, and consists of the
sea-bed and subsoil of the shelf, the slop and the rise. It
does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges
or the subsoil thereof.
Reference to the "submerged prolongation of the land mass" is
to show the relevance of geological concepts to the definition of
the continental margin. While such a reference in the Truman
Proclamation and to some extent in the 1958 Convention on the
Continental Shelf, which were not intended to be extended to the
continental rise, was warranted, the reference seems to be
unjustified in the case of the continental shelf. Geologically,
the structure of the sediments of the shelf and the slope are
similar to that of the land territory, whereas the rise has a
different structure, maybe more similar to that of the oceanic
crust.Therefore the extension of the concept of natural
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prolongation to the rise seems to be in opposition with the
geological facts.
Geomorphologically, the transition of continental to oceanic
crust usually occurs in wide zones, and the boundary between the two
areas is not necessarily precise and clear.m This brings us to
the second facet of the problem: how to determine the outer edge of
the continental margin? The answer which the convention provides
to this question departs, in fact, from the geomorphological
considerations, and rests principally upon the Irish Formula. In
other words, the outer edge of the continental margin is not the
seaward limit of the continental rise. Paragraph 4 contains the
practical methods for establishing the outer edge of the continental
margin, i.e., the legal continental shelf. It says:
(a) For the purpose of this Convention, the coastal State
shall establish the outer edge of the continental margin
wherever the margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea was
measured, by either: (i) a line delineated in accordance with
paragraph 7 by reference to the outermost fixed points at each
of the thicknesses of the sedimentary rocks which is at least
1 per cent of the shortest distance from such a point to the
foot of the continental slope or (ii) a line delineated in
accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to fixed points not
more than 60 nautical miles from the foot of the continental
slope.
(b) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the foot of
the continental slope shall be determined as the point of
maximum change in gradient at its base.
In both methods laid down in this paragraph, the foot of the
continental slope plays a significant role. The formulation
supplied in paragraph 4(b) hardly clarifies the definition of the
foot of the slope. The ambiguity of the definition stems from its
reliance solely on geomorphological characteristics, while a
reference to the geological criterion which may ascertain the
physical relationship of the foot of the slope with the land mass of
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the continental shelf could further specify the location of the
foot. The ambiguity in the phrase "in the absence of evidence to
the contrary" and the difficulties in locating the precise position
of the points of maximum change in the gradient can render the
application of the foot of the slope as the basis for the
determination of the outer limit somewhat problematical.
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the foot of the slope is
generally much easier to define than the edge of the rise.^^
Another example of the terms used in paragraph 4(a), but
without any definition, are the two words "sedimentary rocks". The
fact is that not all geologists agree on a sole definition for any
1 lO
of these words. The uncertainties of the expressions "foot of
the slope" and "sedimentary rocks" could lead to unpredictable
encroachment of the seabed. Such a situation, however, is
controlled by the introduction of the limits based on depth and
distance criteria in paragraph 5. Thus,
The fixed points comprising the line of the outer limits of
the continental shelf on the sea-bed, drawn in accordance with
paragraph 4(a)(i) and (ii) either shall not exceed 350
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of
the territorial sea is measured or shall not exceed 100
nautical miles from the 2,500 metre isobath, which is a line
connecting the depth of 2,500 metres.
The adoption of these distance and depth criteria is an effort to
ensure the existence of a more ascertainable limit for the outer
edge of the continental shelf, and evidence to the fact that was in
the mind of the draftsmen was not necessarily to superimpose the
legal continental shelf on the geomorphological continental margin,
but only to that part of the margin which contains useful mineral
resources, supposedly oil and gas, for the coastal states.
Oceanic ridges, like the mid-Atlantic ridges, according to paragraph
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3 were not to be included in the definition of the continental
margin even if they were situated in the shallow parts of the sea.
The explanation resided in their geological components, which were
oceanic crust. However, the inclusion in paragraph 5 of the
criterion of 2,500 metre isobath, which was meant to reasonably
limit the outer edge of the legal continental shelf in the areas
with broad and relatively shallow margins, gave rise to the fear
that such a criterion could be employed with regard to the oceanic
ridges to extend the limits of the coastal jurisdiction into the
middle of the oceans. In order to prevent such a thing happening,
paragraph 6 of Article 76 stipulates:
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5, on submarine
ridges, the outer limit of the continental shelf shall not
exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
However, the exclusion of the oceanic ridges from the rule does
not extend to other elevations which are considered as natural
components of the continental margin. Thus, paragraph 6 of Article
76 continues: "This paragraph does not apply to submarine
elevations that are natural components of the continental margin,
such as its plateaux, rises, caps, banks, and spurs". The reference
to "natural components" and examples cited give the impression that
the distinction between oceanic ridges and other elevations on the
continental margin is based on the geological differences and not
the size of those elevations. But if we recall that the fear of
application of the criterion of 2,500-metre depth to the oceanic
ridges was due to the impact of those ridges of the process of the
determination of the outer limit and not because of their geological
composition, the question may arise as to the effect of those
elevations which are natural components of the continental margin,
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but at the same time of such considerable size that may produce a
similar result in respect of establishing the outer edge of the
continental margin. The Convention is silent about these cases.
The preceding investigation explains that both limits
established for the continental shelf, i.e. 200 nautical miles
distance and the outer edge of the continental shelf margin,
are difficult to determine and the methods provided for in
Article 76 are based on concepts which are subject to difficult
interpretations. In order to contain any effort to use these
methods in such a way that the result will be inconsistent with the
purpose of the Article, and also to provide for a unified
interpretation of the methods for establishing the outer limit of
the continental shelf, the Convention, in Article 76(8), envisages
the establishment of a Commission on the limits of the continental
shelf, whose main task is to "make recommendation to coastal states
on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their
continental shelf". The composition, functions and power of the
said Commission are specified in Annex II of the Convention. Annex
II comprises nine Articles. According to Article 2, the Commission
shall consist of 21 members, all experts in the field of geology,
geophysics or hydrography. The members all serve in their personal
capacities. They will be elected within 18 months of the date of
the entry into force of the Convention in a meeting of the states
parties which is to be convened by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations. Article 3 specifies two functions for the
Commission: 1- to consider the information submitted by the coastal
states concerning the outer limit of the continental shelf in areas
beyond 200 nautical miles by a majority two-thirds of members
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present and voting and to make recommendations in accordance with
Article 76 and the statement of understanding, and 2- to provide
scientific and technical advice, if requested by the coastal state.
Both the contents of Articles 4, 5, 6 and the combined reading
of Articles 6(3), 7, 8 suggest that the recommendations of the
Commission are not binding, and do not create any obligation for the
coastal state.While according to Article 8, the coastal state
is obligated to act in conformity with the dictates of Article 76(8)
of the Convention, i.e. to submit information on the limit of the
continental shelf beyond 200 miles, to the Commission, there is no
obligation for the coastal state to accept the Commission's
recommendations.
The purely recommendatory character of the suggestions of the
Commission is due to the fact that the determination of the outer
edge of the continental shelf as a zone under national jurisdiction
was considered, by many delegations, as an exercise of the exclusive
sovereign rights of the coastal states,and the demand of some
delegations to give the Commission the power to make binding
decisions on behalf of the international community was rejected.
Although the argument in support of exclusive competence of the
coastal state in establishing the outer limit of its continental
shelf was probably justifiable before the era of the United Nations
claim on the sea-bed, the creation of the Authority as a subject of
international law, and with a domain of activities which have common
frontiers with the sea-bed under coastal states' jurisdiction,
logically requires some sort of sharing of competence in drawing the
borderline by such states on the one side and the Authority on the
other. Such is not the case, however, and the international
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community or its trustee, the Authority, not only plays hardly any
role in the process of the determination of the outer limit, but it
even lacks the right to remind coastal states which delay defining
the outer limits of their legal continental shelves of their
obligations under the Convention. The last sentence in Article
76(8) stipulates that: "the limits of the shelf established by a
coastal state on the basis of these recommendations shall be final
and binding". It may be inferred from this provision that
continental shelf limits determined as a lawful unilateral act of a
coastal state but not on the basis of the Commission's
recommendations may not gain international recognition, nor be
considered final. Hence, the Commission's lack of competence to
issue binding instructions is not equal to its being merely a formal
body. On the contrary, "the fact that a delimitation will not be
disputable if it agrees with the suggestions of the Commission
. . ."119 ancj tjie roie that the Commission can play in the uniform
and objective application of Article 76, surely contribute to its
1 20
significance.A w
The question which remains unanswered is who will have the
last word in regard to the establishment of the outer limit of the
continental shelf, and what will happen if the coastal state and the
Commission, despite all efforts, cannot agree on the determination
of the limits? It is not clear either if the denial of the coastal
state to establish its continental shelf's limits because of
disagreement with the Commission's recommendations may give rise to
any dispute judiciable before a third-party dispute settlement body
under Part XV of the Convention.121 The definition of the
continental shelf in Article 76 and the methods for the
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determination of its outer limit are undoubtedly more complex than
in the 1958 Convention on the continental shelf. The maximum
limits are now more clearly defined, although the concepts applied
in the definition may be subject to different interpretations.
Article 76 can probably accommodate the claims of almost all coastal
states,122 because the draftsmen have successfully managed to
incorporate sufficiently flexible criteria in that Article so that
128
all interests can be taken into consideration. However, since
one of the main problems before the Conference was the establishment
of the precise limits of national jurisdiction, the real success of
the draftsmen in this respect is questionable and remains to be seen
in practice.
SECTION IV: EVALUATION
A present characteristic of the limits of the coastal
jurisdiction has been their imprecision. This is partly due to the
difficulties of establishing a precise boundary in the sea and
partly due to the reluctance of the coastal states to confine
themselves to a clearly specified limit. This somewhat historical
pattern tended to change when in 1967 the sea-bed and subsoil
thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and their
resources were declared as the common heritage of mankind. The
question of establishing the limits of coastal jurisdiction, which
by then had only one dimension and was acknowledged as a unilateral
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act of the coastal state to be exercised at its own discretion,
found a new international dimension.
The introduction of mankind as holder of rights over the
resources of the sea-bed beyond the area of national jurisdiction
resulted in two movements. The first was the intensification of
the already existing competition for the extension of the coastal
maritime zone, and the second was the effort to establish a precise
boundary between the national and international area. What came
out of the first movement was agreement on a maximum 12-mile
territorial sea and a 200-mile EEZ. The adoption of the latter
took more than 35 per cent of the ocean, containing over 90 per cent
of the living resources of the sea, under the jurisdiction of the
coastal states. It may be noted that the exactness of the limits
established for territorial sea, the contiguous zone and the EEZ is
subject to the flexibility of the rules for establishing the
baselines from which these zones are measured.
As regards the establishment of the boundaries between
national and international sea-bed areas, which constituted the
second movement, the result of the efforts embodied in Article 76
can hardly be described as successful and, despite their impressive
detailed appearance, may not produce a precise boundary. While in
the case of the territorial sea or the EEZ, the imprecision and lack
of uniformity may depend solely on the rules for establishing the
baselines, in the case of the continental shelf the determination of
both the baselines and the outer limit is subject to extensive
interpretations of the rules.A great disadvantage of Article
76 is that it does not envisage the slightest role for the Authority
as the trustee of mankind in the international sea-bed area to
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participate in the determination of its common boundaries with
coastal states, since the establishment of the borderlines between
the two areas is under the competence of the coastal states.12^
While no mechanism has been provided to defend the integrity
of the Area and the interests of mankind in the event of possible
excesses by a coastal state in the determination of the outer limit
of its continental shelf, the Convention does contain provisions
aimed at the protection of the interests of coastal states where
activities are conducted in the Area with respect to resource
deposits which lie across the limits separating the Area from the
continental shelf. In this case, activities in the Area shall be
conducted with regard to the rights and interests of that state. A
set of procedures has been formulated to protect the rights and
interests of the state concerned including prior consultation with
such a state and notification, and, in some cases, the requirement
of its consent (Article 142 of the Convention). In these
situations, it can be anticipated that the application of Article
142 of the Convention"'"2^ will be difficult and it is even "possible
that the Authority could be restrained from exploiting deposits less
than five to six hundred miles from the coast because of uncertainty
about jurisdictional limits".127 Finally, it should be noted that
the borderline drawn between the continental shelf and the Area is
in the majority of cases the line of distinction between the area of
organic and the area of non-organic resources, principally the
polymetallic nodules.
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This situation was quite unthinkable in 1967 when the idea of
an international sea-bed area under international management was
born. We share Ogley's view where he says:
UNCLOS thus continued, for the sea-bed as well as the seas
themselves, the process of "enclosure" that had begun with the
Truman Proclamation of 1945. The possibility that what was
left unenclosed might become the "common heritage of mankind"
has not arrested this trend. The Convention made it clear
that what would be left to the International Authority would
be a severely attenuated version of what Pardo could have
envisaged in 1967, if the limits of national jurisdiction has
been frozen. 128
In retrospect may be the adoption of one unified criterion of
a 200-miles distance for both the EEZ and the continental shelf as
the best solution, because it was, firstly, more precise and easier
to establish than the complicated formulae which are now
incorporated in Article 76(4) and (6) and, secondly, the area of the
common heritage of mankind could be at least 14 million square
kilometres more than what it supposedly is today. In short, the
international Sea-bed Area is the portion of the sea-bed which comes
directly after the outer limit of the continental margin. This
margin does not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines of
territorial sea or 100 nautical miles from the 2500 metre isobath
1 OQ
which is a line connecting the depth of 2500 metres. 7
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2. See UN Doc. A/7230, p.11, para. 49. In this respect, the
views expressed by Belgium (A/AC.135/SR.1-9, p.35), the United
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THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE SEA-BED
UNDER CLASSIC DOCTRINES
SECTION I: THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE SEA-BED
AND ITS RESOURCES
The question of the legal status of the sea-bed and its
resources has been the subject of many discussions since the turn of
this century. The introduction of the continental shelf doctrine
in 1945 intensified the debates on the sea-bed beyond the
territorial sea. The United Nations General Assembly, in 1967,
officially opened the debate on the legal status of the deep sea-bed
area and its resources. In fact, sea-bed debates have been going
on since 1967 until today.
In the case of the continental shelf, firstly, the
establishment of the sea-bed legal status was important in view of
the exclusive rights of the coastal states against flag states. In
the case of the deep sea-bed area, secondly, the question is not the
right of coastal states, but the right of the whole international
community to the resources of the deep sea-bed area.
In The North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the Roman Law
doctrines of res nullius or res communis were examined against a
legal right of the coastal states over the continental shelf based
on "natural prolongation" and "adjacency" arguments. Finally, in
the issue of the deep sea-bed area, we see the re-rising of res
nullius. res communis doctrines and the principle of the freedom of
the high seas versus the new concept of the common heritage of
mankind.
Res nullius refers, in Roman law, to the things which do not
belong to anyone, but are susceptible to being owned,^ such as wild
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animals, birds and fish. What is meant by res communis^ in civil
law is things common to all; that is, those things which are used
and enjoyed by everyone, even in single parts, but can never be
exclusively acquired as a whole, e.g., light, air, running water.
In fact, these classic doctrines dealt with the rights and duties of
individuals in respect of other individuals within the Roman Empire
and, therefore, had a private nature. Their sole purpose was to
define different sorts of ownership among individuals within the
O
same national community. As regards the sea, the classic
doctrines were designed only to regulate the relations among the
subjects of the Roman Empire, indeed, no "free use of the sea for
peoples outside the Empire . .
The modern application of the classic doctrines has been used
with respect to relations among states. Generally speaking, the
technologically advanced countries have chosen to base their claims
on using the sea on res nullius or res communis doctrines as
representing existing international law. It is arguable whether
these classical terms can be used at all to justify new situations
which were unthinkable at the time of their formation.
It is worthwhile to examine in this chapter the origin of these
two Roman Law doctrines and to see how they have been employed to
justify the claims of rights to the sea-bed and subsoil and the
resources thereof. This examination covers also the developments
of the principle of the freedom of the high seas, and the nature of
the arguments based on the ancient doctrines in comparison to the
concept of the common heritage of mankind and the arguments derived
from that. The following chapter is devoted to the concept of the
common heritage as a new element of international law.
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SECTION lis CLAIMS OF RIGHTS BASED ON RES NULLIUS DOCTRINE
With respect to the resources of the sea-bed, the reference to
the res nullius doctrine was primarily in connection with the
sedentary fisheries on the sea-bed outside the limits of the
territorial sea.~* Vattel, the famous jurist of the 18th century is
often quoted as being one of the first writers who treated the
question of the legal status of sedentary fisheries.^ He regarded
the sedentary fish as capable of being owned, because nature has
placed them within the reach of the coastal state and that state may
capture them in the same way as they have captured the land they
inhabit.^ His main argument was that, unlike free-swimming fish,
sedentary fish are exhaustible, and therefore it is inevitable that
the coastal state should have exclusive right to them.
To base these claims of rights on a legal doctrine, later
writers during the early decades of this century developed Vattel's
views and extended the res nullius doctrine to the sea-bed outside
the territorial sea but close to the coast. Sir C.J.B. Hurst, for
example, treated the sea-bed not as part of the sea but as a
O
territory covered by the high seas and, therefore, res nullius.
Occupation is one of the means by which such rights may be acquired
under this doctrine.^ The practice of states in respect to the
sedentary fisheries was often justified by claiming the existence of
the status of effective occupation. Under the arguments of the
advocates of the res nullius doctrine, one can point to two common
elements. They believe that the occupation should be effective and
it should be enforced by states or through frequent activities of
their nationals. With regard to the second element, res nullius is
different from its original Roman law form which was to regulate the
relations between individuals rather than states. Moreover, there
is no clear indication in the writings of these advocates as to what
constituted effective occupation of the sea-bed and its resources.
What later writers have suggested is equal to physical presence in
order to guarantee the exclusion of foreigners, and carrying out
activities which are regulated by domestic legislation.^ This
definition is not exhaustive, and it seems that there are still some
misinterpretations about the meaning of effective occupation in the
sea.H However, it is clear that the emphasis on effective
occupation as a conditio sine qua non for the acquisition of title
to the sea-bed and its resources such as sedentary fisheries, was
inspired not only by the practice of states regarding the
acquisition of right over terra nullius, but also by recognition in
international law of occupation as a form of acquisition which was
1 ?
legalized by the 1885 Act of Berlin. The notion of effectiveness
as regards the occupation of unclaimed territories suffered a
radical change after two international arbitrations in 1928 and
1931, and a judgement of PCIJ in 1933. These cases have some
connections with the discussion relating to the legal status of the
sea-bed and its resources after the introduction of the Truman
Proclamation.
The first of these was the Island of Palmas case of 1928
1 O
between the Netherlands and the United States. J The United States
had claimed that, according to Article III of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain from 1898, this island, which is
located between the Philippines and Borneo and was considered to be
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included in the Philippines archipelago, was ceded to the United
States. The Netherlands, on the other hand, had based its claim of
sovereignty on the agreements signed with the native princes, as
well as the peaceful continuous display of state authority over the
island.^ The claims of the United States were based on the
titles of discovery, contiguity and recognition by treaty. The
sole arbitrator, Max Huber, the President of PCIJ at that time,
considered the American claim to the title of discovery as inchoate
title, which could not prevail over a definite title founded on a
continuous and peaceful display of sovereignty.^ The title of
contiguity, in the arbitrator's opinion, had no foundation in
1 f)
international law. °
The Dutch had not directly displayed their sovereignty over the
island very often. In fact, during the 18th and 19th centuries
there were considerable gaps in the evidence of continuous
display.^ The arbitrator, bearing in mind that manifestation of
sovereignty over a distant island could not be expected to be
frequent, ruled that the exercise of some acts of state authority
such as visits of Dutch ships to the island between 1895 and 1906,
and the existence of things such as flags or coats of arms, as
external signs of sovereignty could:
. . . constitute a beginning of establishment of sovereignty by
continuous and peaceful display of a state authority, or a
commencement of occupation of an island not yet forming a part
of the territory of a state, and such a state of things would
create in favour of the Netherlands an inchoate title for
completing the conditions of sovereignty. 18
The classical elements of effective occupation of an unoccupied
territory, i.e. settlement, administration and uninterrupted use
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were thus challenged as a result of the isolation of the island in
question.
The second case was that of the Clipperton Island between
France and Mexico. The Clipperton Island is in the Pacific Ocean
and lies off the Mexican coast. The sovereignty over this island
was the subject of dispute between France and Mexico. The two
states referred the dispute by an agreement of 1909 to the King of
Italy, Victor Emmanuel III, as an arbitrator, who rendered his
decision in 1931. The French claim of sovereignty over the
island was based on the fact that, in 1858, a French commercial
vessel had been in the vicinity of the island, but due to very
difficult weather conditions and despite several efforts, it had had
to adjourn without leaving any sign of sovereignty on the island.
Before leaving the region, the captain, on board the vessel, had
drawn up a proclamation of French sovereignty over the island, and
some geographical notes had also been taken. The French consulate
in Honolulu, a few weeks after this unsuccessful effort, had
notified the Government of Hawaii of the assumption of sovereignty
over Clipperton Island by the French Government. There was no
dispute over this uninhabited island until 1898, when Mexico,
according to a French inquiry addressed the Government of the United
States concerning the activities of some American citizens on the
island, claiming that the island, belonging to the Spanish
Government in North America, came under Mexican sovereignty in 1836
as a result of succession.
The arbitrator, refusing the allegation of discovery by Spain,
maintained that, even if the island had been discovered by Spain, it
would have been necessary to establish if Spain had the right to
- 106 -
incorporate the island in its possessions and if it had effectively
exercised this right. These were not, according to the arbitrator,
established. Moreover, Mexico had not supported its claim of
historic rights by any manifestation of sovereignty over the
island.^
The arbitrator upheld the French claim and rejected the opinion
that an occupation which is not effective cannot be the basis of
taking possession. The decision of the court explained that the
requisites of occupation had become more flexible, and what was
required was an occupation which was appropriate and possible under
21
the given circumstances.
The third case in question is the legal status of Eastern
90
Greenland case. This case, like the previous two, was to examine
what amount of authority had to be exercised over an unsettled
island in order to establish possession. Norway, by a declaration
of 10 July 1931, officially announced taking possession of Eastern
Greenland which was, unlike other parts of the island, uncolonized
by Denmark. Denmark, which had a claim of sovereignty over the
whole of the island, raised a suit against Norway in the PCIJ.
Denmark contended that the area which was declared occupied by
Norway was, at the time of occupation, subject to Danish sovereignty
because it was a part of Greenland, and Denmark had sovereignty over
the whole island. Danish propositions in support of this
contention were that its sovereignty in Greenland had been
continuously and peacefully exercised and had never been contested
by any power. Moreover, Norway had recognized Danish sovereignty
over Greenland as a whole.^ Norway, on the other hand, submitted
that Denmark had not colonized Eastern Greenland, and at the time of
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Norwegian occupation, that area was terra nullius. Norway further
maintained that the Danish attitude between 1915 and 1921, when it
had approached various powers to have its position in Greenland
recognized by them, was disagreeing with a claim to be already in
0 /
possession of the sovereignty over the whole of Greenland.
The court found sufficient evidence for the Danish claim of
peaceful and continuous display of state authority over the island
for many centuries, and particularly in 1915 when Denmark initiated
measures to obtain the recognition of its title over Greenland by
other states. The treaties applying to Greenland as a whole, and
granting concession for trading etc., and legislation establishing
the breadth of the territorial sea, were all, to the court, evidence
of Denmark's will and intention to exercise sovereignty over the
island. The court, accepting these treaties and concessions, and
emphasizing will and intention to exercise sovereignty as evidence
of effective occupation, pronounced:
It is impossible to read the records of the decisions in cases
as to territorial sovereignty without observing that in many
cases the tribunal has been satisfied with very little in the
way of the actual exercise of sovereign rights, provided that
the other states could not make out a superior claim. This is
particularly true in the case of claims to sovereignty over
areas in thinly populated or unsettled countries. 25
One important feature of this case, which is usually neglected
by those who try to apply it to the deep sea-bed area, is the
relation between the effectiveness of occupation and the extent of
competing claims of other states. The court, in its decision, took
into account the fact that up to 1931 there was no claim by any
9fS
power other than Denmark to the sovereignty over Greenland.
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These three cases, and in particular the Clipperton Island
case, relinquished the effectiveness of occupation as an indispens-
27
able requisite for the acquisition of a title over a res nullius.
The advocates of the res nullius doctrine have focused on the cases
mentioned above in order to validate the exploitation of the sea-bed
resources.
The introduction of the Truman Proclamation in 1945, and the
numerous claims of different coastal states over the sea-bed beyond
the limits of territorial sea, re-opened the discussions about the
legal status of the sea-bed and its resources. Those who defended
the position of the sea-bed beyond the territorial sea as res
nullius, cited arguments based on the aforesaid cases and the
relativity of the effectiveness of the occupation. The question of
the legal status of the sea-bed was extensively discussed in the
28
International Law Association in its 43rd and 44th conferences.
The Rapporteur of the Committee for the Rights to the Sea-Bed and
Subsoil, in his 1950 report with regard to the issuing of several
proclamations claiming rights over the sea-bed and lack of
objections to those proclamations, concluded that:
These official documents appear to proceed on the assumption
not only that the continental shelf is a res nullius but also
that control and jurisdiction over this res nullius can be
acquired without effective occupation being necessary. 29
The Rapporteur himself was of the opinion that the development was
towards the recognition of the control and jurisdiction over the
continental shelf as a right either vested ipso jure in the coastal
state, or vested in that state by virtue of national occupation,
e.g. by proclamation.
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Contrary to the general trend of thought at the beginning of
the 1950s, which was in favour of a new basis for exclusive rights
over the resources of the continental shelf, Waldock, in an article
about claims of rights to the continental shelf, defended the basis
of effective occupation. He wrote:
It must now suffice to say that after the Island of Palmas,
Eastern Greenland, and Clipperton Island cases, it seems
impossible to maintain that actual settlement or exploitation
is a sine qua non of effective occupation. Occupation, in the
modern law, is the assumption of sovereignty rather than
appropriation of property and these three cases lay down
clearly that what is required is effective display of state
activity in such a manner as the circumstances of the territory
demand. 31
Another important article was written by Lauterpacht. With
regard to the question of effective occupation, he wrote:
The Clipperton Island case shows that the notion of occupation,
as traditionally understood, may be valueless, in relation to
some areas, for the purpose of acquiring title. Such areas are
not only those which are uninhabited but also those which are
normally uninhabitable. 32
In extending his argument to the sea-bed, he referred to the
Clipperton Island and Eastern Greenland cases, and stated:
They show that there are situations in which occupation, in the
normal meaning of the words, is not required at all and in
which the conception of the occupation is a more or less
deceptive figure of speech. If this is so with regard to
inhabited or sparsely inhabited territory, it is particularly
true in relation to uninhabitable areas such as the seabed and
its subsoil. 33
Lauterpacht further maintained that, in modern international
law, effective occupation could not be considered as a stable
condition for acquisition of title, and the requirement of
effectiveness of occupation is a matter of degree.^ By asserting
this, he did not mean to extend the res nullius concept to the
sea-bed but, on the contrary, he tried to prove that there was no
need to rely on effective occupation to acquire title, because this
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notion had lost its normal meaning. In response to those who
claimed that issuing of proclamations is evidence of virtual
occupation, he maintained:
There is probably no more than dialectics in the attempt
to combine the requirement of occupation with a denial
of it by reducing it to a formal claim in the form of a
proclamation. 35
The International Law Commission dealt with the question of the
continental shelf from 1950 to 1956. The first thing to be
established, in respect of the legal status of the continental
shelf, was that this question and the issue of sedentary fisheries
were different and should not be mixed. This view was held by many
OZl
members of the Commission. According to Brierly, in the case of
sedentary fisheries, it was a question of a right acquired by
occupation, while not the same in the case of the continental
07
shelf.It was generally accepted in the 1950s that the concept
of res nullius could not be applied to the continental shelf,
because numerous proclamations which had been issued since 1945 were
evidence of claims of exclusive rights by the coastal states. The
status of the continental shelf as res nullius would entitle any
state, and not only the coastal state, to acquire rights over it,
OO
and that was inadmissible.
The ILC, in its 1950 Report to the General Assembly, submitted
that the right of a coastal state over the continental shelf was
independent of the concept of occupation. The ILC's comments on
the issue in 1953 and 1956 were on the same lines. In its 1953
Report to the General Assembly, the Commission held that:
Once the seabed and subsoil have become the object of active
interest to states with the view to the exploration and
exploitation of their resources, it is not practicable to treat
them as res nullius, i.e. capable of being acquired by the
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first occupier. It is natural that the coastal states should
resist such a solution. 39
The 1956 ILC Report to the General Assembly contains almost the
same wording.It is obvious from the texts of the ILC comments
that, in the discussions concerning the legal basis of coastal
states' rights over the continental shelf, the res nullius concept
was used with respect to its original meaning in the Roman law.
The Commission considered the effective occupation of the submarine
areas in question as practically impossible and believed that the
resources should not be handed to the fictional occupation either.^
It should be mentioned here that the Commission made a
distinction between the sea-bed and its resources. What was
discussed were the exclusive rights of the coastal states in respect
of the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the
continental shelf.
The Draft Articles concerning the continental shelf, prepared
by the Commission, were adopted by the First United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958, and were incorporated in
the Convention on the Continental Shelf. There were a few
references to res nullius in that Conference, all in rejection of
the concept of res nullius as a legal basis for the exclusive right
over the resources of the continental shelf.
In short, while in the case of the sedentary fisheries, res
nullius was applied with defective content both to the resources and
the sea-bed, in the continental shelf case, this concept was applied
to the resources of the sea-bed with its proper Roman law meaning,
but was rejected as an alternative of rights to those resources.
In fact, the sedentary fisheries were worked in the vicinity of the
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coast and generally by the coastal state, res nullius and its
effective occupation element assisted the coastal state in keeping
the foreigners out. But, when the foreign occupation of the
continental shelf, particularly the European rush to the Gulf of
Mexico and its oil reserves, started, the concept of res nullius
could not hold good any longer.^ That was when the claim of an
ipso jure right over the continental shelf based on "natural
prolongation" and "adjacency" was born.
The proposal of Malta's representative to the General Assembly
in 1967, which was inspired by the will for the reservation of the
sea-bed for peaceful purposes and uses of its resources in the
interest of mankind, was the starting point for the period of the
sea-bed regime.
Malta's proposal contained a new idea - the common heritage
of mankind. It was, in this respect, similar to the proclamation
of the President of the United States issued in 1945. The Truman
Proclamation had been issued by the most powerful state in the world
at the time, and its aim was, in fact, to safeguard the interests of
the U.S. in the adjacent submarine areas. Malta's proposal was put
forward by one of the smallest states of the world which spoke more
on behalf of all poor developing countries than a nation in search
of protecting its own interests. The ever increasing competition
between the super powers in developing arms on the sea-bed as well
as the rapid development of the sea-bed area technology, which made
possible the use of the mineral resources of the sea-bed, had caused
deep concern among all nations, but particularly the smaller, and
Malta's proposal was the manifestation of that anxiety.
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Unlike the Truman Proclamation, which gave the coastal state
exclusive right over the resources of its continental shelf, Malta's
proposal was an effort to keep the sea-bed beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction out of the grasp of any individual state.
Clearly, this could not be approved by those who had the technology
and a great need for those mineral resources, and that was when the
res nullius concept with its occupational element re-emerged in
discussions and writings, because it could enable a few states with
the required technology know-how and capital to exclusively exploit
the sea-bed area and its resources.1^
What is common between sedentary fisheries, resources of the
continental shelf and the mineral resources of the sea-bed area
beyond national jurisdiction, is the need of exclusive rights for a
rather long time in order to develop and exploit them. It is
particularly true about the minerals of the sea-bed area because,
due to the amount of investment required, their economical
exploitation would require exclusive rights to a single area of the
sea-bed for exploration followed by extensive mining operation for a
long period of time.^
In fact, in the course of discussion in the Sea-Bed Committee,
later, in the UNCLOS III, it was never seriously held that the
sea-bed area or its resources was res nullius. On the contrary,
while some writers were trying to influence the course of discussion
in the Sea-Bed Committee by bringing arguments in support of res
nullius, many delegations in the Committee explicitly rejected this
concept and its application to sea-bed mining.^ The U.S., for
example, repeatedly indicated that it did not consider the deep
AO
sea-bed resources as res nullius.
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The supporters of the res nullius here, too, based their
arguments on the similarity of the sea-bed and unclaimed land (terra
nullius). Richard Young, for example, in a speech before the
American Society of International Law in 1968 mentioned:
The existing customary law is, of course, rudimentary with
respect to the deep sea floor. I would presume, however, that
under this law it is possible in principle for a state to
acquire rights of a territorial character over a portion of the
floor through occupation. This view would accord with the
general principles for the acquisition of territory on land,
and supported in some measure by a limited amount of practice
with respect to such resources as a sedentary fisheries. 49
He, nevertheless, concluded that with regard to the amount of the
operations necessary to recover the resources, the conflicting uses
and national interests involved, the existing legal base was not
adequate.^ Once again due attention was paid to the exclusive
right of the coastal states to the sedentary fisheries as well as
the relinquishment of the classical content of the effective
occupation element. Moreover, at this stage, a new argument was
added, based on the practice of states in respect to the emplacement
of submarine cables and pipelines on the deep sea-bed which,
according to the proponents of res nullius supports the validity of
exclusive claims beyond national jurisdiction and thereby the
applicability of the res nullius doctrine."^
Maybe the most outstanding illustration of this position was
the filing of an application in 1974, with the office of the United
States Secretary of State by Deep Sea Venture Inc., an American
company, for registration of a notice of discovery and claim of
exclusive rights in an area of the deep sea-bed in the Pacific
CO
Ocean. The draftsmen of this document were also supporters of
the applicability of the res nullius concept with regard to the deep
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sea-bed minerals.^ The claim was made for an area of 60,000
square kilometres which, after 15 years of exploration, would be
reduced to 30,000 square kilometres for a 40 year period of
exploitation.^ It was asserted that the claim was validly
established "under existing international law as evidenced by the
practice of states, the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and general
rules of law recognized by civilized nations" The reference
by the draftsmen of the Deep Sea Ventures Inc. to the practice of
states was prima facie to the coastal state exclusive right upon the
sedentary fisheries, as well as claims of sovereignty in the Island
of Palms, the Clipperton Island and the legal status of Eastern
Greenland cases. Reference to the Convention on the High Seas was
due to the fact that the freedoms of the high seas were enumerated
in this Convention, and the draftsmen by mentioning this Convention
as one of the legal bases for their claim, made an effort to show
that, while they believed in the principle of the freedom of the
high seas and its applicability to deep sea-bed mining, they were of
the opinion that this freedom was a qualified one in the sense that
minerals were free to all as long as there was no claim, but as soon
as the first claim was registered, the resources in situ, i.e.,
before their extraction, became the property of the claimer.^ In
this way, the draftsmen tried to make an analogy between manganese
nodules and fish.-^ The difference seems to be that fish are res
nullius and free until they are caught and owned, and only those
fish become the fisherman's property and come into his profit, but
manganese nodules need to come under the ownership of the one
who gets title over them long before they reach the stage of
exploitation, and besides, if we accept the res nullius status of
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those resources, unlike fish, the number of which is decided by the
size of the net, the quantity of manganese nodules is not determined
by the capacity of the digging machine, but by the arbitrary
decision of the holder of the title. What the draftsmen meant by
general rules of law were those recognized by civilized nations
practice relative to the systems of mining rights in areas such as
Spitzbergen, South Africa and Australia, which had been peacefully
CO
exercised for some time.
Efforts were made, in this claim, to make a distinction between
the manganese nodules lying on the ocean floor, and the deep sea-bed
itself; this was in order to combine the principle of the freedom
of the high seas, which was the official position of the United
States pending the coming into force of a new international
agreement about the legal status of the sea-bed, with the necessity
of claiming exclusive rights to the manganese nodules.
The whole of this claim and the frame of its registration at
the office of the Secretary of State is based on a previous case
from the turn of this century, namely, the case of mining claims in
Spitzbergen as a terra nullius. The Spitzbergen islands were,
since the time of their discovery at the end of the 16th century,
the subject of contesting claims by the British, the Dutch,
Russians, Canadians and Norwegians. These claims were generally
for the right of sealing and whaling, or hunting for furs and oil.
In the 19th century, even mining of coal was started by private
persons without any state exercising sovereignty over the island.
What the coal miners did in order to establish their exclusive right
was to file a claim on a marked-out area, called a tract, with the
foreign office of their respective countries. This regime and the
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rights of private persons from different countries acquired in this
way were recognized by all those states which had a claim on
Spitzbergen. After World War I, the 1920 Treaty of Paris put an
end to this regime, and recognized the Norwegian sovereignty over
these islands.
Goldie, in an article which was the basis of the Deep Sea
Venture Inc. claim to an area of the deep sea-bed, made an analogy
between the mining tracts in Spitzbergen and mining sites of the
deep sea-bed, and claimed:
. . . it can reasonably be argued that when an ocean bed
resources of hard minerals has been developed and is being
worked, the developing enterprise establishes, by that
activity, a valid claim of right to an area equivalent to a
tract on dry land. 60
In this analogy between unclaimed land and the deep sea-bed area,
several assumptions have been made in order to arrive at a desired
conclusion. The sea-bed, for example, is supposed to be similar to
unclaimed land. It is also supposed that private persons can
develop the deep sea-bed mining sites in the same way as they did in
Spitzbergen, and then, as a result of this supposition, it is
submitted that a notification by the private person to the foreign
office of his country would suffice. Even if one accepts that the
sea-bed is res nullius in the sense of an unclaimed land, it is
generally understood, with regard to the previous practice of states
in the case of sedentary fisheries or continental shelf, that only
states may appropriate the deep sea-bed. Moreover, sporadic acts
of some private persons in a few places in the world for a limited
time cannot constitute the "general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations".61
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The Deep Sea Ventures Inc. claim, besides being filed with the
office of the Secretary of State of the United States, was sent for
notification to several states and a number of organizations and
private persons. Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia rejected
it and the United States, while repeating its official stand, i.e.
the applicability of the principle of the freedom of the high seas,
expressly declared that it did not "recognize exclusive mining
rights to the mineral resources of an area of the sea-bed beyond the
f\ 9
limits of national jurisdiction".
That brings us to the conclusion that all arguments invoked by
advocates of the res nullius concept as the basis of claim of
exclusive right to the deep sea-bed resources are misrepresented.
Examples in support of this position are almost always taken from
the exercise of exclusive right on a piece of unclaimed land. There
is no reason why these examples should be extended to the deep
sea-bed. On the contrary, the weight of opinion is in support of
rejecting such an extension. The rejection of this res nullius
concept and its effective occupation element in the 1958 Convention
on the Continental Shelf was a clear indication of the will and
practice of states in this respect. The analogy with the case of
sedentary fisheries is of no help either. It is true that both
these fisheries and manganese nodules are exhaustible, but there are
some differences between them. The sedentary fisheries, for
example, have been worked in areas adjacent to the coast and, like
oil fields of the continental shelf, it was reasonable to regard the
coastal state as holder of title over them. Manganese nodules are
generally found in the middle of oceans, and very far from the
limits of any national jurisdiction. The only element of res
- 119 -
nullius which could be found in the manganese nodules, at least
until 1970 when the Declaration of Principles was adopted by the
General Assembly, was that they did not belong to any state or
person. But unlike a res nullius, they were the subject of
conflicting claims, and even if any claim to the res nullius status
of those resources could have been considered before 1970, since
that date the claim of title by the international community has
certainly rendered that consideration impracticable.
Finally, it should be noted that the suggested analogy between
manganese nodules and fish is a false one. The acceptance of the
EEZ concept by most coastal states has diminished the importance of
this analogy, because according to the EEZ regime, the greatest part
of the fish will come under national jurisdiction.
SECTION III: CLAIMS OF RIGHTS BASED ON RES COMMUNIS DOCTRINE
AND FREEDOM OF THE HIGH SEAS
While res nullius was basically used to designate things which
were found on land, the most significant example of res communis has
been the sea. What is meant by res communis in civil law are things
common to all; that is, those things which are used and enjoyed by
every one, even in single parts, but can never be exclusively owned
as a whole, e.g., light, air, running water, etc.^
The relation between res communis and access to the seas was
elaborated by the father of modern international law, Grotius,^
defended free access in his famous book, The Freedom of the Seas,
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which he wrote in 1604 in order to protect the Dutch interests
against its enemy. Chapter XII of the book, under the title of
"Mare Liberum", was published in 1609. The main purpose of that
chapter was to justify the freedom of navigation for the purpose of
trade. Speaking about the sea in his book, Grotius says:
The sea is common to all, because it is so limitless that it
cannot become a possession of any one, and because it is
adopted for the use of all, whether we consider it from the
point of view of navigation or of fisheries.
It is clear from "Mare Liberum" that the legal basis on which
Grotius had built up the doctrine of the freedom of the high seas is
that of res communis because it is an essential instrument to
international navigation and trade. This connection between the
res communis doctrine and the principle of the freedom of the high
seas has not been necessarily held by many later writers, and the
said principle has often been referred to as an independent
principle from the res communis doctrine. It has even been
regarded by some, in view of the exploitation of the resources of
the sea-bed, as a totally independent alternative for the rejection
of both res nullius and res communis doctrines.^
During discussions about the sedentary fisheries, the
continental shelf, and later the sea-bed issue, there have been many
writers supporting the view that the high seas and the land covered
by it are indivisible, and the same legal regime should be applied
to both. The conclusion generally is that the sea-bed, like the
superjacent waters, is res communis and the principle of the freedom
of the high seas applies to the sea-bed as well. For example,
Higgins and Colombus, in their book of 1943, The International Law
of the Sea, wrote:
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As regards the . . . [sea-bed], the better opinion appears to
be that it is incapable of occupation by any state and thus its
legal status is the same as that of the waters of the open sea
above it. The same reason for maintaining it unappropriated
in the interests of the freedom of navigation apply with equal
force, to the bed of the sea. 67
During the debate about the continental shelf resources in the
ILA and the ILC, there were a few scholars who argued that the legal
nature of the sea-bed as something common to all human beings
required an international administration of these resources. In
1950, Hsu, a member of the ILC said that he:
. . . took a stand on the universally recognized principle that
the high seas were the property of the international community.
Why then not entrust the development of the continental shelf
resources to the international community? Why not a joint
exploitation of continental shelf resources? 68
The idea of the international administration of the resources
of the sea-bed because of its status as res communis was, in 1951,
taken up again by another member of the ILC, Spiropoulos, who
expressed the view that:
. . . he must repeat that the best solution would be the
establishment of an international board for the protection of
the resources of the sea. That board might be in some sort, a
specialized agency. Such a course would enable the commission
to achieve its purpose ... 69
G. Scelle, a strong supporter of the unity of the high seas and
the sea-bed, while criticizing the ILC for recognition of the
sovereign rights of the coastal states in their continental shelf,
wondered:
. . . why the International Law Commission did not follow in
this field [the continental shelf] the course it adopted with
regard to fisheries on the high seas, whereby the necessary
power of regulation is entrusted to an international
administrative authority. 70
He further suggested:
An international administrative authority set up within the
framework of the United Nations shall be competent to deal with
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any application from natural or juridical persons supported by
one or more governments, with a view to prospecting,
investigating and exploiting the resources of the bed and
subsoil of the high seas. 71
As regards the continental shelf, the opinion that this part of
the sea-bed is res communis did not become very popular, and except
for a few jurists who could not find any legal basis in the coastal
7 9
state's claim over the continental shelf, the prevailing opinion
was that the rights to the resources of the continental shelf
belonged, ipso jure, to the coastal state.
It should be noted that the adoption of a separate legal regime
for the continental shelf by the ILC and in the 1958 Convention on
the Continental Shelf did not prevent many writers from continuing
to assert the unity of the sea-bed and superjacent waters, and this
70
has been repeated since then quite often. J The result was that,
when discussions about the exploitation of the mineral resources of
the deep sea-bed started in the middle of the 1960s, the principle
of the freedom of the high seas, as distinct from res communis,
which had then been used more as signifying a common property rather
than a common use,^ and the applicability of that principle to the
deep sea-bed and mining of its resources, was advocated by a group
of states which were against the internationalization of the
exploitation of these resources. One ground of these states was
that, as the freedom of the high seas is extended to the air space
above them too, there was no reason why it should not be extended to
the deep sea-bed and its resources. In other words, the supporters
of this approach, using an analogy, claimed that the principle of
the freedom of the high seas should be automatically extended to the
deep sea-bed. This was objected to by developing countries."
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Another ground was that the freedom of laying submarine cables and
pipelines on the bottom of the high seas is evidence of the
extension of the principle of the freedom of the high seas to that
area.^ The problem with these kinds of premises is that flying
over the high seas and laying submarine cables and pipelines had
been subject to many international negotiations, and there was
virtually no protest against any state practice in those respects.
That was why freedom of overflight and freedom of laying submarine
cables and pipelines were adopted in Article 2 of the Convention on
the High Seas as existing rules of international law. The exploit¬
ation of manganese nodules was, in the middle of the 1960s, a new
possible activity, and there was neither state practice nor general
agreement in that area to establish a rule of international law.
The advocates of the res communis doctrine, or the extension
of the freedom of the high seas to the sea-bed, generally assert
that neither the water nor the sea-bed can be the subject of
appropriation on any sovereign right, but manganese nodules, like
fish, can be appropriated.^
The principle of the freedom of the high seas and its
applicability to the deep sea-bed was originally supported by some
of the developed countries and the majority of the socialist states,
which during the discussions at the Sea-Bed Committee took this
7 8
position. This view was strongly opposed by most of the
developing countries. The source most often cited as evidence of
the fact that the exploitation of deep sea-bed resources is a
freedom of the high seas has been Article 2 of the 1958 Convention
on the High Seas and the legislative history of that article. The
article reads:
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The high seas being open to all nations, no state may validly
purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty.
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid
down by these articles and by other rules of international law.
It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal
states:
(1)freedom of navigation;
(2) freedom of fishing;
(3) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) freedom to fly over the high seas. 79
The supporters of the extension of the freedom of the high seas
to the deep sea-bed mining argue that the deliberate insertion of
"inter alia", in Article 2 by its draftsmen is to render the list of
freedoms non-exclusive. They further refer to the commentary on
this article by the ILC where the Commission emphasizes that:
The list of freedoms of the high seas contained in this article
is not restrictive. The commission has merely specified four
of the main freedoms, but it is aware that there are other
freedoms, such as freedom to explore or exploit the subsoil of
the high seas and freedom to engage in scientific research
therein. 80
It seems that the "inter alia" clause in this article is a qualified
expression, because after naming four of the freedoms, the draftsmen
define "inter alia" as comparing "other freedoms which are
Q1
recognized by the general principles of international law. ■L By
this definition it becomes considerably clear that the "inter alia"
clause does not include just any freedom, but only those which are
QO
recognized by the general principles of international law. What
was in the minds of the ILC members while drafting this article, as
evident from their commentary, was freedom of scientific research
O O
and freedom of undertaking nuclear weapon tests on the high seas,
because there was some state practice in both cases. On the other
hand, the question of exploitation of the resources of the sea-bed
and subsoil beyond the limits of the continental shelf had not yet
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assumed, in the opinion of the Commission, sufficient practical
importance to justify special regulation.
Since the purpose of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas,
according to its preambular paragraph, was to "codify the rules of
international law relating to the high seas", and because of that
the provisions adopted in it were considered as "generally
declaratory of established principles of international law", the non
inclusion of freedom of exploitation of the sea-bed resources beyond
the continental shelf confirms the fact that this freedom did not
O C
exist as a general principle of international law at that time,
and that Convention could not create rights regarding activities
that at the time of its adoption were non-existent. Whereas in the
ILC there were some discussions about the legal status of the sea¬
bed and the applicability of the freedom of the high seas to that
area, in the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas was adopted with its
"inter alia" clause without any discussion about the sea-bed beyond
the limits of the continental shelf or any indication that deep
sea-bed mining was meant to be one of those unnamed freedoms.
Although some of those unnamed freedoms, such as the freedom of
marine scientific research or freedom to construct artificial
islands and other installations, are now integrated in the
Convention, the exploration and exploitation of the deep sea-bed
resources have been the subject of the claim of the international
community since the time the actual exploration and exploitation
became feasible. The conclusion, therefore, is that deep sea-bed
mining, because of the lack of state practice, was neither meant to
be one of those unnamed freedoms in the list of the ILC or Article 2
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of the Convention on the High Seas, nor has it been accepted as
one of the freedoms of the high seas since the adoption of that
Convention. The principle of the freedom of the high seas
originally concerned non-resources of the sea, i.e., navigation.
Although it was equally applied in the case of fishing, which is
a resource use of the sea, it continued to expand and enclose
other non-resources uses such as overflight, marine scientific
research and discussions about deep sea-bed mining, and efforts have
been made to extend this principle to the new resource use of the
sea. Resistance to and protests against these efforts came from
both developing and developed countries. Canada, for example, in
an intervention at the Sea-Bed Committee in 1971 said:
. . . the concept of the freedom of the high seas, as it
developed over the succeeding centuries, had become tantamount
to a roving jurisdiction - sovereignty following the flag - for
those who were powerful enough to make their wishes felt. 87
Again in 1972, speaking about the same subject, the representative
of Canada at the Sea-Bed Committee said:
While there are those who lament the death of the traditional
unrestricted freedom of the high seas, there are many more
who rejoice that the traditional concept of freedom of the
high seas can no longer be interpreted as a freedom to
over-fish, a licence to pollute, a legal pretext for the
unilateral appropriation of the sea-bed resources beyond
national jurisdiction. 88
New Zealand also made statements to the same effect.^ The
protests of the developing countries were caused by different
considerations. The main concern of the Latin American countries
was the exclusion of foreigners from their claimed fishing zone; so
they insisted on the restrictions to the principle of the freedom of
the high seas. Asian and African countries, on the other hand,
were generally concerned about the exploitation of the mineral
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resources of the sea and the claims of maritime powers such as the
United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union concerning
the applicability of the principle of the freedom of the high seas
to deep sea-bed mining. The representative of Ecuador to the
Sea-Bed Committee in 1972 criticized the freedom of the high seas as
something related to the surface of the sea and needed by the
colonial powers in order to carry out their trade without
hindrance.Tanzania emphasized, in 1974, the necessity of
challenging the freedom of the seas as a dogma, and maintained that:
It had become a catchword and an excuse for a few countries
to exploit ruthlessly the resources of the sea, to terrorize
the world and to destroy the marine environment. That type
of freedom belonged to the old order and had outlived its
time. True liberty struck a balance between rights and
obligations. 91
There were many other statements from developing countries in the
same line rejecting the principle of the freedom of the high seas as
regards the marine resources either in the superjacent waters or on
Q O
the sea-bed. These protests have served two functions.
Firstly, they are evidence that deep sea-bed mining has never been
one of the freedoms under customary international law, and secondly,
they have prevented the exploitation of the deep sea-bed mineral
resources from becoming recognized as a freedom of the high seas.
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SECTION IV: EVALUATION
It can be concluded that, as regards deep sea-bed mining, the
arguments normally attributed to the developed countries in support
of their claims of rights are restrained.
The mineral resources of the deep sea-bed are not res nullius
for several reasons:
1- They are exhaustible, and one should get title over them long
before they can be actually exploited;
2- They have been, since the time of their recognition, subject to
contesting claims, because of their assumed exhaustibility.
3- They should be exploited on an exclusive basis.
4- They cannot be likened to sedentary fisheries, because one of
the basis of rights to have fisheries was, in fact, adjacency, and
the same holds true in the case of the resources of the continental
shelf. The exclusive right of the coastal state to them was
reasonable. The minerals of the deep sea-bed are too far from the
limits of any national jurisdiction. Any national claim to them
based on sedentary fisheries practice is, thus, unwarranted.
Those who advocate the concept of res communis either as common
property or common benefit, justify the exclusive rights of states
to sedentary fisheries, and presumably now to deep sea-bed mineral
resources, on the basis of prescriptive title or a title acquired by
acquiescence of other states. In the case of deep sea-bed mining,
this argument is groundless because of the frequency of protests
to any deep sea mining operation by individual states or juridical
persons. These Latin expressions, which discussed the legal status
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of the high seas, have been replaced by the concept of the common
heritage of mankind. This latter concept, at least until 1970,
was adopted unanimously by the members of the United Nations General
Assembly as mutatis mutandis and applicable to the legal status
of the deep sea-bed and its resources. The Latin expressions
were even rejected by the ILC during discussions concerning the
QO
continental shelf. Their later use in the discussions about
deep sea-bed mining was also rejected by the majority of states
Q A
and scholarly opinion. The content and the value of these
expressions have always varied according to the interests of
the great maritime powers. We share Henkin's view that
these expressions are used as labels to justify a predetermined
result.^
The extension of the principle of the freedom of the high
seas to deep sea-bed mining seems to lack convincing support in
international law. The reference to Article 2 of the Convention
of the High Seas to support such an extension is unwarranted,
because deep sea mining, due to the continuous protests of many, has
never attained the status of a freedom recognized by the general
principles of international law.
The comparison of manganese nodules with fish is strained too,
asthere are indeed more differences than similarities between these
two. While fish are considered as renewable, manganese nodules are
generally assumed to be exhaustible. Catching fish does not
necessarily need sophisticated means and every state can more or
less exercise his right of fishing, but exploitation of the deep sea
resources requires a technology which is owned by a very limited
number of states. Fishing in the high seas does not need an
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exclusive right to a large area for a long time, whereas
exploitation of minerals requires all these conditions. Finally,
Henkin rightly criticizes the analogy between fishing and deep
sea-bed mining by saying that:
The answer given to the problems of navigation, or fishing or
even pearl fishing or subsoil mining, do not dictate the
answers that should apply to elaborate operations for digging
for manganese in the mid oceans. 96
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THE PRINCIPLE OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND
SECTION Is THE PROPER CONCEPT
The concepts of res nullius and res communis proved to be
inadequate as grounds for claims of rights to the resources of the
continental shelf so, when in the 1960s, technological developments
made it possible to explore and exploit the ocean floor resources,
doubts were expressed as to the appropriateness of having recourse
to those concepts and their application to the new situation. That
was when the concept of the common heritage of mankind was born to
meet the challenges of a new period in international affairs. The
whole of Part XI of the Convention, with its related annexes which
deal with exploration and exploitation of the deep sea-bed
resources, is principally based on this concept. The common
heritage of mankind is meant not only to define the legal status of
the deep sea-bed and its resources, but also to govern the whole
system and machinery for the management of those resources. In
this chapter we shall embark on the study of how this concept
developed into a general principle in respect of the international
law of the sea-bed area and the implications of that principle on
the legal status of the deep sea-bed.
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SECTION lis DEVELOPMENTS DURING 1967-1970
The concept of the common heritage of mankind since it was
introduced in the agenda of the General Assembly of the United
Nations in 1967 until 1970, when through the adoption of the
Declaration of Principles by the General Assembly it was formally
proclaimed as a general principle governing the sea-bed area and its
resources, went through many developments as regards the elaboration
of its definition and the implications of its influence on the
exploitation of the sea-bed and its resources. These developments
will be dealt with in the following sections of this chapter.
SECTION III: MALTESE INITIATIVE
The initiative at Malta to the 22nd session of the UN General
Assembly in 1967 concerning the insertion of a new item in the
agenda entitled:
Declaration and treaty concerning the reservation exclusively
for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and of the ocean floor,
underlying the seas beyond the limits of present national
jurisdiction and the use of their resources in the interest of
mankind 1
was accompanied by an explanatory memorandum in which Malta had
stressed the fear of national appropriation of the ocean floor
beyond the continental shelf because of rapid technological
development, and as a result a militarization of the ocean floor and
the exploitation of its resources by a few technologically advanced
countries. Malta, therefore, felt that the time had come to
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declare the ocean floor as the common heritage of mankind, and
further suggested that immediate steps should be taken to draft a
treaty embodying the following principles:
1- The seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of present
national jurisdiction are not subject to national
appropriation; 2- The exploration of the seabed and ocean
floor should be undertaken in a manner consistent with the
principles and purposes of the charter of the United Nations;
3- The use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and their
economic exploitation shall be undertaken with the aim of
safeguarding the interests of mankind, and the financial
benefits from such exploitation should be used primarily to
promote the development of poor countries; 4- The sea-bed and
ocean floor shall be reserved exclusively for peaceful
purposes. 2
Although it was the first time that such a proposal containing
the principle of the common heritage of mankind was put forward at
the General Assembly, the idea was not new. The 1930 Hague
Conference for the codification of international law had referred to
q
the resources of the sea as "common patrimony". Apart from the
deliberations of George Scelle and some other members of the ILC at
the beginning of the 1950s about the preservation of the interests
of humanity as a whole in regard to the exploitation of the
resources of the continental shelf, there were some statements in
different forms during 1 9 66 and 1 9 67 in support of
internationalization of the sea-bed and control of the United
Nations over the non-living resources of the ocean.^ One year
before Malta's proposal, in a symposium at the The Law of the Sea
Institute of the University of Rhode Island, Quincy Wright had said:
"The sea and its bed should be considered a heritage of mankind, and
as its utilization proceeds, all should share equitably in its
benefits".*'
- 140 -
President Johnson, too, in 1966, in a speech on the occasion of
commissioning the navy research vessel "Oceanographer" had stated:
"We must ensure that the deep seas and the ocean bottoms are, and
remain, the legacy of all human beings".^ Just one month before
the submission of Malta's proposal to the General Assembly, on 13
July 1967, the World Peace Through Law Center held a conference with
legal experts participating from 100 countries. The preambular
paragraph of Resolution 15 of this conference reads:
Whereas new technology and oceanography have revealed the
possibility of exploitation of untold resources of the high
seas and the bed thereof beyond the continental shelf and more
than half of mankind finds itself underprivileged, underfed and
underdeveloped, and the high seas are the common heritage of
mankind ... 8
All these previous references to the interest of the world
community in the sea and its resources, notwithstanding the credit
of the introduction of the common heritage of mankind as a new
concept in international law, should be given to Arvid Pardo, the
then representative of Malta to the United Nations. This was a new
and at the same time generic concept which contained elements that
were missing in the previous established expressions and principles.
It could both define the legal status of the deep sea-bed as
belonging to mankind and provide for the principles according to
which the exploitation of the deep sea resources could take place.
(a) Reactions to the Maltese Initiative
The first reactions to the Maltese initiative were varied.
Some considered it as premature and ill-advised.^ Some regarded
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the Maltese as acting for the British.Most developing countries
supported the Maltese plan on the sea-bed issue.^ All countries,
developing or developed, shared, albeit for different reasons, the
interest of having an international arrangement for the uses of the
deep sea-bed. That was why the General Assembly, pursuant to
discussions concerning the Maltese initiative, established, by
Resolution 2340 (XXII) of 18 December 1967, the Ad Hoc Committee to
study the issue and various aspects of the item entitled:
Examination of the question of the reservation exclusively for
peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the
subsoil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the limits of
present national jurisdiction, and the use of their resources
in the interests of mankind. 12
(b) The Content of the Maltese Initiative and the Itea
before the Sea-Bed Committee
There were two major issues involved in the Maltese initiative
and later in the item before the Ad Hoc and Sea-Bed Committees.
The first was the question of demilitarization of the sea-bed, and
the second was the concern for the exploitation of the mineral
resources in a way that the interests of the whole of humanity could
be safeguarded. Both in view of the fact that the concept of the
common heritage of mankind entailed, as an inherent part of it, the
1 ^
peaceful exploitation of the deep sea-bed, and because of the work
of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,
as well as the reluctance of the great maritime powers, the first
issue was soon overshadowed by the question of exploitation of the
deep sea resources.
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The title of the item, both as it was introduced by Malta and
as it was reformulated in later General Assembly agenda or
resolutions, became the source of different interpretations. At
the time of the presentation of Malta's initiative, a great part of
the continental margins was still considered beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction. It was, therefore, natural that the sea-bed
and ocean floor, instead of ocean floor alone, be distinctively
indicated. But some states argued that this separate indication
should be interpreted as a reference to separate regimes for the bed
of the enclosed or semi-enclosed seas and the deep ocean floor, thus
distinguishing between sea-bed and ocean floor. Another point of
difference was the expression "underlying the high seas" in the
title of the item. Some states contended that, as high seas were
outside the territorial sea, the area underlying the high seas was
outside of state sovereignty and the principle of the freedom of the
high seas was applicable there.^ This opinion was not shared by
those who advocated a new legal regime for the deep sea-bed.
Apart from these differences of opinion about the content of
the title of the item, there were disagreements about the legal
status of the deep sea-bed and the system of the exploitation of the
deep sea resources.
A great number of countries, mostly developing, contended
that there existed a legal vacuum in the deep sea-bed,^ and the
concept of the common heritage of mankind, which transcended res
nullius, res communis and other concepts, was to fill up that
vacuum. Some other states, mainly industrialized countries, were
of the opinion that the legal regime of the high seas or the
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principles of international law embodied in the charter of the
United Nations were applicable to the deep sea-bed.
SECTION IV: MALTA AND THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND
Malta announced the resources of the deep sea-bed as a common
heritage of mankind without making any effort to provide a
definition for this concept. That left different countries with
the option of interpreting the concept the way their interests
dictated. But, later on, the Government of Malta tried to
elaborate what the objective was by submitting the item to the
General Assembly and announcing the resources of the deep sea-bed as
the common heritage of mankind. The first effort in that respect
was the answer of Malta to a note verbale of the Secretary-General
about the functions and duties of the Ad Hoc Committee. In this
letter, Malta submitted that the objective was:
Preservation of the international character of the sea-bed
and ocean floor and of their sub-soil underlying the high
seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, not
as res omnium communis, usable for any convenient purpose and
the resources of which are indiscriminately and competitively
exploitable, but through the acceptance by the international
community of the principle that these vast areas of our
planet have a special status as a common heritage of mankind,
and, as such, should be reserved exclusively for peaceful
purposes and administered by an international agency in the
name and for the benefit of all people and of present and
future generations. 16
Malta was, at the same time, aware that the concept of
the common heritage of mankind was new to the international law
which had developed over the centuries; it was, nevertheless,
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convinced that the introduction of this concept and its eventual
extension to other environments rather than the deep sea-bed, was
essential for the effective solution of the problems of universal
concern and the peaceful development of mankind.^^
The major implications of this concept, in Malta's view, were
that, firstly, the common heritage can be used but not owned. In
this respect, there is a similarity between common heritage and res
communis in its Roman law sense. Pardo believed that it was not
wise to use "property" instead of "heritage", because, in his
opinion, property was a form of power and since Roman law times it
18
had implied jus utendi et abutendi (right to use and misuse).
Secondly, the use of common heritage required a balanced system of
management. This is different from the management of a res
communis, which can be fulfilled by each individual state or person.
Thirdly, common heritage implies an active sharing of benefits,
which is again different from the case of a res communis.
Fourthly, this concept implies reservation for peaceful purposes,
and finally it promises reservation for future generations.^ These
last two implications are also new and different from the case of
res communis. In an earlier statement, the representative of Malta
had stressed that the common heritage implied peaceful use, freedom
of access, regulation of use to conserve the heritage and avoid
infringements of the rights of others and equitable distribution of
20the benefits of exploitation. Pardo, thus, submits that Malta
considered common heritage as implying a notion of common use of or
21
access to a certain property but not common ownership. This,
as well as other implications of the principle were extensively
commented on and gradually elaborated by other countries.
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(a) Opponents of the Common Heritage of Mankind Concept
Under this title, at least between 1967 and 1970, when the
Declaration of Principles was adopted by the General Assembly, one
can generally name two groups of states. The first group comprised
some of the industrialized countries with deep sea mining technology
and the second group consisted of the Soviet Union and other
socialist states.
The first group generally considered this concept devoid
of any legal content and contrary to existing norms and principles
of international law, meaning the principle of the freedom of the
high seas. They also contended that this concept could not be
2 2understood until its implications were spelled out. It was
further asserted that, because of the difficulties which could arise
in the formulation of legal norms, "the good of mankind" or "the
common interest of mankind" should be preferred to the word
2 2
"heritage". Another criticism of these countries was the
imprecision and novelty of the concept. Belgium even referred to
it as neologism and a concept that meant different things to
o /
different people. Just like the case of the continental shelf,
there was no claim of sovereignty or sovereign rights to the deep
sea-bed or its subsoil, but these countries insisted on the freedom
of access to and use of the resources without any discrimination.
They referred to the similar propositions in the Outer Space
2 S
Treaty, and argued that there should be a clear distinction
between non-appropriation of the sea-bed on the one hand and the
exploitation or use of it on the other.26
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Many states in this group consistently rejected the equation
of the word "heritage" with "property", and the statement that the
2 7
resources of the deep sea-bed belong to the world community.
Still, there were some other states in the same group which were
more receptive to the concept of common heritage, though with an
interpretation different from that of the developing countries.
For these states, common heritage could equally be called the common
28
property of mankind, common possession or international public
domain, because they all were variants of the same idea. The point
was that to them the common heritage concept did not contain clear
29
juridical significance.
The second group, comprising the majority of the socialist
states, reacted to the common heritage principle almost in the same
manner as the capitalist states. They rejected this concept as a
notion lacking clarity and substance from the standpoint of
international law. In response to those who interpreted common
heritage as common property, the socialist states expressed the view
that such an interpretation failed to take into consideration the
realities of the contemporary world. The fact, according to the
Soviet representative to the General Assembly in 1968, was that
there co-existed states with different social structures and
QQdifferent systems of ownership. Bearing that in mind, he
asserted that thinking of the common heritage in terms of collective
Q 1
ownership was just an illusion and the whole idea was Utopian.
The Soviet Union, in its later interventions at the Sea-Bed
Committee and the General Assembly, repeated this position, and with
regard and, in fact, in response to the arguments that this concept
could prevent appropriation of the sea-bed by states possessing the
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technical means to exploit the resources of the sea-bed, emphasized
that such a collective ownership would be dangerous, because it
would enable various "inheriters" to lay claim to part of that area
and invite the risk of national appropriation or the extension of
state sovereignty to various regions of the sea-bed. Essentially,
the Socialist countries, unlike the western industrialized
countries, insisted that there was no legal lacuna in the sea-bed,
and the charter of the United Nations provided the basis for the
relations among states in all spheres, and creating a special legal
status for the sea-bed would mean that the legal status of this area
33
was different from that of the superjacent waters.
The alternative of the socialist states for the common
heritage of mankind was, thus, the same as that of the techno¬
logically advanced countries of the West, namely the principle of
the freedom of the high seas and the legal norms established by the
Q /
Convention on the High Seas. From the viewpoint of the socialist
states, the more realistic interpretation of the common heritage
concept was that the sea-bed beyond the limits of national jurisdic¬
tion should be used jointly by all states without any appropriation
O C
of that area by any state or person. Reinterpretation by the
Soviet Union of the common heritage, in a more concrete form, was
that the sea-bed is at the general disposal of all states and not
subject to any appropriation.^ This interpretation clearly
equates the concept of the common heritage of mankind with the res
communis omnium and its ensuing principle of the freedom of the high
seas.
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(b) Supporters of the Common Heritage of Mankind
The most distinguished group of states to come under this
heading is that of the developing countries; but it would be a
mere simplification, if not negligence, to consider these countries
as the sole supporters of the principle of the common heritage
of mankind. Many of the developed states, e.g. the Nordic
countries, Switzerland and Austria, also supported this principle.
Nevertheless, the focus here will be on the position of the
37
developing countries.
The introduction of Malta's initiative in 1967 coincided not
only with the emergence of concrete problems in the economic
development of the Third World countries but also with the emergence
of a rather loose unity of these countries under the title of the
Group of 77. It is, therefore, no wonder that the idea of the vast
resources of the deep sea-bed as the common heritage of mankind was
received so strongly by the G77 as a means of fulfilling their
aspirations for creating a New International Economic Order. A
great number of the countries in this group were formerly colonized
by some of the technologically advanced countries, and considered
their economic backwardness a result of the policy of exploitation
carried out under the colonial system. Being aware of their rights
as independent states, they saw in the common heritage concept a
chance to have those rights prevail in order to change that unjust
O O
situation. They hoped that the benefits derived from deep
sea-bed exploitation could help to mitigate the harsh inequalities
between them and the developed countries.39 They saw, in deep
sea resources, the prospects for the correction of a historic
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"imbalance", of which they considered themselves to be victims.^
For the G77, the basic implication of the concept of the common
heritage of mankind was that, in deep sea mining, the benefit of all
should prevail over the interest of a few great powers. For them,
the common heritage principle was unlimited and wholly independent
of any qualitative provisions, from which many other principles and
rules could be deducted.^ This view was clearly in contrast to
the standpoint of the industrialized countries which had taken a
pragmatic approach to the problem, and stressed "the facts of
international relations, i.e. the de facto differences among
states".^
The G77 consisted mainly of three regional groups of
countries from Latin America, Asia and Africa. In the Latin
American group, there were several countries which had claims of
200 nautical miles of territorial sea.^ For these countries, the
concept of the common heritage, which had a direct relation to the
limits of national jurisdiction, could mean a reduction to their
territorial sea. It was more essential to them to have their claim
to an extended territorial sea recognized by the international
community and to enjoy the benefits of their adjacent seas than to
pay homage to a common heritage principle which was yet to be
clarified.^ Although these countries never failed to support the
common heritage concept, after the recognition of the EEZ concept by
the majority of states, which guaranteed a preferential right to
marine resources of up to 200 nautical miles for the coastal state,
they intensified their efforts for the consolidation of the common
heritage concept into concrete legal rules. One should not forget
that the developing countries did not constitute a unified and
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homogeneous group of states, but in the case of deep sea-bed mining
and the common heritage of mankind, their differences
notwithstanding, they were mostly regarded as the G77 with a
specific economic goal, i.e., the establishment of a New
International Economic Order.^
The G77 considered the common heritage of mankind as a
revolutionary concept symbolizing their awareness and realization of
the realities of the sea, and part of a philosophy which sought to
inaugurate a new international order in which equality and justice
would not be vain words.^ Generally speaking, this group of
countries admitted that the precise legal implications of the common
heritage principle were unclear, and had to be developed,^ but they
48themselves contributed most to this development. From the outset,
it was clear that, for this group, the common heritage of mankind
implied a notion of ownership, a property owned by mankind in the
sense that, unlike res communis, none might take any part of it
without the consent of all. This assumption was followed by
several propositions. It was asserted that the common ownership
required a joint sovereignty over the deep sea-bed.^ The result
was also that there should be equitable participation of all states
in the administration of the common heritage. Mankind could not be
represented by just a few developed countries with the necessary
technology and know-how.The common ownership and common
administration would logically lead to the sharing of benefits on an
equitable basis. Here, the G77 had a claim of preferential right
in view of their needs.An equitable sharing of the benefits
would contribute to the realization of the goals of the NIEO. No
matter how the word "mankind" was to be defined, it was asserted by
- 151 -
the G77 that there was a question of representation involved, and an
international organization had to be set up to act on behalf of
mankind for the management of its property. In brief, the common
heritage concept, as the Yugoslavian representative put it,
contained three elements of common ownership, common management and
equitable distribution of the benefits in order to ensure a de facto
and genuine equality of states instead of the prevailing de lure
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equality. The G77 concentrated its efforts on throwing light on
the political and economic implications of the common heritage
principle, and on elaborating those rules which could be derived
from it, but because of the dynamic nature of this new concept,
virtually no effort was made to give a precise legal definition to
it.53
The criticism of the socialist states and developed countries
concerning the common heritage concept was rejected by the Gil.
The opposition of the socialist countries to the common heritage
concept was criticized by some members of the Gil. Mexico, for
example, wondered why the socialist countries did not support the
collective administration of the common heritage of mankind, and
instead, preferred individual concessions for its exploitation which
could result in a characteristically capitalist management.3^ As
regards the contention that the common heritage concept was a
neologism and lacked any legal content, the Gil while not insisting
on its legal content, emphasized that new issues demanded novel
treatment, and there was nothing to hinder states from giving a
legal definition to this concept. Kuwait, for example, in an
intervention at the first committee of the General Assembly,
maintained:
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It feels that if this concept has no legal content at present,
nothing need prevent us from giving it such a content. It
feels this is no heresy inasmuch as the history of inter¬
national law provides a number of examples bearing out our own
point of view that such law is in gestation, in a constant
state of evolution as new and special cases and circumstances
arise in international relations for which appropriate new
rules must be provided. 55
Some states in this group went further to claim that the common
heritage concept, at least in the legal systems based on Roman law,
had a clear legal connotation. In their belief, the reference to
the deep sea-bed resources as heritage was acceptable, because those
resources could be economically evaluated, and there was no
difficulty in giving mankind as a whole, which included the living
and future generations, the title to this heritage.
There were other states outside the G77 which refused the
criticism of neologism. They believed that the ultimate purpose
was to endow the common heritage of mankind, which was a new concept
for a new situation, with specific legal content."^ In short, the
developed countries rejected the common heritage as a concept devoid
of legal content, but the G77 cherished it as a new concept which
could have a precise legal definition.
The technologically advanced countries adhered to a restrictive
interpretation of the common heritage principle which was based on
non-appropriation of the ocean floor. In other words, common
heritage from this point of view was just a new name for the old
C. O
concept of res communis. The G77, on the contrary, had an
extensive interpretation of the concept, which made it possible to
draw many rules from it. The technologically advanced countries
could agree that the ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction, should not be subject to national
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appropriation, but they categorically refused the idea that no-one
might acquire property rights over any part of that area by use,
occupation or any other means.^ Those features of the common
heritage concept which were acceptable both to the developed
countries and the G77, albeit with different interpretations, were:
the international character of the ocean floor which precluded any
national claim of sovereignty; the principle of peaceful use;
observance of the benefits and interests of mankind; and the
establishment of an international regime or internationally agreed
arrangements.
The differences in the perception of what the concept of the
common heritage signified continued for many years to come. To
summarize, it may be said that the common heritage concept, from the
time of its presentation at the 22nd Session of the General Assembly
in 1967 when the Declaration of Principles was adopted, had two
clear features: firstly, it was not accepted by all the countries
involved, and secondly, those who had accepted it, had diverse
interpretations of this concept.
SECTION V: MORATORIUM RESOLUTION
Since the introduction of the Maltese initiative, the bulk of
resolutions of the General Assembly or other United Nations organs
referring to the concept of the common heritage of mankind have
contributed a great deal to the elaboration of the definition
1
of this principle, 1 but two of these resolutions, namely the
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Moratorium Resolution and the Declaration of Principles, are of
particular interest.
Bearing in mind that the realization of the goals of the common
heritage concept and the establishment of an international regime
for the management of this heritage would take some years, and
believing that during those years technologically advanced countries
might start the commercial exploitation of the resources of the deep
sea-bed, the supporters of the concept of the common heritage of
mankind from the outset considered it necessary to establish,
prior to entering into force of an internationally agreed upon
arrangement, a moratorium on any deep sea-bed exploitation through
f\ 9
a General Assembly resolution. A draft resolution was submitted
by Kuwait and other developing countries to the First Committee
of the General Assembly. This was adopted as Resolution 2574
D (XXIV) in December 1969 by 62 votes in favour, 28 against and
28 abstentions. The resolution declared that, pending the
establishment of an international regime for carrying out the
exploitation of sea-bed resources:
(a) States and persons, physical or juridical, are bound to
refrain from all activities of exploitation of the resources of
the area of the seabed and ocean floor, beyond the limits of
national jurisidiction,
(b) No claim to any part of the area or its resources shall be
recognized.
Those who were against this resolution argued that, as the limits of
the area were not yet decided, it was not possible to effect any
moratorium.^ Moreover, it was asserted that adoption of this
resolution might lead to the extension of the limits of the
continental shelf by many states under the prevention of protecting
£ r
their national interests. J It was also maintained that such a
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moratorium would discourage further gathering of knowledge and
experience for the regulation of deep sea-bed activities. The
strong opposition of the technologically advanced countries to the
Moratorium Resolution was not only because of the restrictions for
an indefinite time on the exploitation of deep sea-bed resources,
but also for the more accessible oil and gas reserves in the
continental margin which, according to the definition of the
continental shelf in the 1958 Convention,^ could still be
considered to a great extent outside the limits of national
jurisdiction, and therefore a part of the common heritage of
mankind. The enlargement of the area of the continental shelf was
against the policy of many industrialized countries which saw a
connection between the extension of one area in the sea with the
extension of other maritime zones. Apart from these
considerations, these countries were not prepared to accept any
restrictions on their complete freedom of activities in the sea
before some negotiated acceptable arrangements could be agreed upon.
For the G77, the Moratorium Resolution was a firm step toward
the safeguarding of the common heritage of mankind from any
encroachment. The resolution prohibited the exploitation of deep
sea-bed resources, but was silent about the exploration. That
reflected the misgivings of the G77 about impending exploitation of
the resources, while they had, at least formally, no objection to
the continuation of the exploration programmes.
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SECTION VI: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
Since the beginning of discussion at the Ad Hoc Committee with
respect to the sea-bed issue, many delegations expressed the view
that a statement of principles concerning the establishment of
internationally agreed upon arrangements for the exploitation of the
deep sea-bed resources for the benefit of mankind should be
adopted.^®
The principles laid down in the Antarctic Treaty of 1959^ and
the Outer Space Treaty of 1967^® could, in the opinion of some
delegations, provide some guidance for the CommitteeIn
practice, the process, which culminated in the adoption of
Resolution 2749 (XXV) by the General Assembly in 1970, proved to be
more complicated than envisaged.
The Antarctic and Outer Space were both, at least
theoretically, considered as no man's land and were the subject of
internationally agreed upon treaties, but there was a difference
between them. The Antarctic Treaty had made it possible for the
few states which were parties to the treaty to establish a sort of
exclusive club to carry out some activities on that continent. In
other words, an oligarchic pattern governed the Antarctic, and it
was practically reserved for a small number of states who had proved
their technological capacities and, consequently, their financial
ability
The precedent of outer space and the process of negotiations
at the United Nations, which led to the adoption of the Declaration
of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
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Exploration and Use of Outer Space in 1963 and the Outer Space
Treaty in 1967, was more appropriate and of particular interest to
the case of the deep sea-bed. The announcement of many states,
including the two super powers, during 1963 that they would respect
the principles laid down in the Declaration of Legal Principles
until the Outer Space Treaty entered into force, was a recent
precedent that the members of the Ad Hoc Committee hoped would be
followed. There were, in fact, many dissimilarities between the
two cases. The main difference was in the purpose of the use of
these areas. The conquest of outer space was, and to a great
extent still is, of scientific and strategic interest, but the
sea-bed and its accessible huge resources could offer almost
unlimited supply possibilities with direct impact on the level of
development of many countries. Another difference was that, while
in the case of outer space nothing new had been claimed, and both
the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles and the Outer Space Treaty
of 1967 had considered outer space as res communis, and principles
contained in these two documents were generally acceptable to all
countries, in the case of the deep sea-bed area a new concept, i.e.,
the common heritage of mankind, had been introduced, which was not
only to designate the legal status of the deep sea-bed area, but
also to contain principles necessary for the regulation of
activities on the deep sea-bed. In fact, a declaration of
principles concerning the deep sea-bed area, unlike the case of
outer space, could not be adopted without difficulty. All
resolutions of the General Assembly regarding outer space prior to
the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 were adopted unanimously,7^ because
the majority of states did not have any immediate interest in outer
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space which would be at stake, and they were, in fact, giving up
something they did not yet have.^ But the interest of each and
every state in deep sea-bed mining was patent and divergence of
opinions concerning the principles governing the use of the deep
sea-bed was inevitable.
The question of the legal status of the deep sea-bed and the
meaning of the concept of the common heritage of mankind was one of
the areas of disagreement. For the G77, the common heritage of
mankind was at the top of any statement of principles. The
industrialized countries, on the other hand, limited themselves to
more or less the same principles as were adopted in the case of
outer space and refused to even mention the phrase "common heritage
of mankind" in their working papers or proposals.^ These countries
stated that there was no need to mention the concept of common
heritage of mankind in the Declaration as long as certain specific
~7 f\
results were evident, such as the sharing in the benefits.
(a) Adoption of the Declaration
Finally, on 17 December 1970, the General Assembly adopted
Resolution 2749 (XXV) which was the result of compromise by both the
G77 and the technologically advanced countries. The compromise was
based on the understanding that the principles contained in the
resolution constituted a whole, and that whole was the result of a
delicate balance.^ This resolution, which was adopted by 108
votes to none with 14 abstentions, is generally known as the
lO
Declaration of Principles. Both the developing and the developed
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countries voted for this resolution. The socialist states, with
the exception of Yugoslavia, abstained from voting.
Resolution 2749 (XXV) comprised six preambular and fifteen
operative paragraphs. A specific feature of this resolution is
that both developing and developed countries voted for it while
there existed considerable differences of interpretation of its
component parts.
This divergence of opinions is evident in the statements made
by delegations both before and after the adoption of the resolution.
(b) The Declaration and the Question of the Legal Status
of the Deep Sea-Bed Area
Those paragraphs of the Declaration which have a bearing upon
the legal status of the sea-bed area and its resources are the
third preambular paragraph as well as paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and
13(a). The third preambular paragraph is an example of compromise
between the developing and developed countries. According to this
paragraph, it was recognized: "that the existing legal regime of
the high seas does not provide substantive rules for regulating
the exploration of the . . . area and the exploitation of its
resources". This formulation was clearly different from the
standpoint of the developing countries which insisted "that the
existing legal regime for the high seas is not applicable to the
sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction".^9 was likewise different from
the attitude of the industrialized countries which were in favour of
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preserving the status quo and reaffirmed time and again their
80
support for the principle of the freedoms of the high seas, and
its applicability to deep sea-bed mining. Although "substantive
rules" in this paragraph was generally construed as referring to the
"legal regime of the high seas", and obviously could mean "legal
rules", some authors have challenged such an interpretation and have
maintained that "substantive rules" cannot mean law in general or
principles of law, and what is meant by that in this context is only
81
a "particular regulatory regime". With such an interpretation,
the proponents of the freedom of the high seas try to demonstrate
that the applicable law is that of the regime of the high seas, and
the future regime of the deep sea-bed only regulates the activities
of the states on the basis of that law, i.e., the principle of the
freedom of the high seas.
The concept of the common heritage of mankind was incorpor¬
ated in the first operative paragraph of the Declaration of
Principles, which reads:
The seabed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the
area) , as well as the resources of the area, are the common
heritage of mankind.
There was general agreement about this paragraph, but the definition
of the common heritage of mankind was not agreed upon. For
industrialized countries, the common heritage of mankind was a
phrase still devoid of any legal content, and its meaning would be
8 9
elaborated in the international regime to be established. The
G77, unlike the developed countries, considered the concept of the
common heritage as the cornerstone of any international regime for
the deep sea-bed. The chairman of the Sea-Bed Committee was
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rightly reflecting the view of the developing countries when he said
that the common heritage of mankind was equal to "the property of
the entire human family", and had to be protected against any
OO
possible competitive exploitation. J
Provisions in other operative paragraphs of the resolution were
to elucidate the definition of the common heritage concept both for
the developing and developed countries.Operative paragraphs 2
and 3 specifically intended to define the legal status of the deep
sea-bed and its resources. Paragraph 2 stipulates:
The area shall not be subject to appropriation by any means by
states or persons, natural or juridical, and no state shall
claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part
thereof.
In this paragraph no reference is made to the resources of the area,
but such a reference seems to be implied when one reads this
paragraph together with paragraph 3 which reads:
No state or person, natural or juridical, shall claim, exercise
or acquire rights with respect to the area or its resources
incompatible with the international regime to be established
and the principles of this Declaration.
It is obvious that, when states are prohibited from claiming any
rights to the resources unless in accordance with the international
regime to be established, they are, in fact, forbidden to
appropriate or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over them.
Moreover, the expression "any part thereof" at the end of the
operative paragraph 2 can arguably be a reference to the
"resources".
These two paragraphs are intended to subject the acquisition of
any rights over the deep sea-bed and its resources to the provisions
of the future regime, and since the ideal of an international regime
for the Gil and the industrialized countries was based on their
- 162 -
widely different interpretations of the common heritage concept,
their perceptions of these two paragraphs were different too. The
representatives of some of the technologically advanced countries,
for example, in explaining their vote on the Declaration of
Principles, stated that they believed the "acquisition of rights to
resources by private or state mining operators on a non-exclusive
or
basis would be compatible with the future regime".
El Salvador, taking an opposite position to the developed
countries, interpreted paragraph 3 by stating that "a right which is
acquired over the zone and its resources is subject to its non-
compatibility with the international regime to be established".^
Operative paragraph 5 was, from the viewpoint of the developed
countries, the central paragraph of the Declaration, and all other
87
paragraphs had to construed subject to this one. It reads:
The area shall be open to use exclusively for peaceful purposes
by all states, whether coastal or land-locked, without
discrimination in accordance with the international regime to
be established.
The importance of this paragraph for the supporters of the principle
of the freedom of the high seas was in stating that "the area should
be open to use exclusively for peaceful purposes by all states".
To them, it means free access to the resources without discrim¬
ination, and the future international regime would have to be
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established in compliance with this interpretation. The G77,
with reference to the third preambular paragraph of the resolution,
refused the question of the operative paragraph 5 with the concept
of free access to or free use of the resources. For them, it meant
equal access through the international regime to be established,
and this link between the paragraphs of the Declaration and their
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implementation in accordance with the provisions of the future
regime had to be emphasized.
The sixth operative paragraph, from the point of view of the
arguments for and against it, is similar to paragraph 5. It reads:
States shall act in the area in accordance with the applicable
principles and rules of international law, including the
Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration of Principles
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the
U.N., adopted by the General Assembly on 24 October 1970 in the
interests of maintaining international peace and security and
promoting international co-operation and mutual understanding.
The G77 had made it clear that the principle of the freedom of the
high seas was not to be applicable to the sea-bed, and generally
speaking, the existing rules of international law, with the
exception of those concerning the rights and duties of states, were
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insufficient to govern the sea-bed. The reference to the Charter
of the United Nations and the Declaration of Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in operative paragraph 6 was due to that exception.
The industrialized countries disagreed with this interpreta¬
tion, and insisted that the term "international law" should be read
as referring to the entire body of international law, and not as
referring specifically to, or excluding, any of its major
branches.^
Paragraph 13(a) is intended to differentiate between the legal
status of the sea-bed and superjacent waters. According to this
paragraph nothing in the Declaration shall affect "the legal status
of the waters superjacent to the area or that of the air space above
those waters". This provision is similar to Article 3 of the
Convention on the Continental Shelf to prohibit any claims to the
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superjacent waters. From this paragraph one may deduce that the
inclusion of this provision demonstrates the difference between the
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legal status of the sea-bed and that of the superjacent waters.
In brief, with respect to the interpretation of the G77 and the
industrialized countries of the different paragraphs of the
Declaration of Principles, it can be concluded that: 1- for the
G77, the rights to the sea-bed beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction and its resources as the common heritage of mankind
were vested in humanity, and those rights could not be acquired by
any state unless in accordance with the international regime to be
established. For the technologically advanced countries, every
state or private entity was free to embark upon the exploration and
exploitation of the deep sea-bed and its resources, and the right to
the recovered resources accrued to the one who had worked them. In
this sense, the common heritage of mankind had a meaning similar to
9 ^
the res communis omnium7 and 2- for the G77, there was a legal
lacuna in the sea-bed beyond the limits of the national jurisdic¬
tion, and the common heritage principle was to provide for the rules
necessary for the establishment of an international regime. The
industrialized countries asserted that the regime of the high seas
was applicable to the sea-bed and there was no difference between
the legal status of the sea-bed and the superjacent waters.
The purpose of an international regime for the sea-bed, from
the viewpoint of these countries, was "to regulate" the activities
of states and private entities. Declaration of Principles was
considered by the majority of delegations to contain general
guidelines for the establishment of an international regime. It
was not intended to be a provisional regime.^ Neither was it
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meant to interpret existing international law. Although not
specifically mentioned, its real function was to develop the law and
to fill in the lacuna. For that purpose, its provisions were too
general and according to some authors, even intentionally
ambiguous.^ The nature of the principles laid down in the
declaration was not clearly indicated, but the majority of them, and
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in particular the common heritage principle were lex ferenda.
Norway considered the principles laid down in the declaration as
"indications ... of the rules and provisions of international law,
present and future, applicable to the domain of the ocean floor and
its subsoil".^
As mentioned before, 14 socialist countries abstained from
voting for the Resolution 2749 (XXV). Ogley seeks the reason in
the opinion of the representatives of states of socialist states who
believe that:
. . . the driving force behind . . . [deep exploitation] would
be monopoly capitalism, searching for new profits and new
supplies of raw materials. The governments of capitalist
States would be mere agents of the capitalists themselves; for
them, the notion of the common heritage of mankind would be a
mere blind behind which the giant consortia would be given the
green light to make the sea-bed theirs. 98
Similarly, in 1970, the Soviet representative at the first Committee
of the General Assembly argued that:
As a Socialist State, the Soviet Union could not engage in
joint ownership under conditions where the property would be
exploited in accordance with the principles fundamentally alien
to socialism principles of capitalist management. 99
Moreover, socialist countries believed in the necessity of
determining the precise limits of the Area prior to the adoption of
any declaration of principles, and had reservations concerning the
operative paragraphs 8, 10, 12 and 13.^00
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(c) The Binding Effect of the Declaration
One of the controversial aspects of discussion about the
Declaration of Principles has been its binding effect. As far as
the legal status of the deep sea-bed and its resources as the common
heritage of mankind is concerned, this question became specifically
topical in the years following the adoption of Resolution 2749
(XXV), and particularly in the late 1970s when some of the
industrialized countries contemplated enacting national legislation
for the exploration and exploitation of the deep sea-bed.
The Charter of the United Nations has not conferred upon the
General Assembly any power to make law for the member states.^
The prevailing view is that the resolutions of the General Assembly
1 QO
are not normative international instruments. Nevertheless, the
Assembly can make binding decisions concerning the internal working
of the United Nations organizations. These decisions are not
addressed to the member states but to the organs, representatives or
employees of the United Nations. The questions related to the
financial arrangements of the organization (Article 17 of the
Charter), admission of new members (Article 4), suspension of the
rights and privileges of members (Article 5) and the expulsion of
members (Article 6), fall within the category of these decisions.
The General Assembly, according to Articles 10 to 14 of the
Charter, can adopt resolutions containing recommendations to member
states, i.e., these recommendations are not legally binding upon
states, but rather are to be a formal invitation to states to take
action, which is open for them to accept or reject.^03
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The General Assembly has, according to Article 13(l)(a), the
duty to initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of
promoting international cooperation in the political field and
encouraging the progressive development of international law and its
codification. The General Assembly has adopted, in accordance with
this article, many resolutions which contain declarations of rights
or principles. In most cases, these resolutions have gone far
beyond making mere recommendations, such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Res. 217 A (III)), Declaration of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1514 (XV)), and
Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor,
and the Subsoil thereof beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction
(2749 (XXV)).
In order to decide the legal effect of the General Assembly
resolutions, several factors have to be taken into account. The
language of the resolution is one of the important factors. These
resolutions should contain provisions acceptable to a two-thirds
majority of member states. If such a majority involves the Big
Powers, the resolution can have a treaty-like language, containing
the rights and duties of states.^4 There are many instances that,
because of the post-colonial period's demand from the Third World
for the revision of the structure of international order, the call
for enough affirmative votes has resulted in a resolution with broad
and sometimes vague language.In cases like this, every state
may interpret the resolution from a different ideological angle,
reaching different conclusions.
Another factor is the voting result of the resolution. If all
member states, or at least the great majority of them including
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those states which are especially concerned with the subject matter
of the resolution, vote for it, there is a possibility that the
content of the resolution will be implemented as if it were a
legally binding instrument. Resolution 1962 (XVIII), concerning
the activities in outer space, is an example. Resolutions which do
not get a unanimous or near unanimous affirmative vote, are merely
recommendations to those states to which they are addressed. Some
writers are of the opinion that those who vote for a resolution, and
I
perhaps those who do not dissent, may be bound by them, but
there are also many strong arguments against this view.^"^ Even
if they are not legally binding, the resolutions which have gained
the affirmative vote of a considerable majority of states cannot
be ignored. The voting and statements in explanation of the text
play a significant role in the determination of the extent of its
influence on state practice.
The ICJ has in many cases expressed its views on the legal
I QQ
effect of the General Assembly resolutions in general. In
view of the positivist approach that the Court has almost always
preferred to adopt in its judgements and advisory opinions, the
resolutions of the General Assembly would not have been regarded as
any thing more than recommendations as provided for in the Charter
of the United Nations. The Court, for instance, in the South-West
Africa Cases, Second Phase, said:
The persuasive force of Assembly resolutions can indeed be very
considerable but this is a different thing. It operates on the
political and not legal level; it does not make these
resolutions binding in law. 109
Nevertheless, there are cases where the Court has gone further, and
recognized more effect for these resolutions than their merely being
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recommendatory. One example is the Court's Advisory Opinion about
South West Africa in 1971, when it announced:
. . . it would not be correct to assume that, because the
General Assembly is in principle vested with recommendatory
powers, it is debarred from adopting, in specific cases within
the framework of its competence, resolutions which make
determinations or have operative design. 110
It should be noted that all the announcements of the Court in regard
to the legal effect of the General Assembly resolutions have been in
cases with a political nature, and resolutions adopted in accordance
with Article 13(1)(a) of the Charter have been specifically treated
by the Court. In short, it can be said that the General Assembly
resolutions, including those which contain important and lasting
principles for the encouragement of the progressive development of
international law according to Article 13(1)(a) of the Charter, are
not per se international legal instruments in the strict sense of
the term. In the event they are formulated with a precise language
and adopted unanimously or by an overwhelming majority, one may
expect that members of the international community will abide by
them,m because they can be regarded as the expression of world
opinion on a particular issue.
The question of the binding force of a declaration of
principles about the deep sea-bed and its resources was raised one
year before the adoption of Resolution 2749 (XXV). Some delegations
at the Legal Sub-Committee of the Sea-Bed Committee in 1969
expressed the view that the declaration which would be adopted
according to Article 13 (l)(a) of the Charter would possess binding
112force. This view was understandably opposed by several
delegations.113 jt should be mentioned that neither of the
principal draftsmen of the declaration, namely, Amerasinghe, the
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chairman of the Sea-Bed Committee, nor Galindo-Pohl, the chairman of
the Legal Sub-Committee, claimed at the time of its adoption that
the declaration had a binding force similar to that of an inter¬
nationally negotiated treaty.^^ The moral force of it was,
however, strongly emphasized, and Galindo-Pohl even stressed that
"those who support it must obviously be deemed to be prepared to
abide by its content in good faith . . It was clear from
the statements of many delegations that a sort of quasi-legal effect
was intended to be attributed to the declaration. For example,
Kuwait considered that the principles contained in the Declaration
were basic and fundamental ones "from which no departure would be
allowed and which should faithfully be reflected in the basic
international treaty which will be the constituent instrument of the
[sea-bed] regime".-'"-'-^
In short, it can be concluded that generally the General
Assembly resolutions do not constitute per se a binding legal
effect, but their legal effect depends on several factors such as
the number of affirmative votes they get; the precision of the
language used; the diversity of interpretation given to the
principles contained in them by those who vote for them; the degree
of compromise to reach a consensus, etc. Resolution 2749 (XXV),
containing the Declaration of Principles, was generally considered,
at the time of its adoption, as intending to establish the legal
status of the deep sea-bed and to provide a framework on the basis
of which the future international regime for the exploration and
exploitation of the deep sea-bed and its resources was to be
established.
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In fact, Resolution 2749 (XXV), although adopted by the
affirmative votes of the great majority of states, including
industrialized countries, did not acquire the status of a legally
binding instrument, nor was the concept of the common heritage of
mankind, at the time of the adoption of Resolution 2749 (XXV),
either because of the resolution itself or independent of that,
considered as a legal principle. These negative statements are not
to undermine the significance of the Declaration of Principles and
obligations of states, or at least those which have voted for it, to
observe it in good faith.However, it was the frequent practice
of states, pursuant to the adoption of the Declaration of
Principles, in the form of numerous statements made at the UNCLOS
III, the General Assembly and other United Nations forums such as
UNCTAD or the adoption of resolutions and declarations as well as
the opinions of the prominent jurists, that contributed to the
explanation of the legal content of the common heritage of mankind
concept and its consolidation as a general principle.
(d) Developments Within Other Dnited Nations Fora
As the concept of the common heritage, since the time of its
inception, has been generally identified with the aspirations of the
developing countries, and the insertion of this concept in
Resolution 2740 (XXV) was in fact against the will of the
industrialized countries, it is not surprising to notice that the
greater part of the efforts for the consolidation of this concept
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into a defined legal principle was initiated by developing countries
both in and outside the UN fora.
In 1972, the UNCTAD adopted two resolutions concerning the
commercial exploitation of the resources of the deep sea-bed area.
In Resolution 51 (III) of 1 May 1972, reference was made to the
General Assembly Resolution 2750 (XXV) from 1970, according to which
the UNCTAD was indirectly requested to make recommendations for
containing any adverse economic effects which deep sea mining could
have on the prices of the minerals exported by the developing
countries. The UNCTAD, by Resolution 51 (III), decided to keep
this question constantly under review, and invited the Secretary-
General of the UNCTAD to propose specific and detailed measures in
1 1 O
that connection. AO The second resolution, i.e. Resolution 52
(III), reiterated the standing of the G77 by interpreting the
Declaration of Principles in connection with the Moratorium
Resolution of 1969, and concluding that "prior to the establishment
of the international regime no legal claims on any part of the area
or its resources, based on past, present or future activities will
be recognized".
In the first substantive session of the UNCLOS III in Caracas
in 1974, most of the delegations referred to the common heritage
concept and its implications. Tanzania, for instance, asserted
that the common heritage is jointly owned by all mankind, and
mankind should have control over means of production in order to
receive the wealth produced from resources.^0 jt wag argUe(j by
the G77 that all the activities dating to the exploration of the
Area and exploitation of its resources had to be carried out solely
and directly by the International Sea-Bed Authority.^l peru
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considered the joint management of the deep sea resources as
"essential and perhaps the revolutionary aspect of the common
TOO
heritage".The technologically advanced countries made no
effort to elaborate on the contents of the common heritage concept,
but their comments on the structure of the international machinery
for the exploitation of the deep sea resources or separation of the
question of jurisdiction over the resources and benefits derived
from them,123 made it clear that their interpretation of the common
heritage principle was still essentially different from that of
the G77. This situation prevailed in the years which followed.
The United Kingdom, for example, in the 5th session of the UNCLOS
III, contended that the common heritage concept was not "capable of
10/
precise legal definition". Tanzania, on the contrary, asserted
that this concept was clearly defined in the Declaration of
Principles, particularly paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7.125
On 12 December 1974, the General Assembly adopted Resolution
3281 (XXIX) containing the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States. The adoption of this resolution was in line with the
overall efforts of the G77 to establish a New International Economic
Order, and since deep sea mining was always considered by these
countries as an inalienable part of the said economic order, Article
29 of Chapter III of this Charter was devoted to the question of the
international sea-bed area and the exploitation of its resources.
Article 29 reads:
The sea-bed and ocean floor and the sub-soil thereof, beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction, as well as the resources
of the area, are the common heritage of mankind. On the basis
of the principles adopted by the General Assembly in the
resolution 2749 (XXV) of 17 December 1970, all States shall
ensure that the exploration of the area and exploitation of its
resources are carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes and
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that the benefits derived therefrom are shared equitably by all
States, taking into account the particular interests and needs
of developing countries; an international regime applying to
the area and its resources and including appropriate inter¬
national machinery to give effect to its provisions shall be
established by an international treaty of a universal
character, generally agreed upon. 126
The principles of the peaceful use of the deep sea-bed, the
equitable sharing of benefits by all states, with special regard to
the interests and needs of the developing countries, and the
necessity of establishing an international machinery through an
international treaty, were reaffirmed in this article as components
of the common heritage of mankind. The adoption of this resolution
with the affirmative votes of the socialist states was the decisive
step towards the transformation of the common heritage of mankind
into a principle of customary international law. The explicit
formulation of the principles derived from the common heritage of
mankind, and the adoption of Article 29 of the Charter by 113 votes
to none, with 17 abstentions, affirmed the fact that the common
heritage principle had become a part of customary international law.
The Group of 77 essentially negotiated on the regime of the
deep sea-bed as a part of a much broader frame of establishing the
New International Economic Order. That was why after the adoption
of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, while
negotiations for the legal regime of the deep sea-bed continued in
the UNCLOS III, the other aspect of the question was followed in the
work of UNCTAD.
In September 1978, when the possibility of the enactment of
national legislation for the unilateral exploitation of the deep
sea-bed had generated anxiety among many developing states, the
UNCTAD adopted a resolution, submitted by Colombia, under the title
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of "The Exploitation of the Sea-Bed Beyond the Limits of National
1 07
Jurisdiction". Under this resolution, it was asserted that the
principle of the common heritage of mankind had already acquired the
status of a customary rule of international law.128 Almost
simultaneously with the adoption of the UNCTAD resolution, on 15
September 1978, the chairman of the G77 at the 7th session of the
UNCLOS III, Nandan, with reference to the Declaration of Principles
and the common heritage of mankind, maintained:
One could not therefore dismiss as just one more United Nations
resolution a text which established a principle of
international law precisely in the meaning of Article 38 of the
Statute of the I.C.J, and which embodied the opinion of the
international community. The Declaration was thus the
embodiment of current international law with regard to the
regime of the sea-bed. 129
Here, too, it is clear that the G77 considered the common
heritage principle as a part of customary international law.
Nandan, moreover, emphasized two components of the common heritage,
namely, the international character of its exploitation and non-
1 *3f)
appropriation by individual states.
Further to this statement the Group of 77 established a group
of 12 legal experts five of whom were members of the ILC. The task
of this group was to express opinion on the question of unilateral
legislation and the binding force of the principles contained in the
Declaration of Principles. The group, in a letter of 23 April 1979
addressed to the Chairman of the Group of 77, announced, inter alia,
that "whereas the legal status of the superjacent waters is that of
res communis, the legal status of the sea-bed, subsoil and resources
thereof is that of an indivisible and inalienable common heritage of
mankind.1^1 The non-appropriation and international management of
the common heritage were thus reiterated.
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In response to these views, the United States delegate, in his
intervention at the plenary of the UNCLOS III 7th session said:
From the start of negotiations, his delegation has consistently
maintained that the right to explore and exploit the sea-bed
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction derived from the
freedom of the high seas, which was enjoyed by all nations. 132
He further referred to the Declaration of Principles and said:
"while it proclaimed that the resources of the sea-bed were the
'common heritage of mankind', [it] did not purport to prohibit
1 O O
access to them". It is useful to mention here that the U.S., in
fact, preferred the conclusion of a broadly acceptable convention on
the law of the sea, and this was emphasized time and again.^4
Parallel to the work of the Sea-Bed Committee, and later the
UNCLOS III, in another United Nations forum, namely the Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Outer Space Committee)
comprehensive negotiations concerning the orderly use of the moon
and other celestial bodies were going on. One of the results of
these negotiations was the conclusion of the 1979 Agreement
Governing the Activities on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
(Moon Treaty).135 jn these negotiations, too, the developing and
the developed countries with advanced technology had opposite
positions, but since the exploitation of moon resources was, at
least for the future, a theoretical concern, the developing
countries did not show the same decisiveness as in the case of the
deep sea-bed. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union supported the
adoption of the resolution which included the Agreement.''"^ The
concept of the common heritage of mankind found its way into this
agreement as a principle.137
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Article 11(1) of the Agreement reads:
The moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of
mankind, which finds its expression in the provisions of this
agreement, in particular paragraph 5 of this article.
This formulation content intends to make a distinction between the
common heritage principle of the Moon Treaty and the same principle
in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. States
parties to the Moon Treaty are, according to paragraph 5 of Article
11, to establish, when the exploitation of the natural resources of
the moon is about to become feasible, an international regime,
including appropriate procedures, to govern such exploitation.
In contrast to the case of the deep sea-bed, here it is only states
parties which may establish the international regime, and the main
purposes of the regime are, according to paragraph 7 of Article 11:
(a) the orderly and safe development of the natural resources
of the moon; (b) the national management of those resources;
(c) the expansion of opportunities in the use of these
resources; (d) an equitable sharing by all states parties in
the benefits derived from these resources whereby the interests
and needs of the developing countries, as well as the efforts
of those countries which have contributed either directly or
indirectly to the exploration of the moon, shall be given
special consideration.
Unlike the deep sea-bed legal regime, in the Moon Treaty there
is no mention of international organization for the direct
exploitation of the resources, and states parties themselves are
entitled, according to paragraph 4 of Article 11, to embark on "the
exploration and use of the moon without discrimination of any kind,
on the basis of equality and in accordance with international law
and provisions of this agreement". The future international regime
is to establish procedures for exploitation. The principle of
non-appropriation of common heritage by a state is repeated in
paragraph 3 of the said Article. It is clear from different
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articles of this Agreement and their provisions that the draftsmen
have put a new cover of "common heritage of mankind" over the old
concept of res communis.^38 ^g oniy difference is the qualified
reference to the benefits of the developing states parties.
The adoption of the Moon Treaty and its subsequent entering
into force is evidence to the fact that the industrialized countries
have at least accepted the common heritage of mankind as a principle
of international law, and have also agreed that whenever the
exploitation of the common heritage of mankind occurs, the interests
and needs of the developing countries should be taken into
consideration at the time of distribution of benefits.*39
(e) Developments Outside the United Nations
Developments of the legal content of the common heritage
principle outside the United Nations are the result of many
statements issued by individuals, non-governmental groups, state
officials, conferences and also the references some industrialized
countries have made to this principle in their national legislation
for deep sea mining.
In 1971, the G77 held its Second Ministerial meeting in Lima,
Peru, and adopted a Resolution on Marine Resources. In paragraph 3
of this resolution it is provided that the common heritage of
mankind:
should be managed by a regime which will enable the peoples
of all states to enjoy the substantive benefits that may be
derived therefrom, with due regard for the special
interests and needs of both coastal and land-locked developing
countries. 140
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The Specialized Conference of the Caribbean Countries on the
Problems of the Sea, which was held on 7 June 1972, issued a
declaration in a part of which reference was made to the Declaration
of Principles and the common heritage of mankind.
In September 1972, the representative of the United States
to the Sea-Bed Committee, in a Hearing before the House of
Representatives Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, stated
that in response to the interpretation of the developing countries
of the common heritage of mankind, the United States as well as some
other industrialized countries had continued repeating that common
I/O
heritage did not mean common property. This position of the
United States did not change in the following years.
The Inter-American Juridical Committee of the Organization of
American States, in a resolution adopted on 9 February 1973, without
trying to contribute to the elucidation of the legal content of the
common heritage concept, declared in operative paragraph 13 of the
resolution that:
The seabeds and ocean floor located beyond the zone of 200
nautical miles and beyond the continental shelf, as well as the
resources that may be extracted from them, are the common
heritage of mankind. 143
The Organization of African Unity, in a resolution adopted in
May 1973, reaffirmed their belief in the Declaration of Principles
and the concept of the common heritage of mankind, which in their
belief "should in no way be limited in its scope by restrictive
• , ■* 1 ZLZL
interpretations . '
The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, a non¬
governmental organization, in its report of June 1973, referred to
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the common heritage of mankind as a concept to be applied not only
to the sea-bed but also to the sea and all its resources.^"'
In September 1973, the Fourth Summit Conference of the Non-
Aligned countries was held. In a resolution adopted by this
Conference, it was reaffirmed that the zone and the resources of the
sea-bed and the subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction were the common heritage of mankind, and there was a
need for a powerful international authority to either directly or
indirectly undertake all activities related to the exploration of
the zone and exploitation of its resources.''"^
Differences of opinion between developing and developed
states concerning the status and the legal content of the principle
of the common heritage of mankind continued during the 1970s, but
the main forum for the conflict of opinions was the UNCLOS III.
Towards the end of the 1970s, when it became evident that a few
industrialized states had the intention of enacting national
legislation for the exploration of the deep sea resources, the
significance of the clarification of an agreed definition for the
common heritage principle became more patent.
For the United States, as the leading developed country with
respect to deep sea technology, the common heritage of mankind was
not any longer an abstract concept, but rather was a general
principle which found its specific meaning in any particular
situation.On the other hand, the developing countries made it
even more clear that common heritage was equal to common property,
and any exploitation outwith an internationally agreed upon
convention was illegal.^®
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The common heritage principle has had its influences on some
of the national laws for deep sea mining enacted by a few
industrialized states. The first of these statutes was the Deep
Sea-bed Hard Mineral Resources Act of the United States from
1980.1^ In this act it is stated that the United States voted for
Resolution 2749 (XXV) declaring the principle of the common heritage
of mankind "with the expectation that this principle would be
legally defined under the terms of a comprehensive international
Law of the Sea Treaty . . ."150 jt therefore implied that the
common heritage principle is still devoid of any legal content.
Nevertheless, the Act sets up a "Deep Seabed Revenue Sharing Trust
Fund" which is endowed by part of a tax received from the deep sea
mining activities".151 This Fund will be paid, as benefit share to
mankind, to the International Sea-Bed Authority within ten years of
the enactment of the Act if the United States becomes then party to
the Convention.152
The Federal Republic of Germany was the second country to
enact a law concerning deep sea mining. In the Act of Interim
Regulation of Deep Sea Mining,153 there is no mention of the common
heritage of mankind, but while emphasizing that the exploration of
the deep sea, at least provisionally, would be carried out on the
basis of the freedom of the high seas, it is admitted that the
benefits of all nations would be taken into consideration.154
Moreover, a trust fund is envisaged to be established. This fund,
which is endowed by a part of 0.75% taxes imposed on miners'
activities, will be transferred to the Convention. Otherwise, the
fund will be used for foreign aid purposes.155
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In the Deep Sea Mining Act of the United Kingdom of 1981,
there is no mention of the common heritage principle, neither is
there any disclaimer of sovereignty over the sea-bed or its
resources. In this Act, too, the exploration of the deep sea
resources is considered as a freedom of the high seas.166 As in
the case of the U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany, the United
Kingdom Act established a "Deep Sea Mining Fund" endowed by a part
of taxes levied on the recovery of the resources.16^ The Fund will
be transferred to the Authority when and if the United Kingdom
158
accedes to the Convention.
The Soviet law on provisional measures for the exploration
and exploitation of mineral resources,16^ adopted in 1982, was also
silent about the common heritage principle. It was, nevertheless,
maintained that the issuing of exploitation permits does not amount
to claim of sovereignty, sovereign or exclusive rights, jurisdiction
or right of ownership with respect to any sea-bed area or the
resources thereof.160 As regards the benefit of mankind, the law
provides for the establishment of a special fund to be endowed by a
"part of the assets received from the exploitation ... of the
mineral resources of the sea-bed area".161
The deep sea mining laws of France160 and Japan160 regulated
the activities of their nationals concerning the exploitation of the
mineral resources without even paying lip service to the concept of
the common heritage of mankind16^ and its benefits. In these two
laws, no mention of any fund or similar arrangement for a possible
future benefit sharing with the international community is made.
Italy's law on the Exploration and Exploitation of the
Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed from 1985166 follows the
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pattern of the German law and, in Article 15, provides for the
payment of 3.75% of the median market value of the minerals
recovered by the holder of an exploitation permit "for the purpose
of the Italian Aid to the Developing Countries".166
The common aspects of these legislative acts are that
they are all interim in character and, at least in some of
them, provisions with respect to the benefit of mankind and
revenue sharing are inserted; they are provisional, because the
industrialized countries, while opposing any accommodation of
heritage with property, time and again insisted that they were
committed to the successful completion of the UNCLOS III and the
emergence of a generally agreed upon comprehensive convention on the
law of the sea. Nevertheless, for these countries, the common
heritage of mankind has remained a principle with general character,
and no independent legal meaning, a concept whose content should be
elaborated in each individual case and through an internationally
agreed upon treaty.It may be appropriate here to dwell upon the
question of the common heritage of mankind as a rule of jus cogens
before we try to draw any conclusions from what has been said about
the development of this principle. Although several states,
already in the early stages of the work of the Conference or even
earlier, had referred to the common heritage of mankind as a jus
cogens, the frequency of state practice during the later stages
of the Conference and imminent adoption of the national legislation
for deep sea mining by some states resulted in the introduction of a
provision in Article 311(6) of the Convention prohibiting amendments
to the common heritage principle and derogations therefrom. The
insertion of this provision in the Convention was initiated by Chile
- 184 -
and supported by the majority of the participating states at the
UNCLOS III.168 The said paragraph reads as follows:
States parties agree that there shall be no amendments to the
basic principle relating to the common heritage of mankind
set forth in Article 136 and that they shall not be party to
any agreement in derogation thereof.
Efforts to declare the common heritage of mankind as a jus
cogens are due to the fact that this principle is considered as
"accepted and recognized by the international community of states as
a whole", and thereby has passed one of the tests for the
transformation of a rule of customary law into a jus cogens.1^9
Although the objection of the industrialized countries to the common
heritage of mankind was to its lack of clarity, abstraction and
differences of interpretation, and not to the existence of the
principle as a general concept, mention should be made of the
remarks of Judge Lachs when he said the words "as a whole" in
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties "indicate
that acceptance is not required by each and every member of the
international community".170 The acceptance of the common heritage
principle by the international community goes back to 1970 when the
Declaration of Principles was adopted and 1974 when even the
socialist countries accepted it by voting for the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States. Both consistent state
practice and the independent acts of the United Nations' organs
since then have apparently contributed to the creation of an erga
omnes character for that principle^! and the acceptance of the
formulation of Article 311(6) of the Convention.
In brief, it can be said that the adoption of Resolution 2749
(XXV) containing the common heritage principle by the affirmative
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votes of both developing and developed states without any dissent,
and the consequent practice, seem to have evolved this concept into
a general principle of international law; this against the fact
that there has always been a difference of opinion as to the
precise legal connotation of this principle. Those who try to
reject this principle as a rule of customary law or even more as a
general principle of international law often invoke the argument
that, because of the constant objection of the industrialized
countries to the definition of the developing countries of the
common heritage principle, one of the main elements of custom, i.e.,
opinio juris is not established. It may be pointed out that the
common heritage of mankind, notwithstanding different
interpretations and quite independent of them, has been in fact
accepted as providing general, if not specific, legal obligation
with respect to the utilization of areas beyond the limits of
1 70
national jurisdiction. The repeated undertakings of the
industrialized countries to conform their activities with the
decision of the UNCLOS III, their insistence on the interim
character of the national legislation and inclusion of provisions
for revenue sharing in those laws, all point to the fact that the
common heritage of mankind has already influenced the practice of
these states as a principle of customary international law.
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SECTION VII: THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE DEEP SEA-BED
ACCORDING TO THE CONVENTION
According to the 6th preambular paragraph, Articles 1(1)(1),
133 and 136 of the Convention, the sea-bed beyond the limits of the
national jurisdiction and the subsoil thereof, together called the
I70
Area, and their resources, i.e., all solid, liquid, or gaseous
mineral resources in situ in the Area at or beneath the sea-bed
are the common heritage of mankind.No matter how we try to
define the word heritage, either as materialization of the word
interest-'-^ or as property, it is obvious that Article 136 of the
Convention, which reads: "the Area and its resources are the common
heritage of mankind", is a clear legal statement meaning that
mankind is the owner of the Area and its resources.
The question now arises as to what signifies mankind.
Mankind is the legal expression of a nation or people. The idea of
mankind may have seemed (and to some may still seem) to be a Utopian
concept. General references to mankind may be found in numerous
international instruments. In fact the term "mankind" did not
preoccupy traditional international law for the simple reason that
it was used in humanitarian law with a broad meaning, e.g., it is
used in the first preambular paragraph of the UN Charter.
Several other treaties and resolutions of international
organizations have referred to the interests and rights of mankind
in matters such as the protection of human rights, the punishment of
international crimes and the establishment of special juridical
regimes over space and resources, including outer space, the moon
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and other celestial bodies. Activities carried out in outer space
have been declared to constitute the "province of all mankind".^7
Mankind even has "envoys" in the persons of the astronauts sent into
outer space.
Before the Outer Space Treaty, mankind had never been
recognized as the holder of specific economic rights and had not
been provided with the institutional means to implement these
rights. Moreover, the Antarctic Treaty signed in 1959 describes
mankind and the Moon Treaty which entered into force in 1984 also
makes reference to mankind.
The term "mankind" has an important connection with the new
1982 Convention on the International Law of the Sea. According to
Article 137(2): "All rights in the resources of the Area are vested
in mankind as a whole, on whose behalf the Authority shall act".
It is clear from this article that mankind as such should be
represented by an international organization in which all states
parties to it are members. Member states, according to Article
157(1) of the Convention, do organize and control activities in the
Area, but they do that only in accordance with the provisions of
Part XI of the Convention, having in mind the benefit of mankind as
a whole, and that national interests are to be restrained.
Does mankind thus become a subject of international law? It
can be argued that, by endowing mankind with rights over the Area
and its resources, the 1982 Convention has treated mankind as a
subject of international law.-^l Generally speaking, there seems
to be no fundamental reason for denying, at the international level,
what is an accepted fact of domestic law, namely, the juridical
personification of human collectivities. Whilst the classification
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of "mankind" as an international legal person, and hence a subject
of international law, would no doubt be controversial in some
circles, it is not necessary for present purposes to engage in a
full analysis of this issue in the context of the present study.
This flows from the fact that the Authority is, as we have seen,
specifically charged, in Article 137(2), with the task of acting on
behalf of mankind in respect of all rights in the resources of the
Area. There can be no doubt, even in orthodox legal circles, that
it is a bearer of rights and duties under international law. It
is, for example, provided with such rights and means to prohibit an
1 Opindividual state, a collectivity of states or other entities from
using the resources of the Area freely without its advance consent.
According to the Convention, the Authority is the body that
represents mankind in the deep sea-bed area. The role thus given
to the Authority in safeguarding the interests of mankind as a whole
was a practical recognition of the fact this could only be
effectively achieved by an identifiable entity possessing real legal
capacities.
By its nature, mankind is not able to exercise its rights
directly and therefore has to resort to representatives acting on
its behalf. Mankind is a collective of individuals, and at the
international level individuals are generally represented by states.
Therefore, states are the only entities that can achieve, by acting
jointly with the Authority, the maximum degree of representation of
mankind. The effectiveness of the Authority will depend on the
broadest participation of states and other entities which form part
of the international community. Only participation by all states,
or at least by the majority of them, would truly represent mankind.
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For this reason, the Authority has been conceived as an
intergovernmental organization with a universal vocation, open to
participation by all, not only by states but also by entities other
than states that represent peoples.
Different provisions of Part XI of the Convention affirm the
fact that the terra "mankind" not only includes states but also all
unorganized societies and "people who have not attained full
independence or other self-governing status".Moreover, the
concept of mankind should be understood as including both present
and future generations of peoples inhabiting the earth, from which
it should be concluded that the common heritage of mankind has to be
protected in such a manner as to ensure its continued enjoyment by
184
future generations.
The use of the term "heritage", together with "mankind" in the
phrase "common heritage of mankind" also indicates the fact that the
interests of the peoples to come have to be respected. Both the
concept of mankind as a whole and the notion of collective ownership
which is implied by the "common heritage" lead to the conclusion
that:
No state shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign
rights over any part of the Area or its resources nor shall
any state or natural or juridical person appropriate any
part thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereignty
or sovereign rights nor such appropriation shall be
recognized. 185
In fact, these provisions are not new. They were more
elaborately embodied in the second operative paragraph of the
Declaration of Principles. Since 1975, when the first negotiating
text of the Convention was introduced, the content of Article 137(1)
appeared in all negotiating text. On this point agreement was
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reached from the start between the developed and developing
countries. The very reason why the developed countries approved
this formulation is the fact that they believed such a provision
could not prevent states or private persons from the exploitation of
the resources. With regard to Articles 136 and 137 of the
Convention concerning the legal status of the deep sea-bed, it can
be assumed that the approach of the developing countries has
prevailed over the views of the developed states, but it should also
be borne in mind that, although there ought to be a natural relation
between the status of the deep sea-bed and the system of exploita¬
tion of its resources, for industrialized countries the acceptabil¬
ity of the latter was prior to any formulation of the former.
SECTION VIII: EVALUATION
To recall earlier points about the development of the common
heritage principle, it can be said that due to the evolution in
oceanic technologies, new need emerged and "common heritage of
mankind" was born to meet those requirements.
This principle contains elements which were missing in the
classic doctrine of res communis. It implied an equitable sharing
of the benefits derived from deep sea mining and an international
management of the resources. As many other new concepts, the
common heritage of mankind was from the outset, considered as being
vague, imprecise, incapable of being legally defined, etc., and
other combinations such as "common interest" or "common good" were
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suggested which were by no means more clear or precise. While for
the developed countries, it was a concept without any legal content,
the developing countries regarded it as a new concept which should
be given legal content. Already in 1974, the practice of states in
the form of different statements and the adoption of resolutions at
the United Nations or elsewhere not only had thrown light on the
implications of this new concept, but also transformed it into a
customary norm of international law. Adoption of the Moratorium
Resolution by the General Assembly in 1969 was evidence to the fact
that the majority of states believed that the common heritage
implied joint management and equitable participation of all states
in its administration.
The developed states did not share this interpretation. For
them, "common heritage" meaning "collective ownership of a property"
was both unrealistic and unacceptable. What they could accept
as a definition of common heritage was rather "common access".
Therefore, when the Declaration of Principles was adopted in 1970,
there were different interpretations of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the
Declaration concerning the legal status of the sea-bed. For the
developing countries, all rights to the common heritage were vested
in humanity as a whole, and only the Authority as agent of mankind
was entitled to use it. For the developed countries, every natural
or juridical person was free to exploit the deep sea mineral
resources, and the one who worked them acquired title to them. The
adoption of the Declaration of Principles by 108 votes to none, the
adoption of Article 29 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States in 1974 by 113 votes to none, the recognition of the
common heritage in the Moon Treaty of 1979 as a "principle", the
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insertion of provisions regarding the benefits of mankind in several
of the national laws for the exploitation of deep sea-bed resources
as well as numerous statements by representatives of states, all
influenced the fact that the common heritage of mankind, regardless
of what specific implications can be derived from it, is now a
general principle of international law.
The Convention defines the legal status of the deep sea-bed
on the basis of the common heritage principle. From the provision
of Article 137 it is clear that the Convention, at least in the case
of deep sea legal status, has adopted the interpretation of the
developing countries from the common heritage principle. The
consideration of the interests of mankind as a whole and the notion
of "collective ownership" as claimed by the developing countries
have resulted in providing in Article 137(1) that "No state shall
claim or exercise sovereignty" over the common heritage. The
developed states could easily accept this because they believed that
acquiring ownership rights over extracted minerals did not require
any sovereignty over the resources dni situ. To negate this
assumption, Article 137(3) provided that no right to the extracted
minerals could be acquired except in accordance with the Convention.
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Almost all issues related to sea-bed activities are
characterized by the clash between two general principles of
international law: the common heritage of mankind and freedom of
the high seas supported by the developing and developed countries
respectively. The Parallel System of exploitation of the sea-bed
and its resources is no exception to this statement. Since the
exploitation system embodied in the Convention is essentially based
on the common heritage principle, the unilateral laws of a few
technologically advanced countries provide for a system of
exploitation based on the principle of the freedom of the high seas.
As regards the development of the Parallel System for the
sea-bed resources, the period between 1967 and 1982, when the
Convention on the Law of the Sea was adopted, can be divided into
three parts. The first, which lasted until 1977, started with a
hopeful optimism for an agreement on an international system of
exploitation. These hopes proved groundless, and the deep sea-bed
and its resources resulted in a problematic issue. The strong will
of all states to save the outcome of many years of careful work
generated a significant compromise relating to the role of states
and private entities in the sea-bed activities. The negotiations
following this compromise included the second part which lasted
until 1980 when genuine hopes for the establishment of a viable,
albeit not ideal, Parallel System appeared. The third part
coincides with the refusal of the Reagan administration to sign the
1982 Convention.
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In this chapter, after an overview of the development of the
system of exploitation since 1967, the articles of the Convention
and the main aspects and legal implications of the domestic laws of
the industrialized countries in this respect shall be examined.
SECTION lis THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARALLEL SYSTEM
IN THE UNITED NATIONS BETWEEN 1969 AND 1976
From the early days of the discussions in the United Nations,
it was clear that there was a consensus on the establishment of an
international management for the exploitation of the sea-bed
resources. The establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1968
affirms the fact that no state believed at that time that unilateral
exploitation of deep sea-bed resources on the basis of national
laws and as an exercise of the freedom of the high seas was
either desirable or consistent with existing international law."*"
International arrangements, nevertheless, meant different things to
different states or groups of states. The nature of international
arrangements was provided to answer the question "who should exploit
the sea-bed?"
For the Group of 77, internationalization of the sea-bed meant
the realization of the goals of the common heritage principle by
establishing an international organization which would exclusively
carry out the exploitation of the resources of the Area and would
ensure an equitable sharing of profits between all nations.^
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For the developed countries which did not define the common
heritage of mankind as common property, on the other hand, the main
purpose was to establish a licensing system under a new subsidiary
organ of the United Nations in order to issue licences for
exploitation against receiving a reasonable fee for covering its
administrative expenses. Some of these developed countries further
contended that each licence holder should, in addition, pay a
royalty to the United Nations organ for distribution among states
3
parties to the international arrangements.
In brief, for the developing countries, internationalization of
the sea-bed was the outcome of the principle of the common heritage
of mankind and an important step towards the establishment of a
New International Economic Order which should provide for a de
facto equality of states by creating compensation and preferential
rules in favour of these countries.^ For the industrialized
countries, the nature of sea-bed activities in the sea-bed area,
which require exclusive rights to a huge area for a long time, as
well as uncertainties of the rules of international law in that
respect, rendered the establishment of an international arrangement
inevitable.
(a) Exploitation of The Area for Peaceful Purposes
Although disagreements as to the purposes of international¬
ization and the answer each state or group of states had to the
question of "who should exploit the deep sea-bed", there were a few
principles that both developing and developed countries agreed upon.
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The first principle was that the area of the sea-bed should be
reserved only for peaceful purposes. Reference to the peaceful
uses of the deep sea-bed was with regard to similar provisions in
the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (Article IV) and to the Antarctic
Treaty of 1959 (Article 1). The General Assembly Resolution 2340
(XXI) of 18 December 1967 laid down two main objectives for the Ad
Hoc Committee: reservation of the deep sea-bed exclusively for
peaceful purposes, and the use of its resources for the benefit of
mankind.
The objective of reservation of the deep sea-bed exclusively
for peaceful purposes was so important that in the opinion of
some states the realization of the second objective, i.e., the
exploitation of the resources of the Area for the benefit of mankind
was dependent on the meaning which would be attached to peaceful
uses of the sea-bed.The expression "peaceful uses" was
considered to be a flexible concept with different meanings to
different states. For the United States, the test of a "peaceful"
activity was whether that activity was consistent with the United
Nations Charter and other obligations of international law.^ Since
the Charter recognizes the right of self-defence, defensive military
acts, according to the United States, were to be considered as
peaceful.^
The question of the use of the sea-bed only for peaceful
purposes was of the utmost significance to the Soviet Union. For
this country, the expression "peaceful" was equal to total
prohibition of any military activity on the sea-bed beyond the
limits of the territorial sea.8 In the Soviet opinion, the phrase
"beyond the limits of national jurisdiction" meant the application
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of the concept of peaceful uses to the area beyond the limits of the
national jurisdiction of states was that it brought within the realm
of this principle the continental shelf which was the area most
likely to be used for military purposes in the immediate future.
In support of the proposition that military use of the continental
shelf be banned, it was held that Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf limited the coastal
states' right to exploration and exploitation of the natural
resources of the shelf and did not give the coastal states unlimited
jurisdiction over it. According to this view, the military use of
the sea-bed underlying the high seas beyond territorial seas, in the
area of the continental shelf would inevitably affect the peaceful
exploration and use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction.^ In fact, the Soviet Union
preferred to use "beyond the limit of the territorial sea".^
There were some other states which shared the Soviet interpretation
of "peaceful uses". For example, Sweden, in reply to the Secretary-
General's note verbale concerning the work of the Ad Hoc Committee
wrote:
... a prohibition against the use of the ocean-bed for any
kind of military undertaking would undoubtedly lessen the
temptation of extending national jurisdiction over that area.
The resistance towards the internationalization of the
ocean-bed would also become much weakened if it were to be used
only for peaceful purposes. 11
Since 1969, many delegates to the Sea-Bed Committee started
suggesting that one question of the demilitarization of the sea-bed
would be dealt with in the Committee of Disarmament, and priority
was gradually given to the second question, namely, the exploitation
of the sea-bed resources for the benefit of mankind. The step
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taken by the United States and the Soviet Union in concluding the
"Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and
other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor
and the Subsoil Thereof"12 in 1971, "increased concern about the
peaceful uses of ocean space and paved the way for more relevant
measures in the future",13 but like the Outer Space Treaty, it
prohibited only specific uses of some specifically defined nuclear
weapons, and was not the final and acceptable answer to the demand
for complete demilitarization of the sea-bed. There were many
countries which saw in "peaceful uses" much more than non-military
uses, and believed that a much wider definition should be attached
to that expression. The representative of Ecuador, e.g., speaking
about the adverse impact of sea-mining on the economy of the
developing producing countries of the minerals to be exploited from
the sea-bed, said that "a particularly important aspect of the
violation of the concept of peaceful uses was the kind of economic
aggression involved in the extraction of minerals from the sea-bed".
He further suggested that "the future convention on the law of the
sea must clearly define the concept of peaceful uses".-^
As regards the Area, Article 141 of the Convention specifies
the exclusive use for peaceful purposes without providing any
definition for that concept.^ However, an attempt is made to give
such a definition in Article 301 of the Convention under the title
of "Peaceful uses of the Seas". This article, which is adopted on
1 ftthe basis of Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, 0
reads:
In exercising their rights and performing their duties under
this convention, States Parties shall refrain from any threat
or use of force against territorial integrity or political
- 211 -
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the principles of international law embodied in the
charter of the United Nations.
Neither the view of the Soviet Union nor that of Ecuador has found
expression in this article, and its content seems to reflect the
position of the United States. Article 301 may be construed as
suggesting that only aggressive activities in the sense of Article
2(4) of the Charter are inconsistent with the concept of "peaceful
uses", and probably non-aggressive military activities carried out
by military personnel but for non-military purposes are permitted.
This assumption is based on the fact that the words "inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations" in Article 2(4) of the
Charter are replaced, in Article 301 of the Convention, by
"inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in
the Charter of the United Nations".^ The question of defining
"peaceful uses" or "peaceful purposes" in relation to deep sea
mining was not a hard-core issue at the Conference, and the formula
incorporated in Article 301 of the Convention was ambiguous enough
to be acceptable to more or less all delegations.
(b) Exploitation of the Resources for the Benefit of Mankind
Resolution 2340 (XXII) provided for the exploitation of the
sea-bed resources in the interest of mankind. The whole system of
exploitation of the sea-bed resources which was negotiated at the
Sea-Bed Committee and later at the UNCLOS III had this objective as
its guiding principle, and the Convention which has come into
existence as a result of deliberation at these fora contains
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provisions which are meant to preserve the interests of mankind in
deep sea mining to the highest extent. Here the main problem was
how states interpreted "benefit or interest of mankind".
For the developing countries, the de facto inequality of states
required a preferential treatment in favour of those countries.
Benefit of mankind to them meant, inter alia, special regard to the
needs and interests of the developing countries in order to
establish a New International Economic Order, and thereby to
restructure international relations on the basis of a de^ facto
equality of states. The representative of Ecuador in the First
Committee of the General Assembly in 1969 explicitly interpreted the
concept of the benefit of mankind as "using the net proceeds [of the
deep sea-bed mining] for the economic promotion of the developing
countries, whether they have a sea-coast or not".^ The
industrialized countries saw the benefit to mankind in increased
wealth, improved technology, the ability to exploit sea-bed
resources more economically than on land and a greater affluence for
themselves which would indirectly benefit other countries.^
"Benefit of mankind" had originally a dominant economic
20character both for developing and developed countries, and
contained a right to an equitable sharing of benefits from sea-bed
mining for developing countries and a duty to make different sorts
of payments in connection with deep sea mining by industrialized
countries. Deliberations at the Sea-Bed Committee gradually
widened, at least for the developing countries, the scope of this
concept in order to give more importance to non-economic elements.
Transfer of technology, protection of the marine environment against
pollution, and enhancement of marine scientific research in the deep
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sea-bed were the most important of these factors. This was indeed
a logical development, because the philosophy behind the principle
of the common heritage of mankind required the provision of all
possible preferential treatment for the developing countries, and
not only financial ones, in order to change a de jure equality to a
de facto equality, and as far as deep sea-bed mining was concerned,
to put them on the same footing as the industrialized countries.
The Declaration of Principles of 1970 was an effort to get
together the elements of agreements between states in one single
document which would constitute solid ground for future negotiations
on the legal regime for the deep sea-bed. The principle of benefit
of mankind was incorporated in paragraph 7 of this declaration.
Promotion of scientific research in the area and prevention of
pollution in the marine environment were mentioned in paragraphs
10 and 11 respectively.
One of the principles which developed in close relation with
the concept of benefit of mankind was the protection of the marine
environment from pollution. The fear of pollution was not only
because of the effect of the future exploitation of the deep sea-bed
on the ecological balance of the marine environment, but still more
on account of the prevailing risk of pollution caused by dumping of
21
hazardous elements such as nerve gas in the sea-bed. Because of
the nature of the risk which existed equally for both the developing
and developed countries, the question of establishing preventive
measures against marine pollution was easily settled, and agreements
were reached without much difficulty about the implementation of
these measures.22 Paragraph 11 of the Declaration of Principles
dealt with the prevention of pollution resulting from activities in
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the Area, and the same was incorporated in Article 145 of the
Convention.
Whereas the principles of reservation of the Area for peaceful
purposes and the prevention of pollution were soon left aside as
more or less clear items, other issues related to the question of
"who should exploit the Area" and connected with the concept of the
benefit of mankind, such as the equitable sharing of benefits,
participation of all states in the activities, transfer of
technology and production control, continued to be subject to
conflicting interpretations and contradicting attitude-takings by
the states.
(c) Original Negotiating Situations
Several proposals by different states to the Sea-Bed Committee
concerning the conditions of the regime to be established were
suggested. These proposals showed the degree of disagreement of
opinions in this respect which was mostly influenced by ideological
and political differences. Major Western states, such as the U.S.,
the U.K., France, Japan and Canada, as well as several Latin
American and African states, submitted their own proposals. The
content of these proposals as regards the nature of the regime, the
functions of the international organization and the meaning which
was attached to the benefit of mankind and ensuring principles were
different. At one extreme was the French proposal with much
emphasis on economic efficiency,23 an(j t^e assertion that such
efficiency was irreconcilable with the establishment of an
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international organization with considerable powers. France, in
this proposal, was not prepared to recognize any competence for the
international organization to collect taxes on production from the
resources, and considered it more to the benefit of mankind if the
state concerned, itself contributed an appreciable share of the
taxes levied on the exploitation to an "international, regional or
bilateral programme of assistance to developing countries which it
may select".
The Tanzanian proposal was at the other extreme. It envisaged
"an international organization with exclusive rights for exploration
and exploitation of the sea-bed resources".^
Between these extremes, there were proposals which gave certain
powers to the international organization. In the United States
proposal, the international organization issued licences for sea-bed
resources exploitation but it did not engage in the activities
itself. It also had they duty of supervision of the compliance of
the operations with the rules established in the regime and
27
collection of all payments.
Discussions at the Sea-Bed Committees only revealed the sharp
contradiction between the G77 and the technologically advanced
countries, and the wide differences of views culminated in a
disagreement at the end of the first substantive session of the
UNCLOS III in Caracas in 1974.^ This disagreement had its roots
in developments outside the forum of negotiations for a sea-bed
legal regime. The Arab oil embargo in 1973 in the context of the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which was
a prototype of the unity of the developing countries, and the
immediate effect of that embargo, demonstrated, on the one hand, the
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power of these countries as a political force and, on the other, the
dependability of the industrialized states on the raw materials
on
exported by the developing countries. 7 Therefore, it turned the
question of unrestricted access to the resources of the sea-bed into
a highly important issue of national security for the developed
countries.
The programme of a New International Economic Order was
highlighted in 1974 by the adoption at the General Assembly of The
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. It was,
therefore, reasonable that the negotiations about the legal regime
for the sea-bed at the UNCLOS III became, to the developing
countries, a testing ground for taking a decisive step towards the
establishment of a New International Economic Order, and with regard
to the developments of 1973 and 1974, they felt in a stronger
negotiating position for that purpose. On the other hand, the
industrialized countries found themselves in a more or less
confrontational situation where they had to secure for themselves
the right of free access to the sea-bed while undertaking minimum
international obligations.
1. Disagreement on the issue
The First Committee of the UNCLOS III, which dealt with the
question of the sea-bed legal regime, received, in the 1974 Caracas
sessions, four different proposals which revealed the degree of
opposition of opinions at that time. Three of these proposals,
submitted by the United States, the EEC countries and Japan,
advocated the freedom of states and private entities supported by
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states to participate in the activities in the sea-bed. u These
three proposals generally divided the activities into three aspects:
prospecting, evaluation and exploitation. There was no need to go
into any particular arrangement for prospecting; all applicants had
only to inform the Authority of their intent. For the evaluation
and exploitation aspects, the applicant had to enter into some
"legal arrangement", perhaps in the form of contracts which obliged
it to comply with the regulations imposed by a future convention
with regard to the rights and duties of other states in the Area and
not the rights of the international community represented by the
Authority. No elements of the principle of the benefit of mankind,
such as sharing of benefits, transfer of technology or participation
of all states in the exploitation, were mentioned in these
proposals. A
The fourth proposal, submitted by the G77, gave a controlling
OO
role to the Authority. According to this proposal, the title to
the Area and its resources was vested in the Authority (Article 1),
and it was only the Authority who should decide how and to whom this
title might pass (Article 2). The Authority might enter into joint
venture contracts relating to the activities in the Area (Article
5), but these contracts should ensure the effective control of the
Authority at all times (Article 4). Those who made a contract with
the Authority concerning the activities in the Area should provide
the necessary funds, materials, equipment, skill and know-how
(Article 12), and at the same time be held responsible for any risk
arising out of the conduct of operations (Article 13). The
Authority required all contracts to undertake to transfer their
technology to the Authority [Article 15(a)] and to train personnel
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from developing countries [Article 15(c)]. It seemed that, except
for ensuring security of tenure to the contractor (Article 10), the
Authority only enjoyed rights, and if it had any duties at all, they
were generally against the international community and not the
contractors. The comparison of the proposal of the G77 with those
of the industrialized countries clearly demonstrates the conditions
under which the first substantive session of the UNCLOS III started
its work in 1974.
The G77 insisted on a direct relation between the questions of
"who owns the Area" and "who should exploit it". According to
them, since the Area and its resources belonged to humanity as a
33
whole, the Authority as the agent of humanity should exploit it.
The industrialized countries, on the other hand, made a distinction
between these two questions. Whereas it could be accepted that the
Area was for the use of the international community, it was not
acceptable that a supranational organization would exploit the
resources as the sole agent of the humanity.
The Soviet Union refused to give the Authority the right of
exploitation, arguing that it was unrealistic to imagine such an
organization would involve private companies in the activities on a
contractual basis without submitting to their monopolistic interests
Q cr
and the need for a substantial return on their invested capital.
The Soviet Union instead suggested that only "states themselves must
have the right to exploit the resources of the sea-bed in accordance
with the convention and with licence obtained from the sea-bed
organization" .36 Reference to the equitable distribution of the
benefits among all states with special attention to the needs and
interests of the developing countries was made by the Soviet Union
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and it also proposed the reservation of some sections of the sea-bed
in all the potentially richer areas for those countries which were
37unable to undertake the exploitation of resources immediately.
The difference in interpretations from the principle of the
benefit of mankind was best manifested in the discussions about the
production control at the First Committee of the UNCLOS III in 1974.
The problems of the adverse effects of deep sea-bed production on
the economy of many countries had originally one dimension, i.e.,
the effects on the land-based producers of the same products. In
1974, the other dimension, namely the effects on the consumer, was
also discussed. Generally speaking, the G77 was in favour of
preventive and compensatory measures such as production and price
control in order to defeat the adverse effects on those developing
countries which were principal exporters of one or more of the four
major minerals contained in manganese nodules. The industrialized
countries, on the other hand, argued that production from the
sea-bed not only could meet the increasing world demand for
minerals, but it would also contribute to the stabilization of the
prices which was eventually to the benefit of the majority of states
O Q
which are the consumers.
The huge gap between the developing and developed countries in
1974 concerning the system and conditions of exploitation of deep
sea-bed resources continued for the years to come. What was clear
was that any compromise system must contain several factors: it
should give the Authority a role much more than a registrar; it
should contain some arrangements for the distribution of the profits
or taxes; and it should provide for some form of access of the
technologically advanced countries to the deep sea-bed.
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The first effort to reach a compromise solution was initiated
by C.W. Pinto, the Chairman of the Working Group of the First
Committee in Geneva in 1975. He presented a general paper
entitled, "Basic Conditions of Exploration and Exploitation","^
which was largely based on the proposal of the G.77 in 1974, but
sought to accommodate the interests of the industrialized countries
too. This compromise became possible by incorporating a system of
parallel exploitation suggested by the United States. According to
paragraph 3(d) of the said document, the Authority would designate
sectors of the deep sea-bed for exploration and exploitation by
contracting states. Paragraph 4 provided for the Authority to
enter into contract with the Contracting States, or state
enterprises, or natural or juridical persons, for any activity in
the Area. Paragraph 7 of the document, which contained the
innovative point of the American proposal concerning the Parallel
System, read:
Each applicant with respect to activities of evaluation and
exploitation shall be required to propose to the Authority two
alternative areas of equivalent commercial interests for the
conduct of operations under a contract. The Authority shall
determine one such area to be a reserved area in accordance
with paragraph 8.
The main characteristic of this "Parallel System" was that those
activities which were carried out by the states and private entities
in their own areas were regulated by national law, and the Authority
had no control over them. The Parallel System was meant to give
ultimate control to the Authority over the activities in that area
which belonged to it, and provide, on the other hand, for the
unrestricted access of other entities to other parts of the area
only subject to the legislation of their respective states.^
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The ideological conflict continued in the 1975 Geneva session
of the UNCLOS III. While the United States was against any
cartelization of sea-bed minerals by the G77 in the same manner as
the OPEC had been organized, some of the developing countries
believed that no concession to the original position of the G77,^
was permitted.^ The Algerian representative elaborated on this
point by saying that the G77 were not there "to negotiate with
multinational corporations. They were not there to divide up the
[international sea-bed] zone . . . because it was already common
heritage".^
At the end of the Geneva Session, the ISNT containing a
compromise text based on various proposals by states in regard to
sea mining, was issued by the Chairman of the First Committee.^
There was no mention of the Parallel System in this document and it
was clearly inclined to the position of the G.77. The main
objective of the exploitation system of sea-bed resources, according
to Article 9 of the ISNT, was to foster the healthy development of
the world economy, and for that, efforts should be made to avoid or
minimize any adverse effects on the economies of the developing
countries resulting from a substantial decline in their export
earnings from minerals. The same article provided for the
consideration of the optimum benefit of producers and consumers of
minerals and equitable sharing of benefits, with particular
attention to the interests and needs of the developing countries.
According to Article 11, the Authority should take the necessary
measures for promoting transfer of technology with regard to the
Area, particularly to the developing countries. Article 18
specifically encouraged the participation of the developing
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countries in the activities in the Area. The right to administer
the Area, manage its resources and control the activities of the
Area, was vested in the Authority by Article 21. The Authority,
according to Article 22, enjoyed the discretion to decide if it
wished to directly conduct the activities or determined to enter
into service contracts or joint ventures with any state party or
private entities under the control of the states parties. The
contracts or joint ventures should always ensure the direct
effective control of the Authority.
As is evident, the ISNT had conferred an almost unrestricted
competence upon the Authority. The chief delegate of the United
States in a later personal commentary considered Article 22 of the
ISNT as the one most critical to the progress in the negotiations,
because it made it possible for the Authority to conduct the
operations directly and it might enter into arrangements with states
or private entities only when and if it deemed it appropriate.
He warned, "Unless there is a substantial qualification of this
article to provide for assured access and production by states and
their nationals, an underlying accommodation will not have been
achieved".^
In the fourth session of the UNCLOS III, the ISNT relating to
the sea-bed regime was negotiated at the First Committee, and as a
result of those negotiations, a revised version of it was prepared
by the Chairman of the First Committee according to the same
arrangements agreed upon previously for the preparation of the
ISNT.^ The new document was called Revised Single Negotiating
Text (RSNT).^ The changes in the ISNT which resulted in the RSNT
AO
were mostly favourable to the industrialized countries. ° For
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example, Article 22 of the ISNT, which dealt with the functions of
the Authority and had been strongly criticized by the industrialized
countries, was reformulated in the RSNT. Whereas in the ISNT
activities in the Area should be conducted by the Authority, in the
RSNT, states parties or private entities under the control of states
parties could conduct activities in association with the Authority
and under its control. Another important change was in regard to
the provision concerning the activities in the Area. In the ISNT,
the activities in the Area were required to be governed by, inter
alia, the regulation and supervision by the Authority.^ This is
modified in the RSNT to be governed by the provisions of Part I of
the Convention.The industrialized countries preferred to have
all the provisions clearly articulated in the Convention so that the
possibility of the emergence of unforeseen situations raised by the
regulations adopted in future by the Authority could be curtailed.
The main change that could be considered favourable to the
developing countries was in provisions concerning the adverse
effects of deep sea mining activities on the economies of these
countries. Article 9(6) of the ISNT provided that the activities
in the Area should be conducted in such a manner as to avoid or
minimize these adverse effects without elaborating any practical
measures for that purpose. The RSNT proposed three measures in
order to achieve that goal: 1- international commodity arrangements
to which the Authority could become a party; 2- production
limitation for an interim specified period; and 3- a compensatory
system of economic adjustment assistance.The idea of temporary
production limitation was suggested in April 1976 by the Secretary
of State of the United States, Henry Kissinger, outside the forum of
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the Conference as a compromise gesture to minimize the fears of the
land-based developing producers for adverse effects of the future
deep sea mining on their foreign exchange incomes.
The fifth session of the UNCLOS III in 1976 did not produce any-
new negotiating text, but several working papers concerning the
system of exploitation and the power of the Authority were submitted
to the First Committee, and Kissinger, once again outside the
Conference, made two important concessions on behalf of the United
States. He announced that the United States would be prepared to
ensure the financing of the Enterprise so that it could start mining
activities concurrently with states and private entities, and would
also be prepared to include in the Convention agreed provisions for
the transfer of technologyThis was, anyhow, a general
statement and subject to different interpretations. The other
concession by Kissinger was the proposal for a periodic review of
the system. The G77 generally insisted that, even if the Parallel
System were accepted, there should be arrangements in the Convention
that, after a specified period of time, this system would cease in
favour of a unitary system of exclusive exploitation by the
Authority. The American proposal, though set forth in a very vague
formulation, could mean a review of the operation of the Parallel
System, which was in line with the demands of the G77.
The working papers submitted to the First Committee in this
session were in fact reactions to the RSNT. The G77, which
considered the RSNT as favourable to the industrialized countries,
presented the first working paper~^ in which it was proposed that
activities in the Area should be conducted exclusively by the
Authority either through the Enterprise or through a form of
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association between the Authority and states parties or public or
private entities [Article 22(1)]. Activities of the Enterprise
should be conducted in accordance with a formal written plan, but
activities in association with states or other entities should be
conducted pursuant to a contract with the Authority. Article 8 of
the Annex in this working paper of the G77 gave the Authority the
freedom to decide which criteria it required for concluding a
contract with an applicant. The purpose was to ensure that the
Authority would not be forced to accept any proposed plan of work.
The working paper of the G77 was criticized by the industrialized
countries as reflecting the original position of that group in the
Caracas session in 1974.
Both the Soviet and the American proposals recognized the
right of the Authority to directly conduct the activities in the
deep sea-bed. The Soviet proposal provided for the states parties
also to directly engage in the activities [Article 22(1)]. States
had to enter into contracts with the Authority for that purpose, and
the Authority had to ensure the right of all states parties to
participate in the activities in the Area irrespective of their
geographical location, social system and level of industrial
development [Article 22(2)]. The U.S. proposal recognized for the
Authority the right to directly conduct the activities, but unlike
the proposal of the G77, required the Enterprise to enter into
contracts with the Authority [Article 22(1)]. Article 8 of the
annex in the American proposal stipulated that, in the event an
applicant met all the requirements laid down in the Convention, the
Authority might not refuse to enter into a contract with him.
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The working paper of the G77 received the support of several
industrialized countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
The American proposal had the support of the EEC and Japan.
At the end of the fifth session, it was clear that the
Conference faced a deadlock in regard to the exploitation system of
deep sea-bed resources. The Chairman of the First Committee, Engo,
in his report at the end of the work of the Committee, gave a very
pessimistic picture of the status of negotiations, and formulated
the central and most difficult problem before the First Committee in
the form of three questions: 1- Should the system of exploitation
provide for a guaranteed permanent role in sea-bed mineral
exploitation for states parties and private firms? 2- Should such a
role for states parties and private firms be considered only at the
option of, and subject to conditions negotiated by, the Authority?
3- Should their role be conceived of as essentially temporary, to be
phased out over a defined period agreed to beforehand?-^
One of the members of the American delegation to the Conference
in 1976, in an article about the work of the Conference, referred to
the North-South differences which had prevented the progress of
negotiations and complained that "negotiations have been used as an
occasion to press these differences in a display of group unity".
The Chairman of the First Committee, aware of this link the Group of
77 tried to make between the sea-bed legal regime on the one hand
and the North-South dialogue and the establishment of a New
International Economic Order on the other, made an effort to
elaborate on the objectives of the developing countries which, in
his view, had changed by recognizing their interest in cheap and
reliable supplies of metals. He added that what divided the
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industrialized from developing countries was "the means to achieve
the common overriding objective of increasing the availability of
less costly raw materials deriving from the sea-bed".^9 In order
to neutralize the disagreement, he further said:
I am convinced that we shall spend decades in fruitless
dialogue if we continue to accept that the interests at this
conference may naively be classified into two: those of the
developed versus those of the developing countries. Neither
group is without a diversity of concrete interests, given the
factor of uneven development within. It is worse to maintain
the posture of a confrontation between the few industrialized
countries on the one hand and the proposed Authority or
"mankind" on the other. 60
2. Towards a compromise solution, 1977-1980
Contrary to Engo's prediction, no efforts were made in the
years to come to make a choice among those three options he had
outlined.^ Instead, other important issues such as transfer of
technology, production control and financing the Enterprise became
subject to negotiations. The pessimism about the result of the
work of the First Committee which characterized the last days of the
fifth session, led to the decision by the Conference to devote a
substantial part of the sixth session in 1977 to the work of that
committee. Some two months before the start of the work of the
Conference, Jens Evensen, the chief delegate of Norway, took the
initiative in leading an inter-sessional meeting in Geneva, where
several new texts for Articles 22 and 23 (functions of the
Authority) and point 9 of Annex I (rights and obligations under the
contract) were produced.
When the Conference resumed its work in May 1977, there was
some hope that these new texts could break the ice between the G77
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and the industrialized countries. Evensen continued his efforts by-
leading the informal meetings of the Working Group of the First
Committee. In the course of these negotiations, new revised texts
about the above-mentioned articles were introduced by Evensen.
These revisions - initially more in favour of the industrialized
countries, but later modified to include the views of the majority
in the G77 too - were not acceptable to either of these groups of
states, yet they reinforced the optimism that a reasonable basis for
the continuation of the negotiations and bridging the gap between
the G77 and the industrialized countries was gradually coming into
f\ 9
sight. When the ICNT was introduced at the end of the sixth
session, articles concerning the regime of the sea-bed, having
numbers 133 to 192, were incorporated in Part XI of this document.
The text of Part XI, unlike the other parts of the ICNT, was not
negotiated at the First Committee during the sixth session, but the
Chairman of the Committee had personally prepared it on the basis of
previous negotiations.^ In this text several changes,
particularly on those issues which had been dealt with by Evensen,
and for which some basis for further negotiations had emerged, were
introduced. These changes were generally incompatible with the
texts suggested by Evensen, and, in comparison with the RSNT,
Part XI of the ICNT considerably changed the balance in favour of
the Group of 77. It was, therefore, natural that the industrialized
countries sharply criticized the ICNT.^^
A brief comparison between the related articles in the ISNT and
the ICNT shows the grounds for the bitter reaction of the
industrialized countries to the latter. As regards the right to
exploitation, Article 151 of the ICNT (Article 22 of the RSNT)
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provided for the Authority to carry out all activities in the Area.
The Enterprise states parties and public or private companies could
conduct the activities on behalf of the Authority.
The new element in this article was the indication that the
contracts between the states parties or other entities and the
Authority for conducting activities in the Area might provide for
joint arrangements in accordance with Annex II, paragraph 5(i) and
(j)(iii), both in the reserved areas for the Authority and non-
reserved areas for the states parties or other entities.^ This
provision could be interpreted as subjecting the conclusion of a
contract to the undertaking by the states and companies of entering
f\7
into a joint arrangement with the Authority.
Another new inclusion was the obligation of states or companies
parties to a contract with the Authority under Article 15(2)(ii) to
undertake "to contribute the technological capability, financial and
other resources necessary to enable the Authority to fulfil its
functions . . .". The question of transfer of technology in the
ICNT was more than ever before emphasized. Certain provisions in
Annex II of the ICNT could become bases of formally demanding an
applicant to agree to the transfer of its technology to the
Authority as a sine qua non for being granted a contract to conduct
activities in the Area.^®
Article 150(1)(g)(B) of the ICNT (Article 9 of the RSNT) dealt
with the question of production limits. According to this article,
the Authority should limit, in the first seven years of production,
the total production of the minerals in such a manner that it did
not exceed the projected cumulative growth segment of the world
nickel demand.^ After these seven years, the total production
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should not exceed, on a yearly basis, 60 per cent of the cumulative
growth segment of the world nickel demand. After these seven
years, the total production should not exceed, on a yearly basis,
60 per cent of the cumulative growth segment of the world nickel
demand. The introduction of a period of seven years was an
innovation in comparison to the RSNT. Moreover, the length of the
interim period, which was decided in the RSNT to be 20 years from
1 January 1980, was changed in the ICNT to begin on 1 January 1980
and should terminate on the day when such new "agreements ... in
which all affected parties participate, enter into force".7® The
United States considered it as an artificial limit which is "far
more stringent than would be necessary to protect specific
developing country producers from possible adverse effects . . ,"71
The question of the protection of the developing countries
against the adverse effects of the sea-bed resources exploitation on
their economies was particularly treated in Article 150(l)(g)(D),
where the Assembly of the Authority was assigned to establish a
system of compensation for the developing countries against a
possible reduction in the price or the volume of the minerals
exported, provided the reduction was caused by activities in the
Area.
Another new item in this article was unrestricted power of the
Authority to regulate even the production of minerals other than
70
those derived from the nodules. This widened the scope of the
Authority's power to get closer to the definition of the developing
countries for the common heritage of mankind. The inclusion of
this provision was also criticized by the industrialized countries.
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Finally, it is worth noting that, in another effort to realize
the interpretation of the developing countries from the common
heritage principle, Article 151(9) charged the Authority to
establish a system for the equitable sharing of benefits derived
from the activities in the Area, with regard to the needs of not
only the states parties as in Article 9(6) of the RSNT, but also all
developing countries and "countries which have not attained full
independence or other self-governing status". This provision,
though not challenged or criticized hard, was disliked by some
70
industrialized countries. J
A new article in the ICNT was Article 153, which envisaged a
review of the system of exploitation after 20 years from the entry
into force of the Convention. The main objective of such a review
was to establish whether during that period "a balance has been
maintained between the areas reserved for the Authority and
developing countries and the contract areas exploited by states,
states entities, natural or juridical persons in association with
the Authority",7^ in the event that any amendment in the system
were deemed necessary, it should be ensured that the principle of
the common heritage of mankind, the international regime for the
equitable exploitation of the common heritage for the benefit of
mankind and the Authority in order to conduct, organize and control
7 tr
activities, be maintained. J In the event of no agreement within
five years to amend the provisions concerning the system of
exploitation, "activities in the Area shall be carried out by the
Authority through the Enterprise and through the joint ventures
. . . provided however that the Authority shall exercise effective
control over such activities".76 The provisions of this article
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were criticized by the technologically advanced countries on the
ground that:
It could seriously prejudice the likely long-term character of
the international regime, by requiring that if agreement to the
contrary is not reached within 25 years, the regime shall
automatically be converted into a "unitary" system, ruling out
direct access by contractors ... 77
The industrialized countries feared an eventual disappearance of the
Parallel System as a result of a review conference, in favour of
joint arrangements under the control of the Authority.
Another important problem was the question of financing
the Enterprise and the financial terms of the contracts for
conducting activities in the Area. These questions, because
of their complexity and the lack of reliable information based on
detailed studies of different financial alternatives, were not
comprehensively treated in previous sessions. Evensen, as part of
his overall effort to provide compromise formulae for the most
problematic issues relating to the sea-bed activities, touched upon
the question of financing the Enterprise. In Evensen's proposal
five sources for this purpose were named: 1- transfer of funds from
the Authority which would have income from the contracts with the
states and companies; 2- voluntary contributions from the states;
3- loans; 4- funds received from cooperation with others active on
the deep sea-bed operations; 5- funds for covering the expenditures
of the first project of the Enterprise through specifically
envisaged payments by the states parties. Both alternatives 3 and
5 were the subject of controversy because they could involve many
other problems such as the borrowing capacity of the Enterprise,
deposition of securities for loans, the responsibility of each state
party with a view to the repayment of the loans, the size of the
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contribution of each state party to the first project of the
Enterprise, etc.
As regards the financial terms of contracts for the activities
in the Area, proposals were submitted by India and the United States
during the first part of the sixth session. In both proposals, an
application fee, a production levy and a profit tax were provided
for. Moreover, the Indian proposal included a "charge to mine"
which was supposed to be paid during the mining and in proportion to
78
the quantity of nodules authorized to be mined. What was
included in Annex II, paragraph 7 of the ICNT, was principally based
on the Indian proposal. It is worth mentioning that the financial
arrangements still had in the sixth session a rudimentary character,
and unlike other issues in the First Committee were not discussed
thoroughly. The United States and some other technologically
advanced countries rejected Part XI of the ICNT because of its
positive pro-G77 character. It was clear at the end of the sixth
session that, in order to continue a fruitful negotiation on the
issues related to the sea-bed, it was imperative to take into
consideration the interests of all countries in all major issues
before the First Committee.
In the seventh session of the UNCLOS III, in the spring of
1978, as a result of a procedural decision, seven negotiating groups
were established to deal with the 'hard-core' questions before the
Conference Negotiating Group 6 dealt with the system of exploration
and exploitation and resource policy. Negotiating Group 2 had on
its agenda the important issue of the financial arrangements of the
Authority and the Enterprise as well as the financial terms of the
contracts for conducting activities in the Area.
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Negotiating Group 1 produced new drafts for some of the most
important articles relating to issues under its mandate. Article
151 of the ICNT, which provided for mining by states or private
entities on behalf of the Authority, was reformulated to read
"Activities in the Area shall be carried out as authorized or
approved by the Authority . . This change was a step closer
to the concept of the Parallel System as contemplated by the
industrialized countries.
The important question of technology transfer was also touched
upon by Negotiating Group 1. The purpose of changes, in Annex II,
paragraph 4(c)(ii) of the ICNT concerning the transfer of
technology, was to require the applicant to undertake to negotiate
with the Enterprise and to make available to the Enterprise, upon
obtaining a contract, the technology he would use, on fair and
80reasonable commercial terms and conditions. In other words,
unlike the ICNT text, the conclusion of the contract with the
Authority was not a precondition for the transfer of technology, but
the applicant had an obligation to hold negotiations which should
lead to such a transfer on the basis of fair business conditions
being agreed upon. In case such negotiations did not lead to
agreement, either party might refer the matter to conciliation and
81
even further to arbitration. x
Another major question which was specifically negotiated in the
second part of the seventh session, in summer 1978, was the basis
for rejection of an application for a contract. The industrialized
countries wanted to make sure that some specific conditions were
enumerated in the Convention so, in the event an applicant met those
conditions, he would be automatically granted a contract. The
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G77, on the contrary, intended that the Authority should have broad
competence to study each application, and could take its decisions
according to requirements for each individual case. This question
OO
could not be settled in this session.
The Negotiating Group 2 could easily reach a consensus on the
question of financing the Enterprise through the texts presented by
T. Koh, the Chairman of that group. The new texts contained the
major part of Evensen's proposal from the year before. As regards
the question of financial terms of the contract, the issue was more
complicated. There were several elements which contributed to this
complication. Due to the fact that no commercial exploitation
had taken place by then, the negotiations had to be based on
assumptions. Moreover, there were still several developing
countries which were firmly against any form of parallel activities
in the Area. The financial terms, therefore, could be totally
different for them and others which supported the Parallel System.
The changes in the ICNT during 1978 were certainly a turning point
to make the text more acceptable to the technologically advanced
countries which considered the changes in line with the recognition
OO
of the principle of untrammelled access of qualified applicants. J
Nevertheless, the changes did not result in any revision of the ICNT
in 1978.
The first revised version of the ICNT®^ was issued at the end
of the first part of the eighth session in the spring of 1979. The
revision of the ICNT was substantially based on the reports of the
Chairmen of the three Committees and informal negotiations on them.
As regards the sea-bed, the change in Article 151 of the ICNT, which
in the revised text became Article 153, concerning the legal
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relations between the states or private companies and the Authority
in the case of conducting activities in the Area from "on behalf of"
to "authorized by", suggested by Negotiating Group 1 in the previous
session, was further revised to make it even more favourable to the
industrialized countries. In the revised text, the states and
private entities might conduct activities parallel and only "in
8 Sassociation" with the Authority. In other words, the activities
of states or the companies are neither "on behalf of" the Authority
- thereby rejecting the exclusive right of the Authority over the
Area - nor "authorized by" the Authority - implying a denial of the
discretionary power of the Authority in permitting the activities in
the Area.
An important change, again in favour of the industrialized
countries, was related to the terms of technology transfer. It was
stipulated, in the revised text, that the commitment of the contract
holder to make the technology available to the Enterprise "may be
invoked only if the Enterprise finds that it is unable to obtain the
same or equally efficient and useful technology on the open market
q r
and on fair and reasonable terms and conditions". Thus, the
obligation of the transfer of technology became a qualified one.
Moreover, as was always insisted on by the industrialized countries,
the technology was to be transferred only to the Enterprise and not
to the developing countries, and the contents of paragraph 5(d)(iii)
of the Annex II of the ICNT, which would suggest such a transfer to
the developing countries, was dropped from the ICNT/Rev.l.®^
A development concerning the question of access to the sea-bed
was the change introduced in Article 6(3) of the Annex II to meet
the demand of the industrialized countries in subjecting the refusal
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to grant a contract to an applicant to four grounds specifically
OO
enumerated in the Convention.
The question of financial arrangements was also extensively
discussed in the eighth session. The industrialized countries
generally criticized the text of Article 12 of Annex II of the
ICNT/Rev.l concerning the financial terms of the contracts. The
changes introduced in the text prepared by the Working Group of 21 -
which had been established the same year to deal informally with the
controversial issues before the First Committee, and were later
incorporated, with minor modifications, into the report of the
Chairman of the First Committee - were intended to make the
financial burden tolerable for the contractors while still
safeguarding enough funds for the Enterprise to make it able to
commence its own activities. Both the net proceeds tax and
production charge were reduced in this new text and, in order to
make the production charges of the single system proportionate to
QQ
the taxes in the mixed system, even the former was reduced. y
The provisions concerning production control, which in the
ICNT/Rev. 1 were treated separately under Article 151, were further
modified. The interim period during which a production limitation
was to be imposed was specifically defined to start five years prior
to 1 January of the year in which the earliest commercial production
was planned to commence under an approved plan of work. The
interim period should last 25 years or until the end of the Review
Conference or until the day new agreements between interested
parties entered into force, whichever was earlier.^ The
production ceiling for any given year of the interim period was a
combination of the total increase in annual nickel consumption for
five years before the start of the commercial production plus 60 per
cent of the increase in nickel consumption between the year for
which the production authorization was applied.^ In this way, the
resource policy provisions became even more restrictive in the
ICNT/Rev.l.
With the will for compromise which was being shown from both
the developing and developed countries in the eighth session,
it was reasonable to expect that the remaining issues would soon
be resolved. At this stage, it was clear that the developing
countries were neither able nor willing any more to insist on their
initial demands. The Parallel System of exploitation was generally
accepted, and the main remaining question for these countries was to
see how they could get the most out of the system; to protect
themselves, as much as possible, from the adverse effects of sea-bed
mining on their own economies; and to lay down, in the Convention,
the foundations for access, even though qualified, to appropriate
technology.
At the ninth session of the UNCLOS III in 1980, after further
negotiations for more revisions to the ICNT were completed, the
second revised text was issued at the end of the first part of
QO
this session. The third revision of the ICNT, which turned this
QO
document into an informal text of the Draft Convention, J was issued
a few days before the termination of the second part of the ninth
session in 1980. In both these revisions more changes were
introduced to get it close to the stand of the industrialized
OA
countries, and thereby command a consensus. ^
The major change in provision concerning technology transfer
was the introduction of a ten-year limit from the time the
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Enterprise begins commercial production for demanding any contractor
to transfer the technology to the Enterprise.The industrialized
countries intended to eliminate Article 5(l)(e) of Annex II in
ICNT/Rev.l [later 5(3)(e) of Annex III in the ICNT/Rev. 2 and 3]
which required the contractor to transfer the technology to the
developing countries conducting activities in the reserved areas,
but they failed to do so. Instead, they made such a transfer
conditional in the sense that such an obligation existed only if
"technology has not been requested or transferred ... to the
Enterprise".^ In brief, the modifications in provisions
concerning technology transfer were meant to make the undertakings
of the contractor more precise and binding, and at the same time to
establish some limitations to these obligations in order to fit them
into the realistic situation of the demands of the industrialized
Q7
countries.
There were some changes in provisions concerning the production
limitations too. In order to minimize the fear of the
industrialized countries concerning the adverse effects of the
imposition of a production ceiling in times of low growth, a new
paragraph was added to Article 151 which provided for the assumption
of a minimum three per cent increase in nickel consumption, regard¬
less of how low the real rate of growth was. This assumption was
qualified by establishing that the ceiling did not for any given
QO
year exceed the total projected increase in nickel consumption.
Another innovation in this respect was the inclusion of paragraph
(i) to Article 150. The purpose of this paragraph was to ensure
the competitive capability of the land-based minerals with the
minerals produced from the Area.^
- 240 -
The review of the exploitation system which was the subject of
Article 155 of the revised versions of the ICNT went through some
changes during the ninth session in 1980. These changes too were
in favour of the industrialized countries. These countries were
generally against the idea of a moratorium on the approval of new
contracts in case no agreement could be reached in the Review
Conference.® In the second and third revisions of the ICNT, the
said moratorium was substituted by another provision according to
which the Review Conference, in the event of failure to reach an
agreement, might adopt, by a two-thirds majority, necessary
amendments to the system, and submit them to the states parties.
The amendments should enter into force for all states parties one
year after being ratified or accepted by two-thirds of them.!®*-
These amendments should not affect the contracts already
approved.
The industrialized countries had reservations concerning the
financial terms of the contracts as set forth in the ICNT/Rev. 1.
The negotiations in this respect at the ninth session were based on
the report of the Chairman of Negotiating Group 2 at the end of the
eighth session. Some of the developed countries argued that the
obligations of the contractor are many and therefore counter¬
productive. Another point of concern was the economic advantage
that the Enterprise enjoyed in comparison with other miners. The
industrialized countries believed that the Enterprise should make
the same payments to the Authority as the others. The developing
countries meant to exempt the Enterprise from such payments at least
1 QO
in the initial period until it became self-supporting. The
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compromise formula in the ICNT/Rev.3 put a ten-year limit to this
initial period.
At the end of the ninth session in August 1980 there seemed to
exist consensus about most of the major issues related to the deep
sea-bed activities. The core of this consensus was the Parallel
System for exploration and exploitation of the resources of the deep
sea-bed. In this system, the states parties or private entities
sponsored by the states parties on the one side and the Enterprise
or developing countries on the other, conducted activities in the
non-reserved and reserved areas of the deep sea-bed respectively.
The Enterprise was, according to the Draft Convention, guaranteed
the necessary mining site, technology and capital to carry out its
activities for an initial period. Article 8 of Annex III of the
Draft Convention obligated each applicant for a contract to
accommodate a total area or two separate areas which would allow two
mining operations of equal estimated commercial value. The
Authority would designate one of these areas as the site to be
reserved solely for the Enterprise or the developing countries. In
this way, the Enterprise was guaranteed access to the necessary
sites without carrying out any prospecting activities. Each
applicant was also required to transfer the technology he used to
the Enterprise, provided that the technology was not available in
the open market, and the applicant was legally entitled to transfer
it. The obligation of technology transfer was limited to a period
of ten years from the commencement of the commercial exploitation by
the Enterprise.-*-^
In order to give the Enterprise the chance to become
financially strong and competitive with the other applicants,
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Article 11(3) of Annex IV of the Draft Convention provided for the
financing of the first mining activities of the Enterprise.
According to this article, half of the necessary funds for such
activities, i.e., exploitation, transport, processing and marketing
of the metals, should be provided by all states parties in the form
of long-term interest-free loans in accordance with the scale of
assessments for the United Nations regular budget.The other
half should be raised by loans directly taken by the Enterprise from
markets or international financial institutions, and debts incurred
by the Enterprise in this way should be guaranteed by all states
parties in accordance with the same scale.
On the other side of the Parallel System, the states parties
had received assurances that, in the event they were prepared to
accept the duties set forth in the Draft Convention and abide by
the regulations thereof, they would be guaranteed a contract by
the Authority, and the cases where the granting of such contracts
could be refused were very specifically enumerated in the Draft
Convention. The contract so acquired could be cancelled only on
108
specific grounds. °
The qualifications and commitments of applicants other than the
Enterprise required by the Authority were contained in Annex III,
Article 4 of the Draft Conventions. Apart from the nationality,
control or sponsorship of the applicant,*^9 the most important
commitment of the applicant was formulated in Article 4(6)(a) of
Annex III in the Draft Convention, which required the applicant to
undertake:
to accept as enforceable and comply with the applicable
obligations created by the provisions of Part XI, rules and
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regulations of the Authority, decisions of the organs of the
Authority, and the terms of his contracts with the Authority.
The grounds for refusal of an application for contract, as we
mentioned before,were specified in Article 6(3) of Annex III of
the Draft Convention. The refusal of the contract was therefore
more or less beyond the discretion of the Authority, and if the
application did not fall under one of the grounds listed in that
article, and the applicant was prepared to comply with the
commitments and assurances required by Article 4 of Annex III,m
the Authority only on very specific grounds could refuse to grant a
contract or suspend a contractor's rights. In the event, the
exploitation by either the contractor or the Enterprise might, due
to substantial evidence, cause serious harm to the marine
environment in a particular area, the Council of the Authority could
disapprove such exploitation in that area.^^ When the applicant
received a contract, his rights under that contract might be
suspended or terminated only in cases where:
(a) in spite of warnings by the Authority, the contractor has
conducted his activities in such a way as to result in serious,
persistent and wilful violations of the fundamental terms of
the contract, Part XI and the rules, regulations and procedures
of the Authority or (b)the contractor has failed to comply with
a final binding decision of the dispute settlement body
applicable to him. 113
The Parallel System, which in 1980 won consensus with regard to
the most important questions, i.e., transfer of technology,
financial arrangements, review system and production policy, was in
fact the result of a considerable compromise on the side of the
developing countries and their interpretation of the principle of
the common heritage of mankind. The major industrialized countries
were apparently satisfied with the result of the negotiations
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and hopes were expressed for the completion of the final text of the
Convention in the following year.^15
3. Return to opposition 1981-1982
The election of President Reagan in January 1981 was followed
by a drastic change in the position of the United States. Just a
few days before the tenth session of the Conference started its
work, on 7 March 1981, the Reagan administration in fulfilment of
one of the Republican Party platform plans concerning the law of the
seall^ and because of the pressure from the mining industry,
announced that the United States Government planned to carry out
a thorough policy review concerning the negotiations at the
I I O
Conference. i0 The American review lasted almost one year, and the
position of the new administration became known in early 1982. The
review contained fundamental changes concerning Part XI of the Draft
Convention and those issues about which a consensus had been reached
in August 1980, namely, access, the voting in the Council of the
Authority, the production policy and the review system.The
demand of the United States to renegotiate these fundamental issues
was unequivocally a reflection of the new economic policy adopted by
the Reagan administration which did not admit of any restraint on
economic activities and was subsumed under the laissez-faire
1 ?0
principle.
The suggested changes were, therefore, of such a character
that they were totally unacceptable to the G77 and the socialist
countries. Except for the financial arrangements, these changes
would virtually return the status of the negotiations to where they
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were in 1974. The negotiations in the final session of the
Conference from 8 March to 30 April 1982, notwithstanding the
intensive efforts of the President of the Conference and a group of
11 smaller industrialized countries^which made all efforts to
mediate between the Group of 77 and the United States, did not
result in the emergence of a text acceptable to all partners,
and the United States requested a vote on the text before the
Conference. The text of the Convention, which was in this way
adopted, is principally the same as was embodied in the Draft
Convention.
In order to accommodate a substantial part of the demands of
the United States, the developing countries agreed to the adoption
of a separate resolution originally submitted by the United States
and the European countries concerning the protection of pioneer
investments, i.e., safeguarding the rights of private consortia or
public entities which had already made some investments in the
exploration of the deep sea-bed.*22 This resolution endowed
guaranteed automatic access to the deep sea—bed to the four raining
consortia-*-^ and state-sponsored enterprises of Japan, France, India
and the U.S.S.R. as well as developing countries or their
enterprises which would spend, before 1 January 1985, a sum of
$30 million in pioneer activities, and could register themselves
by the Preparatory Commission as pioneer investors.^4 private
consortia were even ensured of getting priority in relation to other
private entities in acquiring production authorization.
Other compromise steps taken by the developing countries were
the allocation of one seat in the Council for the largest consumer
of the minerals derived from the Area, i.e., the United States,^25
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the introduction of the same decision-making procedure for the
Review Conference as the Conference itself, i.e., consensus,126 an^
the change of the necessary majority for adopting and bringing into
force the future amendments from two-thirds to three-fourths.^27
The negative vote of the United States to the Convention after
14 years of active participation in the negotiations, and after
getting very close to the consensus, together with the reluctance of
some other industrialized countries such as the United Kingdom and
the Federal Republic of Germany, in signing the Convention, left
the future of the legal regime of the deep sea-bed subject to
speculation. These three are potential sea-bed mining countries,
and their participation would certainly contribute to the successful
implementation of Part XI of the Convention.
The Preparatory Commission,in waiting for the deposition of
the 60th instrument of ratification of the Convention which puts it
into force, has been dealing with the task of formulating the rules,
regulations and procedures of the Authority and the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea since 1983. During this time,
some of the deep sea-bed mining states have, parallel with active
participation in the work of the Preparatory Commission, enacted
their own laws which permit private companies to commence the
commercial exploitation of the deep sea-bed resources already,
before the end of this decade.
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SECTION III: THE PARALLEL SYSTEM IN THE CONVENTION
In order to analyze the exploitation system as laid down in the
Convention, we have to first recall the objectives of the G77 and
the industrialized countries as the main interest groups in the
question of the sea-bed activities.
The G77 saw in the great wealth lying on the bottom of the deep
sea a chance to correct the prevailing economic imbalance between
the developing and the industrialized countries, which many members
of the G77 believed to be an outcome of different aspects of
colonialism, and hoped to be modified through concerted efforts
for the establishment of a New International Economic Order. In
order to realize such correction, two demands in the course of
negotiations were essential: equal participation in the activities
in the Area and preferential treatment to the needs and interests
of the developing countries. Equal participation here did not
mean equal right of participation but actual equality in terms of
access to necessary technology and capital in order to be able to
stand on the same footing as the potential sea-bed mining states.
Preferential treatment meant the effect of activities in the area on
the economy of the developing countries and the distribution of the
resources and benefits derived from such activities.
Justice, from the viewpoint of the developing countries,
was not any longer in impartiality and equality, but rather in
partiality in favour of the weak against the strong, in favour of
the poor as against the rich. It meant partiality to correct
loo
inequalities. ^ in order to restructure international relations
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according to the necessities of the modern world, new definitions
had to be given to old concepts such as equality,130 Therefore,
the developing countries, by introducing the concept of the common
heritage of mankind, sought to give a concrete form to their
assertions concerning the existence of a duty for the industrialized
countries to compensate the unjust treatment of the past by
recognizing the interests of the international community. The
community interest or the benefit of mankind as the main aspect of
the common heritage principle meant to the developing countries the
closing of the gap between the industrialized states and the Third
World by assisting the latter to get economically strong. For the
G77, the only viable system for development of these objectives, as
far as sea-bed resources were concerned, was the establishment of a
supranational organization upon which all the rights to the Area
were given. One can say that, in the shaping of the developing
countries' policy towards sea-bed mining, ethical and moral
considerations played a large role as an economic and political
fact.
The position of the industrialized countries was to negotiate
an agreement to incorporate the exploitation of sea-bed resources
into the list of the freedoms of the high seas. As mentioned
before, four freedoms were explicitly listed in Article 2 of the
1958 Convention on the High Seas.^l Freedoms such as laying
submarine cables and pipelines, scientific research or overflight
have been practised by states before the drafting of the 1982
Convention. On the contrary, there was a problem with deep sea
mining right. This problem stemmed from the fact that there was no
state practice with respect to sea mining right when negotiations on
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the UNCLOS III started. Because of the unexpected proposal of
Malta to the General Assembly in 1967, the industrialized countries
were in a way forced to sit at the negotiating table.*32
Accepting the premise that there is an area outside the limits
of national jurisdiction, they sought to establish a registry system
for harmonizing the activities in that area and avoiding conflicts,
but the main principle remained - the freedom of the high seas.
When, in 1970, the industrialized countries accepted, through
the unanimous adoption of Resolution 2749 (XXV) - Declaration of
Principles - that the sea-bed and its resources were the common
heritage of mankind, they in fact only undertook to pay a part of
the benefits which would accrue to them as a result of the
activities in the Area to the developing countries, but never
repudiated the principle of the freedom of the high seas.
The principle of joint management of deep sea-bed resources by
all states, through the Authority as suggested by the representa¬
tives of the developing countries, was impossible. To the developed
countries, the benefit of mankind was best served through a liberal
regime for the exploitation of the sea-bed resources which would
admit of the increase of supply and the decrease of price for all.
The de^ facto equality of states was not, in their view, necessarily
to the benefit of mankind. These countries were not prepared to
recognize the community interests as equal with each other or prior
to national interests. Therefore, the part of the benefit they
were prepared to pay to the developing countries had the nature of
aid rather than a share. They identified the aspirations of the
developing countries in regard to the deep sea-bed as "nothing less
than a new socialist international economic order".133
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For the industrialized countries, there existed two
international issues: politically, it was important to have a
guaranteed access to the sea-bed resources containing strategically
important minerals; economically, it was expedient to provide the
most advantageous business conditions for their nationals who had
almost monopolized the necessary technology and were in possession
of the required capital. Neither of these two issues permitted the
industrialized countries to submit to the discretionary power of an
international organization over which they had probably no decisive
control. It was, as they saw it, illogical to contribute to the
creation of a business competitor, and strengthen it through
transfer of technology or capital. Subsequently, they could not
agree either to the transfer of technology or capital or to the
payment of tax to the Authority, considering the latter even at
variance with the principle of sovereignty of states.
What came out of these two conflicting sets of objectives and
expectations, two ideological controversies, was the Parallel
System, according to which the Authority, through its operating arm,
the Enterprise, on the one side, and the states parties or private
entities, on the other, are entitled to exploit the resources of the
sea-bed. It is our intention here to examine the Parallel System
of the Convention. The main point of this examination is to see
whether the interests of the developing countries versus the
interests of the technologically advanced countries have been
balanced under the Parallel System of the Convention. In fact, the
latter fails to meet objectives for establishing a New International
Economic Order through the application of a compensatory regime to a
concrete situation of disparity. The Parallel System of the
- 251 -
Convention is more favourable to the industrialized countries'
demand for unrestricted access to the sea-bed and its resources with
some nominal and time-restricted undertakings.
The specific objective stated in the Convention for carrying
out activities in the Area is:
... to foster healthy development of the world economy and
balance growth of international trade, and to promote
international co-operation for the overall development of all
countries, especially developing countries. 134
The furtherance of this objective is possible through, inter alia,
transfer of technology to the developing countries for effective
1 oc
participation in the activities, J the promotion of the long-term
equilibrium between supply and demand of the minerals derived both
from the Area and from other resources,and putting necessary
limits on the minerals exploited from the Area in order to protect
the developing countries from the adverse effects of such
exploitation on their economies.1^7 Thus, the Parallel System
should be studied in the light of the said objective and the
measures for its furtherance.
In order to realize such a comprehensive objective, the
Convention prescribes that "Activities in the Area shall be
organized, carried out and controlled by the Authority on behalf of
1
mankind as a whole . . ., whereas the core of the Parallel
System, Article 153(2) of the Convention, stipulates:
2. Activities in the Area shall be carried out . . .:
(a) by the Enterprise, and
(b) in association with the Authority by States Parties, or
state enterprises or natural or juridical persons which possess
the nationality of States Parties or are effectively controlled
by them or their nationals when sponsored by such States, or
any group of the foregoing which meets the requirements
provided in this Part and in Annex III.
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While the Convention has an extensive approach to include not only
all the countries but even peoples who have not attained full
independence or other self-governing status recognized by the United
Nations in the term "mankind"139 on whose behalf the Authority
operates, it takes a restrictive attitude in qualifying those states
or private entities which may conduct activities in the Area. Such
an attitude is natural and comprehensible because even the
compatibility of the Parallel System with the principle of the
common heritage of mankind and "healthy development of the world
economy and balanced growth of international trade", as enumerated
in Article 150, is questionable. It should be borne in mind that
the acceptance of that system by the developing countries was merely
with regard to the fact that, without accommodating the demands
of the potential deep sea-bed mining states and securing their
participation, the International Sea-Bed Authority would exist only
on paper. Therefore, the Convention has a consistent patent
tendency to give, though sometimes unsuccessfully, the Authority, as
the agent of mankind, a status superior to the states and private
entities. The Convention explicitly confers all the rights
relating to the Area and its resources on mankind as a whole on
whose behalf the Authority shall act. The right of states and
private entities to get access to the resources and explore and
exploit them, according to Article 153(2)(b) of the Convention,
should therefore be balanced with the right of the Authority in this
respect. Moreover, since the Parallel System was proposed by the
industrialized countries, and was reluctantly accepted by the Group
of 77 in order to equip the Authority with the initial required
technology and capital for carrying out the activities
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independently, it could be expected, at least by the latter group,
that when the Authority became a technologically independent entity,
the role of the sea-bed mining states in deep sea-bed activities had
to be revised. Therefore, it was felt that the Parallel System
was eventually subject to revision. A closer scrutiny of the right
of access,the mechanism of balance and the question of the
viability of the Parallel System is thus in order.
(a) The Right of Access
As the first and principal condition for containing the right
of access, the states shall be parties to the Convention and other
entities shall have the nationality or the sponsorship of states
parties or be effectively controlled by them, and they shall "follow
the procedures and meet the qualification standards set forth in the
rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority" in order to
qualify for the application of contract to conduct activities in the
Area.^-*- The Convention, moreover, specifies many criteria, both
in Part XI and in Annex III, which constitute the framework for the
activities of these entities inside the Parallel System. These
criteria can be put into two broad categories: those qualifications
which the applicant shall possess at the time of filing his
application and those requirements which are in the form of
obligations and incurred in relation to the application.
As regards the first category, the applicant should supply
evidence testifying to his financial and technical capabilities as
well as his satisfactory performance under any contracts with the
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Authority.142 In the case of the multinational consortia and
potential sea-bed mining states, fulfilment of requirements
concerning the financial and technological capabilities is a given
fact, and even mentioning this requirement seems to be superfluous.
It can be invoked, however, as a means of rejecting non-serious
applicants.
In the second category of criteria, i.e., those which require
undertakings by the applicant to act in a specific manner, a
distinction should be made between the undertakings of a passive and
those of an active nature. The clearest example of a passive
undertaking of the applicant is his acceptance of the Authority's
control of activities in the Area.''"^ This provision, contrary to
its convincingly authoritative appearance, has a restricted
implication, and the control of the Authority here does not amount
to extensive discretionary power. It simply means supervision to
ensure compliance, which includes the right to inspect all
operations.The undertakings of an active nature are rather
extensive and precisely formulated. They can also be divided into
two groups: performance requirements on the one side and those
undertakings which entail the applicant or the contractor to embark
upon a certain positive act on the other.
Every applicant, according to Article 4(6)(a) of Annex III,
should, as part of his application undertake:
to accept as enforceable and comply with the applicable
obligations created by the provisions of Part XI, the rules,
regulations and procedures of the Authority, the decisions of
the organs of the Authority and terms of his contracts with the
Authority.
The general conduct of the applicant is even more precisely
prescribed where it is required to "provide the Authority with a
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written assurance" that his obligations under the contract will be
fulfilled in good faith.145
Whereas the first category of requirements, i.e., qualifica¬
tions which the applicant should possess at the time of application,
and the first group of requirements in the second category, namely,
those with a passive nature, and even those active undertakings
governing the general conduct of the applicant, are non-
controversial. The states which become parties to the Convention
by virtue of submitting their sovereign rights in the resources of
the Area to the Authority, implicitly agree to at least a part
of these undertakings, those requirements which require the
applicant or the contractor to accomplish a certain positive act are
controversial. It is mainly in these undertakings that one may
notice the states or private entities as one side of the Parallel
System are far or close to their initial objectives in deep sea-bed
mining. One may put these positive acts into two groups: 1-
technology transfer and 2- financial payments to the Authority.
(b) Technology Transfer
In reading the provisions of the Convention concerning
technology transfer,one should bear in mind that the prime
objective is to facilitate "the access of the Enterprise and of the
developing countries to the . . . technology [relating to activities
in the Area] under fair and reasonable terms and conditions".^®
The duty of the applicant to comply with such a transfer of
technology is emphasized in Article 4(6)(d) of Annex III. The main
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condition for the Authority to invoke the technology transfer
obligation is that the technology used by the contractor or equally
efficient and useful technology is not available on the open
market.The applicant is required to undertake, upon submitting
a plan of work, to make available to the Enterprise the technology
which he uses in conducting activities and is legally entitled to
transfer.
The transfer can occur through:
licences or other appropriate arrangements which the contractor
shall negotiate with the Enterprise and which shall be
set forth in a specific agreement supplementary to the
contract. 150
The transfer, nevertheless, is not self-executing, and the Authority
should request it.^^ In the event the technology used by the
contractor does not belong to him, and he is not legally authorized
to transfer it to a third person, he has the obligation to either
obtain a written assurance from the owner indicating that the owner
is prepared to directly negotiate with the Enterprise for such a
transfer under fair and reasonable commercial terms,or
should, by means of an enforceable contract, acquire from the owner
the legal right to transfer to the Enterprise the technology he
uses if the Authority so requires.153 In the latter case the
acquisition of such legal right should not cause substantial cost to
the contractor.154
The undertakings of the applicant for the transfer of
technology, as set forth in Article 5(3) of Annex III, are subject
to a time limit envisaged in paragraph 7 of the same article which
states:
The undertakings required by paragraph 3 shall be included in
each contract for carrying out of activities in the Area until
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10 years after the commencement of commercial production by the
Enterprise, and may be invoked during that period.
Relating the beginning of the 10-year period to the commencement of
commercial production by the Enterprise is due to the demands of the
industrialized countries, which considered the Enterprise as a
business competitor, to restrict the duty of transfer of technology
to a limited period. Even though commercial production by the
Enterprise may take some time to commence during which time at least
a part of the contractors who are qualified as pioneer investors
have the obligation to transfer the technology to the Enterprise or
the developing countries,the imposition of the time limit, in
the event the Parallel System endures, may eventually lead to the
supremacy of the technology of the private entities which have both
the incentive and necessary resources to improve their techniques
and acquire more effective methods over the technology possessed by
the Enterprise, which needs to be competitive to survive.
Bearing in mind that the suggestion of the Parallel System by
the industrialized countries was tied to the perception of the
permanence of that system, it may be concluded that the restricted
technology transfer was a foreseeable measure, even though some of
these countries have declared the Convention provision in this
respect to be unacceptable.^^ Such a transfer will occur during a
defined period of time when those countries and their companies
have, according to Resolution II governing preparatory investment,
guaranteed access and the superior position of being already engaged
in the activities. On the other hand, the developing countries
wanted both an initial technology transfer which would enable the
Enterprise and the developing countries to participate in the
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activities, and the recognition of a right to technology which
should be continuously transferred from the industrialized countries
to the developing states in order to facilitate the establishment of
a New International Economic Order. From this perspective, the
technology transfer provisions in the Convention would meet a part
of the initial objectives of the developing countries in this
respect, whereas at the same time they accommodate the objective of
the industrialized countries to limit this transfer to a defined
short period.
(c) Financial Undertakings
The financial objectives of the Parallel System are multifold.
The main goal is "to attract investment and technology to the
exploration and exploitation of the Area" and "to ensure optimum
revenues for the Authority from the proceeds of commercial
production".^7 aiso prescribed that the Enterprise should
be enabled to commence activities at the same time as the other
entities.-*-58 t0 further these objectives, the Convention has laid
down three sorts of charges for the contractor: fixed charges,
charges based on the market value of the recovered resources and
charges based on the profits.
There is a fixed amount for the administrative cost of
processing an application for approval of a plan of work which
amounts to $500.00 per application.1^ Those entities which apply
to the Preparatory Commission for the status of pioneer investors
should pay half of the said amount at the time of filing their
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application. 1 Each contractor shall pay an annual fixed fee of
$1 million from the date of entry into force of the contract.*62
The contractor may cease to pay the annual fixed fee if the
production charge, which is due from the time of commencement of the
commercial production, is higher than $1 million. The production
charge, which comes under the second category of charges, is
calculated on the basis of a certain percentage of the market value
of the processed metals produced from the polymetallic nodules
recovered from the area covered by the contract. This percentage
is 5 for the first ten years of commercial production and 12 for the
1 6ft
rest of the contract s period* 00
In order to fulfil the requirements of those industrialized
countries which considered the payments of heavy production charges
from the start of the activity as improper and counter-productive,
the Convention has provided for a mixed system of payments
containing a lower and different production charge and a part of net
proceeds attributable only to the mining stage of activities.^4
In this system, the production charge is calculated differently and
should be paid during two periods. The first period shall commence
in the first accounting year of commercial production and terminates
when the development costs,^^ as well as interest on the
unrecovered portion thereof, are fully recovered by the contractors
cash surplus, i.e., gross proceeds minus operating costs^*^ and fees
paid to the Authority.^7 production charge in this period
will be 2 per cent of the average market value of the processed
1 6ft
metals. The second period, in which the production charge is 4
per cent, shall commence in the year following the termination of
the first period,^69 if fn any accounting year the payment of a
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4 per cent production charge results in the fall of the return on
investment below 15 per cent, the production charge shall be 2 per
cent for that particular year.^'-'
The payment from net proceeds occurs on an incremental
schedule. From that portion of net proceeds which represents up to
10 per cent return on investment, the contractor shall pay to the
Authority 35 per cent in the first period and 40 per cent in the
second. This amount increases to 42.5 and 50 per cent for that
portion of net proceeds which represents between 10 to 20 per cent
return on investment. On the portion related to more than 20 per
cent return, the contractor shall pay 50 and 70 per cent in the
171
first and second period respectively.
Considering the fact that the objective of the developing
countries was to demand the maximum amounts of payments against
leaving the potential sea-bed mining entities the right to
appropriate portions of the common heritage of mankind and thereby
securing the highest possible receipts for the Authority, a
glance at the above-mentioned provisions and a comparison with the
original demands of the G77 shows how far these provisions are from
that objective. For example, in 1977 India suggested that the
production charge should include a flat-rate "royalty" of $5 per ton
of nodules actually mined, and a "tax" of 20% of the revenue from
the sale of processed metals derived from them.^^ production
charge was to be supplemented by a profit tax of 60 per cent on any
net proceeds accruing after the contractor's return had exceeded 200
per cent of his investment.
During the time negotiations concerning the financial
arrangements were in process, the position of developing countries
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in this respect became gradually weaker in the face of the pressing
demands of the industrialized countries. This period, which lasted
almost three years, is characterized by many setbacks for the
developing countries. One example is the portion of the net
proceeds attributed to the mining stage of the activities. The
issue was raised with due regard to the fact that the nodules in
their natural shape were not saleable and had to be processed into
saleable products which could generate profits. In other words,
the amount of the payments could not be ascertained before the
recovered nodules had been transported and processed. The problem
was how to levy payments on profits in these three different stages,
which could, in many cases, be carried out by the same contractor.
The developing countries generally considered processing as an
inseparable part of the activities, and therefore subject to the
payment of charges to the Authority. On the other hand, the
industrialized countries asserted the view that transportation and
processing are not included in the activities in the Area,^^ and
therefore are not subject to any payment. Because of the inter¬
relation between the mining and processing stages, in cases where
the contractor was engaged in both, determination of the profits
accruing from the mining stage alone was not possible. The solution
was to allocate an agreed artificial percentage of profits to the
mining stage with due regard to the ratio of the investment costs in
the mining sector to the total investment costs.determina¬
tion of this percentage was necessarily disputed because there was a
considerable difference of opinion concerning the amount of cost and
the anticipated profits which should be attributed to each stage.
The industrialized countries contended that only 20 per cent of the
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value of finished metals produced from nodules could be attributed
to the mining stage.^7 estimate of the developing countries
was 60 per cent. The Convention prescribes a minimum of 25 per
178
cent, and this is certainly not an exceptional case where a vital
provision of the Convention reflects the position of the
industrialized countries. For example, the "financial arrangement"
did not appear on the list of subjects the Reagan administration
sought to renegotiate in 1982.
While fulfilling the requirements for getting a contract with
the Authority to explore and exploit the Area, and in particular
those requirements which presuppose the accomplishment of a positive
act by the applicant, such as technology transfer, providing the
Authority with a mine site and financial payment is a prerequisite
for all those potential state or private sea-bed mining entities
which in future, after entry into force of the Convention, intend to
embark upon activities in the Area. Those public or private
enterprises which have been active in this field, and will be the
actual miners for many years to come, have, according to Resolution
II of the Conference, both guaranteed access as pioneer investors
and priority to others, except the Enterprise, in getting production
1 80
authorization.
The industrialized countries have secured, for at least the
next half century, ^1 unrestricted access to the Area and its
resources against the obligation of a time-limited technology
transfer and modest financial payments to the Authority. Bearing
in mind that this guaranteed access, at least for the near future,
is limited to the states or private entities of a few industrialized
countries against more than one hundred developing countries, one
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may wonder if the Parallel System and, in particular, the adoption
of Resolution II, quite contrary to the objectives set for the
activities in the Area,-'-®^ would not provide preferential treatment
for those countries which possess sea-bed mining technology and the
necessary capital.
(d) The Balance of Rights
Approval of the Parallel System by the Conference implied the
recognition of the right of states parties to the Convention and
their enterprises to embark upon the activities in the Area parallel
with the Enterprise and those developing countries which intended to
conduct activities in association with the Authority. Although the
right of the states parties in this respect is strictly defined and
under the control of the Authority, the acceptance of that system
could virtually place a great number of the developing countries and
the Enterprise in an inferior position against a few strong,
experienced business-oriented states or private enterprises. In
order to challenge this inequality and obtain a balance, the
Convention has provided for two sets of measures: those aiming at
restricting the rights of states and private entities in regard to
deep sea mining, and those which are meant to give preferential
treatment to the Authority and the developing countries . It




The most significant provision of the Convention which
restricts the rights of states, either industrialized or developing,
as well as natural or juridical persons to the deep sea-bed, is
Article 137(3), according to which any claim or exercise of right in
the Area should be in accordance with the Convention. In this
article the term state is employed in an unqualified fashion to
demonstrate that the restriction is not limited to the states
parties but applies to all states.
The premise in the Parallel System is that the states parties
have already agreed that conducting activities outside the framework
of the Convention is incompatible with customary international law.
Some other specific restrictions are, therefore, imposed in the
Convention upon those state enterprises or private activities which
1 QO
have the nationality of a state party, and intend to carry out
activities in the Area. The first example of restriction imposed
upon industrialized countries is found in Article 151(9) of the
Convention which reads:
The Authority shall have the power to limit the level of
production of minerals from the Area, other than minerals from
polymetallic nodules, under such conditions and applying such
methods as may be appropriate by adopting regulations in
accordance with article 161, paragraph 8 [procedure of
decision-making at the Council].
This Article has empowered the Authority to establish restrictions
even on the production of minerals other than those derived from the
nodules. Although the procedure for the imposition of such a
restriction is not articulated in the Convention and is dependent on
the adoption of necessary regulations by the Authority, a glance at
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Article 1 of Annex III, which should be read together with Article
12(4) of Annex IV, reveals the preferential treatment which is
accorded to the Enterprise as an agency identified with the
interests of the developing countries. Whereas the title to
the minerals from the deep sea—bed shall pass upon recovery in
accordance with the Convention,18^ it is only the Enterprise which
has explicitly obtained the mandate of having title to all minerals
and processed substances produced by it.188 The Convention is
silent about the rights of states or private entities to title
over deep sea minerals other than those derived from nodules.188
Although this restriction is related to minerals not subject to
the regulations of the Convention, it fits well into the overall
balance that the Convention aims to establish.
The second most notable example of restriction aiming at
limiting the rights of public or private deep sea mining entities
in favour of the Enterprise and developing countries are the
production restrictions enunciated in Article 151. One of the
declared objectives of such restrictions is to protect:
developing countries from adverse effects on their economies or
their export earnings resulting from a reduction in the price
of an affected mineral, or in the volume of exports of that
mineral, to the extent that such reduction is caused by
activities in the Area. 187
Such concern for the adverse effects of the deep sea mining on the
economies of the developing countries is limited to an "interim
1 Q Q
period". In this interim period, which normally lasts
between 20 and 25 years from the 1st of January of the year in
which the earliest commercial production is planned to commence
under an approved plan of work,1^ the operator who has an approved
plan of work may not commence commercial production unless he has
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applied and received a production authorization.^0 The operator
shall specify in his application the annual quantity of nickel he
expects to recover under the approved plan of work, and the
production authorization for that quantity shall be issued by the
Authority unless the sum of that quantity and the quantities already
authorized exceeds the nickel production ceiling in the year the
authorization is going to be issued.The method of determina¬
tion of the production ceiling is detailed in Article 151(4).
The obligation of the operator to apply for a production
authorization separately from his approved plan of work, and the
discretion of the Authority to refuse such an application in order
to keep within the production ceiling imposed by the Convention, is
limited to a specifically defined and restricted interim period.
What will eventually happen to this restriction depends on the
outcome of the Review Conference but one can discern an intention in
the Convention to impose time limits whenever it concerns measures
to protect the interests or enhance the benefits of the developing
countries. Production policies and transfer of technology are two
examples.
2. Preferential treatment
To further the objectives arising from the common heritage
principle and to provide for an equitable exploitation of the
resources of the deep sea-bed as embodied in the fourth preambular
paragraph of the Convention, the Enterprise and the developing
countries have received preferential treatment in many articles of
that instrument. The preferential treatment is meant to give them
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a djj facto equal status with the industrialized countries in the
field which would otherwise be dominated by the technology and
capital of the latter. In order to defeat those criticisms which
are aimed at this preferential treatment on the ground that it is
contradictory to the concept of mankind which embraces all countries
and the equitable exploitation which requires taking into
consideration the interests of all states, the Convention, inspired
by the view of the developing countries and their interpretation of
the term "equitable"^3 has legalized the preferential treatment for
the developing countries in Article 152(2), and sanctioned it as
non-discriminatory.
As regards the keeping of balance in the Parallel System, the
developing countries enjoy preferential treatment either directly or
through the Authority. The most illustrative example is the
sharing of benefits derived from activities in the Area. The
Authority shall provide for such sharing on an equitable and
non-discriminatory basis,195 but this, as we have seen, means
having regard to the needs of the developing countries. Article
160(2)(f)(l) of the Convention, therefore, defines this function of
the Authority more precisely, and binds the equitable "sharing of
financial and other economic benefits derived from activities in the
Area" to the "taking into particular consideration the interests and
needs of developing states and peoples who have not attained full
independence or other self-governing status". Whereas this
preferential treatment concerns all developing countries and peoples
who have not attained full independence against industrialized
countries, in another article the Convention aims to favour a group
of the developing countries. This relates to those countries in
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this group which "suffer serious adverse effects on their export
earnings or economies resulting from a reduction in the price of an
affected mineral or in the volume of exports of that mineral, to the
extent that such reduction is caused by activities in the Area".-'-^
According to Article 151(10) of the Convention, "the Assembly shall
establish a system of compensation or take other measures of
economic adjustment assistance including cooperation with
specialized agencies and other international organizations to assist
developing countries ..." The reason why the contents of Article
151(10) should be considered as preferential treatment is that the
adverse effect of deep sea-bed activities is not limited to the
economies of the developing countries. Some industrialized
countries, e.g., Canada, would also suffer from such activities, but
the article is silent about them. Nevertheless, the last sentence
in this article, which states "The Authority on request shall
initiate studies on the problems of those states which are likely to
be most seriously affected with a view to minimizing their
difficulties and assisting them in their economic adjustment" may be
construed as referring to all states suffering from adverse effects
of sea-bed mining on their economies.
While Article 151 on production policies with provisions on
production limitation is specifically concerned with the production
of nickel and was a restrictive measure, the compensation clause in
the last paragraph of that article is a preferential treatment for
those developing countries which would suffer from the production of
other minerals derived from polymetallic nodules, namely, cobalt,
copper and manganese. Since the Authority may, as a party to a
commodity agreement, undertake obligations concerning production
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limitations in relation to one or more of these minerals, such
limitations constitute a compensatory measure favouring the land-
based producers and thereby a preferential treatment against techno¬
logically advanced countries.
The main objective of the production policies set out in the
Convention "is to promote the growth, efficiency and stability of
markets for those commodities produced from the minerals derived
from the Area, at prices remunerative to producers and fair to
consumers".As a measure for obtaining balance in the Parallel
System and furthering the said objective, the Convention has
accorded to the Authority:
the right to participate in any commodity conference
dealing with those commodities and in which all interested
parties including both producers and consumers participate.
The Authority shall have the right to become a party
to any arrangement or agreement resulting from such
conferences. 198
Since participation of the Authority in such commodity agreements is
with regard to all production in the Area and not only that part
relating to the Enterprise or developing countries, it, in fact,
treats the latter preferentially in order to secure an equitable and
harmonized production policy.
Bearing in mind that conducting activities in the Area requires
a huge investment, the Convention seeks to obtain the necessary
equilibrium of the Parallel System by ensuring the financing of the
Enterprise's operations. In addition to the general obligation of
states parties to "support applications by the Enterprise for loans
on capital market and from international financial institutions",199
the Convention takes into special account the possibility of the
Enterprise conducting activities on one mine site - the first one -
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and transporting, processing and marketing the minerals recovered
therefrom in order, inter alia, to meet its initial administrative
expenses. To provide the Enterprise with the necessary funds for
this initial activity:
All states parties shall make available to the Enterprise an
amount equivalent to one half of the [required] funds ... by
way of long-term interest-free loans in accordance with the
scale of assessments for the United Nations regular budget
. . . Debts incurred by the Enterprise in raising the other
half of the funds shall be guaranteed by all states parties in
accordance with the same scale. 200
Since this obligation of making interest-free loans to the
Enterprise by all states parties is to be fulfilled in accordance
with the scale of assessment from the United Nations regular budget,
it is expected that the major part of the loan will be provided by
those technologically advanced countries which become parties to the
Convention. In this instance, the Enterprise receives preferential
treatment against the other competitors, i.e., the public or private
entities of the industrialized countries, because it is assured of
the necessary capital for the completion of the first generation
activities. The obligations of states parties to make available
the necessary funds to the Enterprise is even repeated in Resolution
II concerning protection of pioneer investors. The certifying
states,20^ according to this resolution, shall "ensure that the
necessary funds are made available to the Enterprise in a timely
manner in accordance with the Convention, upon its entry into
force".202
In an effort to make the Enterprise self-supporting, the
Convention requires the Assembly to exempt the Enterprise from
financial payments to the Authority during the first ten years from
the commencement of commercial production by it.2°3 Recalling the
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payments of a contractor to the Authority, including application
registration fee, annual fixed fee, production charge and share of
net proceeds, one will note that the Enterprise, at least for a
limited time, is treated preferentially.
The Convention not only provides for the preferential treatment
to the Enterprise as an effective measure to make it competitive
with other entities active in the Parallel System, but also
recommends that states parties on whose territories the Enterprise
holds property and assets should provide special incentives, rights,
OA /
privileges and immunities to the Enterprise. Although the
formulation of the relevant article of the Convention is "State
parties may provide special incentives . . ."to show that providing
these rights, privileges and immunities to the Enterprise is not
obligatory for the states parties and the article has a more
recommendatory than obligatory nature, it does not fail to repeat
that, in the event such preferential treatment is given to the
Enterprise, there is no obligation for the states parties to accord
the same treatment to other commercial entities.^5 Nevertheless,
if the states parties accord rights, privileges and immunities to
entities conducting commercial activities in their territories, they
have the obligation to provide the same to the Enterprise.
With regard to these measures, which are taken by the
Convention to compensate the inferior technological capability and
financial possibilities of the developing countries against the
industrialized states, and to correct a situation of disparity by
according to one side preferential treatment to the detriment of the
other side, one may point out that, although the relevant provisions
set out in the Convention are satisfactory, they are insufficient
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to further the original objective of the Parallel System which is
obtaining a balance between the rights and duties of the states and
other entities on the one hand and those of the Authority on the
other.
Exemption of payments to the Authority for ten years, e.g., is
an appropriate preferential measure, but bearing in mind that the
payment of any sort of charges by the Enterprise to the Authority
as set out in Article 10(1) of Annex IV in the Convention is
contradictory to the concept of the common heritage of mankind and
the function of the Authority as its administrator, the reasonable
choice would have been an unlimited exemption of the Enterprise from
any sort of payment to the Authority. The financing of the
Enterprise's operation in one mine-site is a preferential measure
contributing to its becoming self-supporting, but there is a duty
for any state more important than making the Enterprise self-
supporting: the duty to keep the Authority and the Enterprise
functioning effectively, and for that there should not be any time
limit.
It should not be forgotten that the multinational consortia,
acting as business entities, all have the necessary incentives and
possibilities to act effectively. In order to obtain a real
balance between them and the Enterprise, which may as a sort of
international organization lack those incentives and suffer from all
the usual deficiencies of such an organization, it is important to
ensure genuine viable preferential measures for it, and thereby
secure the furtherance of the main objective which is to foster
healthy development of the world economy and balanced growth of
international trade.
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(e) The Review Conference
The revision of the Parallel System after a certain period of
time was a sine qua non for the developing countries in order to
907
accept that system. This was partly because they were accepting
something which had not yet been tried in practice, and partly
because the system per se was perceived to be contradictory to the
idea of joint management of the common heritage of mankind. On the
other hand, for the industrialized countries, the acceptance of
other obligations such as technology transfer and financial payments
to the Authority was dependent on the acquisition of a guaranteed
right to the Area and its resources. The review provision laid
down in Article 155 of the Convention seeks to accommodate a
20ft
compromise. °
The review of the Parallel System shall be carried out by a
conference which the Assembly convenes for this purpose 15 years
after the 1st of January of the year in which the earliest
commercial production commences under an approved plan of work.^09
The choice of 15 years is due to the assumption that the first
generation exploitation of deep sea resources will be completed
during that period, and the result of the working of the system
could be evaluated then. The specific objectives set out for the
Review Conference are to establish, inter alia, whether the
exploitation system has achieved its aims, including the development
of the resources of the Area for the benefit of mankind as a whole,
equitable sharing of benefits derived from activities in the Area,
prevention of monopolization and effective and balanced management
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of reserve areas.210 conference> therefore, shall consider
both the conduct and the results of the system.
Few provisions concerning activities in the Area are to be
maintained regardless of the result of the work of the Review
Conference. At the top of the list of these provisions is the
principle of the common heritage of mankind and the ensuing
principle of equitable exploitation of the resources of the Area for
the benefit of mankind, with particular consideration to the
interests of the developing countries by an Authority which shall
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organize, conduct and control activities in the Area.
As regards the right of access of states to the Area, no clear
and specific reference is made in Article 155(2), but it requires
the Review Conference to ensure the maintenance of " . . . the
rights of states and their general conduct in relation to the Area,
and their participation in activities in the Area in conformity with
this Convention . . .". One may, of course, interpret it as
referring to the right of participation of states in the activities
in the Area according to Article 153(2)(1), but it may similarly be
construed as referring to the rights of states under Article 11 of
Annex III of the Convention concerning joint arrangements with the
Enterprise where the activities are totally controlled by the
Authority. Moreover, Article 155(2) does not exclude state or
private enterprises from the scope of the Review Conference, which
may put in question the future role of these entities within the
Parallel System. As far as this system is concerned, it can be
pointed out that the Review Conference has a rather broad mandate,
and even if states and public or private entities continue to enjoy
the right of access to the Area, "the possibility cannot be
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precluded that the result [of the broad authority given to the
Review Conference] will be abolishment of direct access for private
investors".^
The decisions concerning modifications in the provisions
related to the exploitation system are to be taken by consensus and
recourse to voting should not be taken unless all efforts for
commanding consensus have been exhausted.^l^ If during five years
the Review Conference cannot agree on amendments to the exploitation
system, it may adopt those amendments, within the ensuing 12 months,
by a three-fourths majority, and they will enter into force for all
states parties 12 months after the ratification or accession of
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three-fourths of states parties. Through this procedure, as
Dupuy has rightly observed: "a real legislative power is entrusted
to the Review Conference by means of a majority vote machinery which
should bestow on developing countries the power of the last
91 f\
word". Whatever the amendments may be, the Convention ensures
that the rights acquired under existing contracts shall not be
217affected.'6-1' This security of tenure accorded to the contractor is
based on provisions contained in Article 153(6) and Article 18(1) of
Annex I11.318
The outcome of the Review Conference is difficult to foresee,
and depends very much on the degree of success of the Parallel
System during its first decade of operation. The Review Conference,
due to its mandate in Article 155(1) and (2) and the decision-making
procedure which puts the developing countries in a position to amend
the exploitation system through their own majority, is the only
component element of the Parallel System which may be applied to
correct the system in a way that, even if the states and public or
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private entities retain their right of access on one side of the
system, the Enterprise will be accorded the extra rights, privileges
and exemption of duties so that it can in effect play its superior
role as the operating arm of the agent of mankind.
SECTION IV: GENERAL ASPECTS OF DOMESTIC LEGISLATION
RELATED TO EXPLOITATION SYSTEM
Parallel with the work of the Sea-Bed Committee, the mining
industry of the United States initiated efforts to have the Congress
enact legislation under which the commercial exploitation of the
resources of the sea-bed could become feasible. In 1980, President
Carter signed the Deep Sea-Bed Hard Mineral Resources Act. As a
consequence of the enactment of domestic law for deep sea-bed mining
in the United States, several other industrialized countries
followed suit. They are: the Federal Republic of Germany (1980),
the United Kingdom (1981), France (1981), Japan (1982) and Italy
(1985). The Soviet Union also issued a law in this respect in
1982.219
A crucial point of concern for these countries was to ensure
that the licences issued under national laws be honoured by other
deep sea mining powers, and activities sanctioned by these statutes
be harmonized in such a way that no conflict of interests would
arise. There are, therefore, provisions in these laws, except in
that of the Soviet Union, which provide for the recognition of
other deep sea-bed mining countries as "reciprocating states", if
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firstly, their respective laws are not substantially different from
each other, and secondly, they recognize each other's mining
licences.^20
Besides a clear indication in these statutes as to the
designation of other deep sea mining states as "reciprocating
states", some efforts have been made to establish a multilateral
arrangement for the coordination of the mining activities of these
countries on the sea-bed. The first of these efforts was the
conclusion in 1982 of the Agreement Concerning Interim Arrangement
Relating to Polymetallic Nodules of the Deep Seabed (popularly known
as Reciprocating States Agreement (RSA) between France, the Federal
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Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States).
The nature of this Agreement violates Article 137(3) of the 1982
Convention which provides that: "no state or natural or juridical
person shall claim, acquire or exercise rights with respect to the
minerals recovered from the Area except in accordance with this
Part [Part XI of the Convention], Otherwise, no such claim,
acquisition or exercise of such rights shall be recognized".222
The main purpose was to "facilitate the identification and
resolution of conflicts which may arise" over areas for which the
multinational consortia had applied for mining licences prior to
that Agreement.223
In order to justify the legality of the Agreement and its
compatibility with the Convention and the aspirations of the
Conference, reference was made, in the second and third preambular
paragraphs, to the interim character of the national law of the
respective parties concerning deep sea-bed mining and the fact that
the Conference, through Resolution II, had authorized the protection
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of the preparatory investments in deep sea mining prior to the entry
into force of the Convention.224 The Agreement, however, did not
contain firm operational commitments, and limited itself to
"encouraging the voluntary resolution of overlapping claims among
the pioneer mining consortia".22^
These efforts continued in the years to come, and in August
1984, an agreement was reached among the so-called "like-minded"
group of states, comprising the United States, the United Kingdom,
the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium and
The Netherlands, in the form of a Provisional Understanding
Regarding Deep Seabed Matters.^2^ The Provisional Understanding,
is inconsistent with the UN Convention and Resolution 11 relating to
pioneer investment. This is because it goes beyond the resolution
of conflicts arising from overlapping claims, by including
provisions regarding exploration and exploitation of the seabed
resources outside of the LOS Convention. Additional Western
industrialized states, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, may
possibly follow and enact legislation for deep sea-bed mining. The
purpose of the Provisional Understanding is to coordinate the
issuing of authorizations in respect of applications for deep sea
exploration and exploitation among virtually all potential deep sea
mining states of the West, and particularly to ensure the
recognition by all these states of the agreements reached by the
major consortia in 1983 concerning the coordinates of the areas of
997
deep sea-bed claimed by each of them.
Since the basis of these agreements is to respect the claims
made under the provisions of the national laws of any of the parties
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to the agreement, and thereby provide for the legal security which
is an inherent feature of any domestic law, it is essential to
examine these laws. We shall first dwell upon the study of the
general features of these instruments and their legal bases. After
a comparative study of their contents, the question of the
compatibility of such laws with existing international law shall be
discussed.
(a) Definitions
A common aspect of these laws is that they all give their own
definitions of the sea-bed. According to the American law, deep
sea-bed means the sea-bed and subsoil thereof to a depth of ten
metres, lying seaward of and outside the continental shelf of any
nation or outside any area of national jurisdiction beyond the
continental shelf of a nation provided such jurisdiction is
recognized by the United States.^8 According to the British Act,
the sea-bed is that part of the bed of the high seas, the right to
the resources of which is neither exercisable by the United Kingdom
nor by any other sovereign power.^29 German Act treats this
question more generally by defining the sea-bed as the part of the
sea-bed and its immediate subsoil outside the areas over which the
Federal Republic claims sovereign rights or recognizes the sovereign
o on
rights of other states. The French and Italian laws have
similar formulations for the definition of the sea-bed. In both
cases, they refer to the area of the sea-bed and subsoil beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction "in accordance with international
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law". The Soviet law is similar to the American law in that it
defines the sea-bed as areas beyond the limits of the continental
shelf, but it does not offer any definition of the latter.^32 The
Japanese law, like the British Act, defines the sea-bed as the bed
and subsoil of that part of the high seas over the resources of
which no state has jurisdiction for exploration.^33
Except for the French and the Italian definitions, which are
somehow close to the definition of the sea-bed in the Convention,
the rest are ambiguous.
(b) Declared Goals
The other common feature of the national laws is their
declared goals, which are substantially different from each other.
While for the United States the major objective is "to regulate the
exploration for and commercial recovery of hard mineral resources of
the deep seabed by the United States citizens pending the conclusion
of a comprehensive law of the sea treaty in force in respect of the
United States",the British Act chooses a prohibitive formulation
for declaring the purpose. The implied objective is to prohibit
persons to whom the Act applies from exploring for or exploiting of
the hard mineral resources of the deep sea-bed unless they have been
granted a licence under the Act.^35 The purpose of the German Act
is "to regulate provisionally and to promote the exploration for and
the recovery of mineral resources from the deep sea-bed until the
entry into force of an international agreement for the Federal
Republic of Germany".236 common objective of these three
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countries, inter alia, is "to ensure non-discriminatory access for
their nationals to sea-bed resources, thus providing secure access
to supplies of minerals in the national interests".^?
Although not expressly stated, the purpose of the French law
seems to be setting out conditions under which the French Republic
grants authorizations for the exploration and exploitation of
"mineral" resources to natural persons and corporate bodies of
French nationality pending the entry into force of an international
convention to which France would be a party.® Almost the same
formulation is used in the Italian law. "^9 The Japanese law which,
except for its title, generally gives the impression that it has a
permanent rather than interim character, defines its purposes as
establishing:
interim measures necessary for regulating business activity
in deep sea-bed mining so as to contribute to the promotion
and extension of the public welfare through the rational
development of deep seabed mineral resources and in keeping
with the recent, rapid strides of international society toward
a new order of the sea and other significant changes in the
international environment surrounding deep seabed mining. 240
Unlike the other national laws, the Soviet law gives the
impression that, because of the enactment of national law by other
states, and in order to protect the Soviet interests with respect to
the exploration and exploitation of the mineral resources of the
deep sea-bed, the Soviet Union was reluctantly obliged to take
241
measures.
As is clear from the declared or implied purposes of these
documents, the main objective is to protect national interests by
ensuring a safe and undisputed access to the mineral resources of
the deep sea-bed. The interests of the international community have
obviously no place in the stated objectives. Some of the supporters
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of these laws have tried to signify the provisions contained in some
of them for the protection of the marine environment as a tribute to
the international community, while such provisions may be as much
to the interest of the enacting states as to the rest of the world.
(c) Legal Bases
As regards the legal bases of these laws, they all seek to
repeat that the acts are temporary measures pending the entry into
force of the Convention for the enacting states; and, moreover,
these measures are consistent with the regime of deep sea-bed mining
as developed in the Conference.
Since almost all the enacting states, at the time of the
adoption of their national laws, were actively participating in the
negotiations of the Conference or the Preparatory Commission, it
would have been self-defeating if the law had not had an interim
character. The clear indication of their interim nature in the
titles of these laws or their preambular paragraphs is to be
regarded as a commitment of these states to the results of the
eventual entry into force of the Convention.Nevertheless,
neither this commitment nor the other provisions of the said
legislations suggest the exact duration of the interim period since
it all depends on the yet uncertain date of the entry into force of
the Convention and the eventual allegiance of these states or some
of them to it. McDade , with reference to the indeterminate
duration of the national legislation and the possible conflicts
which may arise due to the delay in the entry into force of the
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Convention and the issuing of exploitation licences under domestic
laws, concludes that unilateral legislation of the industrialized
countries is not indicative of wholehearted support for the
Convention.
The main argument in defence of compatibility of these
domestic laws with the sea regime of the Convention is that the
enacting states do not claim any sovereignty over the sea-bed or its
resources. This is consistent with Article 137(1) of the
Convention which states:
No state shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign
rights over any part of the Area or its resources, nor shall
any state or natural or juridical persons appropriate any part
thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereignty or
sovereign rights nor such appropriation shall be recognized.
It should be noted that the disclaimer of sovereignty in these
acts is not uniform. The legislation of the United States and the
Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet law disclaims sovereign
rights over both the deep sea-bed and its resourcesThe
Japanese and Italian laws confine themselves to disclaiming
O / A
sovereign rights over the deep sea-bed only. The British Act is
silent on this point.
Without rehearsing here the usual arguments about the
inseparability of claims to the sea-bed from those to the resources
thereof, one may point out the contradiction which exists between
such a disclaimer and the conferring of exclusive rights by the
states upon the applicant for exploration or exploitation licences.
One of the representatives of the United States to the Conference,
in a personal effort to justify the enactment of national laws,
wrote:
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No state argued that it could confer a right on its nationals
to mine a specific site that would be exclusive erga omenes
... no state asserted a right to claim a part or even a
"reasonable" part of the deep seabeds or the resources of the
deep seabeds to the exclusion of others pending a treaty, or
to the exclusion of a treaty. 247
The related provisions in the American Act reaffirm this position by
stating that the United States "does not . . . assert sovereignty or
sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership
of, any areas or resources in the deep seabed".^8 Nevertheless,
Section 102(3) of the same act provides that:
a permit [for commercial recovery] recognizes the right of the
holder to recover hard mineral resources, and to own,
transport, use, and sell hard mineral resources recovered,
under the permit and in accordance with the requirements of
this Act.
Biggs, with regard to this contradiction, observes that: "The
rights to recover, own, take away, use, and sell only pertain to
someone with exclusive and absolute ownership over something". He
further concludes that: "if diplomatic protection is granted to
ensure the full exercise of such mineral rights, it is the
equivalent of asserting of public extraterritoriality .In
this context, reference should be made to Article 137(3) of the
Convention which says: "No state or natural or juridical persons
shall claim, acquire or exercise rights with respect to the minerals
recovered from the Area except in accordance with this Part".
As a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning here that in all
the acts, reference is made, explicitly or implicitly, to the deep
sea-bed activities as a freedom of the high seas. The most
explicit example is paragraph 12 of Section 2 of the American Act
which says:
. . . That exploration for and commercial recovery of hard
mineral resources of the deep seabed are freedoms of the high
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seas subject to a duty of reasonable regard to the interests
of other states in their exercise of those and other freedoms
recognized by general principles of international law.
The formulation of section 1(1) of the German Act implies that
deep sea mining remains a freedom of the high seas until the
entering into force of the Convention for that country. The
British Act and French and Italian laws have similar formulations in
this respect. Nevertheless, O'Connell, with reference to his
doctrine of relativity of the freedom of the high seas,^^ argues
that "where it is generally thought acceptable that states should
insist upon certain conduct on or over the high seas, the abstract
freedom of the seas will not stand in the way".^l
The adoption of the Declaration of Principles without any
negative vote and the signing of the Convention by the majority of
the states of the world are, in our opinion, evidence of the general
acceptance that the conduct of states in the use of the deep sea-bed
and its mineral resources cannot be governed by the principle of the
freedom of the high seas.
The asserted legal bases of the national law for deep sea-bed
mining, i.e., their interim nature, disclaimer of sovereignty
compatibility with the Convention, and emanation from the principle
of the freedom of the high seas can hardly hold in the face of
the approval of the Declaration of Principles by the enacting
states, their active participation in the Conference and their
repeated commitment to the establishment of an international regime
for the deep sea-bed as a result of the negotiation at the
Conference.
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SECTION V: RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER DOMESTIC LEGISLATION
The exploitation system of the sea-bed, as laid down in
the national legislation, has, as far as general features are
concerned, some similarity with the regime set out in Part XI of the
Convention. In this legislation, the scope of activities, the
subjects of laws, size and number of mine sites, the authority which
issues the licences and the degree of its discretion, and the
obligation of the contractor are prescribed either in general terms,
as in the case of the Soviet Union and France, or in comprehensive
and detailed fashion, as in the case of the United States. We shall
touch upon these general elements of the system of exploitation
under domestic laws.
(a) Range of Activities
These laws generally regulate two aspects of deep sea mining
activities, namely, exploration and exploitation, but the latter may
find, in these laws, a new and broader definition in comparison with
the Convention. The American law, for instance, prefers the term
"commercial recovery" to "exploitation", and defines it as not only
recovering hard mineral resources, but also processing them at sea,
and disposing of any waste resulting from such activity at sea.^-^
The British Act, though not specifically including the processing or
disposal of waste in the definition of "exploitation", empowers the
Secretary of State, as the administrator of the law, to put the
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necessary terms in respect of the subsequent activities in the
exploitation licence if he thinks fit.^53 jn German Act,
"recovery" is used in place of "exploitation", and it implies the
removal of mineral resources for commercial use, and "processing
thereof, if carried out at sea".^~^ The French law, while
employing the term "exploitation" to denote "extraction of mineral
resources for commercial purposes",^55 does not include subsequent
activities in this definition. The Soviet law does not provide any
definition for "exploration" or "exploitation" of the deep sea
mineral resources. The Japanese law, like the American and German
Acts, prefers "recovery" to "exploitation" and, without specifying
processing or disposing of wastes, points out that "recovery"
contains some subsidiary activities which include sorting, refining,
etc.The definition of "exploitation" in the Italian law is
almost the same as in the French law. 57
In order to avoid complications resulting from this disparity
in definitions, the Provisional Understanding signed by the enacting
states has adopted the expression "deep seabed operations" rather
than "exploitation" to imply all operations, other than prospecting,
in relation to the hard mineral resources. They all divide the
whole of the operation into two aspects of exploration and
exploitation, for each of which a separate licence or permit is
required. The licences give exclusive rights to the holder against
any subject of the state which has issued the licence and the
entities under the jurisdiction of a reciprocating state.^58
In some of these laws, like that of the United States, the
holder of the exploration licence is more or less automatically
entitled to the exploitation permit,259 while other cases,
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such as the French law, in order to obtain an exploitation permit,
the applicant should give proof, during the period of the validity
of the exploration permit, that the exploitation is in fact
possible.260
(b) Subjects of Legislation
All these domestic laws aim to regulate, in the first place,
the activities of their own subjects in relation to deep sea mining,
but by virtue of conferring exclusive rights on their own nationals
and including provisions in respect of reciprocating states practice
in their own national law, they may even influence the behaviour of
others rather than their own subjects.
The purpose of the American law is to regulate deep sea mining
by United States citizens, who are defined as:
(A) any individual who is a citizen of the United States;
(B) any corporation, partnership, joint venture, association,
or other entity organized or existing under the laws of any of
the United States;
(C) any corporation, partnership, joint venture, association
or other entity (whether organized or existing under the laws
of any of the United States or a foreign nation) if the
controlling interest in such entity is held by an individual
or entity described in subparagraph (A) or (B). 261
Such a provision is not included in other documents, but with
respect to the overall provisions of these instruments, it is clear
that none of them provides for the operation of the companies under
licences issued by a non-reciprocating state.
The French, Italian and German laws are equally simple in
their definition of the subject of law. Except for the choice of
the word "resident" in the German law instead of "national" in the
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other two, all three stipulate that permits may be issued only to
their own subjects, and all three confer the right to their subjects
to operate under the permits issued by a reciprocating state.^62
The British Act is more detailed in this respect, and is to be
applied not only to the citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies,
but also any resident thereof.^63 The application of the Act may
extend, by Order in Council, to citizens of the United Kingdom and
colonies resident outside the United Kingdom or resident in any
country specified in the Order.^^
The Japanese law is precise when it confines itself to the
nationals or corporations of Japan, and recognizes the rights of the
Japanese nationals who have entered into a partnership relation with
the nationals or corporations of a reciprocating state. The
Soviet law, being the act of a country with a centrally planned
economy, has the Soviet "enterprises" as its subjects.^66
Although the Soviet Union does not recognize the reciprocity
mechanism as envisaged in other national laws, paragraph 3 of the
law provides for Soviet "co-operation" with those states which
recognize the permits issued to Soviet enterprises for exploration
and exploitation of deep sea-bed resources. This paragraph and the
term "co-operation" leave the option open for the Soviet Union, in
the event the Convention does not enter into force for that country,
to settle its differences with the multinational consortia without
becoming a party to the Reciprocating States Agreement or similar
arrangements. The Soviet enterprises are entitled, according to
paragraph 7 of the law, to engage in the activities carried on by
the foreign entities and vice versa, but this permission is
qualified by the condition that there should exist a treaty between
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the Soviet Union and the interested state of which the foreign
entity is a subject. This paragraph can be invoked as a basis for
the eventual accession of the Soviet Union to the Reciprocating
States Agreement or the Provisional Understanding, but with regard
to the sharp contradiction of ideology and economic system of the
Soviet Union and the Western states, it is possible that the
interested states referred to in paragraph 7 are those with the same
economic system as that of the Soviet Union.
As regards the subjects of the national law for deep sea-bed
mining, one may sum up by saying that the primary purpose of all
these laws is to provide legal security for their own nationals
operating either independently or as a part of an international
consortium. In the latter case, some of these laws , such as those
of the United States and Japan, apparently go further, and try to
extend their applicability in cases where they deem their subjects
have a "controlling interest".
(c) Size of Mine Sites
Another relevant question is the size and number of the mine
sites each applicant may obtain. With the exception of the British
Act, which has no specific indication to the size of the area, the
rest of the instruments contain explicit references to that issue.
The applicant has the right to suggest the size of the area of the
sea-bed for which he applies, but the issuing of permission is
dependent on the fact that the suggested area has reasonable limits
and the interests of other states are taken into account.^67
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According to both the American and the German Acts, the area
suggested by the applicant should be large enough to ensure the
permit holder of sufficient commercial recovery during the entire
period of the permit.^8 The decision about the size of the area,
according to Article 12(2) of the Japanese law, is to be in
accordance with the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
Ordinance. The administrative decision, here, may be constructed
as a means of ensuring the size of the area of the Japanese
applicant does not exceed reasonable limits and the interests of
other states in that area. There is no statutory limitation in any
of these laws on the number of permits which may be allocated to any
applicant. One reason for such a uniformity in avoidance of
anti-monopoly provisions is that imposition of any restriction in
the number of sites for one state would place the entities of that
state at a disadvantage in comparison with entities operating under
other national legislation.^69
(d) Similarities with the Provisions of the Convention
Insertion of provisions for financial and technological
capabilities of the applicant, and reasonableness of the size of the
site in national law, are all efforts to bring the contents of these
laws closer to the requirements of Part XI of the Convention. Thus
the Soviet law in paragraph 4 requires the applicant for an
exploitation permit to specify, in their application, two areas, one
of which
- 292 -
shall be subject to use by the enterprise which has received a
permit, and the other shall be reserved for possible explora¬
tion and exploitation by a future international organization
for the seabed.
The French law is not so explicit, and without mentioning the
International Sea-Bed Authority, it decrees that "the exploitation
permit shall be valid for an area not exceeding half of the area of
the exploration permit".270
Two of the main features of the exploitation system as
established in the Convention, namely, transfer of technology and
production control, are absent in the national laws. The American
Act, in Section 110, dealing with conservation of natural resources,
envisages that each licence or permit issued shall contain:
terms, conditions, and restrictions which have due regard for
the prevention of waste and the future opportunity for the
commercial recovery of the unrecovered balance of hard mineral
resources in the area to which the licence or permit applies.
The Soviet law pays lip service to the requirement of technology
transfer by pronouncing that:
. . . competent agencies of the USSR shall effectuate
cooperation on the basis of international treaties of the USSR
with interested foreign states for the purpose of rendering
assistance to them in the development of technology, in the
production of equipment, in implementing measures to prevent
pollution of the environment, the training of the cadres, and
other questions connected with the exploration and exploitation
of mineral resources of seabed areas. 271
Such assistance to other states for the development of their deep
sea mining technology is conditioned to the existence of a treaty
between the Soviet Union and the interested state.
Since the raison d'etre of national law for deep sea mining is
to avoid the burdensome provisions of Part XI of the Convention, and
facilitate the conducting of activities in a free market climate,
mere reference to provisions similar to those of the Convention
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seems to be an unsuccessful effort to demonstrate the consistency of
these laws with the Convention.
(e) Financial Terms
Before closing this section, mention should be made of the
financial terms of the national laws.
Due to the fact that the major consortia which are engaged in
deep sea mining comprise companies from several different countries,
the favourable financial terms in the law of any of those countries
could lead to the preference of that law by the consortia, and that
would make the realization of any effective reciprocating states
arrangement improbable. Thus, it was inevitable that under all
these laws more or less similar financial obligations would be
prescribed for the permit holder.
The American, British, French and Italian laws of deep sea
raining all impose tax of 3.75 per cent of the value of the
unprocessed nodules.^72 German Act charges the holder of a
permit to pay an annual fee of "0.75 per cent of the average market
price in that particular year for the metals and minerals in their
simple commercial processing forms which are recovered from the
mineral resources mined".^^ As the price of the minerals
contained in the nodules is estimated to be approximately 20 per
cent of the unprocessed nodules, the amount of the German tax seems
to be more or less equal to the 3.75 per cent tax on the value of
unprocessed nodules.274 rp^e British Act, as an equal alternative
to 3.75 per cent tax, Section 9(l)(b) imposes a tax of 0.75 per cent
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of the value of any metals found in the nodules, but unlike the
German Act, the time period on the basis of which the tax is to be
calculated is not specified. The Soviet law is not explicit in
this respect, and without mentioning any specific figure, provides
for the allocation of a "part of the assets received from the
exploitation by Soviet enterprises of mineral resources of seabed
areas" to a special fund.^^ japanese law does not contain any
provisions relating to financial terms, and the determination of
such terms is delegated to Cabinet Order.
One of the principal pieces of evidence offered as support for
the claim of compatibility of the national law with the Convention
has been the existence of provisions in those laws for the
establishment of a revenue sharing fund which shall distribute the
proceeds of deep sea mining among the members of the international
077
community.'"' This contention has been made particularly by the
pioneering enacting states, namely, the United States, the United
Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany.
Section 2(b)(2) of the American law pronounces the establish¬
ment of such a fund as one of the purposes of the law, and section
403 of the same law establishes the "Deep Seabed Revenue Sharing
Fund", and provides for the transfer of the taxes received as a
result of deep sea mining to that Fund.278 Since the tax imposed
by the Act shall be paid only until the date when an international
deep sea-bed treaty - adopted by the UNCLOS III or otherwise - takes
effect with respect to the United States, or until ten years
after the enactment of the legislation, i.e. 1990,the Fund may
have two destinies: either an international deep sea-bed mining
treaty shall be ratified by the United States before 1990 - and
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currently this seems improbable - in which case the amounts
in the Fund shall be available for making contributions to the
international community under that treaty, or in the absence of such
a treaty for the United States, the Congress may decide on the
application of the Fund.^®^ Section 10 of the British law contains
similar provisions concerning the establishment of a "Deep Sea
Mining Fund". In both cases, the commitment of sharing the
proceeds of deep sea-bed mining with the international community
shall cease to exist in the event no international deep sea-bed
mining treaty enters into force for these states within ten years of
the date of the coming into force of their own acts.
The German law is rather brief in this respect. Section 13
of the act envisages the establishment of a trust fund to be
transferred "to the international Sea-Bed Authority after the
entering into force of an international agreement on deep seabed
mining for the Federal Republic of Germany. Up to that time the
trust fund shall be invested for foreign aid purposes". The
Italian law adopts a similar position. Although the establishment
of a fund is not envisaged, Article 15 of the law clearly states
that the revenues from the tax imposed on deep sea mining shall be
used for the purposes of the Italian aid to the developing
countries.
The Soviet law sets forth the provision for the establishment
of a special fund from part of the assets received from deep sea
mining by the Soviet enterprises. The assets of the fund may be
transferred to a future international organization for the sea-bed
in order to fulfil the obligations of the USSR according to a new
convention on the law of the sea.281
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Finally, it should be recalled that the Japanese law not only
leaves financial terms to the designation of the Cabinet, but also
lacks provisions for the establishment of any fund or arrangement
for sharing the proceeds of deep sea mining with the international
community.
To sum up, it may be concluded that, because of the
inevitability of providing legal security for the licence holders
against any claims by the subjects of other potential deep sea-bed
mining states, the national laws contain more or less similar
provisions, which in itself has facilitated the establishment of the
Reciprocating States Agreement. Although attempts have been made
to justify the provisions of these domestic laws as evidence of
their compatibility with Part XI of the Convention, the comparison
of our study in this section and the system of exploitation of the
deep sea-bed under the Convention shows that there cannot be any
similarity in the contents of the provisions of the national law and
those of the Convention, because enactment of such law is per se in
conflict with the purposes of the Convention and aspirations
attached to the principle of the common heritage of mankind.
SECTION VI: DOMESTIC LEGISLATION AND EXISTING
INTERNATIONAL LAW
So far, domestic legislation has been enacted by seven states
which actively participated in the negotiations for the
establishment of a legal regime for the deep sea-bed through the
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Convention. It is, therefore, natural for any observer to wonder
whether this active participation and commitment to the completion
of the work of the Conference would not entail any obligation on the
part of these states to refrain from enacting such laws which are
evidently in conflict with the purposes of the Convention. In
other words, it is not merely the question of rights and obligations
of a non-party to the Convention, but the duties incurred by voting
for the Declaration of Principles and recognizing the principle of
the common heritage of mankind as enshrined in that declaration,
making numerous statements in support of the efforts inside the
Conference for the establishment of a universally acceptable legal
regime on the one hand, and the compatibility of the national
legislation with these duties on the other. We shall try to
discuss, in brief, the rights and obligations of non-parties to the
Convention, and later elaborate the arguments furnished in support
of any claim of compatibility of national laws for deep sea mining
with international law.
It is generally agreed that the Roman law doctrine pacta
tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt - agreements neither impose
obligations nor confer rights on third parties - which is a general
concept of contract law, prevails as regards the relation between
the non-party states and those who are parties to a treaty.282
same vow is articulated in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties,283 which reads: "A treaty does not create
either obligations or rights for a third state without its consent".
There are two exceptions to this rule: (a) general acceptance of a
treaty provision as declaratory of customary international law in
which case the custom, quite independent of the treaty, entails
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rights and duties for third states, and (b) the existence of the
intent of the parties to the treaty to establish rights and duties
for third states.
While there is, it seems, not much controversy about the first
exception, and the requirement of proof for the existence of a rule
of customary international law is placed on the one who wishes to
benefit from a right or impose an obligation, there are some
differences of opinion about the interpretation of Articles 35 and
36 of the Vienna Convention, which contain the requirement of
"intention".
Conferment of rights on third states is stipulated in Article
36, which reads:
1- A right arises for a third state from a provision of a
treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to
accord that right either to the third state, or to a group of
states to which it belongs, or to all states, and the third
state assents thereto. Its assent shall be presumed so long
as the contrary is not indicated, unless the treaty otherwise
provides.
2- A state exercising a right in accordance with paragraph 1
shall comply with the conditions for its exercise provided for
in the treaty or established in conformity with the treaty.
The best example of the conferment of right on the third states are
the treaties concerning the major international water-ways such as
Article 380 of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles dealing with the Kiel
Canal.
The establishment of the intent of the parties to the treaty
comes from several factors. If the third states are not
specifically named in the treaty, the legislative history, voting on
pertinent proposals and statements of the parties at the time of
signature or ratification of the treaty, plays a decisive role.^85
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While in the case of "rights" the Vienna Convention presumes
the assent of the third states unless the contrary is indicated,
Article 35 of the same Convention, dealing with the duties of the
third states, makes the imposition of any "obligation" contingent
upon the acceptance, in writing, by the third state of that
obligation.The requirement of a written acceptance of the
third party, in this case, decreases the significance of the
"intent" factor of the third state.
In discussions about rights and obligations for third states,
mention has been made of so-called "law-making" or constitutive
9 PiPk
"treaties" as distinct from "contractual" treaties. The law¬
making treaties, it is assumed, intend to lay down law where none
existed before, or introduce regulations which constitute a change
in law, and as such do not confine themselves only to the parties.
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Convention on the High
Seas, the Outer Space Treaty and the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, are
examples of law-making treaties often mentioned.O'Connell
holds the view that rights and duties acquired by a third state from
such treaties are not derived from the treaty and its legislative
character, but are due to the fact that the provisions contained in
the treaty have transformed into customary rule through passage from
the treaty into the general corpus of international law.^0
Irrespective of the type of treaties - contractual or
legislative - one may take account of certain treaties that intend
9 Q1
to lay down a set of rights and obligations valid erga omnes.
The usual examples are treaties concerning international entities,
such as the United Nations. This position has been confirmed by
the ICJ in its advisory opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered
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in the Service of the United Nations Case,^92 where the court
expressed the view that:
. . . fifty States, representing the vast majority of the
members of the international community, had the power, in
conformity with international law, to bring into being an
entity possessing objective international personality, and not
merely personality recognized by them alone, together with
capacity to bring international claims. 293
The most illustrative example of treaty provisions which
contain obligations valid erga omnes is paragraph 6 of Article 2 of
the Charter of the United Nations, which states:
The organization shall ensure that States which are not Members
of the United Nations act in accordance with these principles
[described in other paragraphs of the same Article] so far as
may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and
security.
Lauterpacht considers it as a mandatory provision which "constitutes
a claim to regulate the conduct of non-members to the extent
required for the fulfilment of the object of that Article".^4
Nevertheless, those who reject any inherent capacity in treaties to
confer rights or impose obligations on third states argue that those
provisions adverted to in Article 2 of the Charter as applicable to
non-member states are those which are obligatory upon all states,
independently of the Charter, such as the principle of peaceful
settlement of disputes and that of abstention from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
29S
of any state.
One may summarize the discussion by concluding that,
irrespective of the type of treaty, and in addition to factors such
as the language, the statements of the parties, diplomatic corres¬
pondence, etc., the decisive factor for the extension of the rights
and duties to the third state is the consent of that state. The
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sole exception to this rule is when the treaty provision has
acquired the status of a customary rule of international law. Both
proponents and opponents of national law for deep sea mining have
based their claims on this exception and argument.
Before we embark on analysing the arguments for or against
the compatibility of national law with existing international law,
it is useful to point out two of the outstanding features of the
Convention which have some influence on such an analysis.
The first of these features is its universal character. As a
significant document dealing with all issues relating to the law of
the sea, and in order to contribute to the maintenance of peace,
justice and progress for all peoples of the world,^6 it ^as been
time and again emphasized that the Convention should be "a product
of universal consensus and compromise among nations from every
political, economic and social system on this globe".^97 in other
words, it has been meant to produce a universal law, applicable to
all nations. The participation of virtually all the states of the
world, members or non-members of the United Nations, self-governing
territories and states and associated states, in the work of the
Conference is to be regarded as a sign of universality and
uniqueness of the Convention.^98 From this point of view,
i.e., universality, the Convention is an unprecedented legal
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instrument. The extent of the issues covered by it, the length
of the time which has been spent on drafting it directly by the
representatives of almost all of the states of the world and the
significance of its subject endow a sui generis character on its
universal act. Therefore, it may be inappropriate to make use only
of the standard norms of the law of treaties for the interpretation
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of the rights and duties of the parties or the third states in
respect to the Convention, particularly the overall participation of
almost all states in its drafting. It may be even fitting to
reconsider the definition of "third states" in relation to the
Convention.
Another feature of the Convention which is in fact the basis of
its universality is its compact nature as a "package" which makes it
impossible for any individual state to select a part of it and
reject the rest, unless the selected part is overwhelmingly
recognized as declaratory of an existing customary international
law. In connection with this significant quality of the
Convention, the view has been expressed that:
Its quality as a package is a result of the singularity of the
circumstances from which it emerged, which factors included
the close interrelationship of the many different issues
involved, the large number of participating states, and
the vast number of often conflicting interests which frequently
cut across the traditional lines of negotiation by region
. . . [it] necessitated that every individual provision
of the text be weighed within the context of the whole,
producing an intricately balanced text to provide a basis for
universality. 300
Engo, the representative of Cameroon to the Conference, speaking
about the consequence of the "package" quality of the Convention,
said:
Individual states may not pick and choose to be bound by
convenient aspects of its provisions. This is particularly
true for any who may to wish to reject one or more of its 17
parts, selecting only certain rights established under the rest
of the Convention. 301
Having dealt with two of the significant features of the
Convention, namely, universality and package quality, which makes it
distinct from other international conventions, we will now embark on
analyzing the arguments of the industrialized countries with deep
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sea-bed mining laws about the rights that they assert to enjoy from
the provisions of the Convention, and the absence of obligations to
refrain from adopting the national laws.
As mentioned before, assertion of rights derived from the
provisions of the Convention by the states with national law is
based on the designation of those provisions as declaratory of
customary law. Such assertions became usual after it had become
clear that some of the technologically advanced countries might not
sign the Convention. The position of these countries, otherwise,
had always been in favour of beneficial rights as a result of rati¬
fying the Convention. The statement of the American representative
to the Sea-Bed Committee in August 1972 reveals this position. He
maintained:
. . . his delegation was of the opinion that only the countries
which were prepared to ratify or accede to that new treaty
should benefit from the advantages which were to be derived
from its implementation. 302
As a response to the assertion of rights on the basis of trans¬
formation of the Convention provisions into customary law, Nandan,
the delegate of Fiji, in the Final Session of the Conference, said:
. . . each chapter of the Convention is an integral part of
the whole. To attempt to rationalize that parts of the
Convention are simply customary international law, and thereby
to separate them from others, is to ignore the fact that what
was customary international law has been clarified or modified
and that, if such provisions were preserved, it was done as a
quid pro quo for other provisions. Any selective use of the
Convention, therefore, will be not only inappropriate but also
unacceptable. 303
This categorical statement notwithstanding, we believe that, as
long as the provisions are the codification or restatement of
the law which existed prior to the adoption of the Convention
and they are recognized as such, the third states may assume rights
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or obligations in regard to that particular rule. But since a
considerable part of the Convention is in fact a progressive
development of the law, it is imperative, in each case, to establish
whether that particular provision has acquired the status of
customary law. It is conceivable that, apart from the criteria set
out by the ICJ for the transformation of a treaty provision into
customary law,"^^ because of the package quality of the Convention,
such provisions may become customary law only if they are accepted
and applied by the overwhelming majority of states. The regime of
the EEZ is an example.This concept, although novel and a part
of the package deal as a whole, did not have the same sensitive
status in upholding the balance of interests as, for example, the
right of transit passage.
The right of "transit passage" is one of those rights that the
great maritime powers have sought to enjoy while staying outside the
Convention. According to the American delegate to the final
session of the Conference:
. . . those parts of the Convention dealing with navigation and
overflight and most other provisions of the Convention serve
the interests of the international community. These texts
reflect prevailing international practice. 306
The concept of "transit passage" through straits used for inter¬
national navigation, as embodied in Part III of the Convention, is a
new concept which means continuous and expeditious passage of all
ships and aircraft, military as well as commercial, through, under,
or over straits which connect one part of the high seas or an EEZ
to another part of the high seas or an EEZ overlapped by the
territorial seas, without prior notification to or authorization
from states bordering straits.30? The introduction of this new
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concept into the Convention is the result of an effort to bring
about a balance between interests which would be otherwise disturbed
by the extension of the breadth of territorial sea.
The rights contained in the transit passage provisions are
crucial for the free navigation and overflight of maritime powers.
President Reagan, in a statement on 10 March 1983 in connection with
the proclamation on the the U.S. exclusive economic zone, stated
that:
. . . the United States will exercise and assert its navigation
and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a
manner that is consistent with the balance of interests
reflected in the convention. The United States will not,
however, acquiesce in unilateral acts of other States designed
to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international
community in navigation and overflight and other related high
seas uses. 308
While approval of the transit passage regime by all states was a
sine qua non for major maritime powers to agree on the extension
of the territorial sea to 12 miles, for the members of the G77,
which border most of the straits used for international navigation,
the conferment of transit passage rights on the major powers was a
quid pro quo for the acceptance by those powers of the regime of
deep sea-bed mining as incorporated in Part XI of the Convention.
Moreover, the consensus concerning the extension of the breadth of
the territorial sea had already prevailed in the early stages of the
Conference, whereas the reluctant acceptance of the transit passage
regime by the G77 was simultaneous with the progress in formulating
the Parallel System of exploration and exploitation. The question
now is, assuming that Article 3 of the Convention governing the
breadth of the territorial sea has transformed into customary law -
not only because of the consensus which existed in the Conference on
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this point but also with regard to the practice of states, which is
evidence of such a development-^ _ can it be ciaime(i that transit
passage, like the EEZ and protection of the marine environment, has
passed into the corpus of international law? The answer, in our
opinion, should be in the affirmative, but it should immediately be
added that its status as customary law is qualified by its function
as a weight in a very delicate balance of interests. It may not be
invoked unless all closely related interests are recognized. We
share the opinion of Anand, who believes that:
freedom of unimpeded navigation through straits and archi¬
pelagic waters territorialized by extended maritime zones, as
provided in the Convention, has become part of customary
international law . . . 310
The continuous opposition of some strait states such as Spain,
O "J 1
Morocco, Oman, Iran and Yemen notwithstanding, the close
connection between extended territorial sea which seems to have
acquired the status of a customary law and the regime of the transit
passage may render it necessary to recognize the latter as
declaratory of customary international law. In other words, in the
case of two closely related rights, as such a state cannot enjoy one
right as having emanated from custom and reject the other for its
being conventional. The balance of interests which is the
predominant attribute of the "package deal" necessitates the
recognition of this concept as customary law.
What remains for those Western Powers which have doubts about
becoming parties to the Convention is to realize that benefiting
from rights derived from the Convention, if they appertain to
provisions which are the result of a delicate balance of interests
sustained in other specific provisions, is permissible only when
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rights and duties contained in related provisions are duly
recognized. Any claim of transit right, therefore, entails the
duty for the third states of recognizing the right of all coastal
states to extend the breadth of their territorial sea to 12 miles on
the one hand, and recognizing Part XI of the Convention and the
regime of deep sea mining as another end of the balance on the
other.
After discussing "transit passage" as an example of rights
which may be claimed by a third state on the basis of transformation
of the related provision in the Convention into what we may call
qualified customary law, the obligation of third states to refrain
from actions which defeat the purposes of the Convention, with
particular regard to the adoption of national legislation, requires
closer examination. The obligation burdened on non-party states to
refrain from acts inconsistent with the provisions of the Convention
derives, inter alia, from the universal character of the latter, and
the obvious intention of its prospective parties, which constitute a
considerable majority of the states, to establish rules valid erga
312
oranes.
Invocation of the principle of consent may not be of much help
to justify the position of the minority dissenting states. National
laws for deep sea mining are contradictory to the purposes of the
most significant principle enshrined in the Convention, namely, the
common heritage of mankind. This principle, which was universally
recognized as governing the sea-bed and subsoil beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction and the resources thereof by the adoption of
the Declaration of Principles in 1970 and Charter of the Economic
Rights and Duties of States in 1974, has acquired, as a result of
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state practice both in and outside the United Nations, the status of
a general principle of international law. The common heritage
principle does not admit of any legal regime for deep sea-bed mining
unless it is "established with the consent of the international
community as the sole representative of mankind and in conformity
with the system determined by the international community".313
Because of the lack of constant protest and, on the contrary,
the active participation in the drafting of rules which have given
concrete legal implication to the common heritage principle, the
argument of the industrialized countries in defence of their laws
may not be sustained. The common heritage of mankind, if not jus
cogens, has been, in fact, consolidated as general international
law, and the industrialized countries have, in fact, cooperated
wholeheartedly for this consolidation,314 and if the final result
does not meet all their expectations, they may not revoke the
obligation they have incurred through the passage of that concept
into a general principle of international law.
Some of the states with national laws for deep sea mining, in
an effort to justify their claims of free navigation and overflight
and the enactment of the national law as an exercise of the freedom
of the high seas, have asserted that these rights are derived from
the existing international law of the sea. The Federal Republic of
Germany, for example, believes that:
As a matter of law, States cannot be subject to obligations
under the Convention until it has been duly ratified and has
entered into force for them. Pending such entry into force,
States may validly rely on and are bound by all rules of the
law of the sea as developed by the generally recognized
practice of States or as contained in relevant Conventions
already in force. 315
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"Conventions already in force", referred to in the preceding
passage, are the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the law of the sea. As
regards the relation of these instruments to the 1982 Convention,
there were some countries in the Conference which supported the idea
that the new Convention should supersede the 1958 Convention erga
o i £
omnes. The explanation was in the procedure which had been
adopted for the drafting of the Convention. Nevertheless, the
Conference preferred the more traditional practice and laid down in
Article 311(1) of the Convention, that: "This Convention shall
prevail, as between States Parties, over the Geneva Conventions on
the Law of the Sea of 29 April 1958". Such provision, anyhow,
may not justify the adoption of national legislation for deep sea
mining by the states which do not intend to become parties to the
Convention, because deep sea mining is a novel use of the sea which
is not regulated by the 1958 Conventions, and far-fetched interpre¬
tations of the provisions of those conventions can hardly provide
for any legal basis for such unilateral acts.^-^
Four out of seven states with national law for deep sea mining,
namely, France, the Soviet Union, Japan and Italy, have signed the
Convention, and two other signatories, i.e., Netherlands and
Belgium, have been long considering enacting similar law.^® These
states - those which both have national laws and have signed the
Convention - have acquired a special provisional status against the
Convention.
Their conduct prior to the entry into force of the Convention
is regulated by Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, according to which each state "is obliged to refrain from
acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty . . .
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until it shall have made its intention clear not to become party to
the treaty". Regardless of which of these states are parties to
the Vienna Convention, Article 18 of that Convention is generally
considered as declaratory of customary international law, and as
such is binding upon all states.^19
Although the Convention has not allocated a specific article to
the definition of the "object and purpose" of Part XI, it is not
difficult to establish such object or purpose by pointing to several
provisions such as the one in Article 153(1) which states:
"Activities [of exploration and exploitation] in the Area shall be
organized, carried out and controlled by the Authority on behalf of
O orv
mankind as a whole . . .". Provisions like this or the one
incorporated in Article 137(3), which says: "No State or national or
juridical person shall claim, acquire or exercise rights with
respect to the minerals recovered from the Area except in accordance
with this Part", reveal the fact the enactment of national law for
deep sea mining is at variance with the purpose of Part XI of the
Convention.
Acting either as a signatory to the Convention contrary to the
obligations imposed on a state because of Article 18 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, or as a third state against the
obligations incurred because of the common heritage principle being
declaratory of customary international law, the adoption of national
law is contrary to lex lata. Should any commercial exploitation of
the resources occur in accordance with national laws or so-called
"mini-treaty" arrangements, the legality of such activity might be
questioned before the ICJ.321 jn tjie event such incompatibility
with existing international law is established by the ICJ,
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irrespective of the fact that some of the states with national laws
have not made any Optional Clause declaration under Article 36(2) of
the court's statute, such a ruling will undoubtedly have adverse
impact on stability322 and legal security which are required for the
large and risky investments in deep sea mining. It also seems
difficult to imagine how states with deep sea mining laws may, in
the face of such pronouncement, continue issuing exploration and
exploitation licences without instigating the possibility of
conflict.^23
SECTION VIIs EVALUATION
In summary, it can be recalled that the exploration system as
laid down in the Convention and generally known as the Parallel
System contains three elements of access to the sea-bed, balance of
rights between the Authority and the developing countries in
association with the Authority on the one side and the remaining
states parties and public or private entities on the other, and a
review mechanism which makes it possible to revise Part XI of the
Convention. Provisions relating to the first two elements favour
the potential deep sea mining countries. Any entity with the
necessary technology and capital may acquire unrestricted access to
the resources without the Authority being able to refuse his
application except in a few predetermined cases.
The Convention accords a circumscribed preferential treatment
to the developing countries. The real balance can be achieved only
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through giving these countries a genuine superior status over
technologically advanced countries. Balance in this case cannot
mean equality in rights and duties. Achievement of such a balance
depends, inter alia, on the outcome of the work of the Preparatory
Commission and later the Review Conference. The Convention
provisions concerning the latter still permit modifications in the
Parallel System which may bring it closer to the "purpose" of Part
XI of the Convention.
Since the only objective of national law for deep sea mining is
to protect the national interests of the enacting state in a domain
where the international interest is established and, in fact, is
predominant, such laws cannot be legally justified, and invoking
arguments such as the interim nature of these laws, disclaimer of
sovereignty and existence of a right emanating from the principle of
the freedom of the high seas cannot hold in the face of universal
consensus of the principle of the common heritage of mankind. Mere
reference in national law to some provisions similar to those of the
Convention may not change the status of these laws either, and a
closer study of the contents of these statutes and the Convention
reveals the fact that there is indeed no similarity.
The rights that third states may claim to benefit from the
Convention are derived from the provisions which either contain
pre-existing customary international law, or a new law which
has been transformed into customary law. In the latter case, it
should be noted that, because of two unprecedented and unique
characteristics of the Convention, i.e., universality and package
quality, there is a general balance among the provisions which
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reflects the harmonization of interests of the participating states
in the Conference.
If a new rule of customary law is acknowledged by an
overwhelming majority of states as such in the context of the
general balance of interests, that rule is valid against the third
states too. On the other hand, if the new rule of customary law
reflects a particular balance with another rule in the Convention,
the existence of which is dependent on the first rule, the rights
derived from neither of them can be claimed by a third state unless
the obligation from the other one is assumed.
Deep sea mining is a novel use of the seas. The industrialized
countries of the West have as actively as other countries parti¬
cipated in the drafting of a legal regime for this novel use.
Their deep sea mining laws are in contradiction to the purpose of
the Convention, and once they start the commercial exploitation of
the deep sea-bed resources under their own legislation, one may
expect the ICJ to be requested to rule on their legality. A
probable adverse ruling of the court may justify the reasonable
reactions of the rest of the world against such unilateral facts.
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Footnotes - Chapter Five
1. Forming the 35-nations Ad Hoc Committee was the first
collective step leading to the UNCLOS III from 1973 to 1982.
The Ad Hoc Committee was formed in accordance with Resolution
2340 (XXII) (1967). This resolution was adopted in the
United Nations General Assembly by 99 votes to none, with no
abstention. This resolution laid down two main objectives
for the Ad Hoc Committee: reservation of the deep sea-bed
exclusively for peaceful purposes and the use of its
resources for the benefit of mankind. Both these objectivies
were derived from the principle of the common heritage of
mankind as suggested by Pardo in 1967. In fact, based on
these guiding principles and others, the 1982 Convention
establishes a legal regime governing the exploitation of the
common heritage (Articles 150 to 153 and Annex III) and
created an international organization to be in charge of its
management (Articles 156 to 185 and Annex V). The establish¬
ment of the Ad Hoc Committee, then the UNCLOS III which
adopted the 1982 Conventions, plainly approved the fact that
no states believed, from the outset, that unilateral exploit¬
ation on the basis of the freedom of the high seas as existed
before the UNCLOS III, was adequate. Section II of this
chapter discusses the two principles cited in Resolution 2340
(XXI) and its later developments.
2. Off. Rec., Vol. 1, p.157, para. 19 (Peru).
3. UN Doc. A/AC.138/25, p.2, Article 5; and A/AC.138/26, p.6,
para. 10 (The United Kingdom).
4. UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1782, para. 42 (Ecuador).
5. UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1588, para. 143 (Ceylon (Sri Lanka)).
6. UN Doc. A/AC. 135/SR. 13-26, p.52 (the United States); Off.
Rec., Vol. V, p.65, para. 18 (The Philippines). On the
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THE INTERNATIONAL SEA-BED AUTHORITY
SECTION I: THE UNITED NATIONS ROLE
The idea of establishing an international organization for the
administration of the Area and its resources was born with the
designation of the sea-bed and its resources as the common heritage
of mankind. Malta's representative, in his introductory speech
before the First Committee of the General Assembly in 1967,
announced:
. . . our long-term objective is the creation of a special
agency with adequate powers to administer in the interest of
mankind the oceans and the ocean floor beyond national
jurisdiction. We envisage such an agency as assuming
jurisdiction, not as sovereign, but as a trustee for all
countries over the oceans and the ocean floor. The agency
should be endowed with wide powers to regulate, supervise and
control all activities on or under the ocean floor. 1
Although the Ad Hoc Committee made only incidental references to
o
the issue, pursuant to the initiative of several developing
countries,^ in 1968, the General Assembly requested the Secretary
General, through Resolution 2467 (XXIII), to undertake a study
on the question of establishing in due time an appropriate inter¬
national organization for the promotion of the exploration and
exploitation of the resources of the sea-bed area. The result of
the study, as presented to the Sea-Bed Committee in 1969, contained
three different types of machinery for registration, licensing or
operation.^
After considering this report at the Sea-Bed Committee and
statements for or against any of these three types, the General
Assembly once again requested the Secretary-General to prepare a
further study on the same issue.^ This time, however, the General
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Assembly was specific in requesting an in depth study of an
international organization with powers exceeding registration and
licensing; an organization with power to regulate, coordinate,
supervise and control all activities relating to the exploration and
exploitation of sea-bed resources for the benefit of mankind as a
whole, with particular attention to the needs and interests of the
developing countries.
The comprehensive report of the Secretary-General was issued
on 26 May 1970, and further discussions in the Sea-Bed Committee on
the basis of this report and many other deliberations resulted in
the submission of several alternative draft articles by that
Committee to UNCLOS III.^ The developments in the Conference
finally resulted in the adoption of a form of compromise by the
organs, and particularly the Council, that reflects the special
interests of the different groups' procedure in the executive body
which is nearly equal to weighted voting.
It is our intention, after the review of the developments which
led to such a compromise, to briefly describe the structure, powers
and functions of the organs of the Authority as set out in the
Convention and then to examine the dispute settlement system for
disputes relating to the activities in the Area.
The question of an international organization, although as
important as the exploitation system, did not occupy much of the
UNCLOS III time, and problems relating to it such as the composition
of its organs, the competence and functions of them, and the power
Q
relation between these organs, seemed to be more or less possible.
Before we dwell on the study of the International Sea-Bed
Authority, it may be appropriate to have a glance at the
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attitudes of different states in regard to the establishment of an
international organization for the management of the sea-bed and its
resources.
SECTION II: THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
The division of states between developing and developed holds
true even in the case of controversies over the need to establish an
international machinery. It was generally the view of the
industrialized countries that a "regime" for the deep sea-bed did
not necessarily have to include "machinery".^ On the other hand,
the developing countries argued that the principle of the common
heritage of mankind could have a meaning only when and if there
were an international organization to enforce it. Mexico, in
an intervention in the First Committee of the General Assembly,
supported this position by arguing:
The San Francisco Conference did not confine itself to drafting
a series of purposes and principles but set up the United
Nations for the fulfilment of the former and the observance of
the latter, so that legal regime (for the deep sea-bed) must
include the establishment of suitable international machinery
with similar aims. 10
While the technologically advanced countries tended to derive the
force of their argument from the French doctrine of dedoublement
de fonctionnel and assume for themselves as members of the
international community the right of each to administering the
common heritage of mankind on behalf of all the others, the
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developing countries, not being in the position to do likewise,
rejected the argument of the advanced countries.
Here, too, as in the case of the definition of the common
heritage of mankind, the socialist countries led by the Soviet
Union initially sided with the West in rejecting the need for the
establishment of any organization for the management of the sea-bed
resources.^ The main reason was that the Soviet Union, like the
United States and some other industrialized countries, intended to
confine the mandate of the eventual treaty to the exploration and
12
exploitation of the mineral resources of the deep sea-bed, whereas
for the developing countries the treaty should comprise "not only
exploration and exploitation but also marketing, distribution of the
1 ^
profits, disarmament etc." To carry out all these duties, the
establishment of a new international organization seemed inevitable.
The Soviet Union, moreover, considered the creation of an inter¬
national organization for the management of the common heritage as a
Utopian idea which
would probably - as in any other sphere of human activities
today lead either to complete collapse of international
cooperation in this field or to seizure by great monopolies of
virtual control over marine resources ... 14
Although there were these initial categorical rejections of any
form of international machinery, it was soon realized "that the
machinery . . . was indispensable for a workable and meaningful
regime in which all the states would have real participation",^ an(j
the idea was incorporated in paragraph 9 of the Declaration of
Principles, in 1970. This unanimous acceptance, nevertheless did
not reflect the acceptance of any particular type of international
machinery with agreed upon competence and composition. The
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disagreement about the international organization was as large as
the diverse interpretations of the common heritage principle. The
reports of the Secretary-General constituted the basis of
discussions. Both in the Sea-Bed Committee and the General
Assembly it was generally held that there was an intimate connection
between the principles applicable to the sea-bed and its resources
and the kind of international organization required to ensure the
effective implementation of the regime to be based on those
1 f\
principles. Thus, the developing countries demanded the
establishment of a strong organization with a comprehensive mandate
and competence.^ Such a demand gave rise to doubt for the
emergence of a supranational organization. Those who were against
the third alternative of the Secretary-General, namely, an
operational agency, accused such an agency of being "supranational".
The term "supranational" which, during the 1960s, was very
18
topical, had not gained any agreed legal content. It was,
therefore, natural that indiscriminate reference to that term by
different delegations was more confusing than enlightening. What
could be deduced from these references was that by supranational the
speakers usually meant a sort of organization which could make
decisions independent of the will of the Member States, and as such
1 Q
its independent existence was assailable. But, even for those
who were in favour of a strong organization with unfettered
competence for the management of the deep sea-bed and its resources,
the term "supranational" could mean different things.^
The industrialized countries had several arguments against an
international organization with powers of direct exploration and
exploitation. These arguments were generally based on the reality
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of business transactions and the complexity which might arise as a
result of allowing an international organization to act as a
21commercial entity. The industrialized countries and the Eastern
European States, while accepting the need for some sort of
international organization, favoured a registry, or at most a
22
licence issuing institution. ^
The views expressed by the representatives of small countries
such as Sweden, Norway and Denmark showed that these countries
considered it more realistic not to include direct exploration and
exploitation in the powers of the international machinery. For
Norway, "coordination", "regulation" and "supervision" were
2 3
necessary functions of the machinery, while Denmark named
"registration" and "some form of licensing arrangements" as the main
functions.^ According to Sweden, the international machinery
"should provide more than a registry of claims and entail at least
a system for licences and leases for exploration and exploitation
..25
• • •
There was, thus, a spectrum of different opinions about various
types of international organization among different groups of
states. One may observe that, even among the developing countries,
there was no uniformity in this respect. While many of these
states held the view that the organization should have the capacity
to carry out the exploration and exploitation activities on its own,
there were others which doubted the advisability of conferring such
2 f\
a power on the machinery. In short, the diversity of opinions
ranged from supporting the exercise of sovereignty or jurisdiction
by the international machinery in the sea-bed to denying such an
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exercise totally lest the said machinery considered the sea-bed as
27
its own property.
Another related question was the relation of the proposed
international organization to the United Nations. Generally
speaking, the developing countries which advocated an organization
with extensive powers were in favour of an autonomous organization
outside the United Nations system. They did not see the existing
international organizations as prototypes for the new organization,
since the comprehensive powers it was supposed to enjoy would render
it distinguishable from all other international organizations.
Moreover, since its powers were to be greater than the United
Nations General Assembly, unlike most of the specialized agencies,
28
it could not be subject to the Assembly's control.
The technologically advanced countries favoured a machinery
within the United Nation system, or even one which already existed
for some other purposes. Sweden, for instance, as late as 1974,
when the weight of opinion was in favour of an organization outside
the United Nations, held the view that:
The Authority, whose relationship with the United Nations
should be regulated in a special agreement, should be required
under the Convention to report to the United Nations General
Assembly, although the latter should not interfere in matters
relating to the activities of the Authority. Linking the
Authority to the United Nations should help it to carry out its
mandate. 29
The idea of placing the new institution inside the framework of the
United Nations, however, did not gain much support, and soon faded
away.^
After reaching a more or less general agreement in the Sea-Bed
Committee that the proposed organization should at least comprise
two organs, a council as the governing body and an assembly as the
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plenary, the core of discussions concerning the international
organization was three interrelated questions of the organs of the
Authority, their composition and their powers and functions. The
diversity of opinions about the type of organization had its impact
on the debates concerning these three issues too.
The main points of difference between the developing and
industrialized countries regarding the institutional arrangement
turned out to be "the distribution of powers and functions between
the suggested Assembly and the Council; the formula for the
decision-making process in the two organs; the composition of the
Council; and the number of the other necessary principal and
O "I
subsidiary organs of the Authority".
The alternative draft articles on the International Sea-Bed
Authority submitted by the Sea-Bed Committee to the UNCLOS III,^
reflected these differing views. At the first substantive session
of the UNCLOS III in Caracas in 1974, it was generally acknowledged
that, except for the Assembly and the Council as the two main organs
of the Authority, one or more of the following organs, namely, a
secretariat, an Enterprise and tribunal were to be established as
part of the Authority. For some states, all these five organs were
to be considered as principal organs of the Authority, while others
supported three or four main organs, having the rest as subsidiary
33
ones.
The creation of these five organs did not prove to be a
controversial problem. Many states, however, expressed doubts over
the desirability of establishing a sea-bed tribunal as an organ of
the Authority, and expressed preference for leaving the competence
for settlement of all disputes to a law of the sea tribunal. The
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G7 7, which supported the idea of creating a sea-bed tribunal,
accepted in 1977 the suggestion of the industrialized countries that
a special chamber of the law of the sea tribunal be created,
independent of the organization of the Authority, to settle the
dispute relating to deep sea mining.
What remained as a conflict was the distribution of power
between the Assembly and the Council. For the developing countries
the observance of the principle of sovereign equality of states in
the creation of the Authority was of major significance. Thus,
they strongly supported the creation of the Assembly as the truly
supreme organ of the Authority comprising all member states with a
one-state one-vote voting system. The Assembly, in their view,
ought to play a "superior overall policy-making role over the other
principal organs of the Authority".34
The position of the industrialized countries was principally
based on the premise that no organ of the Authority should be
endowed with a status superior to the others. Thus, their
objective was to contain or constrain the discretionary powers of
the Assembly as well as to elevate the influence of the Council in
O C
proportion to that of the Assembly. While the developing
countries assumed a power for the Assembly to set the general
policies, regulations and direction for the day-to-day activities
of other organs of the Authority and in that way attributed a
controlling character to that organ, for the developed states the
main task of the Assembly was approving very broad policy lines. °
According to the initial position of the developing countries,
the Council as the executive organ of the Authority was to determine
specific policies in conformity with the general policies laid down
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by the Assembly. In the view of these countries, membership in the
Council had to be limited, and composition to be solely based on the
Q7
equitable geographical representation. Even here, like in the
case of the Assembly, the main principle was the sovereign equality
of states and any form of weighted voting on the basis of special
38
interest or allocation of permanent seats was excluded. The
industrialized countries, on the contrary, held the position that
the Council should have wide executive powers, and in exercising
its powers it should be to a great extent autonomous. The
composition of the Council, in their view, had to reflect the
OQ
"special interests" of certain states.
In 1975, the developing countries made a gesture of compromise
by conceding to "special interests" as a criterion for the member¬
ship of certain states in the Council,^ thereby accommodating a
significant demand of the developed countries, but some members of
the G7 7 still insisted that, irrespective of the composition, the
Council had to be controlled by the Assembly.^ In the ISNT,
which was the outcome of the 1975 session of the UNCLOS III, the
compromise of the developing countries was included in the form of
allocating 12 out of the total 36 seats to the countries with
special interests.^ It should be noted that the acceptance of
representation of special interests in the Council by the developing
countries did not mean that any group of states with special
interests was accorded more powers or weighted vote. The socialist
countries, which had by then accepted the principle of the common
heritage of mankind, while supporting the position of the developing
countries with respect to the composition of the Council "insisted
that they should have special representation in the Council, and
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be accorded the same protection desired by the West since they
represented one of the major socio-economic systems of the world".^
In the 1976 session of the UNCLOS III the composition of the
Council did not change, and further discussions on this subject as
well as the distribution of the power between the Council and the
Assembly were deferred to later sessions. In Article 159 of the
ICNT, which was issued in 1977, the 36 seats in the Council were
distributed between 18 seats representing special interests, and the
remaining 18 elected in accordance with the principle of equitable
geographical distribution.^ The division of representation based
on special interests and special qualifications on the one hand, and
on equitable geographical distribution on the other, held in the
following sessions, and was finally adopted in the Convention.
Nevertheless, deliberations concerning the composition of the first
half of the Council's members, namely, those elected on the basis of
their special interests, continued intensively in order to achieve a
combination which would give the three main interest groups, i.e.,
the Group of 77, the socialist states and the industrialized
countries, acceptable representation in order to prevent any group
of states from a veto or weighted vote.
Some smaller industrialized countries like Austria, Finland
and Spain, knowing that they would be unlikely to qualify to be
elected to the Council as belonging to a special interest group such
as 'consumer', 'producer', etc., complained at their disadvantageous
representation, and pressed for the enlargement of the Council's
membership or an increase of the number of seats in each geograph¬
ical group from one to two. The idea of enlargement was rejected
by both the Super Powers on the ground of the destabilizing effect
- 347 -
that such a move might have on the delicate balance achieved in the
voting procedure.Even the suggestion for an increase in the
number of guaranteed seats was not attained "because of politically
unacceptable consequences in other categories".^ The extensive
efforts of these countries in 1979 and 1980, when the consensus
about the composition of the Council seemed to have been finally
commanded, did not lead to any success, and they had practically no
option except to accept under-representation in the Council.
From 1978 to 1980, the main forum for deliberations concerning
the composition of the Council and other related issues was
Negotiating Group 3. The institutional questions relating to the
legal regime of the deep sea-bed constituted the mandate of the
Negotiating Group 3, which was chaired by Paul Engo, the Chairman of
the First Committee of the Conference.
The problem of decision-making in the Assembly and the Council
is closely related to the question of composition, powers and
functions of these two organs. In the case of the Assembly, as the
plenary organ in which all member states participate and each has
one vote, the usual voting formula for most of the international
organizations, i.e., two-thirds majority for the questions of
substance and simple majority for other questions, was supported by
AO
the developing countries. The industrialized countries were in
favour of a higher majority. As a compromising step, the ICNT
provided for two qualifications to the said formula, namely the
two-thirds majority should include the majority of states
participating in that session of the Assembly, and the President
could, under certain conditions, defer voting on a question of
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substance for a limited time. These provisions were incorporated
in the Convention.^
The decision-making process in the Council proved to be more
complicated. The efforts of the G77 to subordinate the Council to
the Assembly notwithstanding, it was clear that as the executive
organ, the Council would have the competence to take decisions with
direct effect on the functioning of the exploitation system. That
was why the Group of 77, the socialist states and the industrialized
countries all had it as their objective to save a voting formula
which would protect their vital interests.Engo, in a memorandum
concerning the decision-making process in the Council, briefly
elaborated on the position of the developing and developed countries
in this respect:
From the point of view of the developing countries, the present
Convention will have a precedent-setting effect underlying the
changing mood for greater and more effective participation of
all sections of the international community in all important
decisions reflected by future international agreements and
conventions. The developing countries are aware that whatever
concessions they make on this question are likely to be quoted
against them in other negotiations between North and South.
The developed countries, while feeling comfortable with the
nature of interaction between on-going forces in the
contemporary international society, and having regard to what
they hold dear as vital interests, have had to adjust to the
new realities in order to secure legality that is universally
recognized. 51
The point of departure for all three groups of states was that each
member state had one vote. The Group of 77, relying on its
numerical majority, preferred the same formula as applied to the
Assembly, namely, a two-thirds majority for the questions of
substance and a simple majority for others. The socialist states
initially did not have a uniform position, and their favourite
52
voting pattern could range from consensus to simple majority.
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The industrialized countries were generally in favour of weighted
voting, because, they argued, without their investment and
technology, no international regime for the sea-bed mining would be
CO
viable. Besides, the socialist states and the industrialized
countries had one common goal: to prevent the developing countries
from imposing their will in the Council. This required setting up
a voting system in which the overall majority in the Council was
balanced by a majority in each of the different groups with special
interests.
In an effort to combine all interests, Jens Evensen, chief
delegate of Norway, in 1977 produced a compromise formula according
to which the 18 members representing special interests were
categorized in four "chambers" - six developing countries, four
ocean mining states, four importers of the metals in question and
four land-based producers. The remaining 18 members of the Council,
elected according to geographical distribution, constituted the
fifth chamber. The decisions of the Council, according to Evensen's
formula, were to be taken by a two-thirds majority but it had to
include the simple majority of at least four of the five chambers."^
The developing countries reacted negatively to the so-called
chambered voting seeing it as a sort of veto right for the
industrialized countries.
Later discussions in the Conference revealed that any solution
acceptable to all the states with respect to the decision-making
process of the Council had to take account of several factors: the
need to seek consensus in the first place; in the absence of
consensus, the affirmative vote of an overall majority of members to
a decision; a protective blocking vote by geographical regime.
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The voting process of the Council, as is set in the Convention,
tends to encompass all these considerations. According to this
process, besides the requirement of a simple majority for the
procedural questions, the questions of substance have been divided
into three categories for which a two-thirds majority, three-fourths
majority, or consensus are required."^
The difficulty in reaching an agreement concerning the
composition and voting process in the Council and the final
compromise in the form of a so-called "three-tier system" reflect
the understanding that the Council possesses extensive powers
concerning the main task of the Authority, i.e., rational management
of the mineral resources of the deep sea-bed. Its power now is far
more than the developing countries originally had anticipated. The
structure of the organs of the Authority, and their powers and
functions as enunciated in the Convention, disclose to what degree
the interests of mankind are balanced by the interests of individual
states or groups of states through providing for a system of power
distribution which aims to fit into the purposes of the parallel
system of exploitation. The following discussion aims to examine
this structure and power distribution, and to evaluate the extent of
the Authority's chances to fulfil its mandate through the present
system.
- 351 -
SECTION Ills THE AUTHORITY
(a) Status and General Aspects
The establishment of the Authority is envisaged in Article 156
of the Convention, which also recognizes the ipso facto membership
of all states parties to the Convention in the Authority. Besides,
it provides for the observer status for those who were observers
at the UNCLOS Article 156(4) has specified Jamaica as the
seat of the Authority, but regional offices in other places can be
established.
The Authority is a genuine international organization with an
international legal personality and necessary legal capacity "for
the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes".
According to Articles 177-183, it has all privileges and immunities
recognized for inter-governmental organizations.®®
The Authority is based on the principle of sovereign equality
of its members, and they all undertake to fulfil in good faith the
f\ 1
obligations assumed by them. In the event a member is in arrears
with the payment of its financial contributions for more than two
years, or has grossly and persistently violated the provisions of
Part XI of the Convention, the exercise of its voting rights or
f\ 9
privileges of membership may be suspended.
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(b) The Mandate and Functions
Article 157 of the Convention, under the title of natural and
fundamental principles of the Authority, describes the functions of
the Authority. According to this article, "The Authority is the
organization through which States Parties shall in accordance with
this Part, organize and control activities in the Area, particularly
with a view to administering the resources of the Area". Thus, in
fulfilling its mandate, i.e. development of the common heritage of
mankind to the benefit of all, it exercises three main functions:
organizing, controlling and administering.^^
1. Organizing function
The organizing function of the Authority includes the adoption
of rules, regulations and procedures for, inter alia, the
appropriate conduct of activities in the Area (Article 17 of Annex
III), the protection of the marine environment [Article 145(a)], the
protection and conservation of natural resources of the Area
[Article 145(b)], and the protection of human life with respect to
the activities in the Area (Article 146). The Convention pays
special attention to the first categories of regulation concerning
activities in the Area, and particularly specifies some objective
criteria concerning the operational aspect of the activities such as
the determination of the size of the areas, duration of operations,
performance requirements, specification of the categories of
resources, etc.65 q-^g Authority, in fulfilling this function, does
not confine itself to setting out regulations merely for the
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harmonization of activities, but in fact envisages practical
measures which may entail implications for the actors, and require
active participation and full observance by them. In this way the
organizing function of the Authority implies more than mere
regulations.
2. Controlling function
For those who consider the Authority as an international
organization with a supranational character, the controlling
function is in fact the most illustrative evidence of this
character. It may be pointed out that "control" in this context
should be restrictively interpreted to mean supervision of
compliance of obligations incumbent upon the contractors.
According to Article 139 of the Convention:
States Parties shall have the responsibility to ensure that
activities in the Area, whether carried out by States Parties,
or state enterprises or natural or juridical persons which
possess the nationality of States Parties or are effectively
controlled by them or their nationals, shall be carried out in
conformity with this Part (Part XI). The same responsibility
applies to international organizations for activities in the
Area carried out by such organizations.
In order to check if the states parties have complied with this
obligation, the Convention, in Article 153(4), accords to the
Authority the right to "exercise such control over activities in the
Area as is necessary for the purpose of securing compliance with
relevant provisions [of the Convention] . . ."66
To exercise the controlling function, the Authority is not
required to secure the consent of the states or the companies
engaged in the activities in the Area. The Authority shall
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have the right to take any measures, in the framework of the
provisions of the Convention with activities in the Area, to ensure
compliance.^ Apart from the general provisions for the control of
activities by the Authority, the Convention envisages the inclusion
of provisions concerning the Authority's functions of control and
regulation in specific contracts between the Authority and the
applicant.^® Besides, as a part of the controlling function, it
is provided for the Authority to adopt rules, regulations and
procedures for the inspection and supervision of operations in the
Area.^
3. Administering function
While the organizing and controlling functions of the Authority
are not controversial, and the majority of the international
organizations exercise these functions to varying extents, the
administering function, which, in this case, implies, inter alia,
wide executive powers including policy making, direct and effective
participation in activities in the Area and some related
engagements, is unprecedented in international relations.
Adede, in an effort to demonstrate this unique feature of the
Authority, makes a comparison between this organization, on the one
hand, and the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization
(IMCO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), on
the other. He says:
engaging in the actual money-making business of exploiting the
sea-bed 'by the Authority' is akin to asking both IMCO and ICAO
to acquire and run shipping lines and airlines respectively
as a business on behalf of the international community and
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in competition with the rest of the traditional actors in
trade. 70
It may be added that the Authority not only shall exploit the
mineral resources of the deep sea-bed on behalf of the international
community, but also shall possess the power to decide within the
framework of the provision of the Convention, which entity may
engage in the activities and under what conditions. The competence
for the approval of the plans of work, the selection from among the
applicants for production authorizations, and the issuing of the
actual authorizations for mineral production is vested in the
Authority.^
The executive power of the Authority, which is exercised
through its administering function, extends not only to the
exploitation aspect of the activities, but also to the preparatory
aspects of marine scientific research and technology transfer.
According to Article 143(2) of the Convention:
The Authority may carry out marine scientific research
concerning the Area and its resources, and may enter into
contracts for that purpose. The Authority shall promote and
encourage the conduct of marine scientific research in the
Area, and shall co-ordinate and disseminate the results of such
research and analysis when available.
In this way, the Authority, independent of the states parties, will
be able to carry out marine scientific research, but all the states
parties have the duty to ensure the development of programmes for
the training of the Authority's personnel in the techniques and
70
application of research.
An important task of the Authority which may fall under the
category of its administering function is "to acquire technology and
scientific knowledge relating to activities in the Area", and "to
promote and encourage the transfer to developing states of such
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technology and scientific knowledge so that all states parties
"7 o
benefit therefrom". J As far as "acquiring" the technology is
concerned, there are two possibilities for the Authority. Either
the necessary technology is available on the open market, in which
case the Authority should try to obtain it on fair and reasonable
commercial terms, or it is not available on the open market. In
the latter case, the power of the Authority in obtaining that
technology is circumscribed and qualified by the conditions set
forth in Article 5 of Annex III of the Convention.^
The duty of the Authority to promote technology transfer is
repeated in Article 274(c) of the Convention, where it is required
to ensure that adequate provision is made:
... to facilitate the acquisition of technical assistance in
the field of marine technology by States which may need and
request it, in particular developing States, and the
acquisition by their nationals of the necessary skills and
know-how, including professional training.
Nevertheless, it is not envisaged how this function can be fulfilled
in the event the required technology is not available on the open
market.
There is no doubt that the most disputed, and at the same time
significant part of the Authority's administering function, is its
power to take decisions concerning the exploitation aspect and
measures to determine, and if necessary adjust, the undesired
economic consequences of that exploitation. At the top of the list
of administering functions of the Authority stands its competence to
accord the contractor the exclusive right in respect to the Area of
operation and the category of minerals he is entitled to exploit.^
This is an inherent competence derived from the Authority's status
as the trustee of mankind.
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The Authority, as the administrator of the common heritage of
mankind, is empowered to take measures "to ensure orderly, safe and
7 h
rational management of the resources of the Area . . This, in
fact, constitutes a significant part of the Authority's mandate.
Since unchecked overflow of the minerals derived from the deep sea
manganese nodules into the markets may give rise to disturbances in
the balance of supply and demand, it is in the competence of the
Authority to take measures to promote the "stability of markets for
those commodities produced from the minerals derived from the Area
at prices remunerative to producers and fair to consumers".^
As one measure to achieve this end, the Convention has
conferred upon the Authority the right "to participate in any
commodity conference dealing with those commodities and become
a party to any arrangement or agreement resulting from such
conferences".^® The right to exercise this function of the
Authority is, however, qualified by the condition that the
conference should not include only the producers of the land-based
minerals similar to those exploited from the Area, but the consumers
as well, that being a measure to curtail any effort by the Authority
and the developing countries to enter into agreements against the
major consumers. It is also noteworthy that the competence of the
Authority in this respect is limited to those minerals which are
produced from the manganese nodules in the Area. Thus, due to the
extended coastal jurisdiction occasioned by the introduction of
the concept of the EEZ and a new definition of the outer limit of
the Continental Shelf, there is a possibility that the first
exploitations of manganese nodules may occur in areas under the
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jurisdiction of countries like Mexico, Ecuador or Chile, where the
Authority lacks any competence.^
Another measure is that the Authority, through its plenary
organ - the Assembly - shall establish a system of compensation for
those developing countries which suffer most from the adverse effect
80of activities in the Area on their economy and export earnings.
In order to fulfil its mandate and carry out the general
functions mentioned above, the Authority has included several organs
in its organization. To see how well these organs may guarantee
the accomplishment of the purposes of the Authority, a study of
these organs, their composition, powers and functions, as set out in
the Convention, is appropriate.
(c) Organs of the Authority
The Convention, in Article 158(1), established three principal
organs for the Authority, namely, the Assembly, the Council and the
Secretariat. The Enterprise - the operating arm of the Authority
in charge of direct exploitation in the Area - is not included in
81
the list of principal organs. Besides, the Authority is entitled
89
to create subsidiary organs if it is deemed necessary.
1. The Assembly
The Assembly is designated, in Article 160 of the Convention,
as the "supreme organ" of the Authority to which other principal
organs, i.e., the Council and the Secretariat, shall be accountable.
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Article 159 of the Convention, concerning the composition, procedure
and voting scheme of the Assembly, stipulates that each member shall
have one representative and one vote, and a majority of members
shall establish a quorum. The Assembly shall meet at the seat of
the Authority or wherever it decides to meet on a regular basis,
OO
sessions can be held.
The decision-making procedure at the Assembly is like the
procedure in the plenary of the majority of the international
organizations: a simple majority for procedural questions and a
two-thirds majority of the members present and voting for
substantive questions provided the latter should include the
majority of the states participating in that particular session.®^
This decision-making process has put the developing countries in an
advantageous position, and with regard to their number, they will
have a comfortable majority in the Assembly. There is, however,
one specific case when the decisions of the Assembly shall be
adopted by consensus. That is when the financial contributions of
states parties for funding the Enterprise's activities in its first
mine site are insufficient. In this case, the Assembly shall, at
its first session, adopt measures by consensus for dealing with the
O C
shortfall. Voting on any proposal before the Assembly can be
deferred on two grounds: firstly, if one-fifth of the members of
the Assembly request the president of the Assembly to defer the
voting on a substantive question for a maximum of five days provided
this period does not extend beyond the end of the session; and
secondly, when one-fourth of the members have in writing requested
the president to ask the advisory opinion of the Sea-Bed Dispute
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Chamber on the conformity of a proposal before the Assembly with the
Convention.®^
With regard to the powers and functions of the Assembly, it
should be pointed out that the Assembly, as the supreme organ,
"shall have the power to establish general policies in conformity
with relevant provisions of [the] Convention on any question or
07
matter within the competence of the Authority". Apart from this
general competence, one may classify these powers into two groups.
There are certain functions of the Assembly which may be fulfilled
only in connection with related functions of the Council, whereas
the second group consists of those functions which shall be
exercised solely by the Assembly and on its own initiative. We
shall return to the first group after the discussion about the
Council and its powers.
As regards the second group, it may be pointed out that almost
half of the functions of the Assembly have a non-executive and
general nature in the form of "examine reports", "initiate studies"
and "consider problems".®® The remaining half of the functions
which have more or less an executive nature includes the power to
elect members of the Council; to suspend the exercise of rights and
privileges of membership; and to assess the contributions of
members to the administrative budget of the Authority.®^ In all
these cases, the exercise of the powers of the Assembly is related
to the specific limitations provided in other provisions of
the Convention. In other words, the extent of the power is
circumscribed by predetermined stipulations. Nevertheless, there
are two cases where the Convention seems to have endowed the
Assembly with discretionary powers; these are the establishment of
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subsidiary organs and the taking of decisions upon the equitable
sharing of financial and other economic benefits derived from
activities in the Area. In these cases, although the decisions of
the Assembly shall be consistent with the Convention and certain
criteria shall be observed, the extent of its power is nevertheless
relatively broad.^
Kiss summarized the observations concerning the composition,
voting procedure and powers of the Assembly by saying that they are
91
similar to a national parliamentary body in certain states.
2. The Council
Provisions concerning the composition, procedure and voting of
the Council are included in Article 161 of the Convention. The
Council, as the executive organ of the Authority, with 36 members
from among the members of the Authority, is vested with the power of
establishing specific policies, in conformity with the Convention
and general policies adopted by the Assembly "to be pursued by the
Authority on any question or matter within the competence of the
Authority".^
i Composition:
The members of the Council are elected by the Assembly under a
carefully designed scheme with a view to obtaining a balance of
QO
representation among most states parties, and particularly those
with an interest in deep sea mining. The first half of the
members, i.e., 18 states, shall represent these interests. They
include: 1- four members from among states which have had during
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the last five years before their election, more than 2 per cent of
total world consumption or import of the minerals similar to those
to be derived from the Area. These four should include one
socialist state from Eastern Europe, and the largest consumer, which
is, and will probably remain for the foreseeable future, the United
States; 2- four members from among the eight states parties with
the largest investment in deep sea mining, including at least one
socialist state from Eastern Europe. This formulation almost
automatically guarantees a permanent place for the Soviet Union,
which is the largest investor among the socialist countries and has
the capability to keep this position; 3- four members from among
states parties with the largest export of land-based minerals
similar to those to be derived from the deep sea-bed, including at
least two developing countries; 4- six developing states parties
with special interests, e.g., large populations, land-locked or
geographically disadvantaged position, major imports of minerals in
question, potential capability of producing these minerals, and
least development.^ The Assembly is not free to elect any member
of these groups to represent that group in the Council, but is bound
to observe the nominations which are made inside each group.^ As
has been shown, both Super Powers have secured a de facto permanent
membership in the Council.
The eighteen remaining members shall be elected, according
to Article 161(l)(e), on the basis of an equitable geographical
distribution, but each geographical region shall have at least one
member elected.^ The provision incorporated in Article 161(l)(e)
reading "eighteen members elected according to the principle of
ensuring an equitable geographical distribution of seats in the
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Council as a whole" is to imply that the principle of equitable
geographical distribution is not to be limited only to the eighteen
seats, but through it such an equitable distribution should be
achieved in the composition of the Council as a whole.
As a response to the possibility of limited membership of the
Authority, at least during the period immediately after the entry
into force of the Convention, and subsequently the possibility of a
lack of states parties representing a certain interest or
geographical group to fulfil the requirements of the membership in
the Council, the Convention, in Article 308(3), has provided that
"the first Council shall be constituted in a manner consistent with
the purpose of Article 161 if the provisions of that article cannot
be strictly applied". A departure from the general rule for the
composition of the Council is permitted only for the first Council,
but it seems that the exception should continue to be applied as
long as the strict application of Article 161(1) is not practicable
due to the limited membership of the Authority.^
According to some estimates, the aforementioned scheme of
membership results in the allocation of almost 50 per cent of the
Council seats to the developing countries; 44 per cent to the
industrialized countries; and 6 per cent to the socialist states,
leaving the last group with the power "to determine which of the
first two groups controlled the majority vote on North-South
QQ
issues". Irrespective of how accurate this estimation is and how
close to the truth that forecast may come, the effective functioning




In the Council too, as in the Assembly, a majority of members
shall constitute a quorum, and each member shall have one vote.^
Decisions by the Council are divided into two groups: procedural
and substantive. There is no controversy concerning procedural
decisions which shall be taken by simple majority of members present
and voting, but the adoption of the question of substance is
subject to a specific scheme designed for this purpose. In this
scheme, substantive questions are divided into three groups
reflecting the least sensitive, less sensitive and sensitive nature
of those questions for states parties.
Decisions on questions falling under the first category
require, according to Article 161(8) (b), a two-thirds majority of
the members present and voting, provided this majority includes a
majority of the members of the Council. These least sensitive
matters range from transmitting the reports of the Enterprise to the
Assembly to entering into agreements with the United Nations or
other international organizations.The majority of the
decisions in this group have an administrative nature, such as
presenting annual reports to the Assembly, notifying the Assembly of
the decision taken by the Sea-Bed Dispute Chamber, reviewing the
collection of all payments to be made by or to the Authority, and
making recommendations to the Assembly for a system of compensation
according to Article 15(10).
The second group of decisions, as specified in Article
161(8) (c) requires a three-fourths majority of the members present
and voting, provided the majority includes a majority of the members
of the Council. In fact, the greater part of the decisions
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relating to the exercise of the Council's powers shall fall under
10?this category, which concerns 19 provisions of the Convention.
In the case of more than two-thirds of the questions relating to
these provisions, the Council can take decisions independently and
1 fH
directly. u-> The decisions concerning the exercise of one of the
major functions of the Authority, i.e., the control over the
activities in the Area and the supervision and coordination of the
implementation of the provisions of Part XI, are also in this
category and require a three-fourths majority.
Decisions on the sensitive questions which constitute the third
group, according to Article 161(8)(d), require consensus. For the
purpose of this provision, the term "consensus" is defined as
implying "the absence of any formal objection",but that does not
prevent the members of the Council from making reservations or
declarations. In order to command consensus, it is envisaged that
the President of the Council, in the case it is apparent that there
will be an objection to the proposal, shall establish a committee -
the conciliation committee - of a maximum of nine members of the
Council, and shall make all efforts to reconcile the differences and
reach a consensus within two weeks following the establishment of
the committee.
The questions which fall into this category are the adoption of
the amendments to Part XI of the Convention excluding those
modifications which are under the sole competence of the Review
Conference, taking measures for the protection of the developing
countries from the adverse economic effects caused by the activities
in the Area, and recommendations to the Assembly of rules and
regulations on the equitable sharing of financial and other economic
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benefits derived from the activities in the Area.^^ But the most
important issue in this category is undoubtedly the adoption of the
rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority governing
activities in the Area which are necessary for the implementation of
many general principles laid down in the Convention, and constitute
the basic legal framework of deep sea mining. The Council may
adopt by consensus, and pending their approval by the Assembly,
provisionally apply these rules, regulations and procedures, which
relate to prospecting, exploration and exploitation in the Area and
the financial arrangements and internal administration of the
Authority.
There is one more case where the decision of the Council should
be taken by consensus: when there is an objection to the approval
of a plan of work, and the conciliation committee does not succeed
in commanding a consensus. In this case, that plan of work is
however considered approved unless the Council decides by consensus
to disapprove it. The vote of the sponsoring state for that plan
of work is not counted in achieving the consensus.^
If the proper category for a certain question is disputed, it
should be assumed to require the highest majority unless the Council
108
with the same majority decides otherwise. In the event a
question is not listed in the categories mentioned above, but
according to the rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority
is under the competence of the Council, a decision on it shall be
taken pursuant to the category specified by the said rules and
regulations, and if not specified, pursuant to the category
determined by the Council by consensus.109
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As is clear from the foregoing explanation, the G77 may rely on
its own majority to take decisions only in the case of procedural or
least sensitive questions. In the case of less sensitive
questions, which constitute the greater part of the Council's
functions, the G77 is dependent on the vote of some other countries
from among the socialist countries or Western industrialized
countries in order to obtain a three-fourths majority.^®
Recalling the role the developed countries insisted on attaching to
the Council as a protective device and as a counter-balance to the
Group of 77-dominated Assembly "and as a vehicle for the protection
of the designated interests of the industrialized countries",it
seems that requiring consensus for the decisions on the most
significant issues was the only solution acceptable to these
countries, but even the socialist countries and the developing
countries welcomed consensus as an acceptable and democratic
solution.
Since the most important issue in the consensus category,
namely, the rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority, is
to be handled initially by the Preparatory Commission, it can be
anticipated that the draft adopted by that Commission through
consensus will remain unchanged because the Council, which is a much
smaller forum, may change them only by consensus.This enables
the industrialized countries to evaluate, before ratifying the
Convention, how these initial draft rules, regulations and
procedures will affect the actual conditions of sea-bed mining, and
to base their final decisions concerning the ratification of the
Convention or accession to it on the assessment. The possibility
of having recourse to voting in the case of failure to command
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consensus in the last category of Council decisions is not provided
for in the Convention. Hence, it may be expected that, notwith¬
standing safeguards such as the conciliation committee or the duty
of the opposing state to explain the grounds on which it opposes the
proposal, such a requirement shall lead to the impediment of the
whole system of voting in the Council and necessitate an overall
review of that system.
iii Subsidiary organs:
In addition to the right conferred upon the Council to
establish subsidiary organs for the exercise of its functions,
the Convention has established in Article 163, two organs
subordinate to the Council: the Economic Planning Commission and
the Legal and Technical Commission. The need for such subsidiary
organs was felt from the beginning of the work of the UNCLOS III.
The ISNT in 1975 contained two organs: an Economic Planning
Commission and a Technical Commission. In the RSNT, a rules and
regulations committee was added to the previous organs. In 1978,
it was decided to combine the functions of the three organs and
decrease the number to two: the Legal and Technical Commission and
the Economic Planning Commission.
These commissions have certain common features. Each
commission is composed of 15 members elected by the Council by a
three-fourths majority. Each state party to the Convention can
nominate only one candidate for each commission. person can
be elected to serve in more than one commission. In nominating the
candidates, who shall hold office for a term of five years, with the
possibility of being re-elected for a further term, their
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appropriate qualifications in the area of competence of that
commission should be taken into consideration.^^1 Both the
principle of equitable geographical distribution and the
representation of special interests shall be observed in the
election of members, and in the event of death, incapacity or
resignation, the election of another member for the remainder of
the term shall be made with regard to the same principles.
The members of the commission have an obligation to observe
silence, even after the termination of their functions, concerning
confidential information which came to their knowledge by reason of
their duties for the Authority.
The decision-making procedures of the commissions are to be
established by the rules, regulations and procedures of the
Authority, but as a part of the agreement about the voting system of
the Council in 1980, it was understood that the decisions of the
commissions shall be taken by consensus.
The two commissions are advisory in nature. The main task of
the Economic Planning Commission, which "shall include at least two
members from developing states whose exports of the categories of
minerals to be derived from the Area have a substantial bearing upon
their economies",^0 is to "propose to the Council ... a system of
compensation or other measures of economic adjustment assistance for
developing states which suffer adverse effects caused by activities
in the Area".^-'- This proposal, according to Article 164(2)(b) and
(c), is pursuant to the review of factors affecting supply, demand
and prices of the pertinent materials, and the examination of
situations which may lead to adverse effects on the economy of the
developing countries as enumerated in Article 150(h).
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The powers and functions of the Legal and Technical Commission
are much broader. Although this commission, too, is entitled
mostly to make recommendations to the Council, at least one of its
recommendations has in fact the power of a decision. According to
Article 165(2)(h), the commission shall "review formal written plans
of work for activities in the Area . . . and submit appropriate
recommendations to the Council". If the commission recommends
approval of the plan, it would be deemed to have been approved by
19 9
the Council. The commission, whose recommendation concerning
the plan of work should be "solely on the grounds stated in Annex
III [of the Convention] and shall report fully thereon to the
Council",^23 may rec0n]mend disapproval of the plan of work, in which
case the Council, by a three-fourths majority can, however, approve
the plan. Thus, the role of the commission in the approval or
disapproval of a plan of work seems to be decisive. It should be
remembered that the discretion of the Legal and Technical Commission
is, however, restricted by the carefully written conditions laid
down in Annex III of the Convention, and the possibility that the
commission can deny access to any specific applicant fulfilling all
those conditions is remote.
The actual duty of the assessment of the environmental
implications of activities in the Area rests on the Legal and
Technical Commission. This includes making recommendations to the
Council for: 1- taking measures to protect the marine environment
against pollution resulting from activities in the Area; 2- issuing
emergency orders, either to suspend or adjust operations to prevent
serious harm to the marine environment; 3- disapproving areas for
exploitation when there is indication of the risk of serious harm to
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• 1 ^the environment. jn order to transform these recommendations
into decisions, the vote of three-fourths of the members of the
Council, present and voting, is required.
(d) Division of Power between the Assembly and the Council
Before we proceed to discuss other organs of the Authority, it
is appropriate to look at the inter-relationship between the
respective powers and functions of the Assembly and the Council.
The Convention specified in Article 160 that the Assembly,
being the forum consisting of all the members, shall be considered
as the supreme organ of the Authority. In other words, its
characterization as supreme organ is merely formal and explicitly
due to its composition. The same article empowers the Assembly to
establish general policies on any question within the competence of
the Authority, but this competence is restricted by the condition
that such general policies shall be in conformity with the relevant
provisions of the Convention. It is, again in the same article,
postulated that the other organs of the Authority are accountable to
the Assembly. Here, too, the extent of the accountability is
restricted to the limit specifically provided for in the Convention.
Hence the supremacy of the Assembly, which has its source in its
membership consisting of all members of the Authority, and in its
competence to hold the other principal organs of the Authority
accountable, seems to be purely symbolic.^6
As a sign of the supremacy of the Assembly over the Council,
reference may be made to the "incidental powers" that the Assembly
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enjoys. According to Article 157(2):
The powers and functions of the Authority shall be those
expressly conferred upon it by this Convention. The Authority
shall have such incidental powers, consistent with this
Convention, as are implicit in and necessary for the exercise
of those powers and functions with respect to activities in the
Area.
This ambiguous and obviously contradictory formulation seeks to
reconcile the position of the industrialized countries, which
wanted to see all the powers of the Authority expressly enumerated
in the Convention, and the position of the G77, which held the
view that the Authority should have, like any other international
organization, implied powers necessary for exercising its functions.
Substitution of "implied powers" by "incidental powers" has been
construed as an effort to avoid any implication of broad implied
powers by the Assembly,127 but seems to be an unwarranted
interpretation, and the net result is that the Assembly possesses
the implied powers, and the formulation in Article 157(2) is
redundant. Nevertheless, the exercise of the implied powers alone
is not sufficient to render the Assembly the supreme organ. In
this respect, it should be mentioned that possession of implied
powers is not limited to the Assembly; even the Enterprise enjoys
1 98such powers. As regards the relation of powers between the
organs of the Authority, Article 158(4) makes it explicit that each
organ:
shall be responsible for exercising those powers and functions
which are conferred upon it. In exercising such powers and
functions each organ shall avoid taking any action which may
derogate from or impede the exercise of specific powers and
functions conferred upon another organ.
The industrialized countries insisted on clarifying the scope of the
exercise of the powers and functions of the Assembly and the Council
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in order to avoid any extensive interpretation of such powers for
the Assembly as the supreme organ of the Authority. Formulation of
Article 158(4) was a response to that demand.
It is left to examine the common areas of decision-making of
the Assembly and the Council and to ascertain the status of power
division between these two organs with regard to that examination.
We have already discussed, under Section III(c) of this
chapter, some of those cases where the Assembly may take decisions
independent of any deliberations or recommendations by the Council,
and it was noted that in almost all of these cases, the power of the
Assembly has been circumscribed by relevant provisions of the
Convention. ^9
Among those powers of the Assembly which should be exercised
pursuant to deliberations or recommendations of the Council, there
are certain cases of a purely administrative nature and, as such,
are insignificant to the question of the right of access to the
resources of the Area. They include: the election of the
Secretary-General, election of members of the Governing Board and
the Director-General of the Enterprise, approval of the annual
budget of the Director-General of the Enterprise, approval of the
annual budget of the Authority and examination of the periodic
i on
reports from the Council and from the Enterprise. The most
significant power of the Assembly, which has a direct bearing upon
the question of who and under what conditions has the right to
exploit the deep sea mineral resources, is to "approve the rules,
regulations and procedures of the Authority, and any amendments
thereto, provisionally adopted by the Council . . ."*31
significance of this power of the Assembly is due to the fact that
the enforcement of the general provisions laid down in the
Convention concerning "prospecting, exploration and exploitation in
the Area, the financial management and internal administration of
the Authority"132 is dependent on the way these rules, regulations
and procedures are formed.
The relation between the competence of the Council and the
Assembly in respect of the provisional adoption and the final
approval of these rules, regulations and procedures demonstrates
the extent of the real power and influence of these two organs.
According to Article 162(2)(o)(ii), the Council shall:
adopt and apply provisionally, pending approval by the
Assembly, the rules, regulations and procedures of the
Authority, and any amendments thereto . . . All rules,
regulations and procedures shall remain in effect on a
provisional basis until approved by the Assembly or until
amended by the Council in the light of any views expressed by
the Assembly.
The corresponding power of the Assembly is "to consider and
approve"-'-^^ these rules, regulations and procedures. It has no
power to make amendments and then approve or to draft new provisions
itself. What can be understood by reading these two provisions
together is that the Assembly has no power to force amendments on
the provisionally adopted drafts by the Council, and if the Council
does not agree with the amendments proposed by the Assembly, it can
continue applying those rules, regulations and procedures by
attaching the adjective "provisional" to them. The helplessness of
the Assembly as the supreme organ of the Authority, to act against
the will of the Council is remarkable. Taking this case together
with the approval of the plans of work, which is under the exclusive
competence of the Council, leads us to the conclusion that the
Assembly possesses a restricted power, and the real power concerning
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the decision on the question of access to the resources of the Area
and their management resides in the Council. In other words, while
the Assembly is formally the supreme organ of the Authority, the
Council holds a de facto superior status with real power. This
is exactly in line with the original demand of the industrialized
countries.
(e) The Enterprise
The Enterprise - the operating arm of the Authority - in charge
of direct participation in the activities in the Area, is a real
innovation as far as the institutional organization of the Authority
is concerned. The Enterprise, through which all states parties to
the Convention shall participate in the activities in the Area, has
always been considered as the political symbol of the Group of 77 in
the negotiations concerning the legal regime of the deep sea-bed.
As such, and because of its commercial nature, it was the intention
of the Group of 77 to make it as self-reliant, viable and strong as
possible. The acceptance of the Parallel System of exploitation by
the Group of 77 was indeed based on the assumption of the efficiency
of the Enterprise.^4 The deep sea mining states, on the contrary,
sought to weaken its capabilities and position against its potential
competitors, namely, the deep sea mining consortia. The provisions
of the Convention dealing with the Enterprise shall be read under
the balance of these two contradicting views of the developed and
developing states.
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As mentioned before, the Enterprise is not a "principal organ"
of the Authority, but it is not a subsidiary body either.135
Because of its unprecedented character, it has a sui generis status.
Its main purpose is to carry out, on behalf of the Authority, and
thereby on behalf of mankind as a whole, activities in the Area "as
well as transporting, processing and marketing of minerals recovered
1 86
from the Area". It can also enter into joint arrangements
1 07
including joint ventures or production sharing with contractors.
The legal status, privileges and immunities of the Enterprise,
although set forth in the Convention, cannot be asserted
independently, and their recognition may be subject to special
agreements between the Enterprise and the states parties in whose
territories the former has some sort of activities or represents-
1 88
tion. The legal capacity of the Enterprise extends to the
limits necessary for the exercise of its functions and include:
(a) to enter into contracts, joint arrangements, including
agreements with States and international organizations;
(b) to acquire, lease, hold and dispose of immovable and
movable property;
(c) to be a party to legal proceedings. 139
The Enterprise, as a commercial entity and with such a broad
legal capacity, shall exist "within the framework of the
international legal personality of the Authority". The property
and assets of the Enterprise shall be immune from any form of
seizure unless otherwise ruled by a final judgment against the
Enterpriser^ Besides, the Enterprise shall enjoy in the
territory of states parties all rights, privileges and immunities
accorded by the states parties to entities conducting similar
activities in their territories. The Enterprise is entitled to
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negotiate with the host countries for exemption from direct and
. . 1A3
indirect taxation. J
The Enterprise is subordinate to the Council. Although it
enjoys autonomy in the conduct of its operations, it shall act in
accordance with the Convention and the rules, regulations and
procedures of the Authority, as well as the general policies
established by the Assembly, and shall be subject to the directives
and control of the Council.It is clear that the Enterprise's
autonomy, which is an essential element for the achievement of its
economic objectives, has strict limits established by the
controlling powers of the Authority.
Compared to other organs of the Authority, the Enterprise has a
relatively simple structure. The Enterprise shall be composed of a
Governing Board, a Director-General and the staff necessary for the
exercise of its functions.
The Governing Board shall consist of 15 members elected by the
Assembly according to the principle of equitable geographical
distribution for a period of four years with the possibility of
re-election. In nominating the candidates, the need for the
highest standard of competence and qualifications in the relevant
fields shall be considered. Two-thirds of the members shall
constitute a quorum and the decisions shall be taken by a simple
ma jority. The Governing Board is in charge of directing the
operations of the Enterprise which include, inter alia, submitting
plans of work to the Council, submitting applications for production
authorization, authorizing negotiations for the acquisition of
technology or entering into joint ventures, borrowing funds and
entering into legal proceedingsBecause of the composition of
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the Governing Board, which includes experts in a personal capacity
and not Government representatives, the Enterprise is the only non-
intergovernmental organ of the Authority.
The Director-General of the Enterprise is to be elected by the
Assembly further to the nomination of the Governing Board and the
recommendation of the Council. His term of office may be up to
148
five years, with the right to be re-elected for further terms.
He is the chief executive of the Enterprise "and shall be directly
responsible to the Board for the conduct of operations of the
Enterprise".jn the selection of the staff, the principle of
equitable geographical distribution is subject to "the necessity of
securing the highest standard of efficiency and the technical
competence".''-'^ The Director-General, members of the Governing
Board and the staff all discharge their duties in a personal and
independent capacity, and "they shall not seek or receive
instructions from any government or from any other source external
to the Enterprise".The simple structure of the Governing Board
in the form of a limited membership and a simple decision-making
procedure has been designed to ensure the efficiency of the
Enterprise.'--^
In order to carry out its functions, the Enterprise is in need
of capital, technology and management. Lack of these elements is
the inherent weakness of the Enterprise as a commercial body. To
defeat these shortcomings, the Convention has provided for a
mechanism to assist the Enterprise to start its activities. Apart
from the obligation of all state or private companies which apply
for a mining contract to transfer their technology to the
Enterprise,153 the latter may directly buy this technology if it is
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available on the open market, and also procure goods and services
that it does not possess and which are required for its
operation.^^ An equally important issue is the question of
financing the Enterprise operations. The lengthy Article 11 of the
Statute of the Enterprise deals with this matter. The major source
for financing the activities of the Enterprise, at least in the
initial stages, is the loans it may take. The amount of these
borrowings should be approved by the Council. The Convention
has also set forth special provisions for financing the activities
of the Enterprise in its first mine site as well as transporting,
I CfL
processing and marketing the minerals recovered therefrom. The
Convention puts emphasis on the purely commercial and non-political
character of the Enterprise. It is specifically pointed out that
the decisions of the Enterprise should be taken with regard to
commercial considerations only.^^
In short, it may be observed that, although because of probable
immunities and exemptions, its affiliation with the Authority, its
symbolic importance as the operating arm of the Authority acting on
behalf of and for the benefit of mankind, the Enterprise as a mining
entity may stand in a position superior to that of other multi¬
national mining companies. Its main weaknesses, such as lack of
necessary capital, technology and management, and its subordination
to the control of the political organs of the Authority, can hardly
render it an efficient competitor to the other miners. This is
more true in the initial period of the activities of the Enterprise
when it is heavily dependent on the technology of other miners and
the capital to be financed by the states parties or through loans
guaranteed by them.
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We share the view of Paollillo that:
It will not be an easy task to launch a new entity subject to
the policies and guidelines dictated by international political
bodies, to compete in a field of commercial and industrial
activities that even now is not very well known by enterprises
that have been researching and operating for years in the
field. Financial and technological aids devised in the
Convention will be palliatives to mitigate the Enterprise's
many shortcomings. 158
(f) The Secretariat
The Secretariat is a principal organ of the Authority.^9
It is composed of a Secretary-General as the chief administrative
officer of the Authority and such "qualified scientific and
technical and other personnel as may be required to fulfil the
administrative functions of the Authority".*60 Secretary-
General shall be elected by the Assembly upon the proposal of the
Council for a period of four years with the possibility of being
re-elected. The Secretary-General and the staff of the
Secretariat, by virtue of their positions in a "principal" organ of
the Authority, possess international status, and as such "shall not
seek or receive any instructions from any government or from any
other source external to the Authority".162 They also have, like
the members of the Economic Planning Commission or the Legal and
Technical Commission, the obligation not to disclose "even after the
termination of their functions . . . any confidential information
coming to their knowledge by reason of their employment with the
Authority".163
Among the specified functions of the Secretary-General are
submission of an annual report to the Assembly on the work of the
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Authority and making arrangements "for consultation and co-operation
with international and non-governmental organizations on matters
within the competence of the Authority".^4 What is noteworthy is
that the functions of the Secretariat are limited in comparison to
the traditional role of secretariats in other international
organizations. One typical function of the Secretariat - the
supervision of compliance of obligations burdens upon the member
states - which was entrusted to the Secretariat in the ISNT of
1975,1^5 ancj could give a more significant role to that organ, was
later transferred to the Council. ^6
SECTION IV: SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES RELATING TO THE
SEA-BED ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA
The special system of settlement of disputes arising from the
activities in the Area is a part of the general disputes settlement
of the Convention. It is thus relevant to briefly examine the
general aspects of the latter before the former can be studied in
detail.
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(a) Disputes Settlement System in the Law
of the Sea Convention
1. Development of the system in the United Rations
The variety of interests, both national and international, and
the possibility of the conflict of these interests through the acts
of the users of the sea, has rendered the sea a potential source
of dispute. Being aware of this fact, the First United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea 1958 made an effort to adopt a
compulsory disputes settlement system for the states parties to
any of the four conventions resulting from the Conference. The
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of
the High Seas contained in Articles 9 to 12 few procedures on the
settlement of disputes. In addition, the main disputes settlement
system was excluded into an Optional Protocol which was supplemented
I £-7
to the four Conventions. The ICJ arbitral tribunals and
conciliation procedure were designated by the Protocol as tools for
the settlement of disputes arising out of the interpretation or
application of any of the four Conventions except where the special
procedures of the Convention on Fishing were applicable. The 1958
Optional Protocol did not attract many states at that time and,
therefore, no practice can be referred to that protocol with respect
to dispute settlement.
When, in 1970, the General Assembly decided that the UNCLOS III
would convene in 1973, the need for the incorporation of a
comprehensive compulsory system of disputes settlement in the treaty
1 Aft
resulting from the Conference was acutely felt. The fact that
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the future convention would not only modify or update the existing
rules of international law, but also create new rules entailing
rights and duties in areas of great economic interest for states,
had lent even more importance to the creation of comprehensive
procedures including binding judicial settlements in the Convention.
Moreover, the establishment of a new international organization of
the sort advised by the G77 and in the field of direct economic and
political importance to industrialized countries could produce even
more conflicts, and made access to a compulsory disputes settlement
method indispensable.^^ The Declaration of Principles, as the
first comprehensive international document to the international
regime of the deep sea-bed area, contained a vague reference to the
disputes settlement system according to which resolution of disputes
was to be with regard to Article 33 of the Charter of the United
Nations or another method to be agreed upon in the international
regime to be established.Thus, the option, at least as far as
the legal international regime of the deep sea-bed area was
concerned, was either judicial settlement by the ICJ or another
method of settling disputes to be included in the new regime.
Several delegations to the Sea-Bed Committee, both in 1970 and 1971,
17 2
made proposals concerning the disputes settlement, but the
discussion about it was held before the start of the work of the
UNCLOS III.
Disputes settlement was not included in the mandate of any of
the three Main Committees of the Conference. In the first
substantive session of the UNCLOS III in Caracas, 1974, a group of
delegations formed an Informal Working Group on Settlement of Law of
the Sea Disputes. The initial basis of the deliberations of this
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group was a proposal submitted by the United States to the Sea-Bed
Committee.-'-resuit of the discussions at this forum, which
was submitted to the Conference at the end of the session, high¬
lighted the common points of view of the participating delegates
concerning disputes settlement procedures. The main point of the
expressed opinions was the need for a compulsory disputes settlement
system for the uniform interpretation of the Convention, and the
indispensability of the incorporation of this system, as an integral
part, into the Convention. *7^
The Informal Working Group continued its work in 1975, and
produced a document containing 17 articles to be submitted to the
Conference. In this document, procedures for non-compulsory and
compulsory disputes settlement were included. The ICJ, the inter¬
national court of the law of the sea and an arbitral tribunal were
named in this document as appropriate fora for the compulsory
settlements. The fact that the parties to disputes could be states
as well as international organizations and even individuals made it
necessary to establish a new international tribunal different from
the ICJ,175 the contentious jurisdiction of which is restricted
under its statute to states.
At the end of the 1975 Geneva Session of the Conference, on the
basis of the above-mentioned document, the President of the
Conference produced an Informal Single Negotiating Text on
Settlement of Disputes,^7^ with the intention of placing it as the
basis for future discussion at the Conference. At the same time,
the question of the settlement of disputes relating to the sea-bed
area was dealt with at the First Committee of the Conference. The
ISNT, prepared by the Chairman of the First Committee, contained
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provisions for the establishment of a tribunal as a principal organ
of the Authority7 with the jurisdiction for the interpretation and
1 "70
application of the Convention and the contracts. °
In 1976, the general debate in the Conference on the question
of disputes settlement was held on the basis of the text prepared by
the President, and as a result of discussions, a revised text on the
disputes settlement procedures was produced which was incorporated
into the RSNT. At this time there was general agreement that
the states parties to the Convention and their entities, on the
one hand, and the Authority, on the other, should have the right
to bring any breach of the Convention or the contracts before a
tribunal with binding powers.179 Besides, expressed views were in
favour of a general obligation to submit any disputes relating to
the interpretation and application of the Convention to judicial
settlement.
The question of dispute settlement was left open for discussion
in the following session of the Conference, and except for the
settlement of disputes relating to the activities in the Area, which
was specifically discussed at the First Committee, the features of
the general disputes settlement methods were touched upon by all
delegates in the different fora. In this respect, mention should
be made in particular of the Group of Legal Experts on Disputes
Settlement chaired by Harry Wuensche from the German Democratic
Republic.
With respect to the disputes concerning the sea-bed, the G77
was in favour of compulsory machinery provided a reasonable
limitation was to be imposed on the competence of the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea so that the implementation of such a
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system would not lead to the substitution of the discretion of the
Authority for that of the Tribunal. To minimize this fear, the
ICNT included a condition based on the formulation prepared by Jens
Evensen, which reads:
The Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber shall have no jurisdiction with
regard to the exercise by the Assembly or by the Council or any
of its organs of their discretionary powers under this Part of
the present Convention, in no case shall it substitute its
discretion for that of the Authority. 180
The agreement on the need to incorporate a general compulsory
judicial settlement system in the Convention was, from the start,
conditioned to the exclusion of certain sorts of disputes as
exceptions. The underlying reason for such a condition was the
possible conflict of tribunal jurisdiction which could occur in the
case of disputes relating to the exercise of rights and duties of
the coastal states in areas under their jurisdiction. In the EEZ,
for example, the coastal states exercise sovereign rights in respect
of the management of living and non-living resources, and foreign
flag states enjoy, inter alia, the freedom of navigation and
181
overflight. 0i The possibility exists that in the case of certain
disputes, the decision as to the choice of the tribunal will prove
to be difficult.
The agreement on the need for the compulsory disputes
settlement system was not, however, based on the acceptance of the
exceptions only. It rested on, as Jaenicke has briefly put it, the
fact that, firstly, this "compulsory nature of dispute settlement
procedures ... is limited to dispute about the interpretation of
the Convention, that is to disputes about the interpretation of a
written law" which lacks "the uncertainty with respect to the
contents of unwritten international law", and secondly, both the
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coastal states and the Authority are vested with comprehensive
regulatory and administrative powers by the Convention, and the
endowment of such broad powers could be accepted by major naval
powers only if both coastal states and the Authority could be kept
within well-defined limits and in case of dispute made subject to
1 OO
juridical review.
Because of this basic agreement, negotiating the disputes
settlement system was relatively easy and even sea-bed disputes
settlement procedures, which were of chief significance for both the
prospective sea-bed mining states and the G77, were adopted without
complications.
In the Convention, the disputes relating to the use of the seas
have been put into two major categories: sea-bed and non-sea-bed
disputes. The first category includes the disputes concerning the
activities in the Area. The second category consists of disputes
between states parties in relation to the exercise of their rights
in different maritime zones.
2. Types of fora
The Convention has clearly provided for two disputes settlement
systems. Part XV, comprising Articles 279 to 299, is devoted to
the settlement of disputes related to the law of the sea in general.
Deep sea-bed disputes settlement is regulated by the provisions of
Section 5, Part XI of the Convention. To accommodate the desire
of the majority of states, the Convention, in addition to non-
compulsory procedures such as negotiations or conciliations,133
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envisaged a flexible method for the choice of forum for compulsory
judicial settlement.
As far as the non-sea-bed disputes are concerned, any party can
choose one or more options between the ICJ, the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and general or special arbitration
procedures.Such a choice should be made in writing and at the
time of signing the Convention and depositing the instrument of
1QC
ratification or accession to it. In the event the parties to
the dispute have chosen different procedures or a party has made no
choice, the dispute would have to be submitted to general
arbitration.
The general arbitral tribunal, consisting of five members, can
deal with any disputes relating to the interpretation or application
of the Convention, but if such disputes are related to those
provisions of the Convention which concern fisheries, protection and
preservation of the marine environment, marine scientific research,
or navigation, a special arbitration procedure may be employed.
The Convention has also provided for the establishment of a
permanent organ, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
composed of 21 judges representing the principal legal systems and
geographical regions of the world.^® The judges shall be elected
by a conference of the states parties to the Convention for a period
of nine years.^9
Originally, the idea was to establish such a tribunal with
jurisdiction over disputes concerning activities in the Area as an
integral part of the Authority, and Article 24 of the ISNT reflected
this view by legislating the tribunal as one of the principal organs
of the Authority. The suggestion was dropped from later negotiating
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texts on the ground that such an arrangement may disturb the
independence of the Tribunal from the Authority, which could itself
become a party to the disputes. Instead, the establishment of the
Tribunal for all disputes and one of its specialized chambers for
the sea-bed mining disputes was provided for.*^
To moderate the anxieties of those who had reservations
concerning the submission of disputes to permanent courts like the
ICJ or the Law of the Sea Tribunal, and in order to make the
disputes settlement system even more flexible and thereby facilitate
the acceptance of submission of disputes to binding judicial
settlement, it is laid down in Article 15 of Annex VI of the
Convention that the Law of the Sea Tribunal may set up three
different sorts of chambers.
A special chamber, composed of three or more of the Tribunal
members, may be formed to deal with particular categories of
disputes. If the parties to a particular dispute wish to have
their case dealt with by a chamber of the Tribunal, an ad hoc
chamber for that purpose shall be formed by the Tribunal. Besides,
the latter should annually form a summary procedure chamber composed
of five of its members in order to hear and determine disputes by
summary procedures. The submission of disputes to any of these
chambers is subject to the request of the parties,
In order to deal with the disputes relating to the activities
in the Area, the Tribunal shall establish an independent permanent
i no
and specialized forum, the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber. 7
The comprehensiveness, diversity and the great novelty of
subjects included in the Convention have led to the adoption of a
broad and generalized language which in itself may give rise to
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divergent interpretations. The vague formulation of many provisions
of the Convention, which is the result of efforts to command
consensus, runs counter to "the notions of clarity, certainty and
finality of the law". ^3 These unavoidable deficiencies will
generate ample opportunity for the emergence of disputes. The
compulsory submission of disputes to the ICJ, the Law of the
Sea Tribunal or any of its chambers and arbitration, as set out
in the Convention, is a flexible and realistic approach to this
controversial issue. It is hard to believe that any other
arrangement could win the consent of the states parties to the
Convention and at the same time could yield a workable solution.
The risk of dissimilarity of interpretation and application of the
Convention because of the multiplicity of fora surely exists.^4
Nevertheless, one may expect that, because of its novelty, the Law
of the Sea Tribunal will become the main forum and, in that case,
the main policy in respect of the interpretation and application of
the Convention will be set by that organ. This is more probable,
since in the majority of other fora, and particularly in chambers,
the members of the Tribunal shall participate. Moreover, the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber with respect
to the disputes relating to activities in the Area "could ensure
continuity in the interpretation and application of the
international law governing the Area".195
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(b) Disputes relating to the Activities in the Area
The need to establish a special compulsory disputes settlement
system for the disputes arising from the conduct of activities in
the Area rests in the fact that activities in the Area are regulated
not only by the rules enumerated in Part XI of the Convention and
relevant Annexes III and IV, but also by the rules, regulations and
procedures to be adopted by the Authority. In other words, one of
the operators of activities in the Area has the attributes of law¬
making at the same time as it can directly engage in the conduct of
activities in the same way as states parties or their entities, i.e.
juridical or natural persons, can. This unprecedented legal order,
in which the legislator is simultaneously one of the subjects of
law, may generate many disputes between the Authority and other
subjects. It, therefore, calls for the creation of a specialized
judicial organ with competence and concentration on specific issues
related to sea-bed mining in order to, firstly, ensure the
development of a unified body of jurisprudence and, secondly, to
guarantee the right of access for all entities engaged in deep
sea-bed mining, including private persons, to international
adjudication in case of conflict.
Section 5 of Part XI of the Convention, containing Articles 186
to 191, deals with the question of setting up a special dispute
settlement system for the disputes arising from activities in the
Area. This system provides for the necessary judicial institutions,
the scope of their jurisdiction, the applicable law and procedure.
The components of the system shall be examined in the following.
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1. Institutions
The main organ for the settlement of disputes relating to the
activities in the Area is the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber which has an
organic connection with the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea, but is at the same time a permanent independent body. The
11 judges of the Chamber, elected by and from among the members
of the Tribunal and in accordance with the principle of the
representation of the principal legal systems of the world and
equitable geographical distribution, shall hold office for three
years with the possibility of being elected for a second term.^^
In line with the general policy for establishing a flexible
disputes settlement system for the Convention, and in view of the
fact that the nature of disputes related to the activities in the
Area is characterized by both technical and commercial complexities,
it was felt necessary, at least on the part of some industrialized
countries, to provide for the access to smaller and more effective
and speedy procedures such as arbitration. Thus, the Convention
has, in addition to the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber, envisaged the use
of a special chamber of the Tribunal, or an ad hoc chamber of the
Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber, or a commercial arbitral tribunal for the
settlement of disputes concerning activities in the deep sea-bed.-^7
The special chamber of the tribunal, as mentioned before, may have
three forms with a composition of three or more members from among
the judges of the Tribunal.
The ad hoc chamber of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber shall be
composed of three members from among the judges of the Chamber.
These judges shall be appointed by the Chamber with the approval of
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the parties to the dispute. In the case of disagreement about the
composition of the ad hoc chamber, the parties may each appoint one
judge who shall together agree on the third member. In any case,
the President of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber has the final word in
the solution of problems concerning the composition. Judges of the
ad hoc chamber may not be the nationals or in the service of any of
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the parties to the dispute. Due to the extensive role of the
parties to the dispute in the determination of the composition of
the ad hoc chamber, it may be considered more or less similar to
arbitration.
The parties to a dispute arising from the interpretation or
application of a contract are enjoined by Article 188(2)(a) of
the Convention to submit their dispute to a commercial arbitral
tribunal, the composition of which is not regulated in the
Convention, and is in any event expected to be subject to the terms
of the contract agreed by the parties.
2. Scope of jurisdiction
Riphagen has rightly said that "the jurisdiction of the Sea-Bed
Disputes Chamber ... is rather more in the nature of a legal
control of the international management conducted by the Authority
than of an 'adjudication* between equal parties". This
so-called legal control may entail a non-binding or binding review
of the Authority's acts or omissions. The advisory opinion of the
Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber and the contentious procedures before that
organ represent the said legal control methods respectively.
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i Advisory opinion
The Convention contains two different procedures for requesting
advisory opinions from the SBDC. On the first procedure, both the
Assembly and the Council may request the SBDC to give advisory
opinions on legal questions arising within the scope of their
activities.Such a request can be made at any time, and the
Chamber is to treat it as an urgent matter. This is a general
procedure according to which any legal matter relating to the
activities of the Assembly or the Council can become subject to
advisory opinion.
On the second procedure, which is a restricted one, only the
Assembly may request the advisory opinion of the Sea-Bed Disputes
Chamber on the conformity with the Convention of a proposal before
the Assembly concerning any matter. The sponsorship of at least
one-fourth of the members of the Authority in the form of a written
request addressed to the President is required to submit the
proposal to the SBDC for advisory opinion. Voting on the proposal
201shall be deferred until the Chamber has pronounced its opinion.
ii Contentious procedure
The more important part of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber's
jurisdiction - the second category - concerns contentious
procedures. These procedures may generally be divided into two
groups: cases arising from disputes between states parties, and
cases to which the Authority or the Enterprise on the one hand, and
a state party or private entity on the other, are parties.
Disputes between states parties concerning the interpretation
or application of Part XI of the Convention and its related annexes
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are under the jurisdiction of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber.
Although the need to secure a uniform and coherent interpretation of
the Convention required the limitation of the number of judicial
organs to as few as possible, the urge for flexibility of choice
which prevailed in the provisions of the general disputes settlement
system contained in Part XV of the Convention necessitated the
provision for the same flexibility in the case of sea-bed mining
disputes between states parties. The result was the arrangement
contained in Article 188(1), according to which such disputes may be
submitted either to a special chamber of the Law of the Sea Tribunal
or to an ad hoc chamber of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber. This
compromise arrangement may ease the flexibility of choices, but it
is doubtful if it can ensure the uniformity of interpretation or
application of Part XI of the Convention. The fact that parties to
the disputes may play an essential role in the determination of the
composition of the special or ad hoc chambers may render the result
of the work of these organs, and particularly that of the special
chamber of the Tribunal, different from those of the SBDC itself.^03
Disputes between the Authority and states parties (or state
or private entities) can be divided into non-contractual and
contractual cases. The non-contractual disputes are between
the Authority and a state party and are concerned with the
interpretation and application of the Convention. These disputes
may have three causes: 1- acts or omissions of the Authority or a
state party in violation of Part XI; 2- performance of acts by the
Authority which are in excess of its jurisdiction; and 3- misuse of
powers by the Authority.
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Acts or omissions of the Authority seem to have a broad
implication, meaning a reference to the acts and omissions of all
organs of the Authority. That includes those acts of the
Enterprise which may be related to the interpretation or application
of the Convention.^05 In these cases, because one party to the
dispute is the Authority, no freedom of choice in regard to the
judicial procedure is provided for, and the SBDC has exclusive
jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the SBDC in regard to non-contractual cases
has two limitations. According to Article 189, the Chamber cannot
declare invalid the rules, regulations and procedures of the
Authority, nor can it pronounce itself on the question of their
legality.Under this article there is no explicit designation
of discretionary power to the Authority and the freedom of actions
of the Authority is reduced by the principles and rules enumerated
in Part XI of the Convention and related annexes. In other words,
there is no specific definition for the term discretionary powers in
the Convention. In fact, this is the practice of all other organs
which act within the context of a specific legal order.^07 what
may be considered as the discretionary powers of these organs "is a
margin of choice in the form of, inter alia, determination of the
timelines or advisability of taking a certain act".^® Exclusion
of a decision taken by the Authority in the exercise of its
discretionary powers from the jurisdiction of the SBDC was not
controversial and was "in line with the corresponding practice in
the national legal systems", but its inclusion in Article 189
seems to be superfluous, because:
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... an act carried out in the exercise of a discretionary
power of the Authority - a power the exercise of which is
not subject to any legal regulation - cannot by definition
be subject to jurisdictional review of legality, because it
lacks the legal framework to which its legality would be
referred. 210
The second limitation is in respect of the judicial review of
the rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority. Any
allegation by a state party to the effect that a particular act of
the Authority is contradictory to the Convention, is in excess of
its jurisdiction or is a misuse of power, puts in question the
legality of the rules, regulations and procedures which constitute
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the legal basis of such an act.
The imposition of such a limitation was the subject of
controversy between the G77 and the industrialized countries. It
was generally the position of the industrialized countries that the
system of legal control of the rules, regulations and procedures of
the Authority shall be formed in accordance with the judicial review
system of the EEC. The Court of Justice of the EEC is competent to
review the legality of acts of the Council and the Commission of the
EEC, and declare them null and void in the event it found those acts
illegal "on grounds of incompetence, of errors of substantial form,
of infringement of this Treaty or of any legal provision relating to
its application, or of abuse of power".212
The developing countries were against the idea of giving the
Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber the competence of checking the
compatibility of decisions of the Authority with the constitution,
i.e., Part XI of the Convention, and allowing the SBDC to declare
invalid the rules, regulations and procedures upon which a
particular decision is taken. They argued that such an attribution
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would run counter to "the sanctity and intangibility of the powers
of the Authority".^13 They also contended that the decisions of the
Assembly and the Council were adopted by the representatives of
sovereign states, and the result was quasi legislative acts which
could not logically be subject to judicial decisionsThe
compromise solution, as incorporated in Article 189 of the
Convention, confines the juris- diction of the Chamber to:
. . . deciding claims that application of any rules,
regulations and procedures of the Authority in individual cases
would be in conflict with the contractual obligations of the
parties to the disputes or their obligations under this
Convention.
Thus, the Chamber may not declare the rules, regulations and
procedures of the Authority invalid, but it may decide if the
application of any such rule in the individual case before it could
conflict with the duties of the parties under the Convention or the
contract. In other words, the Chamber does not declare the act
"invalid", but not applicable in a particular case. To compensate
the injuries suffered by the claimant because of such a decision of
non applicability, the Convention has endowed the Chamber with
rather broad competence. The Chamber, therefore, may decide
claims for damages to be paid or other remedy to be given to the
party concerned for the failure of the other party to comply with
its contractual obligations or of its obligations under this
Convention.^15
The main question which arises in reading Article 189 is how
the SBDC may possibly declare a decision of the Authority
non-applicable in a particular case without first pronouncing the
rules, regulations and procedures upon which such a decision is
taken incompatible with the Convention and therefore illegal. It
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seems that the Chamber may not abstain from examining the rules,
regulations and procedures of the Authority, but when it finds an
individual decision is contrary to the Convention, it may not only
adjudicate the damage but also "grant other types of relief,
including, it is believed, injunctions preventing the application or
further application of the unlawful decision or measure".^16 This
conclusion is derived, inter alia, from the fact that:
the judicial review system set up under Article 187(b) and 189
would be pointless if, subject to the duty to pay damages,
the Authority were at liberty to disregard or to go on
disregarding the restrictions imposed by Part XI on its
regulatory powers. 217
We can sum up by saying that the search for conciliating the
anxieties of the industrialized countries and their individuals for
protection against any arbitrary decision of the Authority in
conflict with the principles of Part XI, and the efforts of the G77
in safeguarding the integrity of the Authority and the sanctity of
its powers, resulted in the adoption of the ambiguous and vague
formulation of Article 189 which gives room for divergent
interpretations of the real limits on the jurisdiction of the SBDC.
Contractual disputes which constitute the second group of
contentious cases arise between the Authority and the public or
private entities in respect of application or interpretation of the
contracts. These disputes can be divided into three groups.
The first group comprises those disputes for the settlement
of which the SBDC has exclusive jurisdiction. These disputes
may relate to: the refusal of a contract to a prospective
contractor who has fulfilled all the necessary conditions set
out in Articles 4(6) and 13(2) of Annex III of the Conventional^
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acts or omissions of a party to a contract relating to the
activities in the Area and directed to the other party or directly
affecting its legitimate interests;219 and the liability of the
Authority pursuant to Annex III, Article 22.22®
The second group includes the disputes related to the
contracts, the settlement of which is under the exclusive competence
of a commercial arbitral tribunal. Disputes arising from: the
901
financial terms of the contract; A those related to the fairness
and reasonableness of the commercial terms; and conditions offered
by a contractor for the transfer of technology,222 fall into this
group.
The third group consists of those disputes which may fall under
either the exclusive jurisdiction of the commercial arbitration
tribunal or both such tribunal and the SBDC. This group consists
of disputes arising from the interpretation and application of
contracts.
While in the case of disputes between the Authority and a
State Party concerning the interpretation and application of the
Convention, the jurisdiction of the SBDC is meant to be exercised
principally as a measure to protect the supposedly weaker party,
i.e., the State Party, against the alleged illegal decisions of the
stronger party, i.e., the Authority. Disputes between the
Authority and the Enterprise, on the one hand, and state enterprises
and natural or juridical persons sponsored by states, on the other,
are, in fact, to be considered as between two equal parties of a
commercial contract.
The G77 believed that, since these commercial contracts are to
be concluded in accordance with the dictates of the Convention and
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the rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority, settlement
of disputes regarding their interpretation and application should
fall within the scope of the exclusive jurisdiction of the SBDC.
The industrialized countries, not only because of a general
reluctance to submit disputes involving private persons and
enterprises to a permanent international tribunal whose competence
normally extends to the traditional subjects of international law
and whose composition is probably characterized by the predominant
representation of the judges from the Third World, but also with
respect to the nature of such disputes which require, inter alia,
speedy solution, insisted on the submission of these disputes to
commercial arbitration which is a standard tool of international
trade law.^^
From these two divergent views a compromise formula was
worked out which is now included in Article 188(2) of the
Convention, and provides for the automatic submission of these
disputes to commercial arbitration unless a specific agreement to
the contrary is made between the parties.^24 As a counter balance
to this automatic and guaranteed access of the mining companies to
commercial arbitration, the securing of which was the main concern
of the industrialized countries, the Convention imposes an important
limitation on the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal by
prescribing that such a tribunal:
. . . shall have no jurisdiction to decide any question of
interpretation of this Convention. When the dispute also
involves a question of the interpretation of Part XI and
the Annexes relating thereto, with respect to the activities in
the area, that question shall be referred to the SBDC for a
ruling. 225
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The G77 held the view that a uniform interpretation of the
Convention required the concentration of all disputes related to
such interpretation in one forum - the SBDC. Therefore, it was
unacceptable to them to leave the settlement of disputes concerning
the interpretation of the contracts which might entail the interpre¬
tation of the Convention as well to the exclusive jurisdiction of an
arbitral tribunal. The decision as to whether a particular
question falls into the category of Convention interpretation or
relates to a contract interpretation is to be taken by the arbitral
tribunal either at the request of each party or proprior motu.^^
In the event it is decided by the said tribunal that a question
related to the interpretation of the Convention should be submitted
to the SBDC, it shall wait for the decision of the Chamber, and then
"render its award in conformity with the ruling of that Chamber".^27
The compromise solution, which seeks to reconcile the
requirement of uniformity of the interpretations of the Convention
provisions with the need for the speedy and effective solution of
disputes relating to the interpretation of the Contracts, suffers
from a complex drawback, namely, the vague line of distinction
between Convention interpretation and contract interpretation. The
exclusive competence to draw this distinction is conferred upon the
arbitral tribunal. The exercise of this competence may depend on
the contents of the contract, and whether it contains provisions for
its interpretation, or whether it lacks or includes references to
any general or specific provision of the Convention, etc. This
lack of clarity as to the basis on which the arbitral tribunal shall
determine whether or not a question should be submitted to the
Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber may put in question the extent of the
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jurisdiction of this tribunal in each individual case. Such
vagueness will certainly not contribute to the adoption of a speedy
decision.
3. Procedures and applicable law
As demonstrated in the preceding section, the majority of the
disputes related to the activities in the Area may fall under the
jurisdiction of the SBDC, or may be referred to commercial
2 O Qarbitration. •6° While the procedures in these two instances are
different, the possibility of access to them is identical.
As regards the first group of disputes, any party may submit
the dispute to the Chamber. The same is true in the case of the
second group, but in this case there exists also the possibility
that the dispute shall be referred to another forum if both parties
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so agree. ^
It may be noted here that one of the main characteristics of
the SBDC is that both states and entities other than states and
private persons have access to it. 30 When one of the parties is a
natural or juridical person, the sponsoring state shall have the
right to participate in the proceedings. In cases like this, if
one of the parties is a state party, it may request the sponsoring
state of the other party to appear in the proceedings on behalf of
that person. Failure to appear will give the right to the former
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to be represented by a judicial person of its nationality.
The procedure of the SBDC Chamber is the same as the one
applied to the International Tribunal for the Law of the
2 32
Sea. ° That means that procedural rules concerning, inter alia,
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the institution of the proceedings, provisional measures, hearings,
conduct of case, judgement, intervention and costs, as enumerated in
Section 3 of Annex VI of the Convention, shall apply to the Chamber
too.
Arbitral tribunals dealing with disputes relating to the
undertaking of contractors to transfer technology to the Authority
under fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions shall
conduct the arbitration according to the arbitration rules of the
United Nations Commission of International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), or
"other arbitration rules as may be prescribed in the rules,
regulations and procedures of the Authority".^3 In case of
interpretation or application of the contract or its financial
terms, the parties to the dispute may agree, in the contract, on a
special arbitration procedure. In the absence of such an agreement,
the same arrangement as in the case of disputes relating to
technology transfer shall be applied.^34
Article 293 of the Convention stipulates that the law
applicable for the settlement of disputes in the framework of the
general disputes settlement system of the Convention shall be the
Convention and other rules of international law not incompatible
with this Convention. This formulation suggests that the provisions
of the Convention are the prime source of law to be applied in the
settlement of disputes, and recourse to other rules of international
law can be had only in the event of a gap in the Convention.^35
When the dispute concerns the interpretation and application
of the contracts or the rules, regulations and procedures of
the Authority, the terms of the contract shall be taken into
consideration. The precedence in the applicable laws in this case
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is with the terms of the contract, the rules, regulations and
procedures of the Authority, and the rules of international law
compatible with the Convention.^36
In all cases, except for questions related to the
interpretation and application of contracts, parties may agree that
the disputes shall be decided by the competent court ex aequo et
bono.^7 Nevertheless, in the case of the interpretation of a
Convention provision in relation to the settlement of a dispute
raised from the interpretation and application of a contract, it
seems improbable that, even by the agreement of the parties, the
SBDC may have recourse to this approach, since deciding ex aequo et
bono in this case in fact runs counter to the raison d'etre of the
Chamber, which is securing a uniform interpretation and application
of the Convention in respect of deep sea-bed mining.^38
SECTION V: EVALUATION
The discussion on the International Sea-Bed Authority
demonstrates that the Authority is in many ways a unique inter¬
national organization. Its innovative purposes and functions
and its power to legislate rules, regulations and procedures for
the proper conduct of activities in the Area differentiate it from
most other international organizations. Its main functions as
representing mankind and conducting activities in the Area for the
benefit of mankind necessitates the concentration of the real power
in its plenary organ as the meeting place for the representatives of
- 406 -
the greater part of mankind. This has been the position of the
G77, based on the principle of the common heritage of mankind. The
power now is vested instead in the executive organ, the Council,
which represents to some extent the "special interests" of states
rather than the interests of mankind. This is close to the
position which the industrialized countries adopted after they had
succeeded in getting the Parallel System of exploitation accepted by
the Group of 77.
The present composition, competence and functions of the
Authority, as laid down in the Convention, is far from ideal for an
international organization in charge of rational management of the
resources of the Area for the benefit of mankind. To understand
the compromise which produced the present structure of the
Authority, it should be recalled that, for the G77, the Authority,
as the agent of mankind, was the only entity with the exclusive
right to manage the resources of the Area. The activities of state
and private entities were, according to this group, subject to the
discretionary powers of the Authority. For the industrialized
countries, it was at most a necessary evil whose only legitimate
function was to allocate sites and administer the minimum of
2 29
regulation. These differing positions gave rise to the
controversy between the principle of sovereign equality of states
and its ensuing one-state one-vote scheme, on the one hand, and the
requirement of considerations to the designated economic interests
of certain states, on the other. The same arguments, which
resulted in the creation of the Parallel System of exploitation,
rationalized a compromise in regard to the composition, competence
and functions of the Authority.
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The key words in both cases are "the balance of interests".
This balance is meant to be achieved by providing for the one-nation
one-vote process in the plenary organ of the Authority - the
Assembly - and a rather unique three tier system of voting in the
executive body - the Council. There are well-founded reasons to
fear that the Council, because of its decision-making procedures,
will end up with more or less the same fate as the Security Council
of the United Nations. These procedures render "unlikely
appropriate and timely decisions on important questions".That
is even more alarming if we remember that the decisions of the
Council "will directly and significantly affect the rational
management of the common heritage of mankind, the successful
implementation of the system of exploration and exploitation and the
security of investments in the sea-bed mining".
Irrespective of the difference of voting procedures in the
Council and the Assembly which is intended to protect the minority
of industrialized countries against the imposition of the will of
the majority of the developing states,the powers accorded to the
Council are far more than what was initially intended.
The Enterprise, although guaranteed of access, capital and
technology, seems to be an ineffective commercial entity whose
proper functioning is dependent upon many uncertain factors such
as adequacy of funds and acquisition of efficient technology,
the amount and quality of which may differ as a result of major
industrialized countries staying outside the Convention, and the
existence of an efficient management competitive with a private
company. One may not expect that the Enterprise, being an
international agency and under the control of the Council with
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disputable decision-making procedures, would be able to compete with
the state or private companies.
The distribution of powers, the composition and the conditions
for the execution of functions, all affirm the fact that the
possibilities of the Authority to ensure the successful achievement
of its purpose, i.e., the rational management of the resources of
the Area for the benefit of mankind as a whole, either through its
organizing and controlling functions or through its executive
function, are limited, and the viability of the machinery in its
present form is as doubtful as the Parallel System. It is left to
see how and if the Preparatory Commission may, through the adoption
of rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority, enhance the
position of that organization by, inter alia, strengthening the
powers of the Assembly, and give a fair chance to the Enterprise to
operate as effectively as its competitors.
As it is now, the institutional aspects of the Authority
suggest that its members will exercise effective control over it,
and the execution of its functions and powers will meet many
restraints either in the form of prescribed rules already in the
Convention or the decisions to be adopted by one or other political
organ. It is thus important that states parties, both through the
Preparatory Commission and later through the political organs of the
Authority, make efforts to turn this organization into a viable
strong entity with the possibilities for achieving its purposes.
As regards the system of disputes settlement of the Convention,
it is clear that the existing system is far from perfect. That
holds true even for the sea-bed disputes settlement procedures.
Looking from the viewpoint of mankind and its trustee, the
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Authority, the system seeks to control the discretionary power of
the Authority - which is an indispensable tool for the
implementation of its duties through the imposition of strict rules
and regulations which constitute a stiff legal framework for the
acts of the Authority, and by giving locus standi to individuals and
enterprises before the tribunals with competence to take binding
decisions.
The agreement of the Parallel System of exploitation was with
the anticipation that the participation of private and state
enterprises as well as the Authority in the activities in the Area
would certainly give rise to many disputes between those entities
and the Authority. The industrialized countries succeeded in
ensuring that the most important and probably the most frequent of
these disputes, i.e., those related to the interpretation and
application of contracts between the Authority and private or state
enterprises, should be settled by commercial arbitration. In other
words, disputes relating to the interpretation and application of
the contracts are treated like any other commercial dispute, and the
role of the Authority is equalized to the role of any individual.
This is far from the position of the Gil, which sought to put all
disputes raised from the activities in the Area under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber.
The containment of the integrity and freedom of the Authority
and the elevation of the status of the individuals before the
competent tribunals are not the only drawbacks. That it is
possible for the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber to prevent a rule,
regulation or procedure of the Authority by establishing its
incompatibility with the Convention, seriously puts in question
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the integrity of the Authority. These and other drawbacks
notwithstanding, the result of the compromise between the G77 and
the industrialized countries in respect to the sea-bed disputes
settlement, seems to be a workable system. It may be workable
because it is comprehensive and flexible; it is compulsory and
leads to binding decisions; and it covers almost all sorts of
possible disputes. The workability of the system may convince many
hesitating states to ratify the Convention.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL SEA-BED AUTHORITY
SECTION Is ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMISSION
The need for the establishment of a preparatory commission
with the intention of preparing in advance for the commencement of
the operation of the new institution established by the Convention
upon the entry into force of that instrument was felt and discussed
in 1980, when the prospect of the conclusion of the work of the
Conference was in sight.''' This was, in fact, in line with the
2
practice of many other international organizations. What was
unique was that the preparatory commission, after its primary
function, was to be mandated with an extra function, namely,
the administration of an interim regime for the protection of
preparatory investment in pioneer activities.
The considerable investments of the ocean mining consortia
in the years prior to the adoption of the Convention had given rise
to the demand by some of the industrialized countries for the
integration of the nationally recognized claims of these consortia
with the regime envisaged in the Convention. The question of
preparatory investment protection was not discussed in the
Conference until the very last session in March 1982, when the G77,
as an important concession, accepted the adoption of an interim
regime for such protection in order to attract the American mining
industry and to persuade the United States and other industrialized
countries to join the Convention.^
Two of the resolutions adopted by the Conference in its final
session, as part of a package with the Convention, were annexed in
the Final Act of the Conference. Resolution I provided for the
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establishment of the Preparatory Commission for the International
Sea-Bed Authority and for the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea.-' The regime governing preparatory investment in pioneer
activities relating to polymetallic nodules is incorporated in
Resolution II.
The future of the legal regime for the Sea-bed Area and its
international organization as envisaged in the Convention depends,
to a great extent, on the outcome of the work of the Preparatory
Commission, which is entrusted with the task of preparing for the
commencement of the operations of the Authority and the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and administering the
interim regime, pending the entry into force of the Convention, for
the protection of pioneer investments.
The rules, regulations and procedures which shall be adopted by
the Preparatory Commission in fulfilment of its first function,
i.e., preparation for the establishment of the Authority's organs
and implementation of Part XI, are going to give a more or less
final shape to the legal regime for the Sea-bed Area, and as such,
shall play a significant role in the taking of a decision by some
industrialized countries as to whether they should ratify the
Convention or accede to it.
The special importance attached to the Preparatory Commission
and its role requires a closer study of the functions and the
machinery provided for the implementation of these functions of the
Preparatory Commission. We also intend, in this chapter, to
evaluate the outcome of the Commission's work so far.
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SECTION II: ASPECTS OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION
(a) Legal Bases of the Commission
The creation of the Preparatory Commission was provided for in
Resolution I adopted by the Conference. Certain functions of the
Commission concerning preparatory investment protection have been
embodied in Resolution II, which has the same legal status as
Resolution I. Both resolutions were included in the Final Act of
the Conference which was signed by participants of the Conference.
The question is what is the precise legal character of the two
resolutions? In fact, the resolutions constitute a decision of the
Conference, and the intention of the Conference was to make them
binding upon the states that signed both the Final Act and the
Convention and then have participated in the work of the Preparatory
Commission.
The legal effects of Resolution I would be the same as those of
an agreement setting up a preparatory body for an organization and
entering into force upon signature. Nevertheless, not only the two
resolutions, which have the same legal status, constitute the legal
ground for the activities of the Commission, but also the Commission
should be guided by the provisions of the Convention itself.
References to the Convention are to be found in many provisions of
both resolutions, e.g., in paragraph 5(e), paragraphs 10 and 11 of
Resolution I and in the preambular paragraph and paragraph 1 of
Resolution II. In paragraph 1(f) of Resolution II we read:
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"Area", "Authority", "activities in the Area" and resources "have
the meanings assigned to those terms in the Convention".
In listing the legal instruments governing the activities of
the Commission, one should also mention the Rules of Procedure of
the UNCLOS III which, in accordance with paragraph 4 of Resolution
I, applied mutatis mutandis to the adoption of rules of procedure of
the Commission. Since the Commission at the first session adopted
its own rules of procedure, the former ones ceased to be applicable.
More importantly, the Commission has an internal law. This law can
be used as the legal basis for the activities of the Commission.
It also allows the Commission to make its own resolutions having a
binding character. Based on this law, the Commission, like many
international organizations, has the right to adopt legal rules that
regulate its internal matters. For example, in 1983, the
Preparatory Commission adopted two resolutions concerning internal
problems of the Commission falling under the category of internal
law, namely a resolution on the Structure of the Preparatory
Commission, Functions of the Organs and Bodies of the Preparatory
Commission, Officers and Venue and a resolution on Rules of
Procedure on Decision-making.^
To some extent also the Charter of the United Nations and
regulations adopted by the General Assembly are applicable to the
Preparatory Commission. In accordance with paragraph 14 of
Resolution I, the Commission is financed "from the regular budget of
the United Nations subject to the approval of the General
Q
Assembly". The secretariat services of the Commission are
provided by the United Nations (paragraph 15 of the same
resolution). Thus, the Staff Regulations binding on the United
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Nations staff are applicable to the personnel temporarily working
for the Commission.
Thus it seems that the enumeration of the different legal
sources from which stem the legal norms concerning different aspects
of activities of the Preparatory Commission demonstrates the
complexity of legal problems with which the Commission may be
confronted.
(b) Duration of the Commission
Formally, the Preparatory Commission, established by Resolution
I, was adopted by the Conference on the Law of the Sea simul¬
taneously with the Convention on 10 December 1982. The Commission
should be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations
upon signature of or accession to the Convention by 50 states.
This occurred on 10 December 1982, when the Convention was signed by
119 states. The Commission should meet no sooner than 60 days and
no later than 90 days after that date. It met for the first time
on 15 March 1983, that is, a few days after the time limit fixed in
Resolution I.
The question of the duration of the Preparatory Commission
caused certain minor problems. In a note from the President of the
Conference, it was suggested that the life of the Commission should
last at least until entry into force of the Convention and until the
first meetings of the Assembly and the Council of the Sea-Bed
Authority are convened.9
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In the discussion the view was expressed that, lacking a
sufficient number of ratifications (i.e. 60), the Convention might
not enter into force for years. The question was raised whether it
would not be wise to prescribe a time limit for the activities of
the Commission. The Group of 77 proposed that the Commission
should not continue indefinitely if the Convention had not entered
into force after a certain period. However, other delegations
regarded such a provision as not appropriate and their point of view
prevailed. The proposal of the G77 was not retained in the
Resolution.^
The opinion was also expressed in the discussion that, although
"the life of the Preparatory Commission should not be unduly
long",I* it might be useful to extend it beyond the convening of the
Assembly. The latter view finally prevailed and the following
wording was adopted:
The commission shall remain in existence until the conclusion
of the first session of the Assembly, at which time its
property and records shall be transferred to the Authority.
(Resolution I, paragraph 13).
(c) Sessions of the Commission
The Preparatory Commission, which convened according to
operative paragraph 1 of Resolution I, held its first session in
Jamaica - first in March-April and later in August-September of
1983. The whole of the first session was devoted to the discussion
and adoption of procedural measures. In this session Joseph S.
Warioba from Tanzania was elected as the Chairman.
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The substantive discussion started in 1984. The Preparatory
Commission has so far met twice every year in Kingston (Jamaica),
Geneva or New York.
The Commission fixed without difficulty the timing of its
sessions, but the question of venue has turned out to be
controversial. At the Conference, certain delegations from
developed and developing countries preferred as the location of the
Preparatory Commission the United Nations headquarters. There were
at least two reasons to justify such a position: all of them had
permanent missions in New York and in Geneva and, when meetings of
the Commission are held at the UN headquarters, the expenditures are
lower both for delegations and for the United Nations. However,
when the Conference decided to locate the permanent seat of the
Sea-bed Authority in Jamaica, Jamaica persuaded the majority of
developing states to insist on the location of the Preparatory
Commission at the seat of the Authority. This was reflected in
paragraph 12 of Resolution I, subject to the availability of
appropriate facilities.
The decision taken at the first session, namely, every year to
meet for four weeks in Kingston and four weeks in New York or
Geneva, constituted a kind of compromise. Nevertheless, this
decision has not definitely settled the controversy in respect of
venue of sessions of the Preparatory Commission. Jamaica, as host
country both for the Authority and for the Preparatory Commission,




(d) Purposes and Functions
The Preparatory Commission, whose primary objective is "to
ensure the entry into effective operation without undue delay of the
Authority and the Tribunal and to make the necessary arrangements
for the commencement of their functions",^ consists, under the
second operative paragraph of Resolution I, of representatives of
states which have signed the Convention or acceded to it. Those
states which have signed the Final Act may participate in the
deliberations of the Commission without participating in the taking
of decisions. This was a compromise formula between the G77, which
insisted on the limitation of the members to only the signatories of
the Convention and the industrialized countries, which were of the
opinion that the membership should also be extended to the
signatories of the Final Act.^
The specific functions of the Preparatory Commission are
embodied in operative paragraph 5 of Resolution I, which includes,
inter alia, preparation of draft rules of procedure of the Assembly
and of the Council [paragraph 5(b)], preparation of draft rules,
regulations and procedures, as necessary, to enable the Authority
to commence its functions [paragraph 5(g)], exercise of powers and
functions assigned to it relating to the protection of preparatory
investments [paragraph 5(h)], and undertaking studies on the
problems which would be encountered by developing land-based
producer states likely to be most seriously affected by the
production of minerals derived from the Area [paragraph 5(1)].
Being a transitional institution in nature, the Commission
started in 1983 and "shall remain in existence until the conclusion
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of the first session of the Assembly, at which time its property and
records shall be transferred to the Authority".^
(e) Organization of the Commission
In order to carry out its functions, the Preparatory
Commission, during its first session, decided to establish four
special commissions of equal status and the plenary as the principal
organ. ^ In fact, the decision was in conformity with the
relevant provisions of Resolution I (in particular paragraphs 7, 8
and 9). The creation of two of the special commissions, namely,
Special Commission I for the problems of the developing land
producer countries and Special Commission 2 for the establishment of
the Enterprise, had been envisaged in paragraphs 8 and 9 of
Resolution I. Special Commission 3 for the sea-bed mining code and
Special Commission 4 for the preparation of the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, were created on the basis of
paragraph 7 of Resolution I, which confers upon the Preparatory
Commission the power to establish such subsidiary bodies for the
exercise of its functions.
The plenary, as the principal organ, is responsible for the
main tasks of the Preparatory Commission: elaboration of rules of
procedure of organs of the Authority, creation of a mechanism for
the protection of the pioneer investment according to Resolution II
and preparation of the final report of the Preparatory Commission to
the Assembly of the Authority. In carrying out its duties, the
plenary is assisted by a bureau composed of the Chairman, 14
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Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur-General. The officers of this
bureau, together with the Chairmen of the special commissions and
Vice-Chairmen - four each - constitute a General Committee of 36
members whose main function is to act as the executive organ for the
administration of Resolution II on pioneer investments.^
(f) Decision-making of the Commission
Resolution I is silent about the decision-making mechanism of
the Preparatory Commission. The only guideline is given in
paragraph 4 of the resolution, which concerns the adoption of the
1 8Rules of Procedure of the Commission. The reason for the silence
is the controversy between the G77, which adhered to the majority
votes or at least the same voting procedure as applied in the
Conference itself - majority vote in case of exhaustion of efforts
to command consensus - and the industrialized and socialist
countries, which demanded consensus.^ The compromise reached by
the members of the Commission at the end of the first session in
1983 was the result of a retreat by the G77. According to rule 35
of the Rules of Procedure, the most important decisions of the
Commission are to be taken by consensus. They include those
matters which according to the Convention require consensus and are
listed in Articles 161, 162 and Article 11(3) of Annex IV.^
One case which is included in the category of decisions
requiring consensus is the assessment of the contributions of
the members to the administrative budget of the Authority,21
which according to Article 159(8) of the Convention requires a
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two-thirds majority. Although this contradiction between the
provision of the Convention and the interpretation of the
Preparatory Commission seems to have a practical basis, it may be
observed that such interpretation is limited to the adoption of
2 2relevant proposals only by the Commission. J Other questions
before the Preparatory Commission which fall into the category of
decisions by consensus are the measures for the protection of
pioneer investment [rule 35(l)(b) of the Rules of Procedure],
sea-bed mining code [rule 35(l)(c)] and the final report of the
Commission to the Assembly [rule 35(l)(d)].
Besides the cases mentioned, rule 36(1) requires a two-thirds
majority of those present and voting - provided it includes a
majority of those participating in that particular session - for
decisions on other matters of substance not mentioned in rule 35.
It should be observed that, even in cases where the taking of
decisions by recourse to majority vote is provided for, efforts
should be made to reach a consensus.^
It is clear that the decision-making procedure of the
Preparatory Commission is more precise than that of the Conference.
Consensus is the only procedure for taking decisions on most of the
substantive matters and no recourse can be had to voting in those
cases enumerated in rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure even if the
2 S
Commission faces a deadlock.
Such a decision-making procedure, even though workable during
the course of the Conference when all participants still looked
forward to bringing about an acceptable Convention, and were
therefore prepared to make many concessions, is hardly a useful and
effective method for working out rules, regulations and procedures
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which are supposed to seduce a number of hesitating states to sign
or ratify the Convention or accede to it. Given this drawback, the
Commission cannot be expected to make rapid progress in its work.
Thus, it is relevant to have a closer look at the way the Commission
has dealt with the issues before it so far.
SECTION III: ISSUES BEFORE THE COMMISSION
(a) Preparatory Investment Protection
Resolution II governing preparatory investment in pioneer
activities has two main objectives: to legalize previous investment
of those states and entities which are prepared to continue their
activities under the regime set out by the Convention, and thereby
"to ensure that the Enterprise will be provided with the funds,
technology, and expertise necessary to enable it to keep pace with
the states and other entities . . . with respect to activities in
the Area".^
Resolution II does not define "pioneer investor", but specifies
by name eight of them. They include: four state enterprises
belonging to France, India, Japan and the Soviet Union and four
07
multinational consortia. In addition to these eight entities,
any signatory developing country or its public or private enterprise
which has expended 30 million US dollars in pioneer activities
before 1 January 1985 shall be referred to as a "pioneer investor".
- 440 -
"Pioneer activities" are defined in paragraph 1(b) of that
resolution as the activities related to the exploration aspect, but
acquiring the status of pioneer investor for the exploration aspect
phase would give these entities priority over their competitors -
except the Enterprise - in the allocation of production
28
authorization once the Convention entered into force.
Both the title and paragraph 2(d) of Resolution II suggest that
the interim regime of investment protection is only valid for
polymetallic nodules, and does not include other sources. The
Preparatory Commission is, as one of its main tasks, responsible for
the application of the regime in respect of these pioneer investors
for the conduct of exploration activities in relation to
polymetallic nodules. To fulfil this task, Resolution II has
entrusted several duties to the Commission.
In order to register an applicant as a pioneer investor, the
Commission requires that the certifying state, i.e. the state which
has signed the Convention and of which the applicant is a national,
shall issue a certificate governing the level of expenditure made in
pioneer activities, and ensure, before making the application, that
the area in respect of which application is made does not overlap
with an area for which another application is made or is already
29allocated as a pioneer area.
At the time of adoption of Resolution II in 1982, it was
generally expected that potential sea-bed mining entities should
apply for registration as pioneer investors immediately after the
signing of the Convention by their related states in the same year.
Therefore, paragraph 5(c) of Resolution II provides for submission
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of conflicts concerning overlapping areas to binding arbitration by
1 May 1983 provided they cannot be resolved by negotiations.
The Commission, within 45 days of receiving the application for
registration containing the necessary data with respect to the area
and its capability of being divided into two parts of estimated
equal commercial value, allocate one part as reserved for activity
by the Enterprise or in association with developing countries and
30the other as a pioneer area for the applicant.
The Commission may request every registered pioneer investor to
carry out exploration in the area reserved for the activities by the
Enterprise or in association with the developing countries, but the
obligation of the pioneer investor in this respect is limited to the
31
reserved area which has been covered by his own application.
The Commission has also a general supervisory function with
respect to the administration of the interim regime for the
protection of pioneer investments. As a manifestation of this
function, it shall provide each pioneer investor with a certificate
QO
of compliance with the provision of Resolution II, which includes,
inter alia, compliance with the duty to pay a fixed annual fee
Q Q
or to make periodic expenditure, to train personnel for the
Enterprise and to perform obligations prescribed in the
Q £
Convention relating to the transfer of technology. J
The implementation of Resolution II as one of the two main
tasks of the Preparatory Commission had already been given priority
in the first session of the Commission when the question of
procedure and organization was being discussed. What was felt to
be most urgent in this respect was an early adoption of procedures
and guidelines for the registration of pioneer investors. The
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reason for such urgency was the pressure exerted by the Soviet Union
and India to have their pioneer applications registered. These two
states had notified, in April 1983, the Chairman of the Preparatory
Commission of their consultations, in accordance with paragraph 5(a)
of Resolution II, to ensure that an overlap did not exist between
O £
their areas of application. They had also invoked the same
paragraph and declared that they would take further steps if no
response from other potential certifying states in regard to the
exchange of the coordinates was received before 1 May 1983.
Almost all other potential mining states objected to these
declarations and argued that conflict resolution about the areas of
application could firstly take place only after the Commission had
begun to function by adopting the necessary procedures for the
implementation of Resolution II. Secondly, states, by virtue
of Article 305 of the Convention, could sign the Convention until
9 December 1984. Therefore, those who had not yet signed the
Convention, it was argued, but who would do so by that date, would
Q7
avail themselves of all rights as pioneer investors.
Against these objections, the Soviet Union and India went ahead
with their negotiations, and in May 1983 informed the Chairman of
the Commission that they had reached an understanding in the absence
QQ
of any conflicts between them concerning the areas of application.
The persistent efforts of the Soviet Union and India culminated
in the submission of their application for registration by the
Preparatory Commission as pioneer investors. The Soviet application
was filed on 24 October 1983 and the Indian application on 14
February 1984.39 rightly pointed out that:
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The Soviet drive to obtain priority over the other pioneers
. . . [was] calculated to put pressure on the non-signatory
mining states to sign the Convention for fear that the Soviets
would otherwise get first rights to any areas where overlapping
claims might exist. 40
Taking this position was probably due to the fact that the Soviet
Union had withdrawn from the informal consultations initiated by
Canada almost immediately after the adoption of the Convention in
order to resolve possible conflicts between all potential deep sea
mining states. The reason for the Soviet withdrawal was the
participation of several non-signatories in these consultations.^
Being left outside the club, the Soviet Union had no alternative
except to force the pace and press for an early registration of its
claim by the Preparatory Commission.
Being faced with the pressure of the Soviet Union and India,
the Preparatory Commission, in its second session in 1984, commenced
its first reading of the draft rules for registration, and
provisionally adopted twenty of them relating to the submission and
/ o
receipt of applications. The adoption of these rules was
overshadowed, however, by related unsettled issues of more
significance, namely, the question of the overlapping areas, the
preservation of the confidentiality of data submitted by the
applicant to the Commission, and the establishment of a group of
technical experts to assist the Commission in evaluating the
application.^
By then, the logic of the industrialized countries concerning
the final date of application for registration - 9 December 1984 -
was more or less accepted by the majority of the members of the
Commission. The main point of concern, therefore, was to find
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acceptable solutions to the three related significant issues
enumerated above.
Although the resolution of the conflicts related to the
overlapping sites lay outside the mandate of the Preparatory
Commission, it was decided in this session that the Chairman of the
Commission would be given a mandate to assist the pioneer investors
to settle their conflicts in this respect.^
A few days before the resumption of the work of the Commission,
on 3 August 1984, a Provisional Understanding of Deep Seabed
Matters'^ was signed by the United States, the UK, the Federal
Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and
Japan. One of the assorted purposes of this provisional
understanding was to assure at governmental level the agreement
previously reached among the consortia concerning the settlement of
conflicts on their claimed areas.
On the first day of the resumed session of the Preparatory
Commission on 13 August, both the G77 and the Group of Eastern
European (socialist) states sharply criticized this agreement, and
rejected the claims of the parties to the provisional understanding
that the agreement fulfilled in part the requirement of Resolution
II to resolve overlapping claims.^ According to the G77, the
Provisional Understanding went "beyond the resolution of conflicts
arising from overlapping claims, by including provisions regarding
exploration and exploitation of the sea-bed resources, outside the
Law of the Sea Convention".^®
Almost one week later, Japan and France filed their
applications with the Commission for registration as pioneer
investors.^ The willingness shown in the previous meeting in
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April 1984 by the Soviet Union to hold consultations with other deep
sea mining members of the Commission, namely, India, Japan and
France, together with the application of these countries for
registration as pioneer investors and the intensive efforts of the
Chairman of the Commission, led to an agreement concerning the
timetable and procedure for resolution of conflicts with respect to
overlapping claims among all applicants submitting their
applications before 9 December 1984."^ According to this agreement
- Understanding on the Procedure for Conflict Resolution among the
First Group of Applicants - all applicants would meet on 17 December
1984 to exchange coordinates of their respective claimed areas. In
case of conflict, negotiations should start not later than 11
January 1985, and be completed by 4 March. The report concerning
conflict resolutions would be submitted to the Chairman of the
Commission by 8 March, which was three days before the scheduled
opening of the third session. The agreement of the applicants to
act according to this schedule was the most significant achievement
of the second session of the Commission. In light of the optimism
created as a result of this agreement, the hope was expressed that
consideration of the draft rules^ for registration of pioneer
investors would be completed and the rules adopted by the next
session in March 1985. As a result of this achievement, the
Chairman of the Commission presented some suggestions with respect
52
to rules regarding the creation of a group of technical experts.
Further to the signing of the Provisional Understanding by some
industrialized countries of the West and Japan, which ensured the
settlement of all conflicts with respect to the claimed areas, the
United States issued, on 29 August 1984, exploration licences for
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three of the four consortia. These licences were all for sites
in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone in the Pacific Ocean. They were not
in conflict with the areas claimed by France, Japan or India, but
they were possibly overlapped by the areas applied for by the Soviet
Union. The G77 reacted to the issuing of these licences by calling
them "wholly illegal".^ Nevertheless, the application of all four
states mentioned in paragraph l(a)(i) of Resolution II for
registration as pioneer investors and their agreement to resolve
their conflicts concerning overlaps before the Third Session of the
Commission in March 1985 was so significant to the effective
continuation of the work of the Preparatory Commission that it
overshadowed the issuing of the licences by the United States.
Another question related to pioneer investment addressed by the
Commission in the summer session of 1984 was the desire of the
Federal Republic of Germany to be awarded a pioneer site of its own,
similar to the case of Japan which was eligible to participate in
both groups of pioneer investors enumerated in paragraph 1(a) of
Resolution II. Realizing that the possibility of application of
all four consortia for registration as pioneer investors was remote,
and being aware of the significance of the Federal Republic of
Germany joining the Convention, the G77 did not strongly oppose this
demand, and Warioba, the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission, in
the last day of the work of the Commission, announced that, if the
Federal Republic of Germany signed the Convention, the Commission,
recognizing the importance of finding a solution to the problem,
would consider it at its next session.
Negotiations between France, Japan and the Soviet Union
continued as scheduled. As a result, the overlaps between the
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Soviet Union and Japan were provisionally resolved before the
convocation of the third session of the Preparatory Commission in
March 1985, but the solution could not be final until the overlaps
between the Soviet Union and France, which were believed to be 65
per cent, could be settled. The main problem was that the huge
overlaps had made it very difficult for the Soviet Union and France
to suggest four full sites, two of which were to be reserved for the
Authority. Moreover, four members of the Commission, namely,
Belgium, Canada, Italy and the Netherlands, made it clear that they
might object to registration of a Soviet site that conflicted with
the sites claimed by the consortia of which their national companies
formed a part, and also maintained that "an acceptable overlaps
resolution process must include all potential pioneers identified in
Resolution II". Due to this deadlock with regard to overlapping
claims, no real progress was achieved at the spring session of 1985
in the related work of adopting rules for securing the confiden¬
tiality of data and for establishing a group of experts to review
the pioneer applications. Efforts in the resumed third session in
the summer of 1985 did not lead to any solution for the problem, and
the delay in implementing Resolution II generated some frustration
CO
among the delegates.
As a new cause of complication, the Soviet Union informed the
Commission that its deep sea mining enterprise had received a letter
from one of the four consortia, Ocean Mining Associates, in which
the said consortium, with reference to the licence granted by the
U.S. Department of Commerce, had claimed exclusive rights to
manganese nodules in the sea-bed area identified in the licence.^
This could mean that the overlaps existed not only between the
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French and the Soviet sites, but probably also between the latter
and some of the American licensed sites. The viability of any
arrangements decided by the Commission depended on finding a
solution which would resolve all conflicts, and not leaving "either
the Enterprise or the Soviets holding the bag with a mine site that
conflicts with the areas licensed under US national law".^
In a declaration submitted by Pakistan on behalf of the G77,
and adopted by the Preparatory Commission on 30 August 1985,^ deep
concern was expressed for any action of states which would undermine
the Law of the Sea Convention. The G77 also emphasized that any
actions incompatible with the Convention - and that included the
issuing of licences by the United States - were wholly illegal, and
should not be recognized. The adoption of the declaration,
although without resorting to a vote, necessitated an explanatory
statement by the Chairman, which was attached to the Declaration,
referring to the fact that several delegations did not agree with
its content.
In an effort to defeat the prevailing frustration, the Chairman
indicated, at the conclusion of the session, that if by the
beginning of the second week of the spring session of 1986 no
understanding had been reached by the applicants on the resolution
of overlaps, the matter should be placed before the Commission to
determine a course of action. This could mean, in the worst case,
a vote in the Commission independent of the views of Japan, France
and the Soviet Union. Bearing in mind that the resolution of
overlapping claims was not in fact the duty of the Commission but
that of the applicants, the indication of the Chairman of the
possibility of referring the question to the Commission was evidence
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of the fact that the Commission could not afford more frustration in
an area which had direct impact on the pace of the processing of
work in other related areas.
In line with other efforts to bring about a solution to the
problem of overlaps, the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission
initiated, in February 1986, some talks with the first group of
investors, i.e., France, India, Japan and the Soviet Union, in
Arusha, Tanzania. These talks resulted in an agreement known as
the "Arusha Understanding" which contained a scheme for the
resolution of the overlapping claims through equal sharing of
/ O
overlapping areas. The purpose of the Arusha Understanding was
to provide an acceptable solution to the first investors as well as
to the Commission on behalf of the Authority without prejudicing the
interests of the multinational consortia. To do so, the
overlapping areas were to be equally shared among all applicants
and, in case of conflict with the consortia, even among the
£ o
applicants and the related consortium. J Since the Soviet Union
was the only applicant which could possibly have overlaps with the
consortia, the Arusha Understanding, in an effort to refrain from
prejudice to eventual applications by consortia, practically
provided for the relinquishment of the major part of the Soviet
overlaps with the consortia to the Preparatory Commission.
It is noteworthy that the idea of receiving from the Soviet
Union, as a reserved area for the Enterprise, portions of the sites
which were contained in the licences issued by the United States and
the Federal Republic of Germany, was not acceptable to the
Preparatory Commission in the previous year. The main scheme for
the implementation of the Arusha Understanding was to designate
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equal shares of the sea-bed area in one of the richest areas of the
Clarion-Clipperton Zone to each of the first tier applicants, i.e.,
France, Japan, the Soviet Union and the Enterprise. But a
significant departure from Resolution II and the Convention was
that, in supplying two mine sites of equal value to the Preparatory
Commission, the three applicants, instead of the Commission,^
became authorized to make the first choice for their own. This, in
the case of the Soviet Union, could mean taking a prime area of
52,300 square kilometres for its own and leaving another portion of
the troubled area for the Enterprise. Such a compromise gesture
and sacrifice on the part of the Authority seems to have been made
in the interests of reaching an agreed solution to the problem of
overlaps. ^
When the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission convened
in March 1986, the Arusha Understanding received a positive response
from almost all groups of participants. The main reason was that
further postponement of registration of the first group of pioneer
investors was not to the benefit of any group. During this
session, extensive discussions were held on the interpretation and
implementation of the Arusha Understanding. It was felt, however,
that more time was required to study the Understanding. Another
significant development in respect of the registration of pioneer
investors was the adoption of a declaration condemning the issuing
of mining licences by the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of
fitfl
Germany. The United Kingdom had issued one licence in December
1984 and the Federal Republic two licences at the end of 1985.
Even the adoption of this declaration was faced with difficulties,
and some of the industrialized countries seriously opposed it.
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Hence, the Commission was forced, for the first time, to resort to
voting for adopting a declaration, and the declaration was adopted
with the majority votes of the developing countries for it, with
negative votes of some of the industrialized countries with
interests in deep sea-bed mining, and the abstention of small
industrialized countries.
Further to negotiations in the resumed fourth session, in the
summer of 1986, a modified version of the Arusha Understanding was
proposed as an annex to the statement made by the Acting Chairman of
£ "J
the Preparatory Commission. According to this new version,
before the fifth session in April 1987, revised applications should
be submitted by France, Japan, India and the Soviet Union based on
intersessional discussions and necessary data and information which
should be made available by the parties to each other.
In order to minimize the worries of many delegates who
expressed their concern that the departure from Resolution II might
later become a basis for the departure from the Convention, it was
emphasized, in the statement of the Acting Chairman, that "these
procedures and mechanisms shall not be construed as setting a
precedent for the implementation of the regime for sea-bed mining
under the Convention, nor do they purport to alter or amend that
regime in any way".^®
Feeling close to a solution, the Commission decided to take
steps to establish a group of experts in order to be able to review
the revised applications which were to be submitted before the
commencement of the work of the Commission in April 1987. In fact,
the revised applications were registered in 1987.
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Between the summer of 1984 and the end of 1988, seven
exploration licences were issued to the multinational consortia in
accordance with the national laws by the United States, the United
Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. The efforts of the
Preparatory Commission during the same period of time led to an
agreement which paved the way for the registration of the first four
applications inside the framework of the Convention.
The fulfilment of one of the main functions of the Preparatory
Commission, i.e., the implementation of Resolution II, proved to be
more difficult than anticipated and this was due to the problem of
overlapping areas. The solution suggested to this problem entails
a concession by the Preparatory Commission in favour of the pioneer
investors with respect to the obligation of providing two mine sites
of equal value. This concession is consistent with the practice
of the G77, in almost all other major questions related to the
law of the sea-bed mining. However, the outcome of the work of
the Commission in this respect can be assessed as realistic and
acceptable. The only concern is that any concession by the
Commission, and any departure from the mandate laid down in
Resolution II, may leave the impression that the Commission is
prepared to make many more concession on other questions under its
mandate in order to encourage as many industrialized countries as
possible to ratify the Convention.
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(b) Creation of the Authority and the Tribunal
Another main task of the Preparatory Commission is preparing
for the commencement of the operation of the Authority and the Law
of the Sea Tribunal upon the entry into force of the Convention.
The task of preparing for the establishment of the Tribunal is
entrusted to Special Commission 4, while the plenary and other
Special Commissions are charged with the duty of preparing for the
establishment of the Authority and its organs, developing detailed
rules and procedures for the functioning of the Authority and for
sea-bed mining, and preparing draft regulations for the protection
of developing land-based producer countries against the adverse
effects of sea-bed mining.
The work of the Preparatory Commission in these areas was very
much influenced by the stagnation caused because of stalemate in the
negotiations on the registration of pioneer investors.
Another significant factor is the delay which has become
apparent in commercial prospects for deep sea-bed mining which has
reduced the urgency for a speedy fulfilment of the Preparatory
Commission's task. In other words, many delegations which, up to
the last session of the Conference, feared the imminent commence¬
ment of commercial exploitation of manganese nodules, began to
recognize at the Preparatory Commission that, due to many develop¬
ments and changes, it would take some time before such exploitation
could happen. Some of these developments were, for example,
stagnation in the world market for the minerals to be derived from
the sea-bed and the discovery of polymetallic sulphides and
manganese crusts in areas of the sea-bed which were presumably under
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national jurisdiction. The sulphides were at a much lower depth
than the areas of manganese nodules found in the deep sea-bed and
therefore were easier and cheaper to exploit.
In the following subsections, we shall try to deal briefly with
the outcome of the work of the Commission with respect to its
function as the preparatory organ for the establishment of the
Authority and the Tribunal.
1. Rules of procedure of the organs of the Authority
One of the functions of the plenary was to adopt the
administrative, procedural and budgetary rules of the Authority.
Being mostly engaged with the problem of the registration of pioneer
investors, the plenary initially devoted very little time to this
issue.
The task started by a reading of the draft rules of procedure
for the Assembly in the 1984 session.^ The main concern was that
the Authority, at least during its initial stage of operation,
should be cost effective and lean.^ The reading of the draft
rules continued during the summer meeting of the Commission in 1984,
and by then, 82 out of a total of 111 draft rules had been examined.
After the completion of the first reading, a second reading was
started in the spring session of 1985. A set of draft rules of
procedure for the Council was also distributed at the end of this
session.^* A problem closely attached to the adoption of the rules
of procedure was the financial implication of such rules for the
states parties. The need for an up-to-date report of the financial
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implications of the Convention for the states parties, which was
expressed in 1984, was repeated in spring 1985.
A major issue in this session with respect to the Assembly
rules was the status of the observers. The question was whether
the liberation movements and some international organizations such
as the EEC should be given a higher observer status than, for
example, non-governmental organizations, and whether non-signatory
states should be given the right to participate in the work of the
72
Assembly as observers. The issue of observers, as well as the
establishment of subsidiary organs for the Assembly, was deferred to
the next meeting for further deliberations.
In the summer of 1985, the plenary succeeded in completing the
second reading of the Assembly's rules, and took up the examination
of the rules of procedure of the Council. The issues concerning
the status of observers and the establishment of subsidiary organs
such as a finance committee responsible for the Authority's budget
were postponed until the 1986 session. Another hard-core issue was
70related to various aspects of decision-making. Even consideration
of this issue was deferred to the next session.
The plenary completed its first reading of the Council's rules
in the spring of 1986 meeting. In this session, the draft rules
for election of the members of two subsidiary organs of the Council,
the Economic Planning Commission and the Legal and Technical
Commission, were considered.^ It was proposed by six
industrialized countries with potential engagement in sea-bed mining
that eight out of fifteen members of these subsidiary organs be
elected from candidates nominated by the eight states parties most
substantially engaged in sea-bed mining.^ An amendment introduced
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by socialist countries provided for the substitution of "equitable"
by "equal" geographical distribution as a criterion for the election
of the members of the Legal and Technical Commission. The plenary,
in resumed fourth session in the summer of 1986, completed its first
reading of the rules of procedure for the Legal and Technical
Commission, and commenced a first reading of the rules for the
Economic Planning Commission.
Due to the significant role that the Legal and Technical
Commission can play in the question of the approval of plans of
work, much attention was focused on the rules relevant to the
functioning of this Commission. Both Eastern and Western European
states proposed amendments in regard to aspects of decision¬
making.^ No decision was taken on the amendments, and the final
solution was postponed until a later session when this question
could be settled in a package settlement together with other
controversial issues.
By the end of 1988, the plenary had succeeded in completing
its reading of many draft rules of procedure for the Assembly,
the Council and the Legal and Technical Commission, but most
of the significant issues faced by the plenary in the course of
deliberations on the draft rules, such as issues relating to the
status of observers, decision-making aspects, establishment of
subsidiary organs, particularly a finance committee, and the
procedure for election of members of the organs of the Council, have
been deferred. This is partly due to the delicacy of the issues
concerned and the expectation of many participating delegates that
the Preparatory Commission interpret the Convention in such a way
that the maximum adherence to this instrument can be achieved, and
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partly to the delay in the implementation of the other main function
of the Commission, i.e., registration of pioneer investors. Thus,
as regards the outcome of the work of the Commission with respect to
rules of procedure of the organs of the Authority, it is too early
to determine the concrete results, and the real challenge for the
Commission is yet to come.
2. Developing land-based producer states
The concern of the G77 for the impact of deep sea mining on the
economies of the developing land-based producer states led to the
insertion of a particular provision in Resolution I. According to
paragraph 5(i) of the Resolution, the Preparatory Commission is
charged with the duty to undertake studies on the problems which
would be encountered by the developing land-based producer states
likely to be most seriously affected by the production of minerals
derived from the Area, with a view to minimizing their difficulties
and helping them to make the necessary economic adjustments,
including studies,, on the establishment of a compensation fund, and
submitting recommendations to the Authority thereon.
Special Commission I, entrusted with this duty, commenced its
work in the spring of 1984 by considering a working paper on "The
general considerations".^ It was soon recognized that such a
study is a technical task requiring a closer analysis of some
related issues such as the relation between production from the
sea-bed and existing land-based production, the quantity of the
possible production from the Area and the effect of such production
78
on developing land-based producer states.
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In order to carry out such an analysis, Special Commission I
requested the Secretariat of the United Nations to provide it with
necessary information on the markets for the minerals, the
developing land-based producer states and industries.^ The data
80
provided by the Secretariat to the summer session of 1984 showed
that the prospects for the four main metals contained in the
manganese nodules were not so promising. In this session, the
question of the identification of the developing countries adversely
affected by production from the Area and remedial measures to assist
these countries were touched upon.
As regards the identification of the affected developing
states, a set of criteria such as, for example, values of the
exports of copper, nickel, cobalt and manganese, or a percentage of
the export of these minerals in comparison to the total value of
export, were contemplated. With respect to the remedial measures,
instead of focusing on compensatory measures, more emphasis was
given to assistance for structural adjustments, assistance for the
maintenance of viable production and export capacity, promotion of
81
trade and conclusion of commodity agreements.
In the 1985 session, deliberations on two main issues, namely
the identification of affected states and remedial measures,
continued on the basis of working papers prepared by the
8?
Secretariat. General agreement was reached that the criteria for
the identification of the affected developing states would be based
on the degree of dependence of such states on the share of one or
more of the four minerals, on their export earnings or on their
8 8
economies. Special Commission I, therefore, came to the
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conclusion that, since there were possibilities for many alterations
in the data concerning such a share, this identification of the
affected developing states and the assessment of the impact of
sea-bed mining on the economy of these countries should not be
correctly accomplished before a time rather close to the actual
start of the commercial recovery from the Area.®^
In the 1985 session, several documents containing information
or proposals in respect of remedial measures either already applied
by other international organizations or suggested by the
O tr
participating delegations, were submitted to Special Commission I.
The Secretariat was requested to undertake two detailed studies on
the identification of the factors affecting the degree of dependence
of developing land-based producer states on the minerals in
question, and the role of those minerals in the economies of those
countries. At the end of the 1985 session, the Chairman of Special
Commission I felt that sufficient data were at the disposal of the
Commission for the carrying out of its work.
In the spring session of 1986, Special Commission I reviewed
the methods used by the international organizations to assist the
developing land-based producer countries in order to cope with the
decrease in the their exports. Moreover, in response to the idea
of establishing a compensation fund as a remedial measure, the Group
of Eastern European States expressed their objection, contending
that such an arrangement would be beneficial only to non-parties to
the Convention. The Group proposed instead the conclusion of
bilateral compensation agreements between land-based producers and
sea-mining states. According to this proposal, the Authority would
87establish general principles for such agreements.
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The idea of a compensation fund was rejected even by some of
the industrialized countries. Australia, for example, argued that
there was no need for such a fund, because market forces would
88
finally determine which procedures remained viable.
The deliberations on the papers submitted to Special Commission
I in the previous meeting and the proposal of the Group of Eastern
European States continued in the summer session of 1986. In light
of the general recognition of the considerable delays in deep sea
mining, the view was expressed that the adoption of any specific
remedial measure, be it compensation fund or any other measure,
would hardly be of any value to the Authority before the actual
89
exploitation started. The fifth session of the Preparatory
Commission was convened in 1987. In this session, discussion
continued on the remedial measures.
The result of the work of Special Commission I by the end of
1988 demonstrates that the inclusion of paragraph 5(i) in Resolution
I, concerning the study of the effects of deep sea mining on the
economies of the developing land-based producer states, has been
more or less uncalculated, because the information on the basis of
which such a study can be done is subject to rapid change, and no
long-term projection is likely to yield a realistic picture of the
problem. The solutions which can be worked out under the present
circumstances will probably not hold good at the time when actual
commercial recovery starts. The realization of this fact has
certainly had some impact on the progress of the work in Special
Commission I. The Commission has as yet formulated no answers to
some decisive questions. For instance, it has not yet determined
what the criterion is to be for establishing the relation between
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the decrease in the mineral exports or production earnings of land-
based producers and mining in the Area.
It is difficult to foresee what the recommendations of Special
Commission I to the Authority will be, but it is reasonable to
expect that they will have a broad general character, leaving the
adoption of concrete measures for the Authority itself and in a
situation of a less hypothetical nature.
3. The Enterprise
It is the mandate of Special Commission 2 to provide for the
"early entry into effective operation of the Enterprise" and "to
ensure that the Enterprise is able to carry out activities in the
Area in such a manner as to keep pace with states and other
entities" through the application of measures enumerated in
paragraph 12 of Resolution II.^ These measures include, inter
alia, training of personnel and the carrying out of exploration in
the reserved areas by the pioneer investors.
The work of Special Commission 2 started by considering both
the question of organization and operation of the Enterprise and the
implementation of paragraph 12 of Resolution II. The general
understanding was that, due to the state of the world's mineral
markets and the prevailing uncertainty in respect of possibilities
for funding the Enterprise operation, which depended to a great
extent on the classification of the first 60 states which would
ratify the Convention and bring it into force, only a nucleus
establishment for the initial stages of the Enterprise should be
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contemplated.^"*" The submission of some proposals in favour of
joint ventures as a viable model for the activities of the
Enterprise in the initial stages was also an indication of the fact
that the delegations had realized a considerable change in the
QO
circumstances had taken place.
According to the working paper submitted by Austria for an
interim Joint Enterprise for Exploration, Research and Development
in Ocean Mining (JEFERAD),^ in the period before the entry into
force of the Convention, the existence of an interim infrastructure
in the form of a joint enterprise was necessary. This was a cheap
solution to the requirement of technology transfer, and the
establishment could be handed over to the Enterprise as soon as the
Convention entered into force.
The Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee also submitted a
paper in which difficulties concerning the acquisition of funds,
technology and expertise were described, and it was concluded that a
form of cooperative arrangement between the Enterprise and the
QA
pioneer investors had to be devised.7 There was more support for
the joint venture model, mostly due to the potential shortfall in
Qcr
funding for the Enterprise s independent operation.
In the summer of 1984, some voices were raised against so much
concentration on joint ventures, and demands were made for a full
examination of all potential operational options open to the
Enterprise. Nevertheless, the discussion on this subject
continued, and more documents about joint ventures were submitted to
the Special Commission.96 Austria produced a revised version of
the working paper on JEFERAD.^ This gave rise to discussions
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about the rights of the Preparatory Commission to make commitments
for the Enterprise before the entry into force of the Convention.
In this session the question of pioneer investor obligations to
train personnel and explore a reserved site for the Enterprise was
taken up. As a result of an exchange of views, certain questions
in this respect were given priority. They were, inter alia,
the identification of the needs of the Enterprise in respect of
qualified administrative and technical personnel, the type of
training which is required for exploration and the method of
supplying this training by the pioneer investors, and the precise
definition of the obligations of the certifying states in relation
98
to the financing of the Enterprise.
Special Commission 2, in its spring session of 1985, in
addition to a discussion on the JEFERAD proposal, considered a paper
containing a model joint-venture agreement for sea-bed mining
prepared by the Federal Republic of Germany.Three other papers
on a project profile of a sea-bed mining operation by the Enterprise
and an ad hoc expert core group for the Enterprise and training
needs and requirements of the Enterprise, were also discussed. ^0
At this meeting, consideration of the question of training received
a high priority, and an extensive discussion on the joint-venture
possibilities and the role of a group of experts to assist the
Commission in planning for the Enterprise was deferred until the
summer meeting.
The greater part of the resumed third session in the summer of
1985 was devoted to the question of operational options for the
Enterprise. Despite widespread support for the joint-venture
option, Special Commission 2 decided to study the first option,
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"a fully-integrated project carried out independently by the
Enterprise". The discussion on training was limited, and
further consideration of the problem was postponed to the next
session. Due to the close relation of the question of training and
the registration of pioneer investors, the delay in the latter had
generated some worries concerning the delay in the former.
In this session, two informal meetings were organized in which
a revised version of the JEFERAD proposal and an Australian working
paper on the economic assumptions governing Enterprise operations
were discussed. These assumptions could be used as a basis for
closer study of the operational options of the Enterprise.
In the spring session of 1986, once again priority was given to
the question of training, leaving the impression that Special
Commission 2 observed an alternate turn in considering the two
significant issues before it: training and operational options.
It was felt, at this session, that the Commission had acquired
sufficient material to commence its work on formulating guidelines
1 0?
for a training programme. In this respect, the Commission also
took notice of the fact that the significance of the question of
training required a reconsideration of the priorities of Special
Commission 2 in case the registration of pioneer investors took
1 03
place before the scheme for training programmes was drawn up.
Malta and 15 other countries submitted a draft resolution on a
sea-bed mining training course for the nationals of developing
countries to be carried out in the International Ocean Institute of
Malta.Discussion on this paper, as well as a Soviet study on
the required manpower and skills for the Enterprise, was postponed
until the next meeting.
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Another topic dealt with was the economic viability of deep sea
mining, the subject of an Australian study.Qn tbe basis of
metal-price forecasts and operating costs, the study had concluded
that the aggregate metal prices of the four minerals in manganese
nodules would have to double before return on investment became
attractive enough for private operators. This pessimistic picture
gave rise to the question of whether there should be any link
between profitability and the timing of the performance of training
obligations.
The meeting of Special Commission 2 in the summer of 1986
was characterized by uncertainty about the economic viability of
sea-bed mining. The uncertainty which had prevailed in the
previous sessions, and had precluded an agreement on the economic
assumptions concerning the requirements for the first operation of
the Enterprise, led to the taking of the decision that several
assumptions and their impact on different operational options should
be studied so that the Authority itself could choose, at the time of
the start of activities by the Enterprise, which of the options was
most profitable.^7
The major part of the work of Special Commission 2 until the
end of 1988 dealt with the questions of the operational options of
the Enterprise and the training of its personnel. The uncertainty
about the economic viability of sea-bed mining resulted in the
agreement that no concrete recommendation concerning any specific
option and its preference to other options could be given to the
Authority. Neither could the training of personnel be expected to
happen with the same speed and to the same extent that had been
hoped.
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With respect to the above-mentioned uncertainty, it may be
expected that with the exception of those aspects which will remain
unaffected by the timing of the Enterprise operations, such as its
internal structure, the recommendations of Special Commission 2
about other aspects, particularly the operations, will be more
in the nature of a broad description of the options rather than
concrete specific suggestions.
4. The sea-bed mining code
Special Commission 3 is entrusted with the task of drafting
rules, regulations and procedures for prospecting, exploration
and exploitation of the mineral resources of the deep sea-bed
based on the basic conditions laid down in the Convention. The
result of the work of this Commission will be the Sea-Bed Mining
Code with detailed rules and regulations for daily reference by the
Authority.
Special Commission 3 agreed, in its first meeting in the spring
of 1984, that due to the significance which is attached to the
detailed rules concerning the exploration and exploitation and the
impact of the formation of such rules on the decision of some states
to join the Convention, priority should be given to the drafting of
rules for exploration and exploitation, and other headlines under
its mandate, i.e., the scope and use of terras as rules for
1 08
prospecting, be dealt with at a later stage. As a result
of this agreement, focus was concentrated on the question of
applications of entities to the Authority for the purpose of
exploration and exploitation. The discussions were based on a
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working paper in this respect prepared by the Secretariat.109
main concern, however, was to ensure that the adoption of rules
would produce a balance between the interest of the Authority,
which was the exercise of effective control over sea-bed mining, and
that of the operator to complete its operation under favourable
conditions^
Discussions on the form and content of the application
continued in the summer session of 1984. Although the right to
application for the Enterprise, states parties, or natural or
juridical persons of the nationality of states parties was not
disputed, disagreement existed on the method of submission of an
application which could be either directly by the applicant or
through the sponsoring states. The question of verifying effective
control, the method of locating the mine site and technical
qualifications of the applicants were also touched upon in this
session.
The work of Special Commission 3, in the spring session of
1985, was concerned with the review of the draft rules relating to
the prospecting phase. Although the Convention itself has
envisaged a rather limited role for the Authority in that phase,**
some countries wanted greater control by the Authority in the form
of the application fee, application for permission to operate and
119
notification of areas of prospecting. *-£- As a balance between this
attitude and the approach of those countries which wanted the
freedom of prospecting subject to the obligations provided for in
the Convention, a third alternative emerged according to which the
freedom of prospecting was balanced by the duty of regular reporting
to the Authority.in this session, the relation between the
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mining code and the Convention was emphasized, and it was pointed
out that the mining code had a regulatory nature and was not a
constitutional document, and legally it was dependent on the
Convention.
The main debate in the resumed third session in the summer of
1985 was the method of ensuring that the two sites proposed by the
applicant were of equal estimated commercial value. In addition to
the random selection of one site for the Authority, the possibility
of using the plan of work for that purpose was also examined.
Questions were raised in this respect whether the applicants had the
obligation to prepare a detailed plan of work for both the reserved
and non-reserved areas, and whether information based on prospecting
was sufficient or more detailed information had to be supplied.''"^
Special Commission 3 completed a first reading of the draft
rules on prospecting, exploration and exploitation in the spring
meeting of 1986. A controversial question addressed by the
Commission in this session was whether the submission of an applica¬
tion to the Authority should be in one stage containing both the
designation of an area for the Authority and approval of the plan of
work for the applicant, or in two stages, namely, submission of an
application with the necessary information to enable the Authority
to designate a reserved area and submission of the plan of work with
more detailed data for approval. The latter was supported by the
industrialized countries while the former was favourable to the
developing countries which thought that the one-stage scheme would
yield sufficient useful information on the reserved area.^6
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Almost the whole resumed fourth session in the summer of
1986 was devoted to discussing the financial terms of contract.
The general opinion was that the enforcement of the provisions
embodied in Article 13 of Annex III of the Convention seemed to be
inappropriate with due regard to the prospects for sea-bed mining in
the foreseeable future. It was more clear that, even in this
case, there was a sharp conflict of opinion between the developing
and the developed countries. The fifth session of 1987 also
continued the examination of draft regulations dealing with the
financial terms of mining contracts. In addition to this issue, the
1988 session was devoted to the question of transfer of technology
to the Enterprise.
Because of the significant role that the rules and regulations
drafted by Special Commission 3 will play in the interpretation of
the basic principles of the Convention concerning deep sea mining,
the work of this Commission has been carefully followed. Even
here, uncertainty prevails and the outcome of the debates has not
yet come to a definitive conclusion. Due to the general tendency
in favour of joint venture as an operational option, it may be
expected that some incentives for such an arrangement will be
considered in the process of drafting the sea-bed mining code.
5. The Law of the Sea Tribunal
Special Commission 4 is charged with the task of making the
practical arrangements for the establishment of the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The areas of study of this
- 470 -
commission are: the Tribunal, registration, contentious procedures,
advisory opinions and the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber.118
Special Commission 4 decided, in the spring of 1984, to start
its work by reviewing the procedural rules of the Tribunal, basing
discussions on the rules of the ICJ. For example, representatives
of parties and witnesses; staff rules, expenses of the Tribunal;
the acquisition of property needed for its operatives; and the
organization of certain services such as documentation and a
library. Although the procedural rules of the ICJ were only a
guide, any departure from these rules in order to expedite the
resolution of disputes at the least possible expense, was
unthinkable.11^ Other subjects of interest such as access by
entities other than states, which had no precedent in the ICJ, and
composition of the Tribunal and its various chambers, were also
touched upon, but detailed discussions were deferred to later
sessions. Since the Federal Republic of Germany had not yet signed
the Convention, the Soviet Union suggested that the Commission
should choose a site other than Hamburg for the Tribunal.^0
Further to the request of Special Commission 4, the Secretariat
prepared a comprehensive paper containing four parts on the
composition and functioning of the Tribunal and its registry, the
proceedings in disputes, the organization and the functioning of the
Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber and advisory proceedings.-^l
In the summer of 1984, the first reading of part 1 was
completed, and the part on proceedings in disputes was considered,
but the complete reading of the rest was postponed to the next
meeting. Like in the case of the Legal and Technical Commission of
the Council, here in Special Commission 4 doubts were expressed
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concerning formal adherence to the principle of equitable
geographical distribution as a criterion for the election of members
of the Tribunal and its chambers.-*-^
This review of the draft rules of procedure for the Tribunal
continued in the spring of 1985. The question of the seat of the
Tribunal was raised again, this time in connection with certain
rules such as those dealing with immunities and privileges of
the Tribunal and its staff. Such rules normally had to be dealt
with in the context of the headquarters' agreement with the host
country, and without a definite position on the seat of the
Tribunal, discussion could tend to be hypothetical.
The major issue before Special Commission 4 was the question of
prompt release of vessels as laid down in Article 292 of the
Convention.*23 Consideration of detailed draft articles on this
issue occupied the greater part of the resumed third session in the
summer of 1985. The question of the seat of the Tribunal was
not touched on at this session, but the Commission focused on
that matter in its fourth session in the spring of 1986. The
Secretariat had provided Special Commission 4 with some information
about the establishment of the headquarters of the international
courts and tribunals.was decided that the next meeting
would also be devoted to the same question.
The discussions about the location of the Tribunal were rather
brief in the resumed fourth session. The Chairman of Special
Commission 4 suggested that the date of receipt of the sixtieth
instrument of ratification of the Convention would be designated as
the dead-line by which the Federal Republic of Germany would have to
have acceded to the Convention in order to keep Hamburg as the seat
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of the Tribunal. The fifth session, in 1987, continued the
discussion on the seat of the tribunal, with no agreement.
By the end of 1988, Special Commission 4 had completed its
first reading of the rules of procedure of the Tribunal, and had
addressed almost all questions before it. The work of this
Commission seems to be relatively easier than that of the other
Special Commissions mostly due to its mandate which had never
included the more controversial issues of the Conference. The
question of the seat of the Tribunal has certainly delayed the
progress of the work of this Commission, but neither this nor any
other issue seems to be insurmountable.
SECTION IV: EVALUATION
The outcome of the work of the Preparatory Commission, during
its first six years of activities is not so impressive as one could
expect since the adoption of Resolution I. The number of states
which have ratified the Convention is more than half the number
required to bring that instrument into force, but it can hardly be
said that the Preparatory Commission had completed half of its work
during the same period of time.
There are many reasons for this delay and continuation. The
most significant of all is the uncertainty which has prevailed over
the future of sea-bed mining since the beginning of the 1980s,
partly due to the gloomy picture of the future market for the
minerals contained in the manganese nodules, and partly because
of discoveries of resources such as polymetallic sulphides and
manganese crusts which may be found in areas under coastal state
jurisdiction. This uncertainty has decreased the degree of
urgency which was felt towards the end of the Conference for the
establishment of the Authority and the Tribunal. Another reason,
which is a direct result of the first one, is the lack of a clear
picture of objectives and time frames for achieving them.
The outcome of the work of the Preparatory Commission in
several areas, such as the organization and operation of the
Enterprise and the impact of deep sea raining on the economies of the
developing land-based producer states, has so far amounted to some
broadly formulated draft rules which most probably will have to be
adjusted later to meet actual requirements.
Finally, mention should be made of the complicated question of
overlapping areas as a reason for the delay in the progress of the
work.
It is clear from the contents of Resolution II and the
headlines set out in it for the registration of the pioneer
investors that delegations at the Conference never imagined that the
question of overlaps would prove to be so difficult to resolve.
The protracted negotiations for finding a solution to that issue
have certainly had some impact on the speed of work in the Special
Commissions. That is specifically true in the case of Special
Commission 2 in charge of establishing the Enterprise.
An unwritten objective of the Preparatory Commission, at least
as hoped by some of the industrialized countries, has been to draft
detailed rules, regulations and procedures for the Authority in such
a way that most of the developed countries with the necessary
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technology and investment possibilities for deep sea-bed mining will
be encouraged to join the Convention. The fulfilment of such an
objective requires both flexibility and awareness. The Preparatory
Commission has so far demonstrated both merits on several occasions:
increasing support for joint ventures or some sort of joint arrange¬
ment as a realistic operational option for the Enterprise, or the
delicate solution to the problem of the overlapping claims under the
revised version of the Arusha Understanding, are examples.
In interpreting the basic conditions for deep sea mining into
details rules and regulations, the Preparatory Commission has the
delicate task of showing flexibility while being conscious of
keeping all compromises within the framework of the common heritage
of mankind, that is, the exploitation of the resources of the deep
sea-bed for the benefit of mankind as a whole.
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To conclude this study one has to observe certain points. We
have before us a Convention to which 159 signatures and more than 35
ratifications have so far been appended. The vacuum or inadequacy
which, in fact existed then in respect of the legal principles and
rules for the exploitation of the mineral resources of the Area is
clearly replaced by a comprehensive regime negotiated through the
active participation of almost all the countries of the world, and
incorporated, as the major part, into the Convention. There also
exist seven domestic laws enacted by the industrialized countries
for the same purpose, though they have an interim nature pending the
entry into force of the Convention for the respective enacting
states.
In 1967, and later throughout almost the entire period of the
negotiations at the United Nations, there existed an enthusiasm
about the role that the recovery of the resources of the deep
sea-bed would play in diminishing the gap between the developing and
industrialized countries, on the one hand, and the access of the
consumer countries to more stable sources of strategic minerals, on
the other. This enthusiasm has, to a great extent, faded away now
and seems to have been replaced by a sense of indifference and
frustration by the industrialized and developing countries
respectively. Two factors seem to be responsible for the present
situation. The first is the considerable fall in demand by the
world market for the minerals contained in the manganese nodules and
the consequent depression of prices and abundance of supply.
Future prospects for these minerals are not so bright either.
Moreover, new sources of related minerals have recently been
discovered in areas generally under national jurisdiction. These
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have rendered sea-bed mining an unprofitable business for the near
future. Thus, the industrialized countries do not feel the same
degree of urgency for the start of the commercial recovery of these
resources as they felt some years ago. The second factor is that
the developing countries, after a forceful initial urge towards
establishment of a NIEO in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the
resistance of the industrialized countries, today find themselves
faced with an impasse where political freedom alone cannot improve
their poverty, and the developed countries have shown that they are
not yet prepared to yield to the demands of the Third World. The
ensuing frustration has its influence on the attitude of the
developing countries towards the law of sea-bed mining.
Notwithstanding the existence of this situation of indifference
and frustration about the future of sea-bed mining which finds its
genesis in the politico-economic attitudes of the states and is
subject, therefore, to rapid change, the present status of the law
in respect of these activities should be evaluated from both the
general and specific points of view. The general view takes into
account the success or failure of those involved in the making of a
universal law for sea-bed mining through the United Nations as an
effort to realize one of the distinguishing features of the
contemporary international legal order, whereas the specific view
explains the pros and cons of the legal regime for sea-bed mining as
incorporated in the Convention and the status of the domestic law as
an alternative regime.
It is true that, as a signifying characteristic of the last
three decades, efforts on an unprecedented scale have been made to
adopt general multinational conventions on different branches of
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international law,-*- but the UNCLOS III has undisputedly been the
first real testing ground for the majority of the developing
countries to actively participate in the process of law-making at
the international level, and thereby contribute, on an equal
standing with the industrialized countries, to the progressive
development of the law in a field so strategically, politically and
economically important to the Western powers.
In order to understand the difficulty of the task and the
significance of any progress in negotiating a law acceptable to all
countries and not promulgated by the few Powers and extended to the
rest - as used to be the case - one has to recall that the
industrialized countries, realizing the qualitative changes in the
international community as a result of the decolonization process of
a great number of the African and Asian countries, were prepared
to accept a change in the traditional legal framework, provided
such a change "does not take the form of a radical break, but is
gradual, and . . . it is effected with their active participation
and co-operation".
The developing countries, on the other hand, considered the
international law that originated in Europe as non-responsive to
their needs and necessities and pleaded for a radical change in the
Q
law to reflect the views of all countries as a world law. Such a
world law whose main function is preserving peace and facilitating
international cooperation should take into particular consideration
the needs and interests of the developing countries.
With these as points of departure, the difficulty was to
reconcile the view of the industrialized countries which attempted
to preferably preserve the status quo and that of the developing
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states which struggled for a profound alteration in the existing
legal order.
The core of the problem was to make a choice between creating a
legal arrangement on the basis of the free enterprise system -
laissez faire - which could naturally favour the industrialized
countries, or establishing a powerful international organization to
control and manage the Area and its resources for the benefit of the
international community, with particular regard to the needs and
interests of the developing countries.
For both the developing and the industrialized countries,
negotiations on the legal regime of the sea-bed had a significant
pattern, the result of which might be used as a prototype in future
negotiations in other fields of international relations. Hence,
any compromise from any side had not only an immediate implication
in respect of the legal regime of the sea-bed, but also an extensive
consequence for long-term dialogue between the North and the South.
Unlike other negotiations in the framework of the North-South
dialogue for the establishment of a New International Economic
Order, for example, the negotiations at UNCTAD concerning the
International Programme for Commodities - where the developing
countries usually could participate with the strong position of a
party which had something to offer, deliberations about the legal
regime of the sea-bed were carried out between one party which was
virtually empty-handed at the negotiation table, i.e., the
developing countries, and the other party- the industrialized -
which had the necessary advantage, i.e., technology and money, to
exercise pressure to secure its own interests. What could
compensate to some extent these unequal negotiating positions was
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the strong will of the developing countries as a considerable
political force to demand a change in the prevailing system of
international economic cooperation and the realization of the
industrialized countries of the need to work out a law acceptable to
all countries.
The legal regime for the sea-bed, as embodied in the
Convention, was formulated after 14 years of negotiations. The
Conference, unlike any other forum for negotiating international
issues, benefited from the consensus procedure as the mode of
adopting the provisions of the Convention. The complex difficulty
of the task of the Conference in respect of the progressive
development of international law concerning sea-bed mining, together
with the consensus procedure, rendered the successful completion of
this important undertaking rather doubtful. The fact that the
partici- pating representatives of states succeeded in bringing the
conference to an end which is generally recognized as successful and
acceptable, and producing a convention that has so far received 159
signatures from all classes of states, acknowledges that what was a
quarter of a century ago a prudent forecast about the future of
international law is now the reality of our time.^ In other words,
the imperatives of the international law of cooperation require the
adoption of rules which contain the interests of the international
community as a whole. The provisions of the Convention in respect
of the Sea-Bed Area is demonstrative of the law resulting from a
clash between old and new trends in international relations, a
compromised general guideline acceptable to the vast majority of
states, though in no way ideal for any one state or group of states.
These are, in fact, the characteristics of the international law of
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today, and the adoption of the Convention is, per se, and regardless
of when it enters into force and how the regime of the Sea-Bed Area
will apply in practice, an outstanding success.
The adoption of domestic laws by several industrialized
countries at the end of the work of the Conference or after the
adoption of the Convention seems to be an effort to retain the
traditional pattern of norm-creating in international law. With
regard to the declared purpose of these laws and their interim
nature, the possibility exists that an alternative order based on
these statutes will become operative alongside the legal regime laid
down in the Convention. Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine
that such an alternative, due to its inherent contradiction of the
politico-economic and sociological realities of the present time,
i.e., the existence of over 120 states - all sovereign equals - with
interests, needs and demands often different from those of the
industrialized countries of the West, can ever become practical.
Even if the two regimes operate side by side for a time, it is
reasonable to expect that they shall merge fairly soon, partly due
to the need for stability which is the prerequisite of any legal
order which industrialized countries cannot afford to disregard, and
partly due to the persistent demands of the developing countries for
access to technology and capital which may eventually induce them to
make even more concessions in order to attract the technologically
advanced countries to join the Convention.
Having dealt with the importance of the law of the sea-bed
activities in the context of the contemporary international legal
order from a general point of view, it is now relevant to dwell upon
the said legal regime from a more specific aspect.
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1. As regards the legal status of the Sea-Bed area and its
resources, the concepts of res nullius or res communis were never
taken up seriously as a suitable alternative and the citation of the
principle of the freedom of the high seas by the industrialized
countries was more of a tactical move than one of sincere faith.
The principle of the common heritage of mankind emerged as a new
alternative suitable for a new situation. This principle has
always had different implications for developing and developed
countries. For developing countries, it was in fact this principle
which decisively determined the form and context of the future
regime for the sea-bed area, whereas for the developed countries,
the structure of the future regime could give any legal context to
this principle.
All those countries which voted for the Declaration of
Principles explicitly admitted that res nullius and res communis and
the principle of the freedom of the high seas are not adequate as
regards the legal status of the deep sea-bed and its resources.
The active participation of the industrialized countries in more
than 14 years of negotiations was certainly not to repeat that the
sea-bed area and its resources are either res nullius or res
communis, or the principle of the freedom of the high seas applies
to that area and its resources. The formulation of Articles 136
and 137 of the Convention, which specify the sea-bed area and its
resources as the common heritage of mankind, not subject to any
state sovereignty, is formulated by the consent of both developing
and industrialized countries.
Repeated statements of the representatives of states as well as
state practice in the form of declarations, domestic legislation
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etc., during the last 20 years are evidence of the fact that the
common heritage of mankind, as the principle designating the legal
status of the sea-bed, has acquired the element of opinio juris
necessary to render it a part of customary international law, and
its far-reaching implications and nature, which have given birth to
many other principles applicable to areas and resources beyond
national jurisdiction, have endowed this principle with the quality
of a general principle of international law.
2. From the two opposing doctrines of laissez-faire and total
international control, a compromise emerged between the developing
and the industrialized countries concerning the system of exploita¬
tion of the resources of the Area, commonly identified as the
Parallel System. This compromise gave rise to two significant
problems: a) to harmonize the right of access of the states
parties, state and private entities to the Area and its resources
with the exclusive rights of the Authority as the trustee of
mankind; and b) to obtain a balance of rights and duties between
the states parties, public and private entities on the one side and
the Authority on the other.
The acceptance of the Parallel System by the G77 which amounted
to the recognition of the right of states and natural persons to
participate in the activities in the Area coincided with the
adoption of a policy by the industrialized countries to weaken the
Authority and its chance to be a commercial competitor. An
analysis of the provisions of the Convention in respect to the
Parallel System shows that the industrialized countries have
succeeded in finding answers favourable to their own position as
regards the question of access and balance. The powers of the
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Authority in handling an application for contracts by states parties
or natural or juridical persons are more or less formal and
symbolic. Any applicant who fulfils certain prescribed
requirements of the Convention may virtually have automatic access
to the Area. The efforts to bring about a balance between the
Authority and the other entities through the endowment of
preferential treatment to the Enterprise and the developing
countries have failed in favour of states parties and their
entities. The so-called preferential treatments are either time
limited or subject to limitation of other provisions of the
Convention. The real balance may be obtained when the Enterprise,
with its financial, technological and managerial weaknesses,
acquires permanent, independent and effective access to the
necessary capital and technology. The amendment procedure
envisaged in the provisions related to the Review Conference may
pave the way for such a development.
3. The International Sea-Bed Authority, which is in charge of the
management of the Area and its resources, both because of the nature
of its purposes and functions and its legislative power, is a unique
international organization. Its purposes and functions, i.e.,
representation of mankind and conducting activities in the Area on
behalf of mankind, necessitates the concentration of power in its
plenary organ, the Assembly; but this body, as is evident from the
provisions of the Convention, is a merely symbolic organ, and the
real power rests in the executive body, the Council, both the
composition and the decision-making procedure of which represent
special interests of some particular groups of states and not
mankind. This is in contradiction with the dictates of the
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principle of the common heritage of mankind which requires a de
facto superior status for the Assembly as the plenary of the
representatives of all states parties, presumed to include mankind
as a whole. The compromise on the Parallel System was followed by
many concessions by the G77 in respect of the International Sea-Bed
Authority, and the result is an organization with practically no
discretionary power, and with a decision-making procedure which
makes it possible for a few states to block decisions which may be
against their national interests, but beneficial to the inter¬
national community as a whole.
The Enterprise, as a commercial company belonging to the
Authority, carrying out activities in the Area either by itself or
together with state or private entities in the form of joint
arrangements, is dependent on the contribution of the states parties
for both technology and money. This dependence, together with the
bureaucratic restraints caused by the relation of the Enterprise
with the political organs of the Authority, may put its chances for
success as a competitor to large mining companies in question.
4. The effort to establish a system for the settlement of disputes
raised from the activities in the Area was, like other elements of
the legal regime of the sea-bed, subject to the compromise between
the two main interest groups of states, namely, developing and
industrialized countries. One significant concession from the side
of the developing countries was to accept commercial arbitration in
cases of disputes relating to the interpretation and application of
contracts where the Authority is one of the parties and giving locus
standi to private persons and entities before the tribunal.
Another important setback to the G77 was the agreement to confer
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upon the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber the competence to rule on the
applicability of the Authority's decisions in particular cases.
Despite the drawbacks, the sea-bed disputes settlement system is the
only constituent element of the legal regime of the sea-bed which
seems to be workable even in its present shape. Its possible
workability rests on its comprehensibility, flexibility and its
compulsory character which leads to binding decisions.
5. The domestic laws for deep sea mining enacted by a few
industrialized countries, although bearing the attribute of being
interim in nature pending the entry into force of the Convention for
those countries, are incompatible with the regime embodied in the
Convention and not acceptable to the majority of states. If one
recalls that the acceptance of many provisions concerning the legal
regime of the sea-bed area and the submission to many compromises
and concessions by the developing countries have been only to induce
the industrialized countries to join the Convention and accept its
sea-bed legal regime, it becomes evident that attribution of the
interim nature to these laws and expressed disclaimer of sovereignty
may not render them internationally acceptable. Neither may
citation of freedom of the high seas legally justify the adoption of
these instruments. The universal consensus of the principle of the
common heritage of mankind through the adoption of the Declaration
of Principles in 1970 was, to say the least, the expression of
opinio juris with respect to the form of the management of the Area
and its resources. The requirement of cooperation in the rational
management did not leave any place for unilateral acts.
The proponents of the domestic laws have tried to justify these
instruments by arguing that, while the Area and its resources can be
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the common heritage of mankind, they may be explored and exploited
as a freedom of the high seas. In this way, they insist that there
is no contradiction between these laws and the purposes of the
regime embodied in the Convention, i.e., rational management of the
Area and its resources for the benefit of mankind as a whole.
However, the obvious incompatibility of these laws with the
provisions of the Convention render assertion unwarranted, and give
rise to the question of whether such painstaking negotiations were
at all necessary if the ultimate choice were going to be the
enactment of domestic laws based on the freedom of the high seas,
and whether these states have negotiated in good faith.
Finally, after reviewing the specific aspects of the existing
law of the sea-bed mining activities and the relation of national
law with the regime embodied in the Convention from a specific point
of view, mention will be made of two particular expectations which
were generally expressed by the delegations at the beginning of the
negotiations on the legal regime of the deep sea-bed, namely, the
universality of the resulting instrument and the particular
attention to the needs and interests of the developing countries.
Not only as a logical effect of the principle of the common
heritage of mankind, but also with due regard to the fate of the
1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, to which a small part
of the international community had acceded, it was generally felt
that the legal regime of the sea-bed should have a universal
character to become viable.
Three important states with special interests in sea-bed
mining, namely, the United States, the United Kingdom and the
Federal Republic of Germany, have not yet signed the Convention
- 495 -
mainly because of dissatisfaction with the provisions concerning the
legal regime of the deep sea-bed, but many other countries such as
Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, the Netherlands and the
Soviet Union, all with the necessary technology, have signed the
Convention. Irrespective of how many of those 159 entities which
have signed the Convention would eventually ratify it, one may argue
that, if signing the Convention is to be interpreted as an evidence
of undertaking not to act contrary to the purposes of that document,
even though the Convention has not yet achieved universality in a
strict sense, it certainly has acquired something very close to
that.
As regards the second expectation, i.e., due attention to the
needs and interests of the developing countries, the scheme provided
for in the Convention is far from the ideal power and resource
distribution with preferential status for the developing countries.
Thus, although consideration is shown to the needs of the developing
countries in the form of granting them priority in the enjoyment of
the proceeds of the sea-bed mining activities, the real issue, i.e.
enabling those countries to actually participate in the activities
through transfer of the technology, training of related personnel
and financing, have been left almost neglected. Nonetheless,
bearing in mind the negotiating positions of the developing and the
industrialized countries and having regard to all factors and
circumstances, it would have been unrealistic to expect a result
much different from that with which we are now faced. What the
developing countries have achieved out of these negotiations, even
if modest, is of extreme importance. It is now established that
the needs and interests of the developing countries have to be
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particularly taken into account in any future international
negotiations for the establishment of any legal order between
states.
Now that the Parallel System is generally accepted as a
realistic alternative for the foreseeable future, efforts should be
made to achieve a genuine balance between the two sides of the
system by enhancing the actual possibilities of the developing
countries and the Enterprise to participate in the activities of the
sea-bed regime. The tendency to turn to joint arrangements such as
joint ventures as a cost-effective alternative for the operations of
the Enterprise in its initial stages of activities is a prudent
and conscious step taken by the Preparatory Commission. This
alternative, which can ease both the transfer of technology
and the problem of financing, may give a better chance to small
industrialized states such as Australia, Norway, New Zealand, etc.,
which are generally outside the international consortia, to enter
into cooperation with the Enterprise.
The future alternative, however, is not joint arrangements.
The aim should be to strengthen the Authority and its operating arm
the Enterprise, so that it may independently carry out its
functions. The experience which will be achieved as a result of
actual exploitation of the mineral resources during the next two or
three decades will facilitate the adoption of measures, in the
Review Conference, which should contribute to the substantiation of
that goal.
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